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 Foreword
The works of the German biologist, philosopher and sociologist Helmuth 
Plessner (1892-1985) have remained relatively unknown to the English-
speaking world until now. Without doubt, one of the most important reasons 
for this is the fact that so far only a few of his works has been translated into 
English. Moreover, the majority of the large corpus of secondary literature 
is also in German. For these reasons, the “Plessner Renaissance” that took 
place in the past decades went largely unnoticed among English scholars 
in the humanities and in the natural and social sciences. In order to widen 
the audience, the organizers of the IVth International Plessner Confer-
ence at the Erasmus University Rotterdam in 2009, which was devoted to 
Plessner’s magnum opus, The Levels of the Organic and Man: An Introduction 
to Philosophical Anthropology [Die Stufen des Organischen und der Mensch. 
Einleitung in die philosophische Anthropologie, originally published in 1928], 
decided to hold the entire conference in English. Although the confer-
ence did not attract a large group of participants from English-speaking 
countries, it resulted, for the f irst time in the history of Plessner scholarship, 
in a substantive collection of papers on Plessner’s philosophical anthropol-
ogy written in English.1 The present volume contains a selection of the 
papers presented at that conference, offering an excellent introduction to a 
philosopher whose work has proven to be inspiring for several generations 
of scholars.
I wish to thank Dr. Maarten Coolen from the University of Amsterdam, 
and Prof. Dr. Huib Ernste from Radboud University of Nijmegen, who acted 
as co-organizers of the IVth International Plessner Conference and helped 
1 As only some of Plessner’s works have been translated so far, the papers presented at the 
Rotterdam Plessner conference lacked a uniform translation of Plessner’s key terms. In some 
cases it was just a matter of different spelling. For example, whereas in some contributions the 
German exzentrisch was translated as “eccentric”, in other papers “excentric” was used. In other 
cases the differences concerned the entire word. The German Grenze for example, was translated 
as “boundary” by some authors and as “border” by others. In order to avoid conceptual confusion, 
in almost all cases the editorial choice has been a uniform translation. For that reason, the word 
exzentrisch is consistently translated as eccentric (a motivation for this particular choice is given 
in footnote 2 on page 12). However, in a few cases where different translations were caused by 
differences in context, for which the English language has different words, the choice has been 
made to keep the different translations. For that reason the German Grenze is translated with 
“boundary”, but in some cases as “border”. When an author used synonyms for stylistic reasons 
(for example by alternatively using “corporeality” and “corporeity”), the different translations 
have also been maintained.
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with the selection of the papers for this volume. I would also like to thank 
Laurens van den Berg and Marjolein Wegman for their encouraging sup-
port while organizing the conference, and my research assistants Sassan 
Sangsari and Julien Kloeg for their help during the editing of the text. I 
also wish to thank the anonymous reviewers for their critical comments 
that have helped us to improve the book. Last but not least I would like 
to thank Inge van der Bijl, Ed Hatton, and Jaap Wagenaar of Amsterdam 
University Press for their f irst-rate assistance during the f inal editing and 
production of this book.
I also wish to express my sincere gratitude to the Helmuth Plessner 
Gesellschaft, the Erasmus Trustfonds, and the Faculty of Philosophy of 
Erasmus University for their generous f inancial contributions, without 
which the organization of the conference and the coming open source 
edition of this volume could not have been made possible.
Last but not least, I would like to thank the authors of this volume. Hope-
fully, their contributions mark the beginning of a fruitful reception and 




 Artificial by Nature
An Introduction to Plessner’s Philosophical Anthropology
Jos de Mul
Those who want to f ind a home, a native soil, safety, must make the sacrif ice of 
belief. Those who stick to the mind, do not return.
– Helmuth Plessner
The past few decades have been marked by a remarkable rediscovery of the 
work of the German philosopher and sociologist Helmuth Plessner (1892-
1985), who for a long time remained in the shadow of his contemporary, Mar-
tin Heidegger. During the f irst International Plessner Congress in Freiburg, 
in 2000, the organizers even dared to speak about a “Plessner Renaissance.” 
However, with regards to the Anglo-Saxon academic community, it appears 
too premature to speak about a revival. Given that only a few of his works 
have been translated into English,1 the interest in Plessner’s work has mainly 
been restricted to Germany and, to a lesser extent, Netherlands, Italy, and 
Poland, so far. One does not come across his name, for example, in the 
Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Yet, the publication of The Limits of 
Community: A Critique of Social Radicalism in 1999 – a translation of Grenzen 
der Gemeinschaft: eine Kritik des sozialen Radikalismus (1924) – and the 
forthcoming translation of his philosophical magnum opus, The Levels of 
the Organic and Man [Die Stufen des Organischen und der Mensch], which 
originally appeared in 1928, indicate that there is an up-and-coming interest 
in Plessner’s work among the Anglo-Saxon scholars.
One feasible explanation for the renewed acuteness of Plessner’s 
philosophical anthropology lies in the virtues of his concept ‘eccentric 
positionality’2 and the related concept of the ‘natural artif iciality’ of man. 
1 Until recently, except for some smaller texts (Plessner 1964; 1969a; 19969b; 1970a; 1970b), no 
works of Plessner haven been translated into English. For an overview of Plessner’s writings, 
translations in Dutch, French, Italian, Polish and Spanish, and secondary literature, see the 
website of the Helmuth Plessner Gesellschaft: http://www.helmuth-plessner.de/.
2 Some authors prefer to translate the German “exzentrische Positionalität” with “excentric 
positionality” in order to avoid association with the meaning “deviating from conventional or 
accepted use or conduct,” which is attached to the English word “eccentric.” Nevertheless, we 
decided to use the terms “eccentric” and “eccentricity” throughout this volume, not only because 
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These concepts not only enable us to grasp the fundamental biological 
characteristics of the human condition, but they also have proven to be 
fruitful in the social sciences and humanities. Plessner’s writings not only 
foreshadow current – phenomenological, hermeneutic, and feminist – criti-
cisms of rationalistic and instrumental approaches to the study of human 
life, culture, and technology, as well as the embodied, enacted, embedded, 
and extended alternatives that are currently being developed (Thompson 
2007), but they also remain fruitful and worth studying in their own right. 
Demonstrating this will be the aim of this volume.
This introduction consists of four parts. As Plessner is not well-known 
in the Anglo-Saxon world, I shall f irst brief ly sketch Plessner’s life and 
works as well as place him in the context of twentieth-century continental 
philosophy. In the second part, I will introduce the concept of ‘positionality,’ 
which is central to Plessner’s philosophical anthropology, and contrast this 
spatially oriented concept with Heidegger’s temporally oriented concept of 
Dasein, and subsequently comment on the synchronic nature of Plessner’s 
anthropology. In the third part, Plessner’s three ‘anthropological laws’ will 
be presented. Lastly, a cursory overview of the contents of this book will 
be provided.
In the shadow of tomorrow: The life and works of Helmuth 
Plessner
Helmuth Plessner was born in 1892 in Wiesbaden, Germany, into an affluent 
family of partly Jewish descent.3 His father was a doctor and the director 
of a sanatorium. In the then still prosperous city of Wiesbaden, Helmuth 
witnessed the grandeur of the last years of the German Empire. After suc-
cessfully completing his studies at the gymnasium in his hometown, he went 
on to study medicine in Freiburg, followed by zoology and philosophy in 
Heidelberg. While in Heidelberg, he met highly acclaimed German scholars 
such as Windelband, Weber, and Troelsch. In 1914, he went to Göttingen 
to study phenomenology under Husserl and became fascinated with the 
philosophy of Kant. After obtaining his doctoral degree in Erlangen in 1918, 
this is in accordance with the spelling used in most dictionaries, but also because it has been 
used in previously published translations of Helmuth Plessner’s works, such as Laughing and 
Crying: A Study of the Limits of Human Behaviour [Lachen und Weinen. Eine Untersuchung der 
Grenzen menschlichen Verhaltens, 1941] (Plessner 1970).
3 This biographical sketch has largely been taken from the biographical notes of his Dutch 
student Jan Sperna Weiland (Sperna Weiland 1989).
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he worked under Max Scheler in Cologne, where he wrote his Habilitations-
schrift, the thesis which qualif ied him for a professorship (1920). It was 
not until 1926 however, until he was appointed extraordinary professor of 
philosophy in Cologne. Between these periods, Plessner published his book 
The Unity of the Senses [Die Einheit der Sinne, 1923], and, partly inspired by 
Max Scheler, he worked on the f irst large-scale design of a philosophical 
anthropology. His The Levels of the Organic and Man, written in a rather 
obtuse German, appeared in 1928, only one year after the groundbreaking 
and highly influential publication of Heidegger’s Being and Time [Sein und 
Zeit]. Moreover, Scheler’s short but compelling study of The Position of Man 
in the Cosmos [Die Stellung des Menschen im Kosmos] also appeared in 1928.
At the time, Plessner’s philosophical anthropology received only little 
scholarly attention. However, this was not only due to his rather inaccessible 
writing. When the National-Socialists took power in Germany in 1933, Pless-
ner was dismissed because of his Jewish ancestry. He emigrated to Istanbul 
in Turkey, but his attempt to obtain a professorship there failed. Upon being 
invited by his friend F.J.J. Buytendijk, he went to Groningen, in the north 
of the Netherlands, where he was appointed extraordinary professor of 
sociology in 1939, thanks to a number of sociological studies Plessner had 
previously published, such as the aforementioned The Limits of Community: 
A Critique of Social Radicalism (1924) and The Fate of the German Spirit at the 
End of Its Civil Era [Das Schicksal des Deutschen Geistes im Ausgang seiner 
bürgerlichen Epoche, 1935], reprinted in 1955 under the title The Delayed 
Nation [Die verspätete Nation] – in which he analized the religious, social 
and philosophical roots of National Socialism. According to Plessner, the 
political barbarism of National Socialism could largely be attributed to the 
fact that, unlike most other states in Europe in the nineteenth century, 
Germany had not experienced civil revolution, which meant that the Ger-
man people followed the path of cultural emancipation instead of political 
revolution. Given this background, it was not in the least surprising that to 
Plessner, philosophical anthropology – f irst and foremost – had a practical 
aim. In 1936, he gave an address on the task of philosophical anthropology 
in which he argued that the degeneration of the classical and Christian 
legacies had created a cultural void which fundamentally threatened the 
essence of humankind. The task of philosophical anthropology is to remind 
people of their possibilities, hidden in ‘the shadow of tomorrow.’
The fact that philosophical anthropology remained important to Plessner 
during his sociology professorship can be seen from publications such as 
Laughing and Crying: Inquiries to the Boundaries of Human Behavior [Lachen 
und Weinen. Eine Untersuchung der Grenzen menschlichen Verhaltens, 1941]. 
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In 1943, after the German occupation of the Netherlands, his Jewish lineage 
forced him to go into hiding. After the war he was reappointed to a post in 
Groningen, but this time as full professor of philosophy. In 1951, he returned 
to Germany and was appointed professor of philosophy and sociology in 
Göttingen. In this position, he carried out various administrative functions, 
including that of dean, rector magnificus (vice chancellor) in Göttingen, and 
chairman of the German Association of Sociologists. Upon invitation by 
Adorno and Horkheimer, he also contributed to the research of the Institut 
für Sozialforschung (the Frankfurt School). In 1962, he was appointed for 
a one-year term as visiting professor at the New School for Social Research 
in New York City. In the last period of his academic career, from 1965 to 
1972, he was professor of philosophy in Zürich, Switzerland. Plessner died 
in Göttingen at age 92 in 1985.
Between 1980 and 1985, Suhrkamp published Plessner’s Collected Writ-
ings [Gesammelte Schriften] in ten volumes.4 It will probably take quite 
some time before the entire collection is available in English. However, 
the English-speaking community can duly anticipate the translation of 
Die Stufen des Organischen und der Mensch, a book that occupies a key 
position in his oeuvre and presents both Plessner’s philosophy of nature and 
the building blocks of his philosophical anthropology, social philosophy, 
and philosophy of culture and technology. Without a doubt, Levels of the 
Organic and Man is Plessner’s magnum opus. It will also be the chief point 
of reference of this volume.
Eccentric positionality
We can only understand the importance of Plessner’s concept ‘eccentric 
positionality’ (exzentrische Positionalität) if we place it in the light of hu-
man f initude, a theme that dominates modern philosophy as no other 
(cf. De Mul 2004). Of course, the f initude of man is not an exclusively 
modern theme, as it already played a prominent role in medieval thinking. 
However, as Odo Marquard has shown, in modern philosophy there has 
4 A selection of texts of Plessner not included in the Collected Writings, entitled Politics – 
Anthropology – Philosophy: Essays and Lectures [Politik–Anthropologie–Philosophie: Aufsätze und 
Vorträge], has been published in 2001 by Salvatore Giammusso and Hans-Ulrich Lessing (Plessner 
2001). In addition, Hans-Ulrich Lessing has published a series of previously unpublished lectures 
of Plessner, in which his philosophical anthropology is presented in a broad philosophical 
context: Elemente der Metaphysik: Eine Vorlesung aus dem Wintersemester 1931/32 [Elements of 
Metaphysics: Winter Semester Lectures 1931/32] (Plessner 2002).
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been an important shift in the meaning of the concept. Where the f inite, 
in contrast to a transcendent, self-causing (causa sui) God, was initially 
understood as that which is created – that is to say, that which does not 
have its ground in itself – in modern secularized culture it is def ined 
immanently as that which is limited in space and time (Marquard 1981, 120). 
A crucial difference between Plessner and Heidegger lies in their diverging 
points of departure with regards to their reflection on man, marked by 
related though distinctively different dimensions of human f initude. In 
Being and Time, Heidegger’s focal point is f initude in time. In this context, 
f initude is primarily understood as mortality and the human way of being 
(Dasein, literary translated: there-being), characterized by the awareness 
of this mortality, consequently is def ined as a Being-unto-death (Sein zum 
Tode). In The Levels of the Organic and Man, however, Plessner’s point of 
departure is f initude in space, in which f initude is primarily def ined as 
positionality and human life, in its specif ic relation to its positionality, 
as decentered or, in his vocabulary, eccentric positionality (exzentrische 
Positionalität).
The fact that Heidegger takes the experience of temporality as his 
departure point vastly determines his abstraction from the corporality of 
man, and as a consequence shows an aff inity to the idealistic rather than 
the materialistic tradition (cf. Schulz 1953-1954). In contrast, by putting 
the emphasis on the spatial dimension, Plessner assigns a central role to 
(our relationship to) our physical body. In Plessner’s anthropology, the 
biological dimension plays a crucial role and an important part of his 
analysis aims at demarcating man from other – living and lifeless – bodies. 
However, although Plessner, as a trained biologist, pays much attention 
to the empirical knowledge about life, his focus is on the transcendental-
phenomenological analysis of the material a priori of the subsequent life 
forms, particularly that of the human. In the f irst part of this volume, 
various aspects of Plessner’s method and anthropology will be discussed 
and compared to competing paradigms in more detail. Here, I will restrict 
myself to a short introduction of some of the key concepts of his philosophy 
of nature and anthropology.
According to Plessner, the living body distinguishes itself from the lifeless 
in that it does not only possess contours but is characterized by a boundary 
(or border) (Grenze), and consequently by the crossing of this boundary 
(Grenzverkehr). Moreover, the living body is characterized by a specif ic 
relationship to its own boundary, that is, by a specif ic form of positionality. 
The positionality of living creatures is linked to their double aspectiv-
ity (Doppelaspektivität): they have a relationship to both sides of their 
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constituting boundary, both to the inner and the outer side (GS V, 138f.).5 
Anticipating Ryle’s later critique, Plessner’s concept of double aspectivity 
explicitly opposes the Cartesian dualism of res extensa and res cogitans, in 
which both poles are fundamentalized ontologically. Conversely, Plessner 
considers life to encompass a physical-psychic unity; a lived body which, 
depending on which aspect is disclosed, appears as either body or mind.
The manner in which positionality is organized determines the differ-
ence between plant, animal and human being. In the ‘open’ organization of 
a plant, the organism does not express a relationship to its own positional-
ity. Neither the inner nor the outer has a center. In other words, the plant 
is characterized by a boundary which has no one or nothing on either 
side, neither subject nor object (GS V, 282f.). A relationship with its own 
positionality f irst appears in the ‘closed’ or centric organization of animals. 
In an animal organism, that which crosses the boundary is mediated by a 
center, which at a physical level can be localized in the nervous system, and 
at the psychic level is characterized by awareness of the environment. Thus, 
what distinguishes the animal from the plant is that not only does it have a 
body, it is also in its body. Furthermore, the human life form distinguishes 
itself from that of the animal by also cultivating a relationship with this 
center. Although we inevitably also take up a centrist position, we have, in 
addition, a specif ic relationship to this center. There is therefore a second 
mediation: human beings are aware of their center of experience or being, 
and as such, eccentric. “Man not only lives (lebt) and experiences his life 
(erlebt), but he also experiences his experience of life” (GS V, 364). In other 
words: as eccentric beings we are not where we experience, and we don’t 
experience where we are.6 Expressed from the perspective of the body: “A 
living person is a body, is in his body (as inner experience or soul) and at 
the same time outside his body as the perspective, from which he is both” 
(GS V, 365). Because of this tripartite determination of human existence, 
human beings live in three worlds: an outer world (Aussenwelt), an inner 
5 GS stands for Helmuth Plessner’s Gesammelte Schriften (GS), edited by Günter Dux et al., 10 
vols. (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1980-1985). Volume V of these collected works contains 
Die Stufen des Organischen und der Mensch. Some of the authors in this volume refer to the 
edition published by De Gruyter (Berlin and New York, 1975). Unfortunately the pagination of 
these two editions is not identical. 
6 With this emphasis on the decentred position of the subject, Plessner’s philosophical 
anthropology clearly anticipates the (neo)structuralist conception of man as we f ind it, for 
example, in the writings of Jacques Lacan (see Ebke and Schloßberger 2012).
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world (Innenwelt), and the shared world of culture (Mitwelt).7 Because of 
life’s double aspectivity, each of these three worlds appears to human beings 
both from an inner and an outer perspective. Our body (as part of the outer 
world) is both physical body (Körper) – that is to say, a thing among things 
that occupies a specif ic space in an objective space-time continuum – and a 
living body (Leib) that functions as the center of our perception and actions. 
In its turn the inner world is both soul (Seele), the active source of our 
psychic life, and lived experience (Erlebnis), the theatre in which the psychic 
processes take place. With regard to the world of culture we are both an I 
(Ich), which participates in the creation of this world of culture, and a We 
(Wir) insofar as we are supported and formed by this shared world.
In closing this brief exposition of some of the key concepts of Plessner’s 
philosophical anthropology, I wish to make one critical comment. Accord-
ing to Plessner, eccentric positionality is the highest level of positionality: 
“A further development beyond this point is impossible, because the living 
thing here really has reached a position behind itself” (GS V, 363). On a 
formal level, Plessner’s dialectics of life here seems to remain bound to the 
closed dialectics of German Idealism. Moreover, this comment is diff icult 
to interpret in any other way but as anthropocentric.8 Given Plessner’s 
biological background, this is rather surprising. On the basis of the (Neo)-
Darwinian theory of evolution, it seems naïve to presuppose that evolution 
of life has reached its completion with man. Plessner undoubtedly had good 
methodological and political reasons for placing the diachronic dimension 
of life between parentheses in his The Levels of the Organic and Man. His 
analysis is not so much directed towards the evolutionary or historical 
development of life; but is rather a synchronic analysis of the conditions 
of the possibility of the different life forms on earth. As Lolle Naute, one of 
Plessner’s students in Groningen and later successor of his professorship, 
has argued, this exclusively synchronic approach excludes the possibility 
of posing a number of important questions – for example, regarding the 
non-parallel historical development of the inner world (Innenwelt), the outer 
7 A similar distinction has been made by Popper in Objective Knowledge: An Evolutionary 
Approach (Popper 1972, 118f.).
8 Though Plessner in his anthropology speaks in a universalist and anthropocentric terminol-
ogy about ‘man,’ the notion of eccentric positionality cannot be termed ethnocentric. As we 
will see in the next section, the fundamental openness that characterizes the eccentricity of 
human beings is the very condition of possibility of cultural and individual differences. In this 
sense Plessner’s philosophical anthropology is a non-essentialistic ontology, ‘for forms of life 
are not def ined on the basis of distinctive attributes but in terms of realized scopes of action’ 
(Kockelkoren 1992, 207).
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world (Aussenwelt) and the cultural world (Mitwelt). He therefore suggests 
supplementing Plessner’s synchronic approach with a diachronic one (Nauta 
1991). He argues, for example, following the sociologist Norbert Elias, for an 
examination of the decentralizing processes, in order to clarify the histori-
cal discovery of the three mentioned domains of eccentric positionality. 
However, according to Nauta, for Plessner the synchronic typology of the 
three life forms remains the fundamental conceptual framework. This 
implies that in Plessner’s work, the impact of evolutionary, historical and/
or technological developments on the existing types of positionality largely 
remains untouched. In my view, this restriction is neither theoretically nor 
practically fruitful. As we will see in the third part of this book, present-day 
converging technologies challenge the very ontological structure of human 
positionality. However, we will also notice that Plessner’s terminology is 
apt to describe this ontological transformation of man.
Three anthropological laws
In Plessner’s philosophical anthropology, culture and technology are 
inextricably linked with eccentric positionality: “As an eccentric being 
man is not in an equilibrium, he is without a place, he stands outside time 
in nothingness, he is characterized by a constitutive homelessness (ist 
konstitutiv heimatlos). He always still has to become ‘something’ and create 
an equilibrium for himself” (GS V, 385). This observation gives rise to the 
f irst of the three basic laws of anthropology, which in the last chapter of The 
Levels of the Organic and Man Plessner derives from the notion of eccentric 
positionality, stating human beings are artificial by nature.
Man tries to escape the unbearable eccentricity of his being, he wants to 
compensate for the lack that constitutes his life form. Eccentricity and 
the need for complements are one and the same. Given the context, we 
should not understand “need” psychologically or as something subjective. 
It is something that is logically prior to every psychological need, drive, 
tendency or will. In this fundamental need or nakedness, we f ind the 
motive for everything that is specif ically human: the focus on the irrealis 
and the use of artif icial means, the ultimate foundation of the technical 
artefact and that which it serves: culture (GS V, 385).
In other words, technology and culture are not only – and not even in 
the f irst place – instruments of survival but an ontic necessity (ontische 
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Notwendigkeit) (GS V, 396). In this sense, we are justif ied in claiming that 
human beings have always been cyborgs, that is: beings composed of both 
organic and technological components. Strictly speaking of course, techni-
cal and cultural artifacts such as knives, cars, books and computers are not 
part of the biological body. Yet, as soon as they become part of human life 
they also become part of the human body scheme and cognitive structure.
The world of culture and technology is the expression of the desire of 
human beings to bridge the distance that separates them from the world, 
their fellow man and themselves. Since time immemorial technology has 
been directed at crossing the boundaries that are given in time and space 
with our f initude. This applies to ‘alpha-technologies,’ such as writing, 
which compensates for our f initude in time by enabling us to make use 
of the knowledge and experience of our ancestors and to pass on our own 
knowledge and experience to our descendents. It also applies to ‘beta-
technologies,’ which have been developed abundantly, particularly since 
the birth of natural science. The telescope and the microscope, for example, 
have made it possible to (partially) overcome the spatial limitations of 
our senses. For this reason, Peter Weibel argues that technology must be 
primarily understood as teletechnology:
Technology helps us to f ill, to bridge, to overcome the insuff iciency 
emerging from absence. Every form of technology is teletechnology 
and serves to overcome spatial and temporal distance. However, this 
victory over distance and time is only a phenomenological aspect of 
the (tele)media. The real effect of the media lies in overcoming the 
mental disturbance (fears, control mechanisms, castration complexes, 
etc.) caused by distance and time, by all forms of absence, leave, separa-
tion, disappearance, interruption, withdrawal and loss. By overcoming 
or shutting off the negative horizon of absence, the technical media 
become technologies of care and presence. By visualizing the absent, 
making it symbolically present, the media also transform the damaging 
consequences of absence into pleasant ones. While overcoming distance 
and time, the media also help us to overcome the fear with which these 
inspire the psyche (Weibel 1992, 75).
On the basis of Plessner’s second anthropological law – that of meditated 
immediacy – there is also a comment to be made regarding the hope that 
culture and technology allow us to take control over our lives. Plessner 
rightly points out that although human beings are the creators of their 
technology and culture, the latter acquire their own momentum: “Equally 
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essential for the technical artifact is its inner weight, its objectivity that 
discloses the aspect of technology that only can be found or discovered, 
but never made. Everything that enters the sphere of culture shows its 
dependence on human creation. But at the same time (and to the same 
extent) it is independent from man” (GS V, 397).
Technological actions and cultural expressions have all kinds of un-
intentional side-effects which place strict limits on predictability and 
controlability. Furthermore, as we are not alone in the world but interact 
with other persons, we are constantly confronted with interests and powers 
that conflict with our desires. And while life as we know it remains depend-
ent on f inite, physical bodies, the dream of immortality will always persist.
In Plessner’s view, illusions of control no less than the religious hope to 
f ind eternal bliss are doomed to remain unfulf illed dreams. We f ind this 
expressed in Plessner’s third anthropological law, that of man’s utopian 
standpoint. The promise to provide that which by definition man must do 
without – “safety, reconciliation with fate, understanding reality, a native 
soil” (GS V, 420) – can be no other than a religious or secular illusion. The fact 
that for many people in a society such as ours, technology has taken over the 
utopian role of religion does not make this law any less valid. In reality, at-
tempts to find or create a paradise often result in the very opposite. However, 
this should not surprise us, given that inhumanity is inextricably linked 
with human eccentricity. Or as Plessner expressed it in Unmenschlichkeit: 
“The inhuman is not bound to any specif ic era, but a possibility which is 
inherent to human life: the possibility to negate itself” (Plessner 1982, 205).
Overview of the contents of this volume
In this volume, the focus is on Plessner’s philosophical anthropology as he 
developed it in The Levels of the Organic and Man (1928) and a number of 
his subsequent writings. The reason for this focal point not only has to do 
with the great number of publications that Plessner devoted to philosophical 
anthropology in general and to various specif ic anthropological themes, 
but also because his philosophical anthropology constitutes the foundation 
for his writings in other disciplines, such as sociology, politicology and 
aesthetics. The volume is divided into three parts.
The chapters in Part I of this volume discuss Plessner’s philosophical 
anthropology by situating it within the landscape of contemporary Dar-
winistic life sciences and competing philosophical accounts of human life 
in continental philosophy that are already more familiar in the Anglo-
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Saxon academic community, such as those of Kant, Bergson, and Deleuze. 
Although various aspects of Plessner’s philosophical anthropology come to 
the fore, the eccentric positionality of the human life form plays a central 
role in almost all of the contributions in this part. This is not surprising, as 
from Plessner’s anthropological perspective – which focuses on the essential 
characteristics (Wesensmerkmale) rather than on gradual empirical develop-
ment – it is especially in this eccentric positionality that Homo sapiens 
sapiens differs radically from other, non-human animals. It is because of 
this eccentricity that our species is artif icial by nature and has developed 
itself in an abundant variety of cultural and technological expressions.
The contributions in Part II discuss a variety of phenomena of human 
culture, from the perspective of Plessner’s anthropology, applying key con-
cepts like boundary, positionality, and the three anthropological laws. The 
authors discuss cultural domains like human dwelling, multiculturalism, 
law, medicine, and social work, and throw light on dimensions like masks 
and role playing, as well as on the constitutive homelessness of man. In this 
part, too, Plessner’s ideas are compared and confronted with the works of 
thinkers that are more familiar to the Anglo-Saxon world, such as Hannah 
Arendt, Johan Huizinga, Niklas Luhmann, and Richard Sennett.
Part III is devoted to technology, a dimension of the natural artif iciality 
of the human life form, which seems to have become the most dominant 
feature of globalized postmodern societies. One of the themes in this 
part is the impact of converging technologies, like neuroscience, genetic 
engineering and information technology on human self-understanding. In 
connection with this, other chapters focus on the technological mediation of 
human identity, the cyborgization of man and the future of the human life 
form. Some of the chapters go beyond the human life form and discuss the 
eccentricity and criminal liability of artif icial life forms. Within this context 
also the implications of these developments for philosophical anthropology 
as a paradigm for human self-understanding are being questioned. As the 
comparison with some leading theorists in the domain of philosophy of 
technology, such as Don Ihde and Stiegler will show, Plessner’s views on 
technology continue to be of utmost relevance for today’s thinking.
In the following I will give a more detailed overview of the subsequent 
chapters in this volume.
Part I: Anthropology
In the f irst chapter, Philosophical Anthropology: A Third Way between 
Darwinism and Foucaultism, Joachim Fischer distinguishes between two 
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different meanings of the word ‘philosophical anthropology.’ One can either 
use it to refer to a specif ic (sub)discipline within philosophy, or as the name 
for a specific paradigm. According to Fisher, Plessner’s philosophical anthro-
pology offers a paradigmatic shift in our conception of man, which enables 
us to bridge the gap between two competing paradigms of naturalism and 
culturalism. According to Fisher, Plessner’s philosophical anthropology not 
only enables us to combine the approaches of naturalism and culturalism, 
but it also limits the range of application of each of these paradigms.
Hans-Peter Krüger continues the discussion of the relationship between 
Plessner and theories of evolution in The Nascence of Modern Man: Two Ap-
proaches to the Problem – Biological Evolutionary Theory and Philosophical 
Anthropology. In his contribution, Krüger discusses the interdisciplinary 
contribution of Plessner’s philosophical anthropology to the study of the 
nascence of modern man (in the biological sense of Homo sapiens sapiens) in 
contemporary evolutionary research. Against the background of Plessner’s 
notion of eccentric positionality and Tomasello’s related notion of collective 
intentionality, Krüger discusses a number of topics that play a crucial role 
in the remarkably fast sociocultural development of modern man, such as 
mimesis, role playing, the emancipation of ontogeny from phylogeny, the 
transformation of human drives, as well as the specific relationship between 
generalism and specialism.
Heike Delitz also takes a comparative approach in her contribution. In 
“True” and “False” Evolutionism: Bergson’s Critique of Spencer, Darwin & Co. 
and Its Relevance for Plessner (and Us), she approaches Plessner’s relationship 
to theory of evolution from the perspective of his ‘sparring partner’ Henri 
Bergson. In Creative Evolution (1907), Bergson criticizes Darwin, Spencer 
and other contemporary evolutionary theorists for failing to understand the 
process character of the evolution of life. Although Plessner strongly criti-
cizes Bergson for being a “philosopher against experience,” Delitz explains 
that at the same time, Bergson was an important source of inspiration for 
Plessner. Not only do Plessner and Bergson both distinguish between the 
‘open’ life form of plants, the ‘closed’ life form of animals and the ‘natural 
artif iciality’ of the human life form, but they also share a fundamentally 
non-mechanistic approach to life. Especially this last characteristic gives 
both Bergson and Plessner a renewed relevance to our present “biological 
age.”
In Life, Concept and Subject: Plessner’s Vital turn in the Light of Kant 
and Bergson, Thomas Ebke continues Delitz’s analysis of the relationship 
between Bergson and Plessner. According to Ebke, the philosophy of both 
thinkers is characterized by a ‘vital turn,’ which implies that life itself 
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dictates the concepts we employ to understand what life is. Contrary to the 
explicit claim of Plessner and many of his commentators, Ebke argues that 
this vital turn cannot be conceived of as a transcendental turn in a strict 
Kantian sense. Whereas Kant’s transcendental deduction of the conditions 
of the possibility of objects leads back to the a priori forms and categories 
of the subject, Plessner’s “deduction of the categories of the vital” leads him 
to a ‘material a priori’: the boundary-realization of living things, which is 
in the vital performance that is carried out both by ourselves and by the 
objects we experience. We are only able to deduce the specif ic boundary 
realization of other life forms because, as eccentric beings, we are able to 
take a transcendental perspective at the world that is no longer attached 
to our specif ic (centric) organic shape. Referring to a similar tension in the 
work of Bergson, Ebke argues that both philosophers of life were caught 
in a struggle between a transcendental analysis and the insight into the 
material a priori of life.
In Bodily Experience and Experiencing One’s Body, Maarten Coolen shows 
that, concerning the bodily dimension of human life, Merleau-Ponty’s 
existential phenomenology has remarkable similarities with Plessner’s 
philosophical anthropology. Both thinkers emphasize the embodied 
intentionality of our being-in-the-world. However, according to Coolen, 
Merleau-Ponty underemphasizes the double aspectivity of human exist-
ence. As Plessner has shown, because of this double aspectivity, man not 
only is a living body (Leib), but he also has its living body as a physical 
body (Körper), that is a ‘thing’ amidst other objects in the world. Discuss-
ing Plessner’s three anthropological laws, Coolen points at some crucial 
implications of this double aspectivity. Seen from the perspective of the 
law of mediated immediacy, human corporeality is characterized by the fact 
that as a living body, we mediate our (immediate) contact with the world by 
getting our physical body to do things. While we share this ‘instrumental’ 
use of our body with other animals, as human beings that are eccentric as 
well, we distinguish ourselves from sheer centric animals by experiencing 
the relationship between the living body and the physical body. Man’s 
natural artificiality is closely connected with this: being aware of the 
inherent instrumental nature of his corporeality, man also experiences 
the shortcomings of his body and is being forced to supplement it with 
artif icial (cultural and technological) means. In Plessner’s view, the law of 
the utopian standpoint is another necessary consequence of our eccentric 
positionality: both being a body and having it, we can never f ind a fully 
secure place in the world, but instead maintain an perpetual longing for 
such a ‘safe haven.’ In the remaining sections of his contribution, Coolen 
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argues that the notion of eccentric positionality makes it possible to answer 
some questions that remain unanswered in Hubert Dreyfus’s account of 
learning skillful action (which was inspired by Merleau-Ponty). Taking 
learning to skate as an example, Coolen shows that our body is not only 
familiar with the world, but also always remains alien to itself.
In Plessner and the Mathematical-Physical Perspective: The Prescientific 
Objectivity of the Human Body, Jasper van Buuren continues the discus-
sion about the experience of our body as a physical body (Körper). In his 
contribution the focus is on the question whether the body as a physical 
object should be understood from a scientif ic or a prescientif ic perspective. 
Taking the scientific perspective of the body as a stepping stone, Van Buuren 
argues that, in spite of some passages in The Levels of the Organic and Man in 
which Plessner seems to endorse the primacy of the scientif ic perspective; 
this perspective is actually rendered possible by the prescientif ic objectiv-
ity of the body. Referring to Plessner’s analysis of the difference between 
phenomenal things and Descartes’s res extensa, Van Buuren argues that 
although our own physical body is not phenomenal, it does not f it into the 
Cartesian concept of res extensa either. In a sense, Van Buuren argues that 
both our physical body and our embodied subjectivity are intermediate 
layers between the interior boundary of eccentricity and physical things 
in Cartesian “directionless space.” In his view the physical body is our body 
insofar as it is not yet subject, insofar as it does not yet reach out for a world 
that transcends it, even insofar as it is not yet organic, i.e. it is not yet a 
living body. In the f inal analysis, there appears to be a gap in the (ec)centric 
human life form between the physical and the living body. Both aspects 
inevitably exist next to each other, leading to two separate worldviews. 
Although Plessner’s ‘perspectivist dualism’ should not be identif ied with 
Cartesian substance dualism, both dualisms point at a fundamental tension 
in the human life form.
Plessner’s perspectivist dualism returns in Janna van Grunsven’s The 
Exploited Body: Torture and the Destruction of Selfhood. In this contribu-
tion, Van Grunsven uses Plessner’s notion of our twofold corporeality – of 
simultaneously being a body and having a body – to analyze one of the dev-
astating aftereffects of torture as it is consistently mentioned by its victims, 
namely the permanent loss of trust in the self. Essential for understanding 
this phenomenon, as Van Grunsven takes it, is the consistently mentioned 
experience of having one’s very own body turn against oneself during these 
horrif ic events. By f irst exploring David Sussman’s insightful, yet conceptu-
ally f lawed Kantian attempt to understand this peculiar encounter with 
our own body, she argues that it is Helmuth Plessner’s rich conception of 
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human corporeality that allows us to understand its nature and conditions 
of possibility. Because our body can respond for us beyond the reach of our 
control, it is also the involuntary regions of our corporeality that make 
us deeply vulnerable to others, who can induce our involuntary bodily 
expressions even without our consent. Even though the victim is rendered 
completely defenseless at the mercy of another subject as she is obstructed 
in her autonomous control of her body, her eccentric positionality makes 
it impossible for her not to take up a position. It is precisely because we 
are condemned to always take up a position, and because we do this even 
when we have no autonomous control over our body, that torture through 
deliberate exploitation can turn the victim’s body against herself, causing 
a permanent distrust within the victim, not just towards the world, but 
towards herself.
In Plessner’s Theory of Eccentricity: A Contribution to the Philosophy 
of Medicine, Oreste Tolone discusses the relevance of Plessner’s work for 
medical anthropology and the philosophy of medicine. His starting point, 
like several other authors in Part I, is the tension between being a body 
and having a body, aiming to balance these two positions. Referring to 
Plessner’s three anthropological laws, Tolone claims that a healthy person 
is he who manages to stay in balance between naturality and artif iciality, 
mediacy and immediacy, rootedness and utopia. However, as human life is 
characterized by a constitutional lack of balance, health is not something 
given, but rather something we always still have to achieve. When we fall 
back to either our centric pole or our eccentric pole, physical or mental 
illness and suffering are the result. As long as an ill person doesn’t lose 
his eccentric position, he never coincides entirely with his own illness. 
According to Tolone, this has important implications for the doctor-patient 
relationship. Modern medical practice often reduces the patient to a sheer 
physical body, and thereby disturbs the balance required for a healthy 
life rather than restoring it. Although Plessner did not write extensively 
on the topics of health and illness, Tolone shows that his conception of 
the compound nature of man has certainly contributed to contemporary 
medical controversies, influencing authors such as Gadamer and Habermas.
Although Plessner uses the words “subject” and “object” occasionally, 
he predominantly refers to individuals that are characterized by eccentric 
positionality as persons. In The Duty of Personal Identity: Authenticity and 
Irony, Martino Enrico Boccignone investigates the phenomenon of personal 
identity, focusing on the relationship between personal and collective 
identity in our present globalized and medialized world. The author argues 
that, from a Plessnerian point of view, personal and cultural identities are 
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not essentialist entities, but rather open and dynamic structures involving 
differences in the way they change and are open to self-correction and 
reorientation. Taking up the Plessnerian notion of role playing already 
introduced in Krüger’s contribution, Boccignone emphasizes that because of 
his eccentric positionality, every person is a ‘double’ (Doppelgänger), having 
both a private and a public dimension. From this point of view, Plessner 
criticizes both the Romantic ideal of a complete integration of individual 
and community, as well as the Frankfurt School notion of alienation that is 
based on this ideal. Referring to Levels of the Organic and Man, the author 
especially emphasizes the inscrutability and natural artif iciality of human 
beings. Natural artif iciality is not just a negative divergence or aberration 
from the naturality of the other living beings, but it is also the very basis 
for individual freedom, self-determination, and individual responsibil-
ity. The undetermined character of its agency implies the possibility of a 
relative emancipation from both natural and cultural environments and 
their constraints. It also opens fruitful perspectives for conceptualizing 
intercultural understanding and dialogue and mutual cultural fertilization. 
In the f inal section, Boccignone makes some critical remarks about the 
notion of (Heideggerian) authenticity, as the natural artif iciality of man 
makes every individual and cultural identity inescapably temporal. Against 
such dangerous enthusiasm for authenticity, the author defends the ‘ironic 
self,’ which can be seen as an equilibrist that always tries to keep a delicate 
balance between the lack of a homeland and cosmopolitanism.
Part II: Culture
In Anthropology as a Foundation of Cultural Philosophy: The Connection of 
Human Nature and Culture by Helmuth Plessner and Ernst Cassirer, Henrike 
Lerch opens the second part of this volume. She introduces Plessner’s phi-
losophy of culture from the perspective of the hermeneutic life philosophy 
of Wilhelm Dilthey, one of Plessner’s main sources of inspiration. She then 
compares Plessner’s philosophy of culture with Ernst Cassirer’s kindred 
position, as developed in his Philosophy of Symbolic Forms. Both Plessner 
and Cassirer continue Dilthey’s project of expanding Kant’s critical analysis 
of human knowledge, which was mainly directed at the sciences that study 
nature, to the domain of the humanities (Geisteswissenschaften), which 
have culture as their object. Following Dilthey, both Plessner and Cassirer’s 
focus on the dimension of the ‘expression’ (Ausdruck) in their theories 
on culture. However, Lerch argues that while Cassirer restricted himself 
mainly to an analysis of the symbolic forms (such as language, myth, and 
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science), Plessner connects these expressions to the bodily and biological 
dimension of human culture. Moreover, in the case of Plessner, expression 
is not restricted to human life, but becomes a key characteristic of all living 
beings.
Robert Mugerauer also emphasizes the narrow relationship of biology 
to culture in Bi-Directional Boundaries: Eccentric Life and Its Environment. 
Taking Plessner’s notion of ‘boundary’ as his starting point, Mugerauer 
focuses on the analogous, though potentially misleading relationships 
between membrane/cell, skin/body and wall/house or city. The skin of 
the body and the wall of a house or around a city play the same role as the 
semi-permeable membrane of a cell, which is not so much something that 
closes the cell off from the environment, but rather a boundary that both 
opens up the cell to the surrounding world and constitutes a shelter against 
it. These two aspects form part of a circular, self-sustaining process, in 
which the cell, body and city all show organizational closure coupled to a 
structural openness. Mugerauer argues that Plessner’s basic insights with 
regards to these analogous pairs are in line with current scientif ic and 
phenomenological theories and research. He not only refers to the work 
of Maturana and Varela on autopoetic systems, but also to Heidegger’s 
writings on human dwelling, and Deleuze and Guattari’s reflections on 
territorialization.
In The Unbearable Freedom of Dwelling, Jetske van Oosten goes deeper 
into the built environment. In her contribution, Van Oosten discusses the 
effects of globalization and information networks on human dwelling. She 
discerns a growing uniformity in lifestyles, value systems and patterns 
of behavior, which can also be recognized in urban spaces throughout 
the world. In order to interpret and evaluate the emergence of such non-
places, she confronts New Babylon, the visionary architecture of Constant 
Nieuwenhuys, with Plessner’s notion of the “constitutive homelessness of 
man.” First, Van Oosten argues that eccentric man, unlike other animals, 
indeed lacks a place he can call home. However, being an ambiguous life 
form that is characterized by both centric and eccentric positionality, man 
constantly longs for a home and – following the law of natural artif iciality 
– has to create one for himself. Open for limitless possibilities of dwelling, 
man creates artif icial homes, ranging from tents to skyscrapers. However, 
in everyday life, the law of ‘mediated immediacy’ implies that as soon as 
limitless possibilities become reality, they acquire an independent and 
unpredictable autonomy that resist man’s freedom. In everyday life, tradi-
tions and habits rule. Constant’s New Babylon, a visionary architectonical 
world in which nothing is permanent, glorif ies man’s limitless openness 
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and freedom to dwell. However, as a glorif ication of possibilities, it does 
not offer its inhabitants the (temporary) security and trust of a home. As 
such, New Babylon foreshadows our postmodern fleeting, transient and 
contingent world, full of non-places. However, according to Van Oosten, 
man never ceases to search for a def initive home. As the law of utopian 
standpoint predicts, man keeps oscillating between possibility and reality, 
between eccentric homelessness and a centric longing for a home.
In his contribution Eccentric Positionality and Urban Space, Huib Ernste 
continues the discussion about human dwelling. As a human geographer, 
he focuses on the relationship between human beings and the environment 
and that between man and space. However, whereas in the tradition of 
human geography, space got a lot of theoretical attention, the role of man 
has been underestimated. While Simmel still wrote his famous essay “The 
Metropolis and Mental Life” with a profound ‘anthropological sensitivity,’ 
under influence of modernism and the postmodern proclamation of the 
death of the subject in the work of Wirth and later urban geographers a 
growing neglect of the human dimension can be discerned. Ernste pleads for 
an anthropological return in human geography and he argues that because 
of the prominent role of the spatial dimension of human life in Plessner’s 
philosophical anthropology, this theory holds special relevance. Notions like 
‘boundary’ and ‘eccentricity’ can help us shed new light on the relationship 
between human beings and urban spaces, and can help us develop another, 
more human forms of urban policy. Following a suggestion of Delitz in her 
work on architecture, Ernste points at comparable developments in the 
contemporary French ‘sociology of life,’ for which Deleuze, taking up the 
work of Bergson, is an important source of inspiration.
In Strangely Familiar: The Debate on Multiculturalism and Plessner’s 
Philosophical Anthropology, Kirsten Pols takes up a topical theme that has 
already been mentioned briefly by Boccignone in Part I of this volume. 
Referring to the often antagonistic debates on multiculturalism and iden-
tity politics, Pols demonstrates the relevance of Plessner’s philosophical 
anthropology for this debate and for social and political philosophy and 
theory in general. The starting point of her investigation is the notion of 
Unergründlichkeit, one of the key concepts in Plessner’s anthropology, which 
Pols translates as indeterminacy. It is because of the radical indeterminacy 
that characterizes the eccentric form of life and expresses itself in its natural 
artif iciality, mediated immediacy and utopian character, that man not 
only lacks a home, but also a f ixed self-identity. As a result, we are never 
completely familiar with ourselves. Our own self always already carries 
within its boundaries, aspects of the unknown and unfamiliar. Moreover, 
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indeterminacy also characterizes the political struggle for power in inter-
subjective relations among individuals. From a Plessnerian point of view, 
human history cannot be reduced to a single principle or purpose. The 
principle of indeterminacy not only excludes essentialism, historism and 
determinism with regard to Western culture, but it also has implications for 
the way we think of and deal with other cultures and eras. In the second part 
of her contribution, Pols focuses on the way our bodily existence affects the 
sphere of politics. Connecting to Plessner’s analysis of Laughing and Crying 
[Lachen und Weinen, 1941], Pols argues that in multicultural encounters in 
which we are confronted with ambiguous or overwhelming meanings and 
emotions, our bodies temporarily take over the control over the situation. 
Awareness of these kinds of ambiguities and impotence may warn us against 
oversimplifying ethical discussions about cultural identity, group rights 
and cultural practices.
The next two contributions focus on masks, a phenomenon we f ind in 
all cultures and of which Plessner offers an interesting interpretation. As 
Veronica Magyar-Haas explains in De-Masking as a Characteristic of Social 
Work?, the phenomenon of the social mask is an immediate consequence of 
man’s eccentric positionality and artif iciality. To her, our life is character-
ized by a gap between ourselves and our experiences. Our experience of our 
own inner life and our bodily existence is always mediated by our eccentric 
experience of our experience, and so is our social life. Our interactions with 
other persons are always mediated by the social roles we play. Social masks 
are an integral part of our personality. As Plessner argues in The Limits 
of Community [Grenzen der Gemeinschaft, 1924] and Power and Human 
Nature [Macht und menschliche Natur, 1931], it is precisely the fact that 
we are both centric and eccentric that characterizes our existence with 
an ontological ambiguity. Social masks both unveil and cover ourselves, 
and as such they are closely connected with the need for recognition and 
shame. In her contribution, Magyar-Haas investigates the implications of 
these general insights for social work. Connecting to a distinction Plessner 
makes in Laughing and Crying between involuntary mimic expressions 
and instrumental gestural expressions, the author analyzes a meeting of a 
group of girls in a youth center, in which the dialectics of de-masking and 
re-masking, shame and need for recognition, are used to realize changes 
in experience and behavior. Referring to related analyses of Butler, Sartre, 
and Levinas, she shows how shameful situations can serve as a method for 
stimulating individuals to internalize the predominant norms of the group.
In Helmuth Plessner as a Social Theorist: Role Playing in Legal Discourse, 
Bas Hengstmengel argues that Plessner’s analysis of public life as a public 
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sphere of social roles, prestige, ceremonies, and tact, has a clarifying 
potential to legal discourse. Legal subjects in a process can be regarded 
as prototypical role players, as their action potential is strictly framed by 
process law, practices and customs. According to Hengstmengel, Plessner’s 
notion of social roles can offer a model for the legal subject as an abstract 
bearer of rights and duties. After a discussion of several key elements in 
Plessner’s social philosophy, which he developed in his social and political 
works – next to the aforementioned Limits of Community and Power and 
Human Nature Hengstmengel refers to the later work On This Side of Utopia 
[Diesseits der Utopie, 1966] – he briefly compares Plessner’s theory with some 
related thoughts of Sennett, Tonkiss, Arendt, Huizinga, and Luhmann. They 
all seem to share the idea that artif iciality and formality of roles, forms and 
masks contribute to a healthy distance between inner and outer life. Man 
inevitably has to be a double (Döppelganger) in order to protect the self 
and society. After a concise discussion of the required skills of diplomacy 
and tact, Hengstmengel concludes his contribution by pointing at some 
threats to both the stability of the self and the stability and functioning of 
the legal system.
That Habermas’s reception of Plessner’s idea does not come without 
tensions, is demonstrated by Matthias Schloβberger in Habermas’s New 
Turn towards Plessner’s Philosophical Anthropology. The point of discord 
concerns the political dimension of human life. Although Plessner’s philo-
sophical anthropology is not inherently connected with a specif ic political 
orientation, it emphasizes human freedom and – because of the law of 
utopian standpoint – is rather sceptical towards the grand narratives of 
totalitarian ideologies such as fascism or communism. However, as from the 
perspective of the Frankfurt School, philosophical anthropology has often 
been criticized as being reactive (in the sense of naturalistic) and politically 
conservative. In his early work, Habermas did not criticize Plessner directly, 
but via his critique of Gehlen, whose philosophy is indeed naturalistic and 
conservative. Gehlen argues that due to the indeterminacy and malleability 
of human nature, human beings need the protection of strict institutions.
However, Plessner’s philosophy is not naturalistic in the Gehlenian sense, 
but rather transcendental (though it is, as noted in Ebke’s contribution, a 
transcendentalism of a special type), and neither does he defend a Gehlen-
like institutional conservatism. Schloβberger argues that Habermas has 
neither revised nor modif ied this negative assessment of philosophical 
anthropology, even though he used some of Plessner’s ideas in his latest 
works about the ethics of the species and the future of human life. It is 
only in his more recent publications on genetics and genetic manipulation 
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that Habermas seems to recognize that his approach so far lacked a certain 
explanatory power. By taking some ideas of Helmuth Plessner into consid-
eration, he interprets the unavailability of human life as the unavailability 
of living beings who live in the tension between being a living body and 
having a physical body. However, to this day, he has not clearly articulated 
the full impact of this recognition. It forces Habermas to a paradigm shift 
away from his rationalist philosophy of language towards a philosophy of 
the expressiveness of living beings.
Part III: Technology
In The Quest for the Sources of the Self, Seen from the Vantage Point of Pless-
ner’s Material a Priori, the f irst contribution of Part III of this volume, Petran 
Kockelkoren makes a transition from culture to technology. His starting 
point is the philosophical quest for the sources of the self. Against the 
background of the postmodern proclamation of the death of the subject, 
Kockelkoren criticizes the conservative attempts to resurrect the modern, 
authentic and autonomous subject, as we f ind them, for example, in the 
work of Charles Taylor and Paul Ricoeur. The self is seen as something that is 
inscribed in the human body. Opposed to this view, Kockelkoren, following 
Plessner, argues that self-awareness emerges out of the growing complexity 
of the organization of life. One of the consequences of our eccentricity is 
that our knowledge of the world around us, of our own bodies, and even 
of our so-called inner selves, is always mediated by language, images and 
technologies. Self and identities are the outcome of technological media-
tions and their cultural incorporations. Instead of being the origin of our 
actions and inventions, the self is rather the product of them. Kockelkoren 
concludes that the anthropology of Helmuth Plessner is very apt for the 
understanding of self-production in our present-day technological culture 
and media-society.
In The Brain in the Vat as the Epistemic Object of Neurobiology, Gesa Linde-
mann analyzes everyday practices in neurobiological laboratories from the 
perspective of Helmuth Plessner’s philosophical anthropology. Her focus is 
on neurobiological experiments with invasive electrophysiology (electrodes 
lowered in the brain) that record complex neural events in order to develop 
an exploratory theory of the brain. According to the self-understanding of 
neuroscientists, they provide a mechanistic account of the brain and its 
functions from a third-person perspective. However, following Plessner, 
Lindemann argues that the interaction between living beings is always 
characterized by a second-person perspective. All living beings express 
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themselves by realizing their boundaries and mediating their contacts 
with their environment through these boundaries. Moreover, in the case of 
centric, conscious beings, the living organism perceives, expects and affects, 
whereas eccentric, self-conscious beings in addition expect the expecta-
tions of others. In a detailed description of the four stages a prototypical 
neurobiological experiment with monkeys, Lindemann shows that in the 
initial stages in which the experimenters train the laboratory animals, they 
unavoidably interact from a second-person perspective. It is only during 
the preparation and analysis of the data that the brain is constructed as the 
epistemic object of brain research. In this deceptive phase of the experiment, 
the brain no longer appears as the organ of the organism, but as ‘the brain 
itself.’ It is only in this f inal phase of this reductionistic procedure that the 
‘isolated brain in the vat’ becomes the sole object of interest.
Johannes Hätcher also focuses on electrophysiology in Switching 
“On,” Switching “Off”: Does Neurosurgery in Parkinson’s Disease Create 
Man-Machines? However, his subject is the therapeutic use of deep brain 
stimulation in patients that suffer from Parkinson’s disease. Although brain 
stimulation is often quite successful in suppressing the symptoms of this 
disease, enabling the patients to control their body again and live a more 
or less normal life, there are often serious side-effects. Hätcher argues that 
Plessner’s philosophical anthropology can help to better understand the 
psychosocial problems which often accompany neurosurgical therapy. One 
of the apparently dehumanizing implications of deep brain Stimulation is 
that the brain stimulation can be switched on and off. In Hätcher’s view, 
however, Parkinson patients are not transhumanistic man-machines, but 
rather stay human in their natural artif iciality. In the interviews he had 
with Parkinson patients and their partners, he noticed that they often had 
to laugh when they discussed the possibility of switching the patient off. 
Laughing in these cases expresses the experience that it is abnormal for 
a human person to react like a machine. By laughing in such abnormal 
situations, deep brain stimulated patients stay human in their natural 
artif iciality.
Neuroscience and laughter are also the topics of Heleen J. Pott’s On Humor 
and “Laughing” Rats: Plessner’s Importance for Affective Neuroscience, in 
which she discusses laughing behavior of primates and lower mammals and 
the challenge this phenomenon seems to imply for the human self-image. 
Philosophers from Plato to Plessner have considered laughter as a uniquely 
human capacity. In recent times however, neuroscientif ic research seems to 
undermine philosophy’s restriction of laughter to human beings. Neurosci-
entist Jaak Panksepp famously defends the claim that circuits for laughter 
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exist in ancient brain regions that we share not only with chimpanzees, but 
also with rats. Pott argues that Plessner’s anthropological interpretation of 
laughter enables us to show how there is a shared biological basis for human 
and animal laughter, whereas at the same time important ways of laughing 
are exclusively human. She distinguishes four characteristics that different 
sorts of laughter all have in common: a perception of incongruity, a buildup 
of bodily tension and its relief, a specif ic relationship towards the cause of 
the laughter, and a mechanism of social inclusion. In this sense, there is a 
clear continuity between the laughter of all centric beings, from the laugh-
ing rat to the laughing human person. However, one typical form of laughter, 
which is connected with eccentric positionality, is indeed restricted to 
human beings. If we burst out in laughter in a particular situation and we 
completely lose control over our body, we experience our twofold corporeal-
ity, the fact that we are embodied creatures and creatures in a body at the 
same time. We are, Pott aptly summarizes her contribution, capable of 
breaking out into laughter because of our fundamental brokenness.
In A Moral Bubble: The Influence of Online Personalization on Moral Repo-
sitioning, Esther Keymolen uses Plessner’s anthropology to analyse online 
personalisation with the help of profiling technologies, which tailor internet 
services to the individual needs and preferences of the users. Referring 
to the work of various philosophers of technology like Ihde, Verbeek, and 
Pariser, she f irst explains how these technologies lead to a ‘Filter Bubble,’ 
“a unique universe of information for each of us.” Next, she argues that this 
f iltering also might influence our moral repositioning. Using Plessner’s 
notion of positionality, she argues that profiling technologies build a closed 
Umwelt instead of an open world, resulting in an online environment that 
is characterized by cold ethics rather than by hot morality. In addition, she 
focuses on the opaqueness of the personalized interface. As there has not 
been much public debate about online personalization until now, clear 
rules or agreements on how to implement profiling technologies are lack-
ing, according to Keymolen. Therefore, most of the time there is also a 
lack of transparency with regard to the operations that are being executed 
automatically ‘behind the screen’. Moreover, because users have no direct 
access to the settings of the interface, they cannot judge for themselves 
whether the filtering of information is taken place accurately. Consequently, 
there is little room for moral repositioning. Online personalization might 
hamper normative ref lection, establishing moral stagnation. By way of 
conclusion, Keymolen consider several means to avoid this stagnation. 
Based on a multi-actor approach, she focus on how users, technologies, 
and regulation may counter the negative effects of prof iling technologies.
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In Eccentric Positionality as a Precondition for the Criminal Liability of 
Artificial Life Forms, Mireille Hildebrandt takes up Bas Hengstmengel’s 
discussion about the relevance of Plessner’s anthropology for the study of 
law, though here in a high-tech context. The author explores to what extent 
Plessner’s distinction between animal centricity and human eccentricity 
is ‘the difference that makes the difference’ for the attribution of criminal 
liability among artif icial life forms (ALFs). Building on the work of Steels 
and Bourgine and Varela on artif icial life and Matura and Varela’s notion 
of autopoesis, Hildebrandt argues that even if ALFs are autonomous in the 
sense of having the capacity to rewrite their own program, this in itself is 
not enough to understand them as autonomous in the sense of instantiating 
an eccentric position that allows for reflection on their actions as their 
own actions. Evidently, this also means that only to the extent that ALFs 
do develop some sort of conscious self-reflection, would they, in principle, 
qualify for the censure in criminal law. As Plessner does not connect person-
hood to human beings but rather to eccentric positionality, in principle, 
ALFs would qualify for personhood.
Dierk Spreen continues the discussion about the cyborgization of man 
in Not Terminated: Cyborgized Men Still Remain Human Beings. As the 
title already indicates, Spreen defends the thesis that, because of the fact 
that man always has been artif icial and living in an artif icial world of 
culture and technology, electronic implants, artif icial limbs and organs 
etc., do not mark the end of man. However, this does not mean that the 
technological extensions of the human body that has been made possible 
by the converging technologies do not raise any questions or debates. The 
appearance of body-invasive technologies going beyond the boundary of 
the skin results in theoretical fashions, which on the one hand doubt the 
signif icance of man as the basic category of anthropology-based sociology 
(trans- and post-humanism), and on the other hand question important 
conceptual differentiations such as those between nature and culture or 
between organic and technological entities. In contrast to this position, 
Spreen, closely following Helmuth Plessner’s philosophical anthropology, 
argues that the technologization of the body stays within the limits of 
man’s possibilities, so that we very well may speak of “human cyborgs.” 
In addition, he argues that within the context of the cyborg, it remains 
reasonable to keep up conceptual distinctions such as nature/culture or 
life/technology. Finally, Spreen states that particularly modern man is 
inevitably related to a discursive space of self-reflectibility, where man’s 
natural artif iciality takes specific shape and at the same time remains open 
for change. Moreover, this is not a process in a particular f ixed direction. 
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In the age of “reflexive modernity” (Giddens 1991) it is open for permanent 
debate and reflection.
In Plessner and Technology: Philosophical Anthropology Meets the Posthu-
man, Peter-Paul Verbeek also contributes to this permanent reflection. He 
interprets human enhancements and posthumanism from the perspec-
tive of Plessner’s notion of positionality. He starts his exposition with a 
discussion of the striking role technology has played in the tradition of 
philosophical anthropology since the end of the nineteenth century. On 
the basis of a short overview of the views on technology of, among others, 
Kapp, Schmidt, Gehlen, and Stiegler, Verbeek concludes that all of these 
representatives of this tradition have emphasized that there exists no sharp 
boundary between humans and technology However, Plessner’s notion 
of natural artif iciality radicalizes this theme of man as a deficient being 
(Mängelwesen), because for him, the human def icit is not the lack of an 
adequate organic set of instruments for survival, but the consequence of 
human eccentricity. Next, starting from Plessner’s second anthropological 
law of mediated immediacy and using some further distinctions made by 
philosophers of technology Ihde and Kockelkoren, Verbeek discusses the 
different ways technologies mediate the relationship between humans and 
the world. Human beings embody technologies, interpret the world through 
them, interact with technologies, and use technologies as a background 
for experiences. However, according to Verbeek, with technologies such as 
brain implants, psychotropic drugs, and intelligent prostheses, we enter a 
new type of relationship with technology, in which man and technology 
seem to merge more radically than ever. Verbeek argues that it is here 
where we can encounter a new type of positionality, which he dubs meta-
eccentricity. Rather than just having an eccentric relationship to our centric 
position, we enter a relationship to our eccentricity as well, which thereby 
becomes malleable.
In Philosophical Anthropology 2.0, Jos de Mul concludes the volume with 
a reflection on the impact of the converging technologies (nanotechnol-
ogy, biotechnology, information technology and cognitive science) on the 
paradigm of philosophical anthropology. As Joachim Fischer explained in 
his contribution to this volume, philosophical anthropology in the f irst 
half of the twentieth century can be conceived as a successful response 
to the (Darwinian) naturalization of the worldview. While the debate on 
naturalization often resulted in an unfruitful opposition between radi-
cal reductionism and radical transcendentism, Plessner’s hermeneutical 
phenomenology of life offered a promising ‘third way.’ However, Plessner’s 
phenomenology of human life is not completely free from essentialism and 
36 Jos de Mul 
anthropocentrism. This urges us towards a revision of some crucial elements 
of his philosophical anthropology. This revision is especially relevant in or-
der to adequately respond to the challenges of current neo-Darwinism and 
the converging technologies that are intertwined with it. Whereas classical 
Darwinism challenged the human place in cosmos mainly theoretically, 
technologies like genetic modification, neuro-enhancement and electronic 
implants have the potential to ‘overcome’ Homo sapiens sapiens it in a more 
radical, practical sense. This urges upon us a fundamental post-essentialist 
and post-anthropocentric human self-reflection. The claim that Plessner’s 
phenomenological anthropology still offers a fruitful starting point for the 
development of such ‘philosophical anthropology 2.0’ is demonstrated by a 
reinterpretation of Plessner’s three ‘anthropological laws’ in light of today’s 
converging technologies.
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A Third Way between Darwinism and Foucaultism
Joachim Fischer
The purpose of this chapter is to demonstrate and explicate the technique of 
Philosophical Anthropology.1 The thesis is that Philosophical Anthropology 
is a particular (and arguably extremely important) theory in that it steers a 
course between naturalism and culturalism, in other words, between Darwin 
and Foucault. Plessner might have said ‘between Darwin and Dilthey,’ but 
today, Philosophical Anthropology appears as a paradigm which sits between 
the theories of Darwin and Foucault. It builds a bridge between biology on the 
one hand and social and cultural sciences on the other; a bridge which could 
neither be constructed by Darwin (and his followers) nor by Foucault (and 
his followers). Yet, this bridge allows us to accept both paradigms as ways 
of thinking while simultaneously limiting their spheres. This Philosophical 
Anthropology is reconstructed with reference to Plessner’s The Levels of the 
Organic and Man [Die Stufen des Organischen und der Mensch, 1928] and to 
his sophisticated (and subtle) concept of ‘eccentric positionality.’
Philosophical Anthropology: Discipline or paradigm?
It is important to distinguish between two uses of the term ‘philosophical 
anthropology’: philosophical anthropology as a discipline (a sub-discipline 
within philosophy) and Philosophical Anthropology as a paradigm.2 In the 
1920s there were two philosophical movements in this f ield, out of which 
two senses of the term ‘philosophical anthropology’ were born. In 1928 there 
emerged almost a new discipline called ‘philosophical anthropology’ within 
philosophy, instanced by, for example, Bernhard Groethuysen’s Philosophis-
che Anthropologie (Groethuysen 1931 [1928]), and later by Michael Landmann’s 
Philosophical Anthropology [Philosophische Anthropologie. Menschliche 
Selbstdeutung in Geschichte u. Gegenwart, 1964] (Landmann 1974). This dis-
1 The reason to write ‘Philosophical Anthropology’ with capital letters will be explained in 
the next section.
2 For better orientation the text differentiates between ‘philosophical anthropology as a 
discipline’ and ‘Philosophical Anthropology’ (written capital letters) as a paradigm.
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cipline is concerned with the question ‘Who or what is man?’ The discipline 
‘philosophical anthropology’ is an organized collection of answers to this 
question, marked by a tradition of European thought, and later on farther 
afield (Hartung 2008). It developed as a discipline through contributions from 
different contemporary paradigms, such as psychoanalysis, philosophical 
hermeneutics, existential philosophy, the phenomenology of the body, the 
phenomenology of human Lebenswelt, the anthropology of Feuerbach, early 
Marx, and so on. Later, this discipline developed rules governing what it 
means to work within philosophical anthropology as a discipline, in an 
interdisciplinary framework between different human sciences.
By contrast, under the same title of ‘Philosophical Anthropology’ (to 
distinguish it from the discipline here written with capitals) there emerged 
at the same time a philosophical-anthropological paradigm: a particular ap-
proach to thought, with a distinctive procedure, which attempts to arrive at 
a theory of man via a theory of biological life in general. This is exemplif ied 
in the writings of Scheler (Scheler 1961 [1928]) and Plessner (Plessner 1975 
[1928]). This developing paradigm, under the title ‘Philosophical Anthropol-
ogy,’ was shaped by diverse thinkers and researchers: Scheler, Plessner, 
later Rothacker, Gehlen, Buytendijk, Portmann, and so on. While the work 
of these individuals is not the subject of this paper, it is important to note 
that Plessner was not alone in his intellectual interests in this area. Despite 
the use of different terminology and focusing on different interests, these 
thinkers shared an overarching approach, an approach they identif ied as 
‘Philosophical Anthropology,’ and this participation in a shared paradigm 
was the background to their sometimes strange (and often bitter) rivalry.3
The equivocation of the term ‘philosophical anthropology’ as a discipline 
on the one hand and as a paradigm on the other, leads the philosopher 
down two tracks at once. We can compare the discipline ‘philosophical 
anthropology’ to other disciplines in philosophy (such as epistemology, 
ethics, metaphysics, aesthetics, etc.) and we can also compare the paradigm 
‘Philosophical Anthropology’ with other paradigms (such as neo-Kantianism, 
naturalism, existentialism, phenomenology, critical theory, philosophical 
hermeneutics, poststructuralism, theory of social systems, etc.). Thus, the 
equivocation proves itself to be useful for research. Of course, Plessner and 
the other thinkers who created the new paradigm belonged also to the new 
discipline, but their noteworthy achievement lies in the invention of the 
paradigm called ‘Philosophical Anthropology.’
3 Philosophical anthropology as a paradigm within this group of thinkers and researchers 
is reconstructed in Fischer 2008. See also Rehberg 2009 and Borsari 2009.
PhilosoPhicAl AnthroPology 43
Cartesian dualism as the challenge: Philosophical Anthropology 
as a response
This paper concerns only the paradigm called ‘Philosophical Anthropology,’ 
not the discipline. More specif ically, it is concerned with the theoretical 
strategy of Philosophical Anthropology, a strategy competing with other 
paradigms that engage in some form of analysis of the human world. In 
order to elucidate this theoretical strategy, it is necessary to understand 
the competing approaches, out of which Philosophical Anthropology has 
developed its unique approach. While Cartesisan Dualism had already 
been modif ied by the beginning of the twentieth century (the period of the 
genesis of Philosophical Anthropology), it has once more radicalized at the 
beginning of the twenty-first century. As a result, it split into two competing 
paradigms: between naturalism on the one hand (especially in the form 
of Darwinism, the core paradigm of the natural and neuronal sciences, 
or at least of the life sciences) and culturalism (or so-called Foucaultism 
in the cultural and social sciences) on the other, which are two opposing 
extremes in a spectrum. For naturalism, the distinction between nature 
and culture is a distinction within nature itself; for culturalism, and all 
social-constructionisms, the distinction between nature and culture is an 
a priori distinction made by culture itself.
It is very important to understand that these two theories continue 
the legacy of classical Cartesian dualism, a dualism between the thinking 
thing and the extended thing (mind and nature), but with new terms and 
new means: the evolutionary paradigm now takes the side of the natural, 
physical thing, and culturalism takes the mind as its subject. Even at the 
beginning of the twentieth century, biology on the one hand (Darwin), 
and historic-cultural constructivism in the shape of historicism and her-
meneutic philosophy on the other (Dilthey), gave new expressions to the 
two wings of Cartesianism: in place of the physics of the inanimate thing 
there was now the mechanism of the organism (including the brain), and in 
place of the thinking subject there was now language as an inter-subjective 
medium of thinking (the so called ‘linguistic turn’). Cartesian dualism 
allows each of the two competing paradigms to expand their span over the 
entire Cartesian domain: evolutionary biology claims now to explain not 
only life but the sociocultural world as a whole,4 and, vice versa, culturalism, 
4 An important contribution to evolutionary anthropology was, of course, the initial research 
into the great apes by Wolfgang Köhler (1917).
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by means of the linguistic turn, explains natural science and the evolution-
ary pattern as a mere cultural interpretation-scheme of special historicity.
Anticipating the theoretical strategy of Philosophical Anthropology 
one could interpret this phenomenon as an attempt to reach a convincing 
position regarding cultural and social science in an era that is rigorously 
dominated by evolutionary biology. Philosophical Anthropology is a third 
agent, but not a sheer mediator: it is more sophisticated than that. It f irst 
relativizes the Darwinian analysis of life (including human life), and 
simultaneously it both liberates and limits the sociocultural perspective. 
Philosophical Anthropology makes a generous concession in favour of 
naturalism without being a naturalistic approach itself. At its core, there 
is a philosophical biology which is constructed in response to evolution-
ary naturalism and at the same time it conditions the social and cultural 
sciences. Hence, it can claim to be a good ‘f it,’ inclusive of both theoretical 
worlds.
We can now characterise the two wings of Cartesianism as the challenge 
of naturalism in the shape of Darwinism, and the response to this challenge 
by culturalism in the shape of Dilthey and Foucault. Having done this, we 
can then elucidate the theory we call Philosophical Anthropology. We will 
conclude with short remarks suggesting what one gains by the use of this 
paradigm.
Darwinian naturalism
Darwin’s theory of evolution has not only become a key theory within 
biology itself, but also a biologically-founded theory within anthropology. 
As Ernst Mayr claims, “No modern thinker, can, in the end, avoid thinking, 
when it comes to the essentials of his worldview, as a ‘Darwinist’ thinks” 
(Mayr 1988). We can think of the Darwinian paradigm as a rocket with two 
phases: f irst, the theory of life or living organisms, and secondly, embedded 
within this theory, a theory of the human being.
Darwin’s theory of life, expressed in The Origins of Species by Means of 
Natural Selection (Darwin 2000 [1859]), understands all species of living 
organisms (both those still in existence and those now extinct) as resulting 
from an evolution inherent in the very nature of living things. According to 
this theory, the variety now observable in living organisms did not result 
from a creation by a transcendent power, but from a process of development 
ruled by certain inherent mechanisms: genetic variation arising through 
the process of reproduction, natural selection of variations which are suc-
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cessful in their environment, and f inally, the stabilisation of successful 
species of organisms. It is important to note that these variations include 
not only organs and other physiological achievements, but also kinds of 
behavior of individual organisms (in higher species), predispositions for 
certain behaviors, ‘moods,’ and other non-physiological characteristics. The 
theory postulates that all organisms (extant and extinct) are connected to 
one set of ancestors.
The second phase of the evolutionary ‘rocket’ Darwin himself introduced 
in The Descent of Man (Darwin 1990 [1875]) published some twenty years 
after The Origins of Species by Means of Natural Selection. Impressed by 
abundant empirical evidence, Darwin was led to compare human beings 
to other creatures within the realm of living things, and came to the thesis 
that there was a common descent of plants, animals, and human beings, and 
that the natural origin of human beings is the same as that of other higher 
primates. This systematic inclusion of man in the living world amounts, sci-
entif ically, to the inclusion of anthropology within biology. Darwin himself 
contrasts his thesis with a traditional idealistic self-interpretation of man: 
for Darwin, the human mind derives from lower forms of cognition, the 
human language from the voices of mammals, the moral sentiments from 
social instincts. Evolutionary theory allows us to systematically understand 
all those characteristics over which man seems to have a monopoly simply 
being mechanisms of life (evolved traits), and to reduce all anthropological 
terms to biological terms. Darwin’s key claim is: “Nevertheless the difference 
in mind between man and the higher animals, great as it is, certainly is one 
of degree and not of kind” (Darwin 1990 [1875]). This theory of the merely 
gradual differentiation in the evolution of life, covers the ‘impulses’ of life. 
The struggle for survival of the individual organism, and the survival of the 
species by reproduction, the mechanisms of variation, selection, and stabi-
lization all function at the human level and explain all human phenomena, 
including what we think of as sociocultural; all patterns of conduct, all 
symbolic interactions, all inner moods and mindsets, can be explained as 
epiphenomena of the mechanisms of survival and reproduction common to 
all living things. Evolutionary theory as a naturalistic paradigm postulates 
‘bio-power’ in the human being – but in a sense other than that used by 
poststructuralists and Foucault. It is not that sociocultural constructions 
and disciplining discourses that have come to wield power over human life 
in historically diverse ways and govern life by these cultural constructions, 
but rather that life itself is the determining power: bio-power is the power 
of life itself extending into all human constructions and discourses. In this 
evolutionary theory, all aspects of the sociocultural can be ‘biologized’ or 
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explained with reference to nature: within the Darwinian paradigm, one 
can observe and explain how life itself ramifies through all the branches and 
stems of the mental, emotional, social, and cultural world (Dawkins 2009; 
Eibl 2007). Similarly, with biological psychology, sociobiology, biological 
cultural science, and evolutionary epistemology, this bio-evolutionary pro-
gramme of an ‘evolutionary anthropology’ penetrates into the sociocultural 
sphere: “Der Darwin-Code. Die Evolution erklärt unser Leben” – the title of 
a Darwinist study published during the year of Darwin 2009 (Junker and 
Paul 2009).
Culturalism and constructionism: Responses to Darwinism 
within Cartesianism
Darwinists can claim that we have been living in a ‘biological epoch’ since 
last third of the nineteenth century (Illies 2006). How can we challenge this 
claim? We can differentiate between two categories of response: Darwin 
or God (Klose and Oehler 2008) and Darwin or Foucault. In popular debate, 
there is much interest in the attempt to re-establish theology, and the theo-
logical theory of the creation of living beings (including man) by God, but the 
theory of creationism is not influential within science. Within science, the 
alternative to the Darwinian approach is constructionism, which is highly 
developed and dominates the scene with a broad spectrum of variation. It is 
important to introduce the def ining features of constructionism here, as it 
will serve us to contrast it with Philosophical Anthropology as a paradigm. 
Two contemporary constructionisms that have attempted to respond to the 
f irst Darwinian challenge (theory of life) were neo-Kantianism (the renewal 
of idealism) on the one hand, and historicism, or hermeneutic philosophy 
(especially as seen in Dilthey) on the other (De Mul 2004). On what common 
principle do these responses rely? The key principle of such approaches, the 
starting point of the paradigm, is always the inherent ‘order’ of thought and 
speech, which, be it an intellectual or symbolic or linguistic order, is itself 
unaffected by nature. This principle is common across all the various forms 
of constructionism, regardless of whether it involves the order of language, 
symbols, writing, symbolic forms (Cassirer), historical a priori (Dilthey), or 
the respective epistemologies of word-view and self-view (Foucault).
Seen from this point of view evolutionary biology appears to be a mere 
discourse, a linguistic construction on ‘life,’ according to the rules of a 
certain discourse-formation and part of the discursive ‘bio-power’ (the term 
now used in Foucault’s sense). The decisive move within the theoretical 
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chess game of socioconstructivism or historicism or poststructuralism is to 
claim that the distinction between nature and culture is only possible within 
culture, within the respective symbolic order of social culture (Reckwitz 
2006). ‘Life,’ particularly human life, enters the game only according to 
socially-constructed systems and worldviews, marked by subjugations of 
the body and bio-power-control of populations, techniques of controlling 
life, contingent rules (instantiated in discourses, images, language, sym-
bolization, and bio-politics) and the contingent decisions of inter-subjective 
or trans-subjective cultural order. All of these concepts define what can be 
accepted as ‘life’ and as ‘human.’ All naturalisms, including evolutionary 
theory, can be deconstructed as merely a strategic discourse or narrative, 
and can therefore be suspended, repealed, or cancelled.
Philosophical Anthropology: A third way
Against this historical background, we are now ready to introduce 
Philosophical Anthropology. To understand Philosophical Anthropology, 
it is important to remember that all of the thinkers within this paradigm 
retain a non-Darwinian idealistic self-interpretation of man, i.e. that man 
is special in self-knowledge and self-determination, and liable to cultural 
social construction. This position is foundational for Philosophical Anthro-
pologists and not open for discussion. As such, the reductionist Darwinian 
theory constitutes a real challenge to thinkers in this f ield. The strategy 
of Philosophical Anthropology as a philosophical paradigm is to follow 
neither evolutionary theory on the one hand, nor to evade (as culturalistic 
constructivism does) the basic question of nature and life on the other. In 
other words, it tries not to follow naturalism, nor to dodge the question 
of nature in the same way Dilthey and Foucault did. What Philosophical 
Anthropologists accept from the evolutionary approach is explanation 
from within nature, i.e. that there is an explanation of life inherent within 
nature – without recourse to theological models or teleological models of 
the purpose of nature. In short, they accept the basic role of biology (Jonas 
1966). Philosophical anthropology places itself in a concession to Darwinism 
and nonetheless does not coincide with Darwinism.
The key issue in any theory of Philosophical Anthropology therefore is its 
internal relation to a philosophical biology (Grene 1965). Every Philosophical 
Anthropology, as a paradigm, invents a philosophical biology by means of 
which it then unfolds a theory of social culture. In challenging Darwinism, 
the relationship to a particular philosophical biology is decisive. It is there-
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fore characteristic of Philosophical Anthropology that in its conceptual 
framework, it never starts as an anthropology, but rather, before considering 
man, deals with the wider theory of life. It is typical of this approach to reach 
consideration of the human only in the wider context of all living things. In 
contrast to the impulse of evolutionary theory, the guiding impulse here, 
when considering the living world in general, is to avoid surrendering to the 
irreducible experience of man as a reason – and discourse-mediated being, 
capable of self-detachment, language, ecstasy, laughing, crying, and so on. 
In the view of the Philosophical Anthropologists, there is nothing wrong 
with evolutionary theory as a theory of life, except that it is inadequate as 
a theory of human beings, as it is unable to explain their special experi-
ences. The credo of Philosophical Anthropology is: as a philosopher, you 
are responsible for the biology which interprets man. So philosophers have 
to be responsible for inventing a proper philosophical biology compatible 
with the theory of life in general, but also appropriate to the interpretation 
of man. That is the task in which Philosophical Anthropology engages in 
this biological epoch in which we f ind ourselves. In biologically-informed 
talk about the organic world, the phenomena of life should be described in 
such a way that – after consideration of the organic in general, the human 
organism is at last considered – the experience encountered at the beginning 
(the self-detachment, self-determination, or dignity of man) should not be 
proven to be an illusion or a mere epiphenomenon. To put it in another way, 
the strategy of Philosophical Anthropology, faced with the challenge of 
Darwinism, is to arrive at a unified theory wherein a non-reductive concept 
of man-in-nature, achieved within an inclusive theory of life, is capable of 
dealing with the contrasts between plants, animals, and man. In a sense, 
all the Philosophical Anthropologists are working like detectives or inves-
tigators, sifting through the f indings of empirical biology for discoveries 
which might allow them to stress the Sonderstellung of human organisms. 
Therefore, they are deeply interested in the discoveries of Driesch (1921), Von 
Uexküll (1996), Buytendijk (1928), Bolk (1926), Portmann (1990), and many 
other biological researchers whose biological discoveries might offer an 
open door to the anthropologists’ philosophical biology.5 Let us explicate 
the paradigm more precisely. Provided that the Darwinian theory of man is 
either a type of vertical reduction akin to a conceptual reductive operation 
which translates all theological or philosophical assertions concerning man 
5 And they all were deeply impressed by Henri Bergson and his philosophical dealing with 
evolutionary theory – the ‘L’évolution creatice’ (1944 [1907]) was a model for their own attempts 
at similar enterprises.
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to assertions about natural science or biological states, or it is a type of verti-
cal reduction in parallel to an ontological reduction in which the human 
being in the end is nothing other than a natural body, then Philosophical 
Anthropology turns the table by turning the reduction upside down.
In short, it operates as a theory of vertical emergence within a theory 
of living things which itself includes a theory of the stages of living things 
(without recourse to theology or teleology). By this theory of vertical emer-
gence in nature, the Sonderstellung of man can be carefully characterized 
(Thies 2004). Therefore, one can see at f irst sight that the anthropology of 
Feuerbach, for instance, does not belong to this paradigm, because it shares 
the operation of reductionism. So Feuerbach, characterized by his material-
ism, need not be counted as a progenitor of Philosophical Anthropology.
Philosophical Anthropology and Plessner’s ‘eccentric 
positionality’
Now is the time to explain Plessner’s term ‘eccentric positionality’ (Plessner 
1975 [1928]).6 The discussion so far will hopefully aid us in accurately defin-
ing and sharpening our Philosophical Anthropology by using Plessner’s 
rather sophisticated concept. The concept itself reveals how Philosophi-
cal Anthropology works as a paradigm. In fact, other advocates of the 
philosophical-anthropological approach. e.g. Scheler or Gehlen, Portmann 
or Jonas, more or less tacitly accepted Plessner’s term. Plessner takes for 
granted self-detachment, self-determination, and all the properties classi-
cally (and idealistically) ascribed to human beings, but he does not begin 
with them – i.e. they are not his point of departure. The goal here is to reach 
the peak of the culturalist endeavour (the whole realm of cultural and social 
sciences), the so-called hermeneutic sphere, but not by beginning with its 
own assumptions. As the operation of Philosophical Anthropology requires, 
Plessner reaches the classically idealistic terms in a roundabout way, via an 
excursus in the theory of life. He starts with the idea of the thing. The thing 
appears as a phenomenon to the subject, but the drive of Plessner’s theory 
is not to try to reconstruct the experience the subject has in relation to the 
phenomenon, but rather to focus on the phenomenon of the thing itself. His 
approach prefers philosophical attention to the thing (the object, that which 
is experienced) over attention to the subject (that which experiences). Thus, 
6 For useful interpretations of this important term, see, for instance, Eßbach 1994, Krüger 
1998, Fischer 2000 or Lindemann 2005.
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he starts with the distinction between inanimate and living things, and 
characterizes living things as defined by a ‘boundary’ (Grenze). Organisms, 
or living things, are marked by boundaries; they are boundary-realizing 
things. An organism has boundary-contact with its environment; it builds 
up its own complexity in metabolism with the environment by means of 
its boundary. This approach of def ining organisms by their boundaries 
has many implications. Plessner can explain the properties of organisms 
by this condition (according to empirical biology: and this constitutes the 
main part of Die Stufen des Organischen und der Mensch), but can also 
pave the way for an application of this analysis to the sociocultural sphere 
of man. The boundary of the organism is not only a result of the fact that 
living things have to organize their own survival (i.e. solve the question of 
stabilisation), but the idea of the boundary of an organism also includes the 
notion of ‘expressivity’ – another important difference between living and 
inanimate objects. By their boundaries, living things become manifest at 
their surfaces, and by their surfaces as boundaries these living things are 
phenomena in the deep sense of the word. It is extremely important to note 
at this point that Plessner’s philosophical biology, constructed within a 
Philosophical Anthropology, already encapsulates the basic idea of ‘expres-
sivity’ by def ining living things by their boundaries. And ‘expressivity,’ 
since Dilthey, is vitally important as the key term of self-awareness in the 
social and cultural sciences. Thus, Plessner creates a connection to the 
cultural and social sciences from within a philosophical biology via the 
establishment of a fundamental category which includes the idea of ‘human 
expression’ (Plessner 1964).
To develop and extend this approach into the sphere of human beings, 
Plessner needs not only a theory of different types of living things, but also 
a concept that will enable him to differentiate between different levels 
or stages of boundary-regulation. This need is satisf ied with the concept 
of ‘positionality.’ It replaces the key notion of idealism (Fichte’s Setzung, 
or the self-positioning ‘I’) with a naturalistic idea – passive positionality 
(Gesetztheit) or being positioned. This positionality marks a deep concession 
of Philosophical Anthropology towards Darwinism, because it highlights 
the relative passivity of organisms – being pushed by the anonymous force 
of nature into the boundaries they have to keep. The living body is given 
by nature. Positionality implies that there is no Creator who makes and 
positions living beings; there is no self-positioning ‘I’ who positioned nature 
(as the Non-I): nor is there a society or culture which creates or def ines 
life. Positionality entails only that the anonymous force of nature pushes 
individual organisms into their boundaries and borders, disposing them 
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to stay within a specif ic spatial environment.7 Plessner now continues his 
Philosophical Anthropology by distinguishing stages of positionality, driven 
by the goal to classify plants, different kinds of animals, and human beings. 
He distinguishes between open and closed forms of positionality, and next 
between a-centric and centric positionality. Mammals and within them 
primates, belong to the latter group. One could say that the emergence of 
‘centric positionality’ denotes the breakthrough of intentionality in the evo-
lution of life. Plessner explains this intentionality towards the environment 
(Umweltintentionalität) from the practical correlation between organism and 
environment. In doing so, he gives this key concept of phenomenology and 
pragmatism a crucial place in his reconstruction of the levels of the organic.8
And one has to bear in mind that Plessner’s intention with ‘centric 
positionality’ is to include what he calls ‘frontal positionality.’ This is very 
important for his next step, because with the term ‘frontal positionality’ he 
can draw attention to the observable fact that some kinds of brain-animals 
are already in communication with the brains of other animals: by the 
frontal appearance of their positionality, i.e. by their expressive boundary 
surfaces, visual patterns, touching and shouting, which allow interactional 
co-ordination and imitation between positionalities. There is already a 
relationship between the individual organism and the society, even at the 
level of ‘frontal positionality’ – perceiving each other through the senses.
We can now turn our attention to human beings. Plessner suggests the 
concept ‘eccentric positionality’ for the characterization of our life form. 
One could say that Plessner, or Philosophical Anthropology in general, 
captures in this term the 1-2% difference in genetic make-up between the 
great apes and human beings. ‘Eccentric positionality’ implies that in these 
living things there is a kind of disengagement or detachment from life, but 
within life, and, because this happens within natural life, it has to be lived 
in life, to be connected to life. Eccentricity takes place within positionality. 
Eccentric positionality means detachment from the body within the body, 
or in other words, detachment from life within life. Thus, one can adopt 
Plessner’s approach within both rival paradigms of Cartesian dualism: 
within Foucaultism/culturalism it operates at the level of discourse; within 
Darwinism/naturalism it operates at the level of the biological in human life.
7 Perhaps ‘positionality’ as the key term of a philosophical biology is more appropriate than 
‘auto-poiesis,’ which means something like self-creation or self-organisation of life because 
positionality contains the notion of the moment that life happens to the organism, when it is 
set or positioned in its boundary.
8 One has to take into account Plessner’s deep aff inity with the new understandings of 
ontology propounded by Hartmann (1975).
52 JoAchiM fischer 
But detachment from life within life means for this type of living being 
that it has to invent something in place of nature (it has to invent cultural 
society) and then to embody this invention within nature, because eccentric 
positionality always remains ‘positionality’ – forced upon the living being 
by the anonymous force of nature.
Philosophical Anthropology as a paradigm: What do we get out 
of it?
What have we gained from the use of this kind of paradigm? Using 
the paradigm, we can generate original anthropological categories, 
Sonderstellungs-terms, reserved for human beings alone. Eccentric posi-
tionality entails both that all anthropological categories are transformed, 
broken-bridged vital categories, still working within the anthropological 
dimension, and also that these anthropological categories are opened for 
variation and determinations by historic categories, concepts of ‘styles’ of 
human life. So, through Philosophical Anthropology, we have established 
a connection to the bio-power both in the Darwinian sense, as well as to 
the bio-power in a Foucaultist sense. To generate such anthropological 
categories, Plessner introduces the so-called laws of ‘natural artif icial-
ity,’ ‘mediated immediacy’ and the ‘utopian standpoint,’ all of which are 
guidelines for the discovery of anthropological categories. Consider, for 
example, laughter and crying. For Plessner, this pair is the paradigm of the 
paradigm, the key example of what he intends to do with Philosophical 
Anthropology (Plessner 1970 [1941]): only eccentric positionalities can 
and must laugh and cry – in moments of crisis of sensible orientation, 
laughing and crying are vital reactions of the positionality to the crises 
of eccentricity. Every organism has to physically react to crisis, but only 
an eccentric-positioned being, which exists within a constructed world of 
sense and reason, can be thrown off kilter by the unexpected, unavoidable 
reality of the natural world. Laughing or crying, as reactions to crisis, 
are not cultural constructions by human beings, but things happening 
to their bodies: it is a regenerative return to the positionality, to their 
passivity, to the experience that they are living bodies. In short, they are 
regenerative powers of human life. At the same time, this vitality, this 
evolutionary bio-power in laughing and crying can and must be disciplined 
by the Foucaultist bio-power which disciplines, controls, and regulates 
the occasions of expressions of laughing and crying through the various 
forces of culture within society.
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Darwinism and Foucaultism seen from the perspective of 
eccentric positionality
Philosophical Anthropology is a way of thinking which, as we have seen, 
operates somewhere between Darwin and Dilthey, and which re-emerges as 
a fascinating approach that stands between Darwin and Foucault, between 
the alternatives of naturalism and culturalism. Plessner’s key concept of 
eccentric positionality could be an appropriate way to grasp, within a proper 
philosophical biology, the sociocultural dimension of man. If it works, this 
approach could offer a technique to control and limit the claims of Darwin-
ism as well as those of Foucaultism. If it works, the technique of Philosophical 
Anthropology can be seen not only as a paradigm within the discipline 
of philosophical anthropology (among other paradigms), but as a subtle 
paradigm within epistemology, in ethics, in bioethics, in cultural sciences (De 
Mul 1991), in philosophy of technology (De Mul 2010), in psychology (Coolen 
2008), in sociology (Claessens 1980; Tomasello 2008), and human geography 
(Ernste 2004), in philosophy of nature (Grene 1974), and ecophilosophy 
(Peterson 2010), even (as Max Scheler has applied it) in modern metaphysics.
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2 The Nascence of Modern Man
Two Approaches to the Problem – Biological Evolutionary 
Theory and Philosophical Anthropology
Hans-Peter Krüger1
Biological and medical anthropology, social and cultural anthropology, 
and historical anthropology – each investigate different aspects of the hu-
man condition. Yet the f irst specif ically philosophical anthropological task 
consists of integrating these different aspects into a single interdisciplinary 
framework. Such a framework must systematically capture the intercon-
nections between nature and culture, as well as individuality and sociality. 
As far as temporal and historical issues are concerned, such a systematic 
and interdisciplinary framework must also be able to provide us with some 
orientation with respect to human evolutionary history. In short, it must 
perform a signif icant heuristic function. In this interdisciplinary sense, 
philosophical anthropology is not a special anthropological discipline but 
rather a universal anthropology, which circumscribes the f ield of research 
as a whole and shapes it to be compatible with all other anthropological 
subf ields. The structure and function of philosophical anthropology is 
assessed by its ability to weave together a number of disciplinary tasks.
One encounters the second task of philosophical anthropology as soon 
as one seriously reflects upon the historical fact that posing and answering 
anthropological questions has itself been an integral part of the human con-
dition since the Axial Ages, that is, since the stabilization of high cultures 
of the personality between approximately 500 BC and 500 AD. Apparently, 
this institutionalization of personality, which, at that time, was enjoyed by 
only a small minority, made it possible to distinguish man from other living 
creatures by distinguishing persons from other creatures. Such distinctions 
and their modif ications functioned as differential criteria, albeit from a 
point of view we would recognize today as anthropocentric and ethno-
centric. This problem of elevating the predominant self-perception to the 
status of a central standard for everyone and everything else has only grown 
more pointed since the dawn of modernity. One can thus follow Michel 
Foucault in calling the epistemic and political constitution of modernity 
an anthropological circle (cf. Krüger 2009, ch. I. 1.). One must, therefore, 
1 Translated from the German by Daniel Smyth.
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also investigate what makes anthropologies possible and how they are 
able, by means of methodological control, to put themselves in a position to 
manifest political authority. Otherwise, particular anthropologies and even 
philosophical anthropology itself degenerate into an ideological muddle, 
as history has taught us all to frequently.
To the best of my knowledge, only Helmuth Plessner’s philosophical 
anthropology has managed to convincingly fulf ill both of these philosophi-
cal tasks (cf. Krüger 2009, ch. II. 4., Krüger 2010, ch. I.). Hence, that is the 
system I have chosen to work with. As it would go beyond the scope of this 
essay, I have to restrict myself to only explore the f irst of the two tasks 
mentioned above. I will begin with some contemporary proposals for how 
to think about the evolution of modern man (in the biological sense of Homo 
sapiens sapiens). Second, I will reconstruct the most important interdisci-
plinary contributions to this question within the discourse of philosophical 
anthropology. There has of course been a great deal of empirical progress in 
the various related special disciplines in the last two decades. Nonetheless, 
the conceptual task that arises in reflecting on the evolution of man remains 
fundamentally unchanged. Despite the close relationship between man’s 
new sociocultural niche and his new sociocultural environment in the 
evolution of nature, the questions posed within philosophical anthropology 
were more developed both philosophically and anthropologically than they 
are in the contemporary discussion.
How are variation and selection connected in the evolution of 
modern man? The formation of a sociocultural niche of collective 
intentionality
The modern, synthetic theory of evolution (Mayr and Provine 1998) no 
longer recognizes a single and unif ied necessity, but only the contingent 
interplay of two distinct processes. There is neither a place for preformation, 
nor for any telos or compulsion towards higher development. The two types 
of processes that this theory is concerned with are those of variation and 
selection. Variation has to do with the genotype, i.e. with the alteration of 
the inherited material typical of the species. As they are being passed on 
to the next generation, genes can be altered by several mechanisms. These 
can involve external influences, i.e. mutations in the narrow sense (e.g. by 
radiation, poisons, viruses), by errors in replicating DNA and RNA patterns 
in an organism’s sperm or ovum, or through the recombination of genes 
in sexual reproduction. On the other hand, selection has to do with the 
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phenotype, i.e. with the modes of behavior specif ic to a species within its 
specif ic environment. This behavioristic understanding of the phenotype 
is broader than its reduction to a physical manifestation of the organism’s 
genotypic potential. What can be observed from the outside, is behavior. 
The functions of physical structures are functions of behavior in its genetic, 
epigenetic, behavioral and symbolic dimensions (Luhmann 1997; Jablonka 
and Lamb 2005). Although one can clearly distinguish between variation 
and selection, the two processes must interact, however contingently. The 
survival of the genotype is impossible without reproductive behavior, as-
suming sexual dimorphism. Selection not only presupposes organisms that 
behave in certain ways, but also genes that are inherited through successive 
generations. Thus, the distinction between variation and selection is not 
a complete division and separation of the two sides, but rather raises the 
question of how they are connected. However, this question cannot be 
answered all too hastily, as though one already knew the answer. Instead, 
one must investigate and answer the relationship on a case-by-case basis 
(Jablonka and Lamb 2005).
In response to the question of the connection between variation and 
selection, two hypotheses have been pursued repeatedly in mammalian and 
avian biology: 1) population and 2) niche. Many mammals are social and 
live together throughout successive generations. They do not simply meet 
in order to reproduce while otherwise living in isolation from one another. 
Rather, they jointly care for the brood and share food or hunt together. In 
a particular spatiotemporal environment, they constitute populations, 
upon which the survival of individual conspecif ics (and thus of their genes) 
depends. To this extent, the transmission of a particular genotypic variation 
also depends on the social status of the relevant organism within the popu-
lation in that area. The social modes of behavior lie along a spectrum from 
cooperative to competitive and thus depends on the sex of the organism 
and the particular reproductive functions that sex fulfils in cooperation and 
competition. The formation of populations facilitates behavioral learning 
throughout successive generations. Population formation can become a 
niche formation when the social collective reintegrates enduring behavioral 
functions within itself and when cooperation and competition between 
members are kept within specif ic boundaries by means of quick and effec-
tive hierarchies. Yet, for niche formation to occur, the surrounding environ-
ment must also be favorable and conducive to the social organization of the 
population. This favorable relation may be contingent and have nothing to 
do with the social collectivity, i.e. it may be passively bestowed upon it. Or, 
it may be a direct consequence or side-effect of the collectivity’s existence, 
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e.g. as a result of the collectivity entering symbiotic relations with members 
of other species in expelling and eliminating competitors, i.e. when the 
fostering relation is a result of the collectivity’s own activities. According 
to Hugh Miller (1964), one also speaks of insulation: in a living community 
there is a center and a periphery in the sense that those creatures in the 
center are subjected to less selective pressure than those on the periphery. 
I use the concept of the niche in the sense of a relatively stable interplay 
between a social collective and an environment favorable to it. Naturally, 
niche formation is not something intended by the niche or the relevant 
social collective, but rather is the result of various feedbacks, both social 
and ecological in kind.
If niche formation is to be found throughout the mammalian world, it is 
perhaps most signif icant for the evolution of primates. Indeed, the appear-
ance of man seems to depend on it to such an extent that a certain inversion 
occurs. Here, I mean the inversion of passive niche formation into active 
niche formation: active or passive in terms of the social collective. Compared 
to other primates, there is an increasing gap between the genotype and 
the phenotype of modern man in the biological sense, i.e. Homo sapiens 
in the last 100,000 to 200,000 years. Within this period of time, the human 
genotype has hardly varied at all, while the modes of behavior (phenotype 
in broader sense) have varied enormously. Simply imagine what humans in 
East Africa might have looked like prior to the global spread of Homo sapiens 
some 100,000 years ago, and compare that with how they look today, in the 
midst of economic, political and cultural globalization in the great me-
tropolises of the world. The clearest leap in phenotype (modes of behavior) 
is located – according to the old biological classif ication – approximately 
40,000 to 60,000 years ago with the emergence of Homo sapiens sapiens, 
because a certain sociocultural accumulation can be reconstructed from 
this point on. The biological theory of evolution cannot explain such a great 
jump in such a short period of time – not even for the period of time that 
separates Homo sapiens from Homo sapiens sapiens, i.e. at least 40,000 years, 
but no more than 160,000 years. One must therefore work with numerous 
intermediary steps distributed in space and time. This strategic approach 
has recently been convincingly pursued by Michael Tomasello in his The 
Cultural Origins of Human Cognition (1999) and Steven Mithen (for the 
evolution from the early forms of Homo to Homo sapiens, cf. Mithen 1996).
Articulated in the framework of the biological theory of evolution, the 
hypothesis is as follows: a new niche must have developed, which provided 
for processes of cultural learning that were then able to build upon one 
another and thus accelerate evolution enormously. The construction of 
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such a niche becomes more plausible if one thinks of it as a series of small 
incremental steps. This series could have begun with kin selection (includ-
ing mutual cooperation). It could then have increased in strength through 
reciprocal altruism (including strong or indirect reciprocity) and eventually 
culminated in selecting in favor of culturally integrated groups (i.e. cultural 
group selection). In order to avoid misunderstandings, I should remark 
that, though I use the abbreviations that are customary in the discourse 
of biological evolutionary theory, I do not believe in the myths of either 
the egoistic or the altruistic gene. In biological evolutionary theory it is 
not genes, but rather organisms that are the proper subjects of behavior. 
Without an organism that behaves in certain ways in its environment, its 
genes would not be activated or deactivated at the right time, nor would 
they be replicated, transmitted or inherited. It contradicts the biological 
theory of evolution to replace the two processes of variation and selection 
with a myth of some single, prior necessity, as has unfortunately been done 
in Anglophone discussions in the last few decades.
But for the purpose of mathematical modeling, one can make use of the 
unconscious effect that, when it comes to mutual cooperation between 
blood relatives, their shared inherited material can be passed on without 
the need for each of the related organisms to reproduce. The “Gesamtfitniss” 
or “inclusive f itness” (Hamilton 1964) of a non-reproducing individual can 
be improved throughout successive generations, if it cooperates with its 
relatives whose own reproduction involves passing on some of the genes 
they share. Thus, the non-reproducing individual nevertheless manages 
to reproduce indirectly. The idea of indirect effects can also be formulated 
ecologically, if one proceeds beyond kin selection. Members of different spe-
cies in a shared environment can also cooperate to their mutual advantage 
at the expense of a third species, their needs and cooperative capacities 
need only be complementary to one another within a shared environment. 
One famous example of this is the honey guide – a type of bird, which 
leads the honey badger to beehives by means of its call. Reciprocity occurs 
when the costs for each cooperative partner are, on average, lower than 
the benef its that the partner draws from the collaboration. In practice, 
reciprocal altruism is to be expected from species that live together in 
stable groups in which repeated encounters between the same individuals 
are likely. Nevertheless, this model carries with it the possibility for decep-
tion. If deception becomes chronic, then the model collapses. The model 
is only evolutionarily viable when deception is punished in such a way 
that it cannot become the rule. If one assumes that a creature has some 
awareness of the indirect effects of its behavior and that this awareness 
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grows over the course of the creature’s life – as one may assume in the 
case of primates – then the effects of indirect reciprocal altruism can only 
stabilize as cultural norms develop, which are predominantly maintained 
and whose sporadic violation is punished.
If one takes these three steps together – kin selection, reciprocal altruism, 
and cultural group selection – they enable “an evolutionary cascade of 
selective processes” (Hurford 2007, 304). This cascade of positive selective 
processes – cooperation, mutuality, reciprocity, and culture formation – may 
have exerted feedback effects on the selection of individuals and their traits 
(including their sexual selection) as well as on historical changes favorable 
to cultural stabilization. Following Tomasello, one can let oneself be guided 
by the idea that collective or shared intentionality (as opposed to merely 
individual intentionality) and the cultural learning of role reversal (as op-
posed to other forms of behavior) predominated in such niche constructions.
Connecting the contemporary discussion with the 
interdisciplinary discourse of philosophical anthropology
World and imitation in a socio-cultural environment: Joint activity and 
mimicry in a bio-social environment
Within the interdisciplinary discourse of philosophical anthropology, one 
makes a categorical distinction between Umwelt (either understood as sur-
rounding bio-social or sociocultural world) and a world as such. What came 
to be the contemporary problem of niche formation used to be discussed 
using this sort of terminology – and all the better, to my mind. Ever since 
Jakob von Uexküll’s theoretical biology, it has been clear that there is a cor-
relation between the physiological structure of organisms (their blueprint) 
and their behavioral functions in a determinate environment. Different 
species have different environments, and often not the environment that 
the biologist takes them to have at f irst glance. Thus, snails and spiders do 
not perceive any thing-constants in their environment, while primates, 
as Wolfgang Köhler’s experiments with chimpanzees showed, doubtlessly 
operate with things, albeit not with any awareness of the physical laws 
governing them, as we do. In order to categorically sort this and other 
empirical discoveries, Max Scheler introduced the distinction between a 
world (Welt) and a surrounding-world or environment (Umwelt) (Scheler 1995, 
39-45). Biologists use their own worldview as the framework for distinguish-
ing between the environments specific to various creatures. Of course, even 
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at that time it was well known among zoologists, amongst whom Helmuth 
Plessner was one, that mammals and especially primates stand in social 
“co-relationships” (Mitverhältnissen) (Plessner 1975, 308), and hence live in 
a bio-social environment. But Plessner did not want to prematurely identify 
and risk confusing this with a sociocultural environment such as that hu-
mans actively create. Such sociocultural environments are made possible 
by world-frameworks, which Plessner explicates near the end of The Levels 
of the Organic and Man [Die Stufen des Organischen und der Mensch, 1928] 
as the presuppositions of practices among persons (cf. Plessner 1975, ch. 7).
For Plessner, there is a fundamental difference between an animal 
environment that is merely social in the sense that animals spontaneously 
“join in” on the behavior of their conspecif ics and are subsequently able 
to “mimic” such behavior, and an environment where there is genuine 
“imitation” of behavior.2 In the latter case, one must be able to answer 
two questions: What is being imitated? (i.e. which state of affairs is being 
exhibited?), and Who is being imitated? (i.e. which person?) (Plessner 1948a; 
1948b; 1961a). These two questions cannot be answered by describing how 
similar organisms behave similarly, i.e. in accordance with Von Uexküll’s 
correlations. For these correlations are – ontogentically and phylogeneti-
cally – prior to the imitation of personal roles and prior to the exhibition 
of states of affairs. The sociality of mammals, according to Plessner, is not 
made possible by a shared world (Mitwelt) in which persons share a form 
of mindedness. Today, one could follow Tomasello in speaking of mind in 
an elementary sense, whenever the criterion is fulf illed that collective 
intentions become grammaticalized (Tomasello 2003).
From a contemporary point of view, we can see that Plessner was right 
to distinguish between spontaneous joint activity, temporally delayed 
mimicry and imitation (of something and of someone). This is demonstrated 
by the discussion of individual and collective intentions of the f irst and 
second order in non-human primates as compared with human children. 
The philosophical issue is not who happens to be empirically correct, but 
rather whether the research programme provides us with categorical 
distinctions which help us address meaningful questions. It may be, as 
Tomasello has acknowledged in the interim, that chimpanzees demonstrate 
shared attention, collaborative activity and even f irst order shared inten-
tions in some behavioral areas – particularly competitions for dominance. 
Yet, chimpanzees are nevertheless unable to form shared intentions about 
2 Translator’s note: In German a distinction is made between “Mitmachen” (join in, or joint 
activity), “Nachmachen” (mimic, mimicry), and “Nachahmung” (imitate, imitation).
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shared intentions, i.e. intentions of the second order. Furthermore, only the 
latter embodies the culturally stable, truly collective intentions upon which 
human children build up their behavior (Tomasello 2008). Chimpanzees 
do not understand the recursion of symbols, which reach beyond what is 
perceptible (relative to an individual’s memory) in situations, assuming the 
repetition of drive satisfaction. The number 5 means something different 
from the empirically perceptible and memorable insight that f ive bananas 
are better than two bananas for a very hungry belly. Of course, the empirical 
research into f irst and second order intentions must be carried further.
In the interest of advancing such research, however, we must clearly 
eliminate the anthropomorphic confusion of joint activity and mimicry 
with imitation – a conceptual confusion that makes sophisticated and 
differentiated empirical research impossible. Spontaneous joint activity 
between conspecifics involves mirror neurons, a mechanism Plessner could 
not have known about in his time. But this neurophysiological correlate 
confirms what Plessner had described as joint activity: if a creature perceives 
here and now what his conspecif ic is doing, this automatically generates 
neural activity in those regions of its brain which prepare for sensory and 
motor engagement that corresponds to the behavior of the conspecif ic. 
Mimicry is then simply such joint activity with the addition of individual 
memory (Plessner 1975, 278-286). If the creature can re-imagine something 
that it already perceived, this triggers comparable neural activities. Having 
once been successful in satisfying a particular drive, the creature follows the 
same strategy in its next moment of need. Imitation, however, involves more, 
namely the mind, which possesses a cultural history of its grammaticalisa-
tion, in which questions concerning what and who is being imitated can 
be posed and answered. This is only possible in an eccentric positionality, 
as Plessner calls his specif ication of world as opposed to environment. 
Eccentric positionality triadically removes itself from the dyads of centric 
positionality – thus eccentric. It positions itself outside of centric interac-
tions between the organism and the environment and outside of centric 
interactions between organisms only to return from this outside to the 
interactions themselves. Thus, Tomasello speaks of a so called “bird’s eye 
view” (Tomasello 2008, 160, 179, 266). Imitation cannot be explained by mir-
ror neurons, which only represent a genetic precondition, but not a sufficient 
condition. Imitation demands an emotional motivation that leads a creature 
to identify itself with a sociocultural f igure external to the organism or to 
distance itself from that f igure (cf. by contrast, Iacoboni 2008, 99f.).
As far as Scheler and Plessner were concerned, Köhler had proven that 
chimpanzees have a high degree of practical intelligence, but that this 
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intelligence remains bound to the individual organism – to its sensory 
and motor mechanisms and its individual memory. According to Plessner, 
it was crucial that chimpanzees lack a “sense of the negative” (Plessner 
1975, 271): they remain empirically generalizing positivists – a view that 
has been radically advocated in the contemporary literature by Povinelli 
(2000). Chimpanzees do not expect any states of affairs that, independently 
of their own organism, also exhibit other perspectives. They expect only 
states of fields, which they negotiate senso-motorically until they sud-
denly arrive at an insight (Plessner 1975, 272, 276f.). Yet they are unable to 
detach this insight from the type of senso-motor situation in which they 
attained it and transfer it into other sorts of senso-motor situations. They 
generalize within a behavioral function – for example, competition or tool 
production – and this generalization is quite individualized insofar as it is 
memory-based. Anthropomorphically speaking, this also has its benefits: 
they neither believe in ghosts nor in natural laws. But most importantly, 
their expectations do not have a world framework that has emancipated 
itself from their senses and their motor possibilities. They do not expect 
states of affairs in spatial emptiness, e.g. in a Newtonian world, or in a 
silent, still world of empty time. It is not constitutive of their behavior 
to have a symbolic, i.e. a triadic structure of the world, which cannot be 
derived from any empirical generalization. In contrast, one recognizes 
practices among persons precisely in such symbolic-triadic presuppositions, 
i.e. in mindedness, not only in the external and internal world but also in 
the joint-world (Plessner 1975, ch. 7.2). World structures do not take shape 
frontally, dyadically, immediately or directly, i.e. they are precisely not like 
an environment or surrounding world. Rather, they take shape mediatedly, 
indirectly, along detours, triadically, on a stage that presents the foreground, 
within a framework of world that forms the background and bleeds out 
into a ‘nowhere and never.’ Humans must therefore be able to alter their 
behavior. Their centric form of organization requires centric behavioral 
possibilities, i.e. a centric positionality, as Plessner calls his conception of an 
animal environment. But f irst, a human sociocultural environment must 
be created. This is made possible by a triadic world framework in which 
persons share a form of mindedness symbolically (Plessner 1975, ch. 7.3-7.5).
Between laughter and tears: Playing with and playing in personal roles
Plessner’s theory of personal roles further develops the concept of imitation, 
the basics of which we have introduced above. It does so in such a way that 
a temporal dynamic arises within behavior along a certain spectrum, which 
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must be experienced in order to be learned. The theory concerns both 
playing in and playing with personal roles (Plessner 1960; 1961b; 1961c; 1967). 
These forms of play occur between the poles of laughing and crying, which 
are no longer considered as ‘playable’ (Plessner 1941). This was the theme of 
my book Between Laughter and Tears I: The Spectrum of Human Phenomena 
[Zwischen Lachen und Weinen I: Das Spektrum menschlicher Phänomene, 
1999]. Rationalistic philosophies treat the capacity of speaking and acting 
as the essence of man, whether it be implicitly or explicitly. For Plessner, 
they are the provisional results of another process, by means of which we 
are able to take on and put ourselves into playing personal roles and to 
come out of them again: namely, by playing with them. Fundamentally, a 
person stands outside of his or her organism. From there, the person can 
distinguish the extent to which he or she lives in a vital body – as though 
in a sheath – and the extent to which he or she possesses this organism 
from the outside, in treating it as he or she might treat other bodies. Every 
person thus has a twofold relation to his or her body. He or she lives in it, 
but can also possess it from the outside (Plessner 1975, 293). In order to 
do so, the person must take on a role outside of his or her organism, i.e. in 
sociocultural interactions with others.
Here, there are various kinds of cases that structure this role-play. 
Minimally, a role consists in a habit, i.e. in moving pictures in accordance 
with which one enters onto the scene, and in an idiomatically determinate 
language (dialect) that matches the habit. One can exceed such a role by 
over-identifying with it, e.g. by passionately overshooting the role in the eyes 
of others. Conversely, one might fall short of the expectations that others 
have about the role, because one is compulsively preoccupied with some-
thing else. Both kinds of phenomena – passions and compulsions – may be 
conditioned, in which case they are generally tolerated, or they may become 
unconditioned. In the latter case, they destroy the role, and, if there does 
not happen to be a more appropriate role, then the whole existence of the 
role becomes questionable. Those affected either slip off into superhuman 
realms, or they undershoot the level of personality altogether. Subsequently, 
the realm of human behavior gets left behind, for which every culture has 
any number of expressions and taboos (holy, divine, devilish).
Plessner’s fundamental thought is quite simple and cross-culturally 
observable: we all learn human behavior between laughing and crying. 
When we are no longer able to respond to a situation in the sense of a 
determinate role, the situation gets called into question. If no modifications 
of the role manage to resolve the situation, we attempt to answer it by 
playing laughter or tears. And should this change of roles not help either, 
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then we break into non-played laughter or tears, provided the situation does 
not involve any form of violence. Thus, we arrive at the limits of human 
behavior. At these limits, though the person is no longer able to give any 
answer, his or her body still is, despite the fact that his or her competence 
to play the role collapses. In non-played laughter, the body breaks out of the 
relevant habit and language out into the world. For the person concerned, 
the situation involved too many possibilities of meaning that simultane-
ously contradicted with one another. The person as it was, f lees out of its 
own organism. In non-played crying, however, the person collapses in on 
herself and falls back into his or her body. For such a person, the whole 
situation has become senseless. The person gives up on answering the 
situational question and instead simply hands herself over to the body, 
which, as it were, shrivels up (Plessner 1941, 359-384). It is not diff icult 
to recognize the structure of personality from The Levels of the Organic 
and Man (1928) in Plessner’s analyses of Laughter and Tears (1941). In both 
limit cases, the locus of personality vanishes from the interactions of the 
organism to its environment. Either the person flees outwards, away from 
the body, because he or she sees too many contradictory world-possibilities 
and is paralyzed. Or the person – lacking distance from the situation – falls 
into the interactions themselves and ultimately into her body, because no 
horizon of sense or meaning manages to establish itself. Anyone who has 
thus experienced the limits of her own behavior and is now able to live with 
them may express her sovereignty in a smile (Plessner 1950).
One can now run through the whole spectrum between laughter and tears 
anew, by considering these limit experiences and asking how sociocultural 
roles might be changed in order for persons to be able to live better, or, as 
one could also say, in order for living creatures to be able to live in a personal 
manner. In this respect, surely Plessner’s greatest achievement since his 
Limits of the Community [Grenzen der Gemeinschaft, 1924] consists in having 
indicated the anthropologically necessary twofold structure of personal 
roles. A role is a mask in the sense that it can publicly reveal and privately 
conceal. If a person has to live both within her body as well as outside of it, 
then, structurally speaking, she needs to be able to distinguish, for herself 
and for others, between the private and the public sphere. This twofold 
structure contains a great civilizing lesson, which must not be sacrif iced 
to any community ideology. Every living person needs the freedom to play. 
She must be able to distinguish between herself as the bearer of the role, and 
herself as the player of the role (Plessner 1961b, 195-204). Or, as G.H. Mead puts 
it: there is no “I” without such a “mine” and a “me.” This is the reason Plessner 
speaks of the “We-form of one’s own I” in the Levels (Plessner 1975, 303).
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The evolutionary potential of emancipating ontogeny from 
phylogeny: The extra-uterine year, plasticity to domestication, 
fetalization and corticalization
In the nineteenth century, it was common biological practice to assume 
that, as the phrase went, ontogeny (individual development) recapitulates 
phylogeny (species development) only in abbreviated form. Since at least 
the 1920s, however, biologists have begun earnestly investigating the extent 
to which a limited emancipation of ontogeny from phylogeny might lead 
to new evolutionary potentials, particularly to potentials that can be 
conceived as peculiarities of the appearance of modern man. Therefore, I 
will briefly address the increasing gap between human ontogeny and the 
phylogeny of Homo sapiens, as contrasted to non-human animals. This gap 
is characterized by the following biological phenomena: an extra-uterine 
year, nidicolous vs. nidifugous animals, and the plasticity to domestication 
(especially during the imprinting phase). These phenomena are connected 
to others: premature nativity, fetalization and cerebralization (brain growth 
relative to the rest of the organism) and corticalization (growth of the 
cerebral cortex relative to the rest of the brain). In all of these respects, 
Plessner is fundamentally in agreement with Louis Bolk, Adolf Portmann 
and Frederick Jakob Buytendijk (Plessner 1964; 1965a; 1965b; 1967a; 1967b).
Among primates, the periods of childhood and adolescence increase 
the closer the primate resembles human beings. It spans from about 6-7 
years to 14-20 years. Adult behavior must f irst be learned in play. Such 
behavior is certainly not present immediately after birth, nor is it simply a 
question of the growth of the organism. In humans, even the f irst year of 
life outside of the uterus is quite striking. It is only at the end of this year 
that the cranium grows together, which is typically a part of embryonic 
development in the uterus. What is today called the “revolution” only sets 
in thereafter (between the ninth and twelfth month). It is only after this 
that the infant proceeds to walk upright, learns shared intentions in shared 
attention with adults and develops language skills. Beginning in the third 
year of life, the child’s use of language becomes recursive, i.e. emancipated 
from perceptual situations and the memory of perceived situations and, 
as of the fourth year, the child becomes familiar with narration and the 
independent correction of unintelligible discourse, without recourse to 
perception (cf. Tomasello 2003). Even enculturated great apes – i.e. apes 
that have been raised among humans – reach the limits of their linguistic 
development at a level that human children reach in their third year. The 
apes never master the recursion of triadic symbols upon triadic symbols.
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For the purpose of understanding the fundamental biological problem 
involved, let us limit ourselves to the f irst year of life in human infants. It 
makes sense to refer to this stage as an “extra-uterine year” insofar as it 
involves embryonic developments that typically take place in the uterus 
among other animals. Anatomically speaking, this premature birth enables 
the infant, which has a large head and brain relative to the rest of its body, 
to be born through the mother’s pelvis. The pelvic circumference is limited 
through bipedalism. Comparatively speaking, premature births are, for 
humans, the norm and this requires particular care within a niche. The 
development of the brain in the extra-uterine year accelerates so expo-
nentially that crucial phases continue all the way into puberty – phases 
in which “superf luous” neural connections, i.e. those that are used too 
seldomly in behavior, are eliminated (Singer 2002). It is important to note 
that this does not only involve an externalization of embryonic develop-
ment into sociocultural relations between the infant and adult persons. 
Conversely, this sociocultural externalization of the organism remains oc-
cupied with tasks that, by biological standards, largely belong to embryonic 
development. In a certain sense, the cultural social collective – and, in 
particular, the mother-child relationship – has now taken over the role of 
the uterus, at least until the separation from the parents begins some time 
during puberty. The sociocultural niche must provide for such fetalization, 
cerebralization, corticalization and increasingly prolonged ontogenesis, i.e. 
the niche must develop special resources and caring skills. This is not simply 
a question of nutrition, but also of lasting emotional connections between 
the sexes and generations, including, not least of all, playing opportunities 
for the children. Sociocultural structures require, biologically speaking, 
organismal plasticity, and are thus limited exclusively to genetically and 
behaviorally f ixed organisms. And when social and cultural phenomena 
recursively reflect back on themselves, when they develop self-reference, 
then they require still more fetalization and an extension of the phases of 
play in childhood and youth. It is here that the potential for self-amplifying 
feedback-loops emerges, which enables specif ic cultural development.
One can also describe the same fundamental problem under a different 
aspect by using the terminology of domestication. For several millennia, 
humans have made use of a biological mechanism – that of imprinting – 
which is not only found in mammals but in several bird species as well. 
Yet, even these animals care for their brood for a relatively long time. It is 
through these social relations that species-specif ic behavior is acquired. If 
one alters these social relations by subjecting the young animals to human 
care after lactation (viz. after the nesting period), they can be domesticated. 
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It is well known that our familiar species of domestic animals (dogs, cats, 
etc.) was shaped in this way. Transferring them into a different social niche 
can, over the course of many generations, not only alter their behavior, but 
their genetic material as well. The model of domestication is thus highly 
instructive, for it artif icially accelerates a process that can be redescribed 
as the formation of social niches or, as the case may be, bio-social environ-
ments. Naturally, this model already presupposes the presence of humans 
and thus, viewed phylogenetically, presents a circular account of the self-
domestication of a particular primate species. But it is nevertheless helpful 
insofar as it shows what can happen when ontogeny becomes somewhat 
emancipated from phylogeny by means of niche formation.
Let us consider yet another terminological distinction stemming from 
the biology of Plessner’s time, in order to redescribe the anthropological 
problem from a comparative perspective. It was standard practice to 
distinguish between nidicolous (or altricial) and nidifugous (or precocial) 
animals. The distinction turns on the time at which the offspring are able 
to independently leave the nest. Nidicolous animals remain in the nest 
for a long time. They come into the world unripe and unready. Nidifugous 
animals, like geese and hares, leave the nest quite early. But this only means 
that they are organismally “ready” to move independently by themselves. 
It does not mean that they have already mastered the adult repertoire 
of their species’s behavior. This is something they learn by following the 
adult animal to which they became accustomed during their imprinting 
phase. While the role of the imprinter is typically played by the mother, 
this is not necessarily the case, as can be seen in the case of domestication. 
Schneider (1975) therefore refers to nidifugous animals as “mother followers” 
(“Mutterfolger”) and Hassenstein (1975) calls man the “clinger” (“Tragling”). 
If one attempts to apply this distinction to humans – albeit only indirectly 
– then one would have to say that, on account of the extra-uterine year, 
humans are secondary nidicolous animals, and accordingly also secondary 
nidifugous animals. The human combines both variants of ontogenesis 
found in mammals and birds, but on a phylogenetically different initial 
level, namely that of primates.
Yet, none of these intra-biological comparisons ultimately solve the 
problem of how modern man came to being. However, they do show what 
sorts of evolutionary possibilities have occurred in the animal realm. The 
nascence of man in natural evolution is nowhere near as inexplicable as 
dualists often claim if one is willing to take seriously the thought that a 
bio-social environment might develop which supported fetalization and 
cerebralization, and specif ically the development of the cerebral cortex, 
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i.e. corticalization. But this also means that one cannot approach biology 
reductionistically. For it already includes social and cultural phenomena, 
if by “culture” one understands the non-genetic transmission of behavioral 
styles that serve to further adopt to ones particular environment. This is 
customary today in primatology. Populations of the same species have to 
display partially different behavior in different environments. In Plessner’s 
time, one refrained from speaking of animal cultures, because the concept 
of culture (at least for Plessner) entailed self-reference of triadic symbols 
to triadic symbols.
Symbolic transformation of the life drives and the obviation of organs
The symbolic transformation of drives plays a prominent role in the inter-
disciplinary discourse of philosophical anthropology. If one considers the 
evolutionary history and phylogeny of man, the characterization of the 
human species as rational cannot work top-down, proceeding from pure 
reason, but only bottom-up. This issue of the symbolic transformation of 
drives – which was given a particular inflection by Sigmund Freud’s psy-
choanalytic theory – is bound up with other issues such as compensation, 
suppression, repression and transference. These drew attention not only 
at inter-personal but also intra-personal relationships, even if these were 
psychologically restricted to individual case studies which themselves are 
diff icult to assess for social reasons. In so-called pathological case studies, it 
is not just the claim of transhistorical validity that appears dubious in light 
of cultural-historical research. They also relate to how personal relation-
ships to things developed, and how personal matters appeared as thing-like. 
The question regarding the symbolization of drives simultaneously requires 
consideration of the opposing question, namely, how symbolization might 
be connected with relations to things. In this respect, one cannot get around 
Paul Alsberg’s hypothesis about the technological obviation of organs in 
human behavior. But how should we think about the connection between 
the symbolization of personal relationships and of things?
It was already clear to Scheler that one must distinguish between in-
stincts and drives (Scheler 1995, 22-27). Instincts genetically determine 
f ixed behavioral patterns. It is precisely such f ixed determination that 
is lacking in life drives. Between their stimulation and their fulf illment, 
there is some flexibility with regards to time and strategy. Their fulf illment 
is, to an extent, learned. Scheler also recognized that learning through 
association presupposed dissociation. His hypothesis, which has regained 
contemporary signif icance, was that the cerebral cortex was the organ that 
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dissociated instinctive and associative connections between sensory and 
motor mechanisms. Corticalization counteracts the instinctive networks, 
which are phylogenetically inscribed, as well as the associative connections, 
which are ontogenetically developed. This represents the neurophysiologi-
cal correlate for the psychic phenomena we experience in behavior as the 
intelligent and symbolic satisfaction of drives. Thus, the appearance of 
humans, viewed physiologically and functionally, must not only involve an 
increasing role for the brain, i.e. cerebralization, but must also and especially 
involve growth in the cerebral cortex, i.e. corticalization. Plessner calls the 
cerebrum the organ of pauses, which interrupt the coupling of sensory 
and motor mechanisms (Plessner 2002, 174-177). Responses to stimuli are 
not immediate and direct, but rather take detours through dissociation, 
renewed association, intelligent reconstruction and emotional bonds that 
can be symbolically meaningful.
Scheler and Plessner start with the assumption that primates possess an 
energetic superfluity of drives, which, when they are not fulf illed, become 
symbolically charged in behavior and can be lived out in bodily fantasies. 
It is at this point that symbolic binding, fulf illment and transference come 
into play (Plessner 1961a; 1961b). Scheler and Plessner share this fundamental 
thought with Freud, but it is striking that neither of them adopts any of his 
special interpretations – e.g. the Oedipal complex – because these bear on a 
special cultural-historical semantic. As far as anthropological comparisons 
are concerned, the only thing of interest is the general mechanism by means 
of which symbolic transference, compensation, suppression and repression 
is brought about. To determine what these forms signify and how we should 
assess their relation to one another, Scheler develops his own grammar of 
the life of feelings (cf. Krüger 2009, ch. II. 7.) and Plessner his own spectrum 
of human phenomena. The symbolization of the life drives is key to the 
transition from the bio-social to a sociocultural environment. Mindedness 
developed from the ground up through the dynamics of sympathy (Scheler) 
or imitation (Plessner), rather than from the top down through pure reason 
or calculi.
In the end, however, the symbolization of the life drives cannot be the 
whole story of the transition from a bio-social to a sociocultural environ-
ment. Symbolization creates an extremely important f ilter between the 
organism and the environment, reducing both adaptive pressures (from 
the perspective of the organism) and selective pressures (from the perspec-
tive of the environment). But this does not yet explain how it is possible 
to establish distance from the environment in the biological sense with 
which we began. The foundations of this achievement are to be found 
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in the use and eventual production of tools by great apes. Paul Alsberg’s 
striking description of these phenomena is enshrined in his principle of 
the “obviation of the body” (Körperausschaltung). What he means by this is 
the withdrawal of the human organism from direct and immediate contact 
with the environment. Instruments get interposed and these instruments 
then mediate human organs, protect them, extend them and make them 
more effective in manipulating objects in the environment. There are two 
principle manifestations of such mediation. First, the hand – the principle 
organ of contact – whose freedom of movement steadily increases and 
whose capacity for leverage can be extended and strengthened. A second 
manifestation is the new perceptual space that results from walking upright. 
The latter leads, as Plessner puts it, to “distance-seeing” (FernSehen) – seeing 
beyond the immediate vicinity – whereby the organism learns to distinguish 
backgrounds from foregrounds and becomes aware of the phenomenon of 
being seen by others (Plessner 1970, ch. 3).
Plessner’s originality lies in his attempt to solve the problem of how 
chains of human conduct have altered by means of an integrative model. 
In doing so, to my understanding (Krüger 2001, 118-128), he develops three 
questions and three matching hypothetical answers: a) How does habitual 
conduct get called into question?, b) How is this question answered – i.e. 
how does one respond when habitual conduct is called into question?, and 
c) How does this answer (or response) become habituated over time? In an-
swering these three questions, the various sense modalities are not sharply 
separated from human language. Rather, the specif ic task of answering 
these questions is to be understood within the framework of the symbolic 
function of the senses. Plessner’s symbolic function integrates three aspects 
of human conduct by answering these three questions (see his Unity of the 
Senses [Plessner 1923]): f irst, a) the aisthesis of the senses – both in percep-
tion and imagination – thematically interrupts habitual conduct, then b) 
one answers or responds to these new themes by means of precisification 
and paradigmatization in discourse and f inally c) this paradigmatically 
precisif ied answer or response to the aberrant or divergent theme is then 
made reproducible by means of schematization. It is in this manner that 
the response itself becomes habitualized. Technology and science are 
fundamentally understood to embody such schematizations. Thus, this 
model does not rely on the typical dualism between the customary and 
the innovative, but rather on a historically processual interconnection 
between phases of questioning, responding and renewed habitualization. 
The dualism arises – from the perspective of this new model – as a special 
case in which the connection between a response and its schematization is 
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dissolved and one either forgets which question (or questionable status) one 
was responding to or even forgets what the question was in the f irst place.
This model must be understood in conjunction with Plessner’s unusual 
understanding of language, which seeks to overcome precisely this dual-
ism: the development of linguistic self-reference in written text must be 
coupled to the creature’s senses in its behavioral f ield if language is to 
maintain this sort of automatic intelligibility and transparency. Con-
versely, this means that the symbolic function of human beings’ senses 
must differ from that of animals, which cannot rely on a recursive dynamic 
of symbols upon symbols in the structure of their conduct. Plessner under-
stands language as the coupling of expressions with actions or, to use J.L. 
Austin’s terminology, as the coupling of the performative and the consta-
tive (cf. Krüger 2001, chapter 1. 2.). Actions (constative) are understood 
based on the model of the integration of the remote sense of sight and the 
tactile, proximate senses (embodied in skin and the hand). Expressions 
(performative) are conceived in terms of voices – one’s own and that of 
others – as well as in terms of proprioception (perception of one’s own 
body) (Plessner 1975, 339f.). The various sensual domains are connected 
with language, which makes linguistic metaphors intelligible, insofar as 
these arise through symbolic transference and coupling of various sensible 
domains with one another.
Generalists and specialists in the formation of conduct
One can ultimately distinguish between generalists and specialists among 
primates – although this distinction should not be understood as mutually 
exclusive, since both sides can complement each other in various ways 
(cf. Plessner 1961b, 166f.). A population is specialized to the extent that its 
adaptation to the environment only bears on a special kind of environment, 
e.g. a tropical forest habitat, a savannah or, if one includes aquatic mammals, 
a specif ic kind of aquatic habitat. Viewed in terms of positive selection, this 
means that the relevant sort of adaptation is only favored by selective forces 
in a certain kind of special environment. In contrast, general adaptations 
stand out insofar as they are reinforced by many different kinds of environ-
ments by, for example, favoring the spread of the species through positive 
selection. One can sort primates’ practical intelligence and their capacity 
for symbolization in terms of their general and their special adaptive and/
or selective advantages in particular environments. Thus, intelligence and 
symbolization are candidates for adaptive and selective advantages that 
arise through the generalization of forms of conduct. In contrast, the practi-
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cal connection of individual organisms’ intelligence and symbolization with 
particular sensory and motor mechanisms, which are only advantageous 
in a particular kind of environment, would speak in favor of an adaptive 
and selective advantage attained through the specialization of forms of 
conduct. The history of the appearance of modern man is a progression 
through various specialized habitats, resulting in a species that managed 
to survive in all corners of the earth. The tendency to generalize forms of 
conduct has apparently been advantageous throughout all of man’s early 
and transitional forms. In contrast, great apes – our closest relatives – seem, 
on the whole, to have been specialists.
To this extent, one must work out a more detailed account of how this 
thought – regarding the distinction between generalizing and specializing 
tendencies from the perspective of evolutionary theory – applies to each of 
the levels of learned conduct and their combinatory possibilities. Ultimately, 
one must be able to translate this distinction in terms of the distinction with 
which we began, i.e. the distinction between bio-social and sociocultural 
environments. In bio-social environments, various biological behavioral 
functions are already distributed among the various sexes and generations 
in various forms of cooperation and competition. Here, it appears that 
generalizing behavioral features, such as intelligence and symbolization, 
are only capable of adorning forms of conduct that are already biologi-
cally predetermined. However, the logic of the formation of sociocultural 
environments functions differently, because these are made possible by 
a shared symbolic world, particularly a shared symbolic joint-world. The 
starting point here is itself something general which is shared symbolically 
and intelligibly but which must be specialized according to the specif ic 
environment, even in a sociocultural environment. One has already posed 
the question in the wrong way if one thinks that evolutionary and cultural 
history is just the story of the triumph of the generalization of forms of 
conduct over their specialization. Rather, each intermediate step poses a 
new problem of re-distributing and re-combining generalizing and special-
izing behavioral tendencies (cf. the paleoanthropological suggestions in 
Mithen 1996). This holds true not only for bio-social environments but for 
sociocultural environments as well. Even the relationship between these 
two kinds of environment cannot be conceived as though the former simply 
replaced the latter all at once, for these kinds of environments may well 
have complemented one another. As inconceivable and improbable as this 
may seem, one must acknowledge that it gains viability through fact that 
only one of all the many species of Homo that arose in the last millennia 
managed to survive.
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3 “True” and “False” Evolutionism
Bergson’s Critique of Spencer, Darwin & Co. and Its 
Relevance for Plessner (and Us)
Heike Delitz
Underlying the doctrines which disregard the radical novelty of each moment in 
evolution there are many misunderstandings, many errors. But there is espe-
cially the idea that the possible is less than the real, and that, for this reason, 
the possibility of things precedes their existence […] [T]they could be thought of 
before being realized.
– Henri Bergson
Plessner and Bergson: Two theories of (human) life
Plessner’s particular way of thinking about human beings within the realm 
of organic life cannot be adequately discussed without reference to Henri 
Bergson’s philosophy of biology, nor without reference to Plessner’s critique 
of Bergson. Bergson seems, at f irst glance, far more interested in evolution-
ary biological thinking than Plessner, although upon closer inspection, one 
can make the case that it is in fact also a crucial issue for Plessner. This paper 
seeks to analyze Bergson’s subtle dispute with the evolutionary theories of 
his contemporaries: Charles Darwin and Herbert Spencer (Bergson 1995, 51), 
and also that of Jean-Baptiste Lamarck (1963 [1809]), as well as the theories 
of the neo-Darwinians, neo-Lamarckians, and neo-Vitalists mentioned in 
Creative Evolution [L’Évolution créatrice, 1907] (Bergson 1944). In his lectures 
on the history of philosophy, Bergson argues against the ‘spiritualists’ (Spi-
noza, Leibniz) and the Old Vitalists or ‘duodynamists’ (Bichat) (Bergson 
1990, 45), and this is why he refuses to call himself a ‘Vitalist’: for Vitalism 
uses distinctly different principles for inorganic matter on the one hand, and 
life on the other, whereas Bergson explicates a philosophy of immanence. His 
differentiation between inorganic matter and living matter, a distinction 
typical of Vitalism, appears stronger than it actually is, as we will see below.
With Plessner’s philosophical anthropology in mind, let us concentrate 
on the tension between Bergson’s philosophy of biology and evolutionary 
theory. Bergson expounds his own philosophy of biology using the concepts 
of élan vital and creative evolution, often in explicit and incisive disagreement 
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with philosophical, and especially biological, theories of evolution. In the last 
chapter of Creative Evolution, Bergson calls these theories the work of ‘false 
evolutionists.’ His arguments, which accept empirical f indings but shine a 
new analytical light on them, are far from being ‘irrationalist,’ as labelled 
by Plessner, and by philosophers since Plessner’s time. As a result of his 
vocal critics, biologists who know Bergson’s name but are unfamiliar with 
his work call him absurd or mystical (for one exception to this, see Russel 
1945, 1). The aim of this paper, therefore, is to f irst accurately display the 
core of Bergson’s argument, and then show how, from this starting point, he 
develops a whole new philosophy – a new philosophy of biology, and a new 
philosophical anthropology in particular. Although we will focus on Bergson, 
Plessner’s work will always be in the background of the discussion: both his 
critique of Bergson’s philosophy of biology, and Plessner’s own philosophical 
anthropology. One can clearly see here two distinct traditions in philosophi-
cal anthropology, both of which seek to answer the Darwinian challenge.
Plessner’s critique of Bergson
Bergson, at first glance, does not fare well under Plessner’s critique, especially 
upon reading Levels of the Organic and Man [Stufen des Organischen und der 
Mensch, 1928]. Plessner’s treatment of Bergson here is similar to his assessment 
of Jakob von Uexküll and of his theory of specific environments for different 
species (cf. Von Uexküll 1926). Plessner begins with a discussion of Bergson’s 
philosophy of biology, criticizing contemporary ‘ideologies of life.’ He begins:
Each age f inds the word which explains it. The terminology of the 
eighteenth century culminated in the concept of reason; that of the 
nineteenth in the concept of development; that of the current period in 
the concept of life. […] In this word, the age perceives its own energy, its 
dynamism, its play, its joy in the daemon of the unknown future – and 
its own weakness, its lack of origins, devotion and capacity to live. […] 
A philosophy of life arises, originally determined to spellbind a new 
generation, just as each generation becomes held by a philosophy in the 
spell of a vision – now called thereby to lead it to knowledge and thereby 
to free it from disenchantment (Plessner 1975, 3f.).1
1 I am grateful for corrections Matthew Maguire.
I follow the still unpublished translation of Scott Davis (The Levels of the Organic and Man). 
However, the pages refer to the German edition (1975).
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Bergson is used as a sparring partner for Plessner’s own philosophical 
anthropology: a protagonist in his project of ‘disenchanting’ philosophical 
anthropology by dispelling irrationalism. For Plessner, Bergson, with his 
philosophical method of ‘intuition,’ is a philosopher who works against 
experience, a point he stresses repeatedly. Admittedly, this point is not 
made in Plessner’s f irst main publication, which, in some respects, shares 
similar views with Bergson’s Matter and Memory (1911 [1896]). In The Unity 
of the Senses [Die Einheit der Sinne, 1923], a f irst exposition of his own 
philosophical method, Plessner, like Bergson, expounds the idea of a ‘partial 
coincidence’ of subject and object (1980b [1923], 106-120) and takes Bergson’s 
ideas seriously. But later, in particular in The Belated Nation [Die verspätete 
Nation, 1935], Plessner makes it quite clear that Bergson’s approach has 
to be differentiated from his own.2 Bergson’s Creative Evolution seems 
to have been a signif icant landmark in a growing movement of German 
anti-intellectual ideologies (Plessner 1983 [1935], 211). Therefore, in response 
to the unexpected and remarkable success of Bergsonism as a movement, 
Plessner had to expound a new philosophy of biology.
But this is merely a f irst impression of the Bergson-Plessner relationship: 
a closer inspection will reveal that there are many more explicit and implicit 
Bergsonian influences in Plessner’s thought. For this, one only needs to 
look at Plessner’s f irst philosophical work. In 1913, Plessner expresses his 
frank admiration for Bergson’s project of a new integral philosophy or a 
new metaphysics. Bergson is, according to Plessner, ‘until now the only 
metaphysician of our days’ (1980a, 14). Of course, there always remains room 
for debate as to what ‘metaphysics’ is. For Bergson, metaphysics is nothing 
other than the careful clearing of one’s own last concepts and notions, the 
clearing of ‘pseudoproblems’ posed as if they were real problems. In other 
words, the task of philosophy is the invention of new ways of thinking. Thus, 
any philosopher carries the burden to invent notions and concepts, or to 
pose new problems – always only one, infinitely simple idea, whose articula-
tion he (or she) seeks as a life-long pursuit (Bergson 2002d, 234). Plessner’s 
‘self-contradictory’ or ‘paradoxical’ arguments seem now to be his ‘one 
simple idea,’ for which he is indebted to Bergson in some way. At one point, 
Plessner indeed refers to Bergson’s skepticism about various philosophical 
terms and scientific concepts, as this would be his (Plessner’s) own core idea: 
According to Plessner, Bergson views traditional philosophical terminology 
to engage in a destruction of the continuity of becoming (Plessner 1980a, 
2 For the difference between Bergson and (old) Bergsonism, see Merleau-Ponty 1964. See for 
the ‘gloire’ of Bergson also Combe 2004.
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70n22). But, the differences between Bergson’s and Plessner’s approaches 
are nowhere near as deep as they have since come to be viewed. As early as 
1913, Plessner endorsed the early criticisms of ‘Bergsonism,’ while being at 
the same time impressed by Bergson himself (he is clearly more impressed 
by Bergson than by Nietzsche).
Furthermore, one particular achievement of Bergson is absolutely crucial 
for Plessner’s own work. In the f irst chapter of Levels of the Organic, Plessner 
applauds Bergson’s exposure of a circulus vitiosus in Spencer’s theory of 
evolution, and in all other philosophical approaches that seek to analyse hu-
man beings as part of the natural world. For Bergson (according to Plessner) 
raises the crucial question: How can one think of man as both subject 
and object of nature at the same time? In Plessner’s view, Bergson applies 
this criticism to Spencer’s work in diverse ways and each time succeeds in 
exposing circular arguments. Spencer adopted, on the one hand, a natural 
evolution approach to cognitive categories, and, on the other hand, took 
these categories as the basis for evolution in nature: the circular argument 
lying between the ‘mechanical natural formation (corresponding to the 
categories), and the genesis of these natural formations, which themselves 
naturally were no longer mechanical’ (Plessner 1975, 7). Plessner sees his own 
avoidance of ‘circular argumentation’ as that which contrasts his approach 
to that of Bergson; for he considers ‘circular argumentation’ to be ‘the prin-
ciple of construction’ of Bergson’s philosophy (ibid., 12). Bergson’s solution, 
alluded to in the word ‘intuition,’ is also criticized: his method of ‘(organic-
vitalistic) intuition’ is evasive, contradicts the facts, and is ‘speculative’ 
(ibid., 8). Bergson seems to be unable to think of human beings as subjects 
of nature, and in particular unable “to consider human beings as subjects of 
a cultural-historical reality, as moral persons conscious of responsibilities, 
determined in just the same way as corporeal nature and phylogenetic 
history is determined” (ibid., 12). As I will demonstrate later, with a little help 
from Deleuze (1991), one can understand Bergson’s method of ‘intuition’ not 
as Plessner understands it, but rather as a philosophical method that does 
not merge into the triad of hermeneutics, phenomenology, and Kantianism. 
In any case, one has to note Bergson’s philosophical distance from most of 
the labels his readers have imposed upon him during the twentieth century: 
irrationalism, (old) vitalism, intuitionism, and so on.3
3 For the German (“fruitful”) misreading of Bergson, see Raulet 2005. Maybe Heidegger almost 
reached Bergson’s point in criticizing the implied metaphysics in philosophy and science. But in 
the end he missed it too. According to him, Bergson was thinking time as space, like Aristotle. 
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Explicitly mentioned in the late article “Conditio Humana” (but implied 
in his earlier works as well), Plessner seems to acknowledge the seriousness 
and rigor of Bergson’s philosophy: he acknowledges Bergson as the ‘im-
mediate forerunner of philosophical anthropology.’ Bergson, together with 
Wilhelm Dilthey a ‘Spätling’ of the nineteenth century, expounded a similar 
philosophical anthropology in his attempt to bring together organic life and 
mind, biology and philosophy. But once again, there is a critical undertone 
in Plessner’s treatment of Bergson: in his “turn away from the gesture of 
pragmatic knowledge (the methodical f igure of exact sciences) Bergson 
evades Spencer’s circle and wins the freedom of living nature and of the 
position of man.” At the same time Bergson (according to Plessner), in his at-
tempt to distance himself from evolutionary anthropocentrism, “constricts 
human being’s living body on the narrow, pragmatical Homo faber” (Plessner 
1983, 149, 154). Plessner dwells on Bergson’s critique of Spencer, but focuses 
on Bergson’s alleged weakness (his epistemology). Plessner underestimates 
both Bergson’s method as well as his carefully defined distinctions between 
plant, animal, and human life: his philosophical anthropology. Plessner 
can be accused of oversimplifying Bergson’s analysis: “Bergson’s ‘la plante 
est un animal endormi’ is the creed of all romantics.” With reference to the 
method of “introspective intuition,” plants are, for Bergson, different “from 
animals only through the lack of a waking consciousness” (Plessner 1975, 
225). Such an analysis has no place in Plessner’s own philosophy of biological 
or philosophical anthropology: the idea of the “open form,” for example, “can 
be exhibited in all plant-life-externalizations as the founding unity of its 
essential features, without resort to any sort of psychic or psychoid drive-
powers” (ibid., 225). There may be, however, some slight Bergsonist f lavor 
in Power and Human Nature, as Plessner invents here the idea of creative 
groundlessness; he describes man as the “location of the creative breakdown 
of his cultural world” (Plessner 1981, 160). This is a hidden Bergsonism which 
becomes all the more striking when Plessner articulates “sentences about 
the inconceivability of life and inexhaustibility of human ability,” which 
by no means imply a “thought which wants to cling asymptotical on life 
(like Bergson), but rather take on a positive position to life in life” (189). In 
fact, it is not at all easy to identify the differences between Bergson’s and 
Plessner’s philosophy as each side tries to defensively distance itself from 
the other. Plessner always gives us some negative critique of Bergson, though 
he is clearly won by Bergson’s general approach, and by many of his crucial 
Obviously he didn’t catch the change in Bergson’s writings since his Latin thesis (Quid Aristoteles 
de loco senserit, 1889).
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arguments, especially in L’Évolution créatrice. This is because Bergson’s 
work seems, to Plessner, to be the f irst philosophical analysis in which the 
philosophical challenge of evolutionary biology is recognized. Furthermore, 
Bergson articulates here a philosophical perspective on human beings as 
subjects and objects of nature, which is crucial to Plessner’s own project.
Bergson’s critique of scientific evolutionary theories
The enormous challenge Bergson posed for Plessner is revealed by the fact 
that Plessner felt the need to constantly criticize Bergson. There appears to 
be, beyond all the criticism, perhaps an underlying Bergsonian influence: 
Bergson was the first to expound a philosophy of biology and a philosophical 
anthropology in the sense of Plessner’s Stufen. Plessner never articulates 
what he takes to be the core of Bergson’s philosophy, perhaps even because 
he did not fully understand it. One therefore has to look into Bergson’s 
own work to see the kernel of Plessner’s philosophy of biology or ‘general 
organology’ (Canguilhem 2008a), as well as its ramif ications for different 
areas of the biological world. The argument is complicated, especially in 
its critique of evolutionary theories; but, because of the radicalism of the 
approach, it is the potential starting point of a novel analysis of organic life.
This new philosophy of biology can be outlined in four main points:
1. Evolutionary theories, because of their concept of time, see all organic life 
‘already given’ or sub specie aeternitas, but the view sub specie durationis 
is surely essential.
2. ‘Life is a tendency of action in matter; which wants to grow over itself,’ to 
act expansively and with greater and greater choice – a tendency toward 
undirected growth and dissociation.
3. Plant, animal, and human are the principal loci of this tendency.
4. ‘Freedom’ is the ‘form of human life.’
As there have always been many misunderstandings of Bergson’s position, it 
is necessary to articulate what the concepts of évolution créatrice, élan vital, 
and durée actually mean. These concepts arose in the context of Bergson’s 
profound disagreement with his contemporaries’ evolutionary theories, 
especially with the following authors and their concepts: Herbert Spencer 
in his theory of evolution as a directed process from simple homogeneity to 
complex heterogeneity (following Coleridge’s theory of life (1848) and Von 
Baer’s law of embryological development, 1827-1838); Charles Darwin in his 
theory of gradual variation and selection according to adaptation (1864); 
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Hugo de Vries in his theory of mutation (in place of infinitesimal gradation) 
(1909-1910); Theodor Eimer in his idea of ‘orthogenesis’ as a directed line of 
evolution arising from the inheritance of acquired characteristics (1890); 
August Weismann in his theory of germ plasma (1893) as the only place of 
variation (instead of the inheritance of adopted characteristics as Darwin 
argued). This last theory is the platform for a later synthetic evolutionary 
theory and for today’s genetic theory (together with a concept of mutation 
derived, but altered, from De Vries).
Bergson does not deny any empirical facts about the history of living 
organisms. On the contrary, the idea of evolution and the corresponding 
empirical facts are taken for granted. Bergson stands resolutely on the 
factual foundation of evolutionary biology (Bergson 1944, 70), yet deliver-
ing a new interpretation of these facts. So, the crucial question concerns 
what Spencer, Darwin, and others mean by the word ‘evolution,’ and what 
perspective they therefore develop with respect to biological life in general 
and human life in particular. Thus, there appears to be a task common to 
both evolutionary theory and Bergson’s analysis: namely, to explain the 
manifold forms of living organisms, the common ancestry of all, and the 
extinction of some. To count as an evolutionary theory in the f irst place, a 
theory must offer some answers to these issues. Addressing these issues, 
Bergson develops a quite distinct philosophy of the ‘true’ evolutionary 
character of organic life. His overall task is, of course, more than the develop-
ment of a philosophy of science, or a philosophy of biology. Rather, the task 
is to develop a ‘right’ idea of life as a whole, and therefore nothing less than 
an analysis of all that is. Bergson therefore constructs a new metaphysics, 
ontology, epistemology, and philosophical anthropology. To understand his 
project, we must clarify f irst the notion of ‘evolution’ in Spencer, Darwin, 
Lamarck, the neo-Darwinians, and the neo-Lamarckians. We must also 
clarify the implications of ‘f inalistic’ theories here, as (at least in Bergson’s 
view) these are equally as mechanistic as the other theories mentioned. 
We then need to clarify Bergson’s position. His analysis claims to f ind a 
characteristic common to these diverse theories of evolution; namely, that 
they are all mechanistic, in a sense I will explain below.
What then is the core of evolutionary theory in Bergson’s view? Spen-
cer, Darwin, and all the other evolutionary theorists mentioned above 
presuppose gradual variations. ‘Gradualism’ is a crucial concept in any 
evolutionary theory. ‘Evolution’ means, for any such theory, a process of 
change through inf initely small steps. In Spencer’s words, evolution is a 
movement from an “indefinite, incoherent homogeneity toward a definite, 
coherent heterogeneity” (Spencer 1867, § 138), by “daily inf initesimal steps” 
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(Ribot 1874, 158).4 Darwin def ines his process of evolution in the same 
way: as a process which operates by way of the smallest steps, through 
successively slight variations. The “process of modif ication must be slow 
and gradual” (1864, 277), and “Natura non facit saltum” (1864, 173). The Latin 
phrase is an old philosophical dictum which can be found in, for instance, 
Leibniz and, mutatis mutandis, even in Aristotle. Variations have to be slight 
so that the whole organism can still function in spite of the mutations or 
variations. Thus ‘evolution’ is conceived of as a step-by-step process. Indeed 
this seems to have been, until recently, the most obvious way of conceptual-
izing ‘evolution.’ It is surely still an axiom of today’s evolutionary theory, 
whether Gradualist or Punctualist, though both approaches can account 
for small ‘jumps’ under certain environmental circumstances.
It is here that Bergson develops his argument that every evolutionary 
theory contains assumptions inherited from classical philosophy. Bergson’s 
critique is that all these theories present evolution as something other than 
a process. Every evolutionary theory is approached from the viewpoint of 
eternity. Evolutionary history is divided in stages which can be seen all 
at once from this viewpoint: this is “spatialized” time (Bergson 1944, 233). 
Such a concept of time, where it is seen as a series of intervals rather than 
as a continuum, is embedded in an ancient metaphysics: analysis of time 
into a series of states-of-affairs implies an underlying classical metaphysics. 
Becoming for Bergson, in contrast, is among the most striking character-
istics of life. Ultimately, becoming is also the natural state of matter: the 
universe changes from one level of organizational complexity to a lower 
one (détente, entropy), whereas living organisms usually do the opposite. 
But in both animate and inanimate realms, duration “means invention, 
the creation of forms, the continual elaboration of the absolutely new” 
(1944, 14). Because of their concept of time, Bergson calls these evolutionary 
theories mechanistic in that they understand (individual) development and 
(trans-individual) evolution as agglomerations or combinations or series 
of states-of-affairs.
Bergson rejects the idea of a ‘life force’; he emphasizes instead the 
distinctly “empirical character” of his notions, especially of élan vital 
(Bergson 1935, 92). Even in some of his last letters he continues to refuse 
having to concede the existence of a vital force. “I have enumerated […] 
4 “Evolution is an integration of matter and concomitant dissipation of motion; during which 
the matter passes from an indefinite, incoherent homogeneity to a definite, coherent heterogene-
ity; and during which the retained motion undergoes a parallel transformation” (Spencer 1867, 
§ 145).
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the ignorances which make up a certain quite special vision of evolution 
and life, at the point that I mark by writing the word élan. […] My so-called 
metaphor is […] the precise, and at the same time global, notation of possible 
observations. And this is why it is radically distinct from sterile images,” 
such as a vital force or a will to power (Bergson 2002b, 369). Biologists, 
and, for that matter, ordinary people, think of time in notions of inter-
vals: of minutes, or, seconds, or parts of seconds etc. In contrast, ‘we’ (we 
all who take ‘time’ as related to ‘space’) think of time mechanistically. 
Mechanistic theories (which postulate the smallest possible steps and 
therefore fragment becoming) also crucially rely on chance or randomness 
to play a major role in evolutionary processes. As chance is merely a name 
for causes-yet-unknown, scientif ic theories must provisionally build the 
reality of randomness into their analyses. If we knew all causes and all 
pre-existing states-of-affairs, we could see the course of evolution at a 
glance: “all is given.” If all is given, there is no becoming. The essence of 
any “mechanical explanation, in fact, is to regard the future and the past 
as calculable functions of the present, and thus to claim that all is given” 
(Bergson 1944, 43). Hence, radical mechanicalism implies a “metaphysic 
in which the totality of the real is postulated complete in eternity, and in 
which the apparent duration of things expresses merely the inf irmity of a 
mind that cannot know everything at once” (Bergson 1944, 45). It is in this 
way that the Spencerian method turns out to be false, for it “consists in re-
constructing evolution with fragments of the evolved” (Bergson 1944, 396). 
It is this way that Spencer, Darwin, neo-Darwinians and neo-Lamarckians 
err: they observe reality in its present form, analyze it into fragments, then 
integrate these fragments – thus failing to capture the essence of becoming 
(Bergson 1944, 396).
An alternative approach is found in f inalism, seen for instance in the 
vitalism of Hans Driesch. It is a theory which can be pitted against any 
mechanistic theory. But for Bergson, such vitalism (f inalism) is “quite as 
unacceptable,” and “for the same reason.” Finalists speak per definitionem 
of an ‘end’ of evolution: they assume a pre-existing model which has to be 
realized. According to Bergson, f inalists essentially follow Leibniz’s idea of a 
‘preformed world.’ Finalism is therefore nothing more than a retrenchment 
in the mechanistic metaphysics of Leibniz. The only difference is that f inal-
ism considers utility as being immanent rather than external. Any teleologi-
cal theory always posits that material things and sentient beings merely 
realize a program of events previously determined: there is no invention, 
no creation. Finalism is thus only an “inverted mechanism” (Bergson 1944, 
45). In his ‘directed evolution’ of individuals through “suspension” of entropy 
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(as ‘entelechy’ is def ined5), Driesch is nothing more than a mechanist. Like 
the principle of mechanical causality, the principle of f inality leads to the 
conclusion that “all is given”; again, there is no becoming-another (Bergson 
1944, 52). On the same account, the failure of embryological theories and 
of developmental theories alike is that they do not grasp evolution as a 
living process.
Because they assume a classical metaphysics, a philosophy of identity and 
dualism, both gradualist-causal and f inalistic-intentional theories are false 
accounts; they cannot grasp the continuous becoming of the natural world. 
Yet evolutionary biology claims to explain becoming by assuming time to 
be continuous and only divided into discrete intervals for its explanatory 
power. However, this is not enough for Bergson as he sets out a new under-
standing of time: present and indivisible duration. Because life is becoming, 
one must substitute the “false evolutionism” (which “consists in cutting up 
present reality, already evolved, into little bits no less evolved, and then 
recomposing it with these fragments, thus positing in advance everything”) 
with “true evolutionism,” in which the future is unforeseeable (Bergson 
1944, xxiv). For Bergson, such is the very task of philosophy. Physicists (and 
perhaps biologists too) properly understand their roles when they push 
“matter in the direction of spatiality”; but has metaphysics understood 
its role when it has simply trodden in the steps of physics (Bergson 1944, 
227)? Inert matter has duration, because of entropy. But with regards to 
inert matter “we may neglect the f lowing without committing a serious 
error,” because of our practical interest, and because matter “is weighted 
with geometry; and matter, the reality which descends, endures only by 
its connection with that which ascends,” i.e. with life (Bergson 1944, 401).
However, the error shared among all evolutionary theories lies at an even 
deeper level. In classical metaphysics (which posits distinct states-of-affairs 
instead of a continuum of being), the error lies in “false questions.” Bergson 
exposes a logical failing in classical philosophical analysis (and by extension 
in evolutionary theories too) which purports to describe reality: the failing 
is seen in particular in their notions of nothing, disorder, and possibility. 
Any analysis of such nature gives rise to apparently meaningful questions 
which in reality are vacuous (Bergson 1944, 240ff.). Consider, for instance, 
Leibniz’s question (why does there exist something rather than nothing?), 
5 The action of Entelechy consists in “suspending” possible becoming; it is “unable to cause 
reactions between chemical compounds, […] unable to create differences of intensity of any kind. 
But entelechy is able […] to suspend […] the reactions which are possible with such compounds 
as are present, and which would happen without entelechy” (Driesch 1929, vol. 2, 180).
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or the analysis of primary disorder as absence of order (which can be found, 
for instance, in Niklas Luhmann’s social systems theory). The negative 
idea of absent order is empty, it is a logical failure. “In analyzing the idea of 
disorder thus subtilized, we shall see that it represents nothing at all, and 
at the same time the problems that have been raised around it will vanish” 
(Bergson 1944, 243). Furthermore, “this confusion is the origin of most of 
the diff iculties raised by the problem of knowledge, among the ancients 
as well as among the moderns” (Bergson 1944, 248). The same illusion can 
be found in the concept of the possible: it is always seen as reality minus 
its existence, already given and then negated. So the idea of the possible is 
richer than the idea of the actual (a given reality plus its imagined absence), 
yet one always assumes the opposite to be the case. The same happens with 
the ideas of order and existence: one believes “that there is less […] in the 
concept of disorder” than in the concept of order. But for Bergson, “there is 
more intellectual content” in these ideas: one has to conceptualize exist-
ence and its absence; or reality and its possibility. So, within the “doctrines 
which disregard the radical novelty of each moment in evolution” there are 
multiple errors. But it is “especially the idea that the possible is less than 
the real” which becomes misleading, since such thought implies that “the 
possibility of things precedes their existence” and as a result, “they could 
be thought of before being realized” (Bergson 2002e, 228). The possible is 
thus only the “mirage of the present in the past”: the “image of tomorrow is 
already contained in our actual present, which will be the past of tomorrow.” 
It is precisely here where we encounter the illusion. “One does not see that 
the contrary is the case, that the possible implies the corresponding reality 
with, moreover, something added” (Bergson 2002e, 229). There is, therefore, 
no becoming, but only a succession of states-of-affairs in evolutionary theo-
ries. So we have to “resign ourselves to the inevitable: it is the real which 
makes itself possible and not the possible which becomes real” (Bergson 
2002e, 232). Recognizing the problem, Deleuze suggests that we speak of the 
virtual/actual instead of the possible/real,6 or in notions of differentiation as 
becoming another, instead of conceptualizing ‘being’ or reality as identity. 
The “difference […] in the virtual grounds the movement of actualisation, 
of differentiation, as creation.” It is thereby “substituted for the identity and 
the resemblance of the possible, which inspires only a pseudo-movement” 
(Deleuze 1994, 213). Rather than awaiting realization, the virtual is fully 
6 For the f irst time, in 1960, in his course on Chapter III of Évolution Créatrice: “Bergson prefers 
not to say that the possible becomes real; but rather that what is virtual is actualizing itself” 
(Deleuze 2004, 181). 
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real; what happens in evolution is that the virtual is actualized. The concept 
of the virtual/actual is another way of rendering Bergson’s élan vital: the 
process of life as actualizing unforeseeable directions in different living 
forms, which can be identif ied as ‘possible’ only retrospectively.
Bergson, armed with this concept of the virtual/actual, adopts a point 
of view which differs substantially from that of any evolutionary biology 
and any evolutionism. He is interested in the phenomenon of various forms 
of life resulting from a unique ‘effort’ or ‘impulse,’ and therefore sets out a 
theory of ‘ascent’ instead of descent (‘creative evolution’). Furthermore, he 
invents an entirely new ontology, of immanence rather than of duality (an 
ontology apparent as early as Matter and Memory), and a new metaphys-
ics, that of difference rather than identity. This philosophy of Bergson 
is adopted and explicated by Deleuze, from the 1960s onwards, under 
the term “philosophy of difference” (1994) or new “vitalism” (Deleuze 
1995, 143). The starting point of this philosophy (a philosophy shared 
among others by Cornelius Castoriadis and Gilbert Simondon, even if 
only implicitly) is the concept of becoming-another, instead of being (Sein): 
the concept of the radical new, in place of identity or doubling. Here we 
should be mindful of Foucault’s critique of philosophy of identity in The 
Order of Things, and Castoriadis’s similar critique in Imaginary Institu-
tion of Society. Both argue that classical philosophy is unable to think of 
the new as new, and unable to think of becoming as becoming-another. 
Such failure to arrive at any concept of identity seems to be a f law of 
evolutionary theory, due to the fact that any such theory is inherently 
‘mechanistic’ (Bergson) in the sense of fragmenting time, and seeing all 
possible evolution as ‘already given.’
This philosophy of difference, or better yet, of differentiation, has its 
own method. Bergson always stressed the effort of ‘intuition.’ The method 
he calls “intuition” is characterized by an “exceptional effort” to leave 
“nothing outside” (Bergson 2002c, 251). It consists, according to Bergson 
and supported by Deleuze, of three steps. The f irst “concerns the stat-
ing and creating of problems” (exposing pseudo-problems and posing 
genuine problems): “I recommend and have practiced for some f ifty years 
a method which essentially consists in envisaging special problems in 
philosophy, as is done in the positive sciences […] the true diff iculty 
is to pose the problem” (Bergson 2002b, 370). The second step requires 
the discovery of “differences in kind” rather than gradual differences of 
degree. The third step is the “apprehension of real time” in concepts and 
notions of becoming. Together, this “gives the ‘fundamental meaning’ 
of intuition: intuition presupposes duration. It consists in thinking in 
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terms of duration” (Deleuze 1991, 14, 31).7 In other words, the Bergsonian 
method is a process of removing “the positive notation of ‘immediate 
data’ in a dialectic of time” and substituting the “intuition of essences 
into a ‘phenomenology of genesis’ [linked] together in a living unity” 
(Merleau-Ponty 1964a, 156).
Bergson’s concept of life
Life is becoming, that is why Bergson attempts to f ind a viewpoint sub specie 
durationis. For this he needs a new method. To f ind such method, he re-
analyzes not only the concept of time, but also the role of ‘adaptation’ in 
evolutionary theories. Evolutionary theories explain only the variations 
occurring at a given moment, but not the course and trajectory of a series 
of adaptations. This view of adaptation conveys a fairly passive idea of the 
nature of living organisms. The prevailing evolutionary theories explain 
only what has been selected, instead of explaining what arises. Furthermore, 
they attribute any adaptation to accidental, gradual variation. But over 
the course of evolutionary history, there must have been many variations 
serving no useful function, and there must also have been many different 
ways in which an adapted organ, for example, could be brought about in 
the evolution of a species. Bergson discusses the theory of the heredity of 
useful properties with great skepticism, concluding that there are too many 
chances and states-of-affairs. The same criticism holds for neo-Lamarckian-
ism, with its individual purposeful changes and its living ‘heritage’ of useful 
developments. With their unstated classical metaphysics (analyzing time as 
a series of intervals), evolutionary theories rely on a hidden model: nature 
is seen as combining things and elements successively, whereas according 
to Bergson, the process of dissociation is more important: “Life does not 
proceed by the association and addition of elements, but by dissociation 
and division” (Bergson 1944, 99). Evolutionary theories, with their particular 
concepts of time and life, are tools for inquiring into the function of nature.
7 Moulard-Leonard (2008, 89-104) refers to Bergson’s method as a “transcendental/vir-
tual empiricism”: “I have been arguing that the word virtual precisely aims at conveying the 
transvaluated status of those pure conditions: they are absolute outside of experience and 
can therefore not be found in experience” (which would be the Kantian thought); but “their 
ontological principle is one of alteration and mobility, so if there is a sense in which they can 
still be called pure forms, then they can no longer be reduced to some ready-made, abstract 
containers for experience” (99f.).
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The notions of order and disorder as used in classical evolutionary 
theories can also expose hidden models and philosophical assumptions. 
Life, according to Bergson, is a process of differentiation. It is not the 
case that disorder is the default situation and that order requires expla-
nation. Life, he says, is a ‘tendency,’ and there is no directed evolution. 
Acknowledging that all theories of evolution are (more or less) adequate 
heuristic images, Bergson feels compelled to present a new image: life as 
ascent, differentiating itself with unforeseeable direction, with matter 
functioning both as a vehicle and obstacle. He also claims that within 
this image, there is a tendency for living things to have and to spend more 
and more energy in more and more explosive and directed ways. With 
this approach Bergson challenges ancient metaphysics, which is prone 
to thinking of time as an extensive manifold, and instead invites the 
perspective of being regarded as an unforeseeable, intensive manifold. 
Such philosophy of life thus has to think in terms of a process, of simple 
and indivisible acts.
Bergson’s development of this notion can easily be spotted in one very 
specif ic case: the development of complicated organs (1944, 105ff.). The case 
of complex organs is an old chestnut in the battery of arguments against 
gradual evolution. However, one has to reach Bergson’s conclusion in order 
to understand how different his argument is from the traditional arguments 
in this f ield. He does not set out to rate organs by functionality, but rather 
to categorize organs into very different families, such as mollusks and 
vertebrates. Here he proposes a unique explanatory image: the hand which 
moves through iron f ilings (Bergson 1944, 105f.; cf. for the importance of this 
image, see Fujita 2007). Depending on the energy behind the motion of the 
hand (its ‘impulse’ or ‘effort’), it comes as far as it does and no further, and 
forms such and such shapes. Bergson does not wish to analyse this situation 
by looking at the cause (the hand) and the effect (the shape of the f ilings), 
but rather to see the hand’s moving through the f ilings and forming a shape 
as one simple act; in any state complete in itself:
Let us now imagine that […] the hand has to pass through iron f ilings 
which are compressed and offer resistance to it in proportion as it goes 
forward. At a certain moment the hand will have exhausted its effort, 
and, at this very moment, the f ilings will be massed and coordinated in a 
certain def inite form, to wit, that of the hand that is stopped. […] [T]here 
has been merely one indivisible act, that of the hand passing through the 
f ilings: the inexhaustible detail of the movement of the grains, as well 
as the order of their f inal arrangement, expresses negatively, in a way, 
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this undivided movement, being the unitary form of a resistance, and 
not a synthesis of positive elementary actions. […] The greater the effort 
of the hand, the farther it will go into the f ilings. But at whatever point 
it stops, instantaneously and automatically the f ilings co-ordinate and 
f ind their equilibrium. […] According as the undivided act constituting 
vision advances more or less, the materiality of the organ is made of a 
more or less considerable number of mutually coordinated elements, but 
the order is necessarily complete and perfect. […] That is what neither 
mechanism nor f inalism takes into account, [following the] idea, that it 
would have been possible for a part only of this co-ordination to have 
been realized, that the complete realization is a kind of special favour 
(1944, 105f.).
It is in this manner – by thinking of moving energy or the impulse to act 
within matter – that Bergson models life in general. ‘Impulse’ in this context 
is another word for élan vital. It may take the place of ‘chance’ in evolution-
ary theories.
This theory of life is applicable to plants, animals, and human beings 
in their similarities and differences. The overall idea is to model life (as 
totality and individuality) as a process. In the case of organs, it is the act of 
viewing which is important, not the parts of the organ or their functions. 
An individual is thus seen as an energy-act or a motion. An animal body is 
not a conglomeration of organs but formed energy; and any morphology is a 
very specif ically directed and form-fixed motion. Life as a whole, according 
to the process-view, is an energetic question (correlating to Carnot’s law 
of energy). The task of analyzing life is meant to describe the continuities 
between the movement of inorganic matter and the functioning of living 
matter; to bring indetermination into the necessities of inorganic mat-
ter; to reach suspensions of entropy. Within this “effort” against entropy 
there are at least three essential categories (plants, non-human animals, 
and human beings). Understood as forms of energy or impulse, plants are 
one particular category that are constituted of matter, collect energy, and 
have no motility (self-propagated displacement through space). Animals 
are def ined by motility, (more or less) instinctive and (usually) directed 
activities: the simplest example being that of the amoeba, which sticks out 
its pseudopia in (admittedly undirected) ways. Insofar as animals move, 
they are sensitive and aware (awareness is a trait characterized not only 
by having a nervous system, but by having a capacity for motility). There 
are, of course, ‘blind’ evolutionary ‘alleys’; such as arthropods with their 
exoskeletons, ‘caged up’ life.
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With human life, the question of formed energy is rather different. 
Animals are, in relation to their instinctive motion, fixed: they are directed 
forms of energy, and their organs are natural tools. Human life is charac-
terized by a tendency towards intellect (formal, relational knowledge), 
foresight, as well as concentrated and variable motion (especially in the 
use of hands). Human beings invent tools and even tools for making tools, 
therefore enjoying greater potential for motion (even including space flight), 
using organic and inorganic energy, inventing new needs for themselves, 
and new emotions in themselves. This particular way of living depends on 
the human nervous system, the gap between problem and answer (and the 
desire to bridge it), and the utility of language. Therefore, Bergson develops 
a def inition of human life as life with freedom to act. In human life, life 
recognizes itself as having creative power (Bergson develops both a theory 
of life and an epistemology).
Bergson and Plessner revisited
Returning to Plessner’s critique of Bergson, one can see that his interpreta-
tion is somewhat correct: Bergson does indeed identify circular arguments 
in Spencer; but this does not seem to be Bergson’s main point. Plessner 
uses notions of space and states of being to imagine different forms of 
life and ways of differentiating it from matter. These include wholeness, 
shape instead of becoming (as Simmel had already done previously [1918, 
12f.]), borders as inner/outer relations, and positionality as an active/passive 
counterrelation between individual and environment. He searches for ‘vital 
categories’ (like Bergson), but with a greater emphasis on the difference 
between the common features of living things (which arise from the rela-
tionship between individual and environment – Umwelt; this relation is a 
variation by Jakob von Uexküll of Darwin’s notion of adaptation). Bergson 
develops the relationship between individual and environment in a more 
active sense (motion/consciousness), while Plessner thinks of it in notions of 
counterbalance. He does not seem to be interested in questions of descent 
or ascent, as he discusses theories of individual evolution (embryology). 
Perhaps mainly because of Bergson, Plessner felt the need to invent his own 
way. Bergson paved that way: expounding a theory of life which could be 
called ‘vitalistic’ in the sense of taking evolution seriously, in relation to an 
adequate analysis of the human being.
Despite Plessner’s disagreements with Bergson, both share an abiding 
interest in the search for a notion of human beings as living and knowing 
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beings, deserving a special position among other forms of life. Bergson and 
Plessner both emphasize that philosophy has to formulate differences within 
life. In these differences they f ind compatible formulations. For example, 
they present plants as ‘open’ and thereby as ‘less impulsive’ forms of life 
(Plessner with respect to their open relation to their environment, Bergson 
with respect to their immobility and therefore diminished affectivity). They 
both conceive animals as ‘closed’ forms. Hence for Bergson and Plessner, 
organs are forms of complexity within animals, and relatedly, Bergson and 
Plessner have similar notions regarding animals’ spontaneity of motion. 
According to an increasingly central sensory-motoric system, and to a less 
fixed form of action, animal life expends increasing amounts of energy 
within a rapidly shortening time frame. Bergson and Plessner both expound 
plausible theories of what is means to be human. Finally, Plessner and 
Bergson both speak of unforeseeable forms of human life. Extraterrestrial 
human beings are possible. For Plessner, being “human is bound to no f ixed 
gestalt, and in this regard could as well take place under many kinds of 
gestalt that do not match the one familiar to us. […] The character of humans 
is bound only to the central organizational form which provides the basis 
for their eccentricity” (Plessner 1975, 293). And for Bergson, it is “probable 
that life goes on on other planets, in other solar systems also, under forms 
of which we have no idea, in physical conditions to which it [life] seems 
to us, from the point of view of our physiology, to be absolutely opposed” 
(Bergson 1944, 279).
Life has an open-ended quality in both Plessner and Bergson. In sociologi-
cal anthropology, this leads to a theory of the ever-evolving human being, 
with potential for ever-new social inventions and institutions. Since we live 
in ‘biological ages’ (Illies 2006) the relevance of these non-mechanistic phi-
losophies of life (allowing an analysis of the human being which grasps the 
human self-image as non-determined or ‘free’) is evident. Therefore, after 
some deep ruptures arising from the exposition of an often-misunderstood 
Bergsonism, there is currently some international resonance between 
Deleuze and Canguilhem and the aspirations to revive Bergson’s work 
(Worms 2009, 567ff.). As a consequence, there is also a renewed interest 
in Plessner. Bergson presents a new analysis of life, a (new) vitalistic ap-
proach, although Plessner refused to call him a vitalist (e.g. in comparison 
to Hans Driesch). This vitalism “is the expression of the conf idence the 
living being has in life, of the self-identity of life within the living human 
being conscious of living” (Canguilhem 2008b, 62). Recent ‘evolutionary 
developmental biology,’ which is interested in innovation and novelty, might 
have some aff inities with this Bergsonian account of life, by criticizing, as it 
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does, mechanism in biology (found in any Darwinian approach).8 Plessner 
presents essentially the same analysis of the living being, but in a different 
way: in more spatial (than temporal) images, and in more realistic concepts 
(of power, and of constraint). Plessner’s and Bergson’s analysis support 
and aff irm one another. Their convergence lies in the creative natural 
artificiality of human life, and ultimately in the self-confidence of life in 
human life. The relevance for us, if we seek any adequate analysis of life (and 
in particular human life) lies in a philosophy of evolution which is always 
in close contact with contemporary life-sciences and also critiques their 
(implied but unstated) misinterpretations and assumptions.
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4 Life, Concept and Subject
Plessner’s Vital Turn in the Light of Kant and Bergson
Thomas Ebke
Overture: Plessner’s reception of Kant’s categories
At the beginning of the second chapter of The Levels of Organic Being and 
Man [Die Stufen des Organischen und der Mensch, 1928], Helmuth Plessner 
gives a brief outline of what he will later characterize as “vital categories”:
In the language of philosophy, category means a form which experience 
complies with but which doesn’t spring from experience; a form whose 
scope doesn’t come to an end with the sphere of subjective acts but rather 
spills over to the sphere of the objects, which is why not only the experi-
ence we have of things, but also the things themselves are subordinate 
to that form. Thus, categories are forms which belong neither to the 
subject nor to the object alone but make them come together in virtue 
of their neutrality. They are conditions of possibility of agreement and 
concord between two essentially different and independent entities so 
that these are neither separated by an insurmountable gap nor influence 
one another directly (Plessner 1975, 65).
It can hardly be doubted that the gist of Plessner’s “re-creation of philoso-
phy” in The Levels of Organic Being and Man consists of his attempt to bring 
about a new Copernican revolution. Plessner’s deep bond with Kant is a 
well-known area of research, even though the status of his dissertation on 
Kant, The Crisis of Transcendental Truth in Its Origin [Die Krisis der tran-
szendentalen Wahrheit im Anfange, 1918], has not been thoroughly explored 
at all. By all means, the third chapter of Plessner’s magnum opus revolves 
around the claim to accomplish a deduction of the so-called “constitutive 
qualities of the organic.” In fact, it would be diff icult to fully seize the punch 
line of Plessner’s philosophy of the organic if one chooses to neglect the 
transcendental drive of his train of thought.
Strangely enough though, it seems that literally anyone who has dealt 
with this particular aspect in Plessner’s book is not concerned with the ques-
tion of whether or not what Plessner puts forward here is justif iably called a 
deduction. As it is hard to picture Plessner as anything but a transcendental 
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thinker, it has become commonplace to take for granted that his philosophy 
of life is shaped from within by a philosophical operation that can lay full 
claim to being a deduction in the Kantian sense. However, the above quote 
is far from being a neat piece of evidence for the transcendentalist stance. 
At the very least one might be accused of overinterpretation when trying 
to defend the idea that Kant would have readily subscribed to a thesis such 
as this: “Thus, categories are forms which belong neither to the subject 
nor to the object alone but make them come together in virtue of their 
neutrality” (ibid.).
The speculation that I would like to dwell on a little in this chapter is 
that Plessner did achieve no such thing as a deduction of the categories of 
the organic. Furthermore, my impression is that Plessner had a tough time 
inscribing a transcendental fabric into his argument. Certainly, a transcen-
dental turn governs the way Plessner poses the problem of life. In fact, it is 
key for grasping the diff iculty of eccentric positionality. Nonetheless, this 
turn is spoiled by another project or strategy which is at work underneath the 
official story. As far as I can see, this project appealed to Plessner on par with 
the one emanating from the transcendental paradigm. His enthusiasm can be 
read between the lines of what Plessner explicitly says. Yet, this subtext was 
discarded as a systematic answer to the question how knowledge of life can 
be transmitted. Plessner’s vital turn indeed became a transcendental turn. 
However, in his theory we can catch a glimpse of an altogether different vital 
turn, a turn which, if Plessner had chosen to think it through to the end, would 
have presented itself as knowledge of life that sloughs the role of the subject.
To elucidate this context a bit further, I would f irst like to clarify what 
exactly is meant by a ‘vital turn’ in Plessner’s argument. My focus in this 
f irst step will be to show that Plessner’s effort to conceive this vital turn as 
a transcendental turn is unconvincing, because Plessner felt the force of 
a different denouement which he implied, but aborted. Secondly, I would 
like to disclose a similar constellation in the case of Henri Bergson. In a 
brief epilogue, I will raise the question of how this moment of ambiguity in 
Plessner’s philosophy can be assessed in the interplay between life, concept 
and subject.
Preliminarily, it might also be relevant to note that there is a dominating 
view in the literature dedicated to Plessner which claims that he actually 
succeeded in constructing a systematic and demanding adaptation of Kant.1 
This consensus seems to aff irm the image created by Plessner himself, an 
1 For examples, see Pietrowicz 1992, Beaufort 2000, Fischer 2000, Breun 2006, Krüger 1999, 
Krüger 2001, and Mitscherlich 2007.
life, concePt And subJec t 101
image that suggests a seamless overall project which smoothly integrates 
transcendentalism, phenomenology, hermeneutics, philosophy of life and 
the scientif ic scenery of the period. Slightly deviating from the main cur-
rent, I would like to abet the idea that Plessner’s philosophy sometimes 
leaves the impression of an eclectic building that harbours quite a few 
heterogeneous elements without necessarily f inding inner unity at all times.
Plessner’s deduction of the vital categories as his vital turn
It is interesting to call to mind why Plessner deemed it necessary to provide 
a deduction of the categories of the vital in the f irst place. Having started 
out with a phenomenological analysis of things as they appear, Plessner 
had been able to point out that a living thing looks as if it realized its own 
border. But looks can be deceptive, there can be false friends. It is precisely 
this distinction between appearance and being, between an indication 
and a constitution that leads Plessner henceforth to alter his philosophical 
procedure. If we wish to f ind a key to the problem of life, we must rule out 
the case of an entity that pretends to be alive without actually being alive. 
Let us note that Plessner indeed shares a very obvious motive with Kant 
in this respect.
Above all, it is the word “constitution” that we ought to pay close at-
tention to. Summarizing the way that Plessner constructs his argument 
initially, it doesn’t seem too far-fetched to predict that Plessner might go on 
to use the term “constitution” in a conventional phenomenological sense. 
Following that trail would boil down to an investigation of the ways in 
which consciousness constitutes phenomena as correlatives to its own 
intentional acts. If Plessner championed this method, he would be able to 
convert his “turn towards the object” into a phenomenological exploration 
of consciousness.
Astonishingly, this classical direction of phenomenology is clearly not 
the direction Plessner pushes his own analysis towards. On the contrary, 
Plessner seeks to argue that the conditions of possibility for determining an 
object’s vital “border” are rooted in the peculiar constitution of the object 
itself rather than in the consciousness of a subject. Thus, the term constitu-
tion refers to a mode of composition that is inherently entrenched in life. 
Olivia Mitscherlich has fleshed out the twofold aim that Plessner pursued 
in his deduction of the vital categories. According to Mitscherlich, Plessner 
does not wish to deduce the biological functions of the living from his 
phenomenological starting point, namely the hypothesis of border realiza-
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tion (Mitscherlich 2007, 106). By doing so, Plessner would only retroactively 
gather biological evidence for an arbitrary conception of the living. Opposed 
to this view, Mitscherlich believes that Plessner wanted his strategy to work 
in both ways: It is true that what we naively, and from the mere appearance 
of things, would describe as border realization begs for biological features 
of the living that testify to the reality of our hypothesis (ibid., 106). Yet at 
the same time, and inversely, we might just as well say that the capacity of 
the living to realize its own borders relies on certain irreducible modes of 
life (ibid., 105). In this light, we may conclude that Plessner implements the 
structure of a Kantian deduction without resorting to a unilateral point of 
departure for deduction.
What we have here in a nutshell, is Plessner’s conversed transcenden-
talism. Objects are able to appear to subjects because both these poles 
exhibit a correlation with one other by means of a “condition of possibility 
of agreement” (ibid., 65). Yet this third alternative that has both sides “come 
together” and guarantees their interaction is a link that eludes both sides 
at a time. One may illuminate this as follows: The intuition (Anschauung) 
of things must of course be identif ied as an intuition related to a subject 
(or a consciousness, for that matter) which, to the extent that it relates to 
things, indeed constitutes these things. The subject charts transcendental 
presuppositions, forms of order without which the distinct unity of a thing 
would not even set itself apart from the diversity of sensual data. But what 
is intuited – and this represents the very point of Plessner’s argument – is 
the constitution of things in themselves, a constitution that can in no way 
be charged to the account of the subject performing the intuition. Beyond 
the scope of sheer conditions of knowledge which are transcendentally 
deduced on the part of the subject, Plessner understands categories to be 
object conditions, modalities that can only be elucidated if one asks what 
a thing constitutively is. Thus, the categories, as def ined by Plessner, bring 
about a disjunction “between heterogeneous spheres, between thought 
and intuition as well as between subject and object” (ibid., 116). Subject and 
object are related to one another only by way of a rupture that divides them.
This means that in Plessner’s approach, the transcendental capacities 
to constitute things are embraced by the ontic constitution of the things 
themselves; the “basic issue” (ibid., 115) which had been phenomenologically 
isolated in a f irst step and suggested that vividness is a process of border 
realization must now, in a second step, be authenticated through “laws 
of connection between the living and its environment […], i.e. materially 
aprioric laws” (ibid., 65). What is at stake in Plessner’s approach is precisely 
this reciprocal relationship, this inversion between subjectively constituted 
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views of (living) reality and the qualitative constitution of (living) reality 
(cf. Grünewald 1993). If, following Jan Beaufort, one may speak of a theory 
of constitution (Konstitutionstheorie) to be at the heart of Plessner’s project 
(Beaufort 2000, 52), it has to be added that in such a theory, the conditions 
of the object and the conditions of the knowledge of the object intertwine.
It is indispensable to discuss a bit further the precise consequences 
that flow from this construction. Right from the start, any identif ication 
of objects, including living objects, is possible only within the limits of a 
hermeneutic relation. Plessner’s theory of the object is interlinked with a 
“theory of observation and a theory of interpretation” (Lindemann 2005, 
85), whose a priori is not at all supplied as a matter of course. This is why 
the recovery of the a priori, as f inally achieved by Plessner at the end of The 
Levels of Organic Being and Man, does not get lost on the idealistic track 
that would return to transcendental subjectivity. All along, one has to recall 
two points to keep a clear eye on the foundations of Plessner’s knowledge of 
life: On the one hand, this type of knowledge is antecedent to the “narrow 
methodical controls of the empirical sciences” (ibid.). The latter ignore the 
qualitative aspects of their objects, leading them to ignore the very practice 
that underlies their own operations. On the other hand, this knowledge 
eludes the rational force of an a priori that would be anchored in the subject. 
Plessner registered “this new standing of the a priori in its relation to the 
a posteriori” (Plessner 1981, 165) above all in Macht und menschliche Natur 
(Power and Human Nature) as the revolutionary trove of philosophical 
anthropology, with Dilthey as the decisive pioneer.
Let us make one thing plain: As matters stand, Plessner deviates from 
Kant in a crucial respect. One extraordinary point Plessner insists on all 
throughout is that categories can be understood as “forms of concordance 
between heterogeneous spheres, between thoughts and intuitions as well 
as between subject and object” (Plessner 1975, 116). It is a sign of Plessner’s 
dazzling skills as a writer that this passage presents itself not so much as a 
bold transformation, but rather as an immanent reading of Kant’s original 
text. Quite allusively and implicitly, Plessner tries to get across his statement 
that “the transcendental unity of self-consciousness may be the central 
point of all categories, but not the point of their deduction, the principle 
and source of their differentiation” (ibid., 113).
Having said that, we should now be able to grasp the deviance between 
Plessner and Kant. For Kant, it would have been unacceptable to sever 
the bond that links the categories with the transcendental unity of self-
consciousness. Of course we are moving in the realm of the subject as a 
synthetic center when we have to account for the origin of the categories. 
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According to Kant, the categories do not float between subject and object; 
they depend emphatically upon the synthesis of the subject. From a strict 
Kantian point of view, Plessner falls short of the philosophical standards a 
deduction would have to embrace. Plessner, on the other hand, envisages 
a creative process which in itself is irreducible, but not transcendentally 
imprinted in self-consciousness. The a priori that makes the experience of 
phenomena possible for a subject: that a priori is a process that takes place 
in between the poles of subject and object. Moreover, it is a process that 
brings about the opposition between subject and object while at the same 
time entangling one with the other.
We are now standing at the threshold of what I would like to call the 
vital turn within Plessner’s mindset. This vital turn is only a turn away from 
both Kant and Husserl because, as mentioned above, Plessner argues that 
the specif ic feature which we ascribe to living entities does not derive from 
an a priori within “us,” i.e. the subjects. Instead, this feature is intrinsic to 
the constitution of the objects themselves. But we ought to move one step 
ahead: What we’d have to beware of is the fact that our ability as subjects to 
experience an environment of objects is the result of something which we 
do because we live. Whereas Kant thought that the condition of possibility 
that allows us to experience objects is grounded in the synthetic operations 
of our intellect, Plessner encourages us to trace back this condition to a 
vital performance that is carried out both by ourselves and by the objects 
we experience. If we as human beings are able to conceive of living things 
as living things, then this is not due to a unique cognitive performance, 
but to a performance we share with the very objects we are confronted 
with. And this performance is the performance of life in its own right – the 
realization of the boundary.
Thus, the shift conducted by Plessner is a vital turn because we have 
already performed the movement of life ourselves when we describe things 
as living things. And as we have just seen, Plessner develops this argument 
in view of the constitution, i.e. the reality of the living. However, it would be 
a severe misapprehension of Plessner’s intentions to abandon the interpreta-
tion at this juncture. It is not the be all and end all of Plessner’s philosophical 
anthropology to tell us that human subjectivity can be fully dissolved into 
and rewritten under the conditions of life. What makes Plessner’s approach 
so complex is the fact that even though that may very well be his main 
discovery, the transcendental perspective is still built into his conception 
of life.
The important thing is that the transcendental question takes on a new 
shape in Plessner’s framework. He clings on to it and keeps it alive instead 
life, concePt And subJec t 105
of simply inscribing it into life. To my mind, this particular twist reveals 
itself when we investigate the relationship between man and life under the 
circumstances of eccentric positionality. Couldn’t we say that the tension 
that occurs in eccentric positionality hints at a point of view, a perspective or 
a look at the world that is no longer attached to any specif ic organic shape? 
The categories in which man’s knowledge of life proceeds do indeed turn 
out to be the constituents of the objects themselves. But a living being that 
is able to objectify its proper constitution is “once more related” (ibid., 288) 
to that very constitution and hence “no longer bound by it” (ibid., 291). If the 
structure which carries and characterizes the living becomes transparent, 
it does so only from a point of view that breaks away from the immanence 
of life: “Man is placed into his own border and hence way beyond it, which 
confines him, the living thing” (ibid., 292). We might even put it like this: 
Man does not only perform the movement of life, he is confronted with the 
fact and the results of and the alternatives to his performance. If an animal 
realizes its border, it spontaneously generates the horizon under which 
things can appear to and vanish from its eyes. In sharp contrast, man is 
driven into the experience that his horizon can only be socially construed. 
It changes historically and it is continuously open for interpretation.
In other words, Plessner f inally surpasses his own vital turn by arguing 
that our ability to understand the constitution of life cannot, for once, be 
traced back to having the constitution of life. Plessner’s philosophy, as we see 
it, wavers between the discovery of life as an a priori and a transcendental 
motive, which rejects the idea of an aprioric constitution within the material 
reality of objects. In the following section of my argument, I would like to 
zero in on a quite similar rupture conveyed by Henri Bergson’s philosophy 
of life. Just like Plessner, Bergson was caught in the struggle between a 
transcendental analysis and the insight into the material a priori of life.
From Matière et Mémoire to La Pensée et Le Mouvant: Henri 
Bergson’s vital turn2
Bergson’s early work Matter and Memory [Matière et Mémoire, 1896] (trans-
lated into English in 1911), tackles the question on how it is possible that we 
2 It needs to be underscored that the reading of Bergson proposed in this paper is essentially 
inspired by Georges Canguilhem’s critique of Bergson in his 1994 essay “Le concept et la vie.” 
(Canguilhem 1994). In an attempt to reveal the relationship between life and concept as a recur-
rent motif in the history of philosophy, Canguilhem juxtaposes Hegel and Aristotle on one side 
106 thoMAs ebKe 
perceive similarities among the objects of our sensual experience. By all 
means, the systematic topic that creates the background of Bergson’s text 
concerns the immaterial character of memories. Guided by this problem, 
Bergson is f inally faced with the reason why we ascribe generality and simi-
larity to phenomena that are nevertheless present to us only as concrete, 
sensual data. In summary, Bergson starts out to explain the formation of 
concepts as instruments that help us treat realities as something general, 
as something we can cope with eff iciently and habitually.
For our present purpose, it is paramount to state that Bergson develops 
his solution of the problem of generality by objecting, f irst and foremost, 
to a classical postulate harboured by nominalists and conceptualists alike. 
Strongly opposed to these two paradigms, Bergson dismisses the assump-
tion that our sensual perception immediately brings us into touch with 
individualities. Our senses do not refer to distinct and delimited objects. 
If anything, we f ind our way through our environment with the help of a 
vague feeling rather than a sharp sense of difference. I would like to quote 
Bergson on this subject:
But this will be more clearly evident if we go back to the purely utilitarian 
origins of our perception of things. That which interests us in a given 
situation, that which we are likely to rasp in it f irst, is the side by which 
it can respond to a tendency or a need. But a need goes straight to the 
resemblance or quality; it cares little for individual differences. To this dis-
cernment of the useful we may surmise that the perception of animals is, 
in most cases, confined. It is grass in general which attracts the herbivorous 
animal: the color and the smell of grass, felt and experienced as forces […] 
are the sole immediate data of its external perception (Bergson 1911, 206).
of the dividing line with Kant and Bergson on the other side. From Canguilhem’s point of view, 
Hegel and Aristotle came closer to the solution of this crucial relationship because they went 
beyond the idea of the subject as the origin of conceptual knowledge. Aristotle argued that the 
soul (psyche) of the living is precisely that principle which renders the living its def inite being 
(ousia) while at the same time representing the reference point for our conceptual knowledge 
(logos) of the living. Hegel def ined life as the immediate unity of a concept with its own reality, 
i.e. as a phenomenon which, in everything it produces, reproduces itself. Differing from this 
type of theory, as represented by Aristotle and Hegel, Canguilhem stages Kant and Bergson as 
thinkers who could not accept the idea of a substantiality of life that would no longer depend on 
a transcendental perspective. However, both in Kant’s and Bergson’s writings Canguilhem f inds 
the traces of an implicit “material a priori.” Both were on the verge of acknowledging the objective 
unity of life and concept, but failed to express this unity as both remained loyal to a philosophy 
centered on the subject. My suggestion in this paper is to inscribe Plessner’s philosophy of life 
into the pattern and the divisions mentioned by Canguilhem in “Le concept et la vie.”
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A few paragraphs later, Bergson draws the following conclusion:
In short, we can follow from the mineral to the plant, from the plant to 
the simplest conscious beings, from the animal to man the progress of 
the operation by which things and beings seize from out their surround-
ings that which attracts them, that which interests them practically, 
without needing any effort of abstraction, simply because the rest of 
their surroundings takes no hold upon them: this similarity of reaction 
following actions superf icially different is the germ which the human 
consciousness develops into general ideas (Ibid., 207f.).
All we need to know for that matter is that Bergson employs a utilitarian 
theory of perception to explain the formation of general concepts. Humans, 
just like any other living beings, perceive and treat objects in the light of 
their organic needs. The stimuli that stream in on us from the environment 
may be varied and diffuse. However, they produce identical reactions on 
our part, reactions that gradually become a habit. In this vein, the process 
of generalizing, of dealing with objects as exemplars of a species is a vital 
habit that panders to our survival. I would like to underscore that Bergson, 
arguing as he does, links the knowledge of life to a philosophy of the sub-
ject. Even though the problem of knowledge is no longer bound to Kant’s 
transcendental subjectivity, it is indicative of a vital subjectivity that desires 
to know in order to live more successfully.
However, there are two faces of Bergson as a philosopher of life. While it 
is sound to say that he remained within the paradigm of the subject as far as 
Matter and Memory is concerned, it is equally true that Bergson altered his 
approach in The Creative Mind: An Introduction to Metaphysics [La Pensée et 
Le Mouvant, 1934; English translation 1946; quotes here are taken from the 
1992 edition]. In this text we f ind to use the phrase that has been guiding 
us so far – his ‘vital turn.’
In the context we are presently occupied with, we can only pinpoint out 
the most evident divergence that opposes Bergson’s new attitude to the 
one he had expressed in Matière et Mémoire. It is true that Bergson arrives 
at his new argument by repeating the point he had made previously. Our 
use of general concepts for phenomena that are in themselves contingent 
and sensual goes back to the fact that we isolate features which matter to 
us in a vital and immediate way. According to Bergson, this interpretation 
implies an idea that needs to be taken seriously – the idea that similarities 
are not at all arbitrarily construed, but already suggested to us by experi-
ence. What remains to be analyzed is “why experience presents us with 
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resemblances which we have only to translate into generalities. Among 
these resemblances there are some, naturally, which go the fundamental 
root of things” (Bergson 1992, 56). The concepts of life habitually used by 
an organic subject refer to objects that already display a conceptual order. 
In this situation, Bergson points out that the important issue to consider is 
“what one might call objective generalities, inherent in reality itself” (ibid.). 
As a matter of fact, one might say, life is subdivided, diversif ied, dispersed 
and specif ied in its material manifestations. There are inherently rational 
differences in life that are in no way invented by man, but antecedent to 
him.
In an interesting reversal of Kant, Bergson goes on to say that there is a 
specif ic class of
resemblances [which] are biological in essence: they would have it that 
life should work as if life itself had general ideas, those of genus and 
species, as if it followed a certain limited number of structural plans, as 
if it had instituted general properties of life, f inally and above all as if 
[…] it had wished to arrange the living in a hierarchical series, along a 
scale where the resemblances between individuals are more numerous 
the higher one goes. […] In principle it is always in reality itself that our 
subdivisions into species, genera, etc. – generalities which we translate 
into general ideas – will be based (Ibid., 56f.).
Kant advised us to look at nature as if it followed concepts that we as hu-
mans are able to think of, but he emphasized that this is only a subjective 
maxim regulating our knowledge. Bergson on the other hand, seems to say 
that life operates as if reproducing an objective conceptual order, a universal 
kind of information that communicates itself to us at any moment. Hence, 
Bergson’s vital turn is a turn away from the transcendental position of the 
subject towards a material a priori: To know life is to be capable of reading 
the code that is inherent to life. With this image in mind, I would now like 
to close the loop with a little epilogue that will carry us back to Plessner.
Epilogue
My brief digression from Plessner to Bergson was supposed to show that 
both thinkers have incorporated something into their philosophies, which 
I would like to describe as a vital turn. In a nutshell, this turn implies that 
life itself dictates the concepts we employ to understand what life is. This 
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is the crucial discovery that emerges as a subtext in both Bergson’s and 
Plessner’s conceptions. As a subtext, this insight necessarily runs up against 
other intentions that are equally at work, both in Plessner’s and in Bergson’s 
case. However, it is not just a coincidence that Bergson’s philosophical 
route seems to be an exact inversion of the trajectory taken by Plessner. 
Plessner comes to the realization that our capacity to know life is a capacity 
that springs from life. Yet, he plays out this idea against a transcendental 
mindset. The condition of possibility which allows us to experience life as 
a whole is not our immanence in life, but the hiatus which sets us apart 
from it. Compared to that, Bergson begins, in Matière et Mémoire, with an 
understanding of life as seen from the utilitarian perspective of an organic 
subject. In La Pensée et Le Mouvant, he goes on to revise this philosophy of 
the subject in favour of a biological structuralism. By doing so, Bergson pays 
tribute to the idea that the knowledge of life needs to be devised irrespective 
of a transcendental or phenomenological agent.
Would it be unfair to think that Plessner detected the very conclusion 
that Bergson had exposed himself to, albeit in a different type of philoso-
phy? If we reconsider Plessner’s strange def inition of transcendentalism 
while also bearing in mind that eccentric positionality evokes the paradox 
of a subjectivity without a subject, can one easily get the impression that 
Plessner tacitly acknowledged the immanence of life? Furthermore, does 
it seem like he refused to work out this problem to cover all its implica-
tions? After all, Plessner’s approach brings forward two lines at a time, two 
disparate projects that just cannot have evolved simultaneously and that 
cannot coexist side by side. One is certainly not wrong in thinking that 
Bergson amplif ied something we usually call vitalism when he obliterated 
the agency of the subject from the conceptualization of life. And one is 
certainly entitled to ask if Plessner seriously left no stone unturned to 
silence the voice of the vitalism inside his own project.
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5 Bodily Experience and Experiencing 
One’s Body
Maarten Coolen
The world from a bodily perspective
What makes my own body so different from the things around me? When 
Maurice Merleau-Ponty, in his Phenomenology of Perception, turns to the 
question of how to describe the specif ic spatiality of one’s own body, he 
starts with an everyday example of someone sitting at a table. “If my arm is 
resting on the table, I should never think of saying that it is beside the ash-
tray in the way in which the ash-tray is beside the telephone” (Merleau-Ponty 
2002, 112). This seemingly simple observation already suff ices to effectively 
demonstrate how seriously Merleau-Ponty takes the bodily perspective on 
the world in his phenomenological account of human existence. Clearly, 
I do not perceive my own body, or a part of it, merely as a thing that is 
located somewhere in space, as I do with other things. On the contrary, 
without my body there is no space at all for me through which it would 
make sense to speak of things that are lying next to each other on the table. 
My pre-reflexive familiarity with the world depends on my so-called body 
schema, i.e. my body’s ability to project its motor intentions into the world 
it inhabits. But this body schema is not an image or a representation in 
which my body’s empirically determinable motor habits and capabilities 
are simply summed up. My body is polarized by its tasks, “it exists towards 
its tasks,” and consequently the term ‘body schema’ expresses “that my body 
is in the world (est au monde)” (Merleau-Ponty 2002, 115).
In an earlier part of his book, Merleau-Ponty carefully presents his objec-
tions against the empiricist and rationalist (or “intellectualist,” which is 
the term he uses) theories of human perception and action which were 
most prevalent amongst his contemporaries. These objections are still valid 
when applied to today’s versions of this kind of theories, e.g. in mainstream 
cognitivistic sciences, which depart from two basic assumptions. First, 
it is assumed that knowledge of the world is obtained by analyzing it in 
terms of detachable and isolated elements, and placing these elements 
in some systematic order, by which a universe is constructed that serves 
as a rational representation of the world. Secondly, one presupposes that 
humans take action in their world by manipulating this representation, 
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according to the rules of ‘calculative reason.’ In the cognitivist view, human 
knowledge consists in processing data that are stored in a representation of 
the world. This representationalism is indeed the dominant contemporary 
manifestation of that stance towards the world that Husserl identif ied as 
the “general positing which characterizes the natural attitude” (1982, 57), 
and Merleau-Ponty called the “prejudice in favour of the objective world” 
(2002, 7). On the basis of Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology of perception, one 
can indeed make a convincing case for the claim that these presuppositions 
prohibit the possibility of a full understanding of human existence. He also 
shows in great detail how one can acquire a comprehensive perspective on 
man’s openness towards the world in a phenomenology that starts from 
the primacy of the “bodily point of view” – to use a phrase introduced by 
Taylor Carman (2008, 93f.).
But, on the other hand, humans have the capability of distancing them-
selves from the world they inhabit, and of adopting an attitude in which 
they can distinguish objective features in their surroundings. Moreover, 
they are able to objectify their bodily capabilities into stable functional 
structures through which they act on the external world outside of them. 
From the phenomenological perspective on human perception and skilful 
action one cannot stress enough how this reflection and objectif ication 
is only possible because the human body is maintaining its grip on the 
world in the background (cf. Dreyfus 2007, 363). In my view, this is indeed 
a necessary condition of the possibility for humans to reflect and objectify. 
However, is it suff icient? What kind of experience would force humans to 
give up their being absorbed in responding to solicitations that stem from 
affordances they come across in their world?
In order to answer these questions, it is necessary to develop a phe-
nomenological account in which one, while holding on to the primacy 
of embodied intentionality, tries to describe the kind of situations in 
which humans actually experience that they are forced to give up their 
unref lective coping with the world, and also tries to show how they 
actually manage to make the turn to ref lection and objectif ication. One 
of the elements of such an account, I will argue, would be a descrip-
tion of how the body can have a relation to itself and become part of 
the external world in the very process of being geared into the world it 
inhabits. To achieve this, I could have chosen to try f inding an interpreta-
tion of Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology that allows for an answer to my 
problem. Instead, I opted for a different approach, namely to look at his 
phenomenology from the viewpoint of Helmuth Plessner’s philosophical 
anthropology.
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Phenomenology and philosophical anthropology
In everyday life, we don’t need explicit mental representations of what we 
want to see or do, or of how our bodies are situated in the world we are 
familiar with. When we want to look at something, we tend to move around 
until we have found the right distance from which we can take in both 
the thing as a whole and its details that are relevant to us in the particular 
situation. “For each object,” Merleau-Ponty says, “as for each picture in an 
art gallery, there is an optimum distance from which it requires to be seen, 
a direction viewed from which it vouchsafes most of itself; at a shorter or 
greater distance we have merely a perception blurred through excess or 
def iciency” (Merleau-Ponty 2002, 351).
Without any doubt, Merleau-Ponty gives an apt description of what is 
presented to us in our perceptual f ield, when we have found the optimal 
view of the painting. But he does not mention at all that here we might also 
have some kind of experience in which we sense that our body is indeed 
located at the right place after moving around in the art gallery. And when 
we are reaching out for things we need in order to perform a certain task, e.g. 
preparing food in the kitchen, we tend to get a grasp of them that is optimal 
for fulf illing the task we are involved in. As Merleau-Ponty says elsewhere 
in the Phenomenology of Perception: “My body is geared into the world 
when my perception presents me with a spectacle as varied and as clearly 
articulated as possible, and when my motor intentions, as they unfold, 
receive the responses they expect from the world” (ibid., 291). He clearly 
points out how we get things done without having to make representations 
of what we are aiming at. The body is solicited by the situation to f ind an 
optimal equilibrium for what has to be get done. But in Merleau-Ponty’s 
phenomenology of skilful coping, the body itself seems to ‘vanish’ when it 
perceives something or puts itself into action, in favour of the world that 
is opened by it. It gets, so to speak, swallowed up in its being attuned to 
the world.1 It cannot at the same time be experienced as something that is 
located in the perceived world. As Merleau-Ponty puts it: “I am aware of my 
body via the world, […] and I am aware of the world through the medium 
of my body” (2002, 94-95).2
One can fully subscribe to the primacy of the bodily point of view, and at 
the same time feel forced to consider the question whether humans, exactly on 
the basis of their bodily coping with the world, can also have a pre-reflective 
1 In a very different context, Shusterman (2005) presents similar observations.
2 The translation is slightly changed: ‘aware’ instead of ‘conscious.’
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sensitivity towards the phenomenon that they, as human beings, always have 
to occupy, as living bodies, a place on their own behalf, and that this is a place 
which in one way or another may also be present to them as a place – whatever 
this place may actually be. For Plessner, the issue that humans are positioned 
in their world through their bodies stands at the centre of his philosophical 
anthropology. One should take into account, he says, “that man does not 
have a univocal, but an equivocal relation to his own body, that his existence 
imposes on him this ambiguity of being an ‘embodied’ (leibhaften) creature 
and a creature ‘in the body’ (im Körper)” (1970, 32). Regardless of whether 
humans move about and do something, or quietly take in the perceived world, 
the condition of their existence is marked by this double aspectivity.
Plessner warns against misunderstanding this twofold perspective as a 
dualistic theory in which the inner is conceived of as a purely mental person 
who is operating his outer body, which is nothing more than a physical thing. 
This is in accordance with Merleau-Ponty. Man is his living body (Leib), 
insofar as it serves him as a centre of his incarnated intentionality; and he 
has his body (Körper), insofar as it is a thing that locates him amidst of other 
things, or a thing he can use in action. “A human being always and conjointly 
is a living body […] and has this living body as this physical body” (1970, 34). 
Neither do I coincide with being my body, as if I could f ind the right distance 
to see a painting without any awareness of the place where I am standing, 
nor do I just have my body at my disposal, as if I could move it around as 
a purely external object without any motor intentionality to be fulf illed. 
I must accept two orders, one related to my embodied intentionality, and 
another one related to my body’s place in an external world. So, taking up the 
example of looking at a painting in an art gallery once more: when I bump 
with my back into a wall while trying to f ind the optimal distance to look 
at the painting, I do not only experience that I fail to get the optimal view 
of it, I also sense that I fail to put my body in the right place, and this in turn 
makes me aware of my body as a thing that is positioned amidst other things.
Human bodily existence is characterized by the following threefold 
structure: the living creature is its body, it has its body as a thing, and it 
continuously actualizes the relation between being its body and having its 
body. Man must come to terms with the fact that he exists as a living body 
in a physical thing (als Leib im Körper). In any situation he must meet the 
demand for a settlement for the relation between being his body and having 
it. But this reconciliation cannot but be a momentaneous one. Moreover, 
man will never be able to penetrate into the nature of this relation that 
constitutes his existence. Plessner’s expression eccentric positionality 
captures this fundamental trait of the human condition very adequately. 
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Additionally, an individual living being whose position is structured in this 
threefold manner, Plessner calls a person.3
There are not many passages in Plessner’s work, in which he explicitly 
refers to Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy as another example of an account 
in which corporeality has a central place in understanding what it is to 
be a human being. He does mention Merleau-Ponty, however, towards 
the end of the preface to the second edition of Die Stufen des Organischen 
und der Mensch, which appeared in 1965. Because one can f ind phrases 
in Merleau-Ponty which show a striking similarity to his own, Plessner 
wonders whether Merleau-Ponty had known his book after all. He dismisses 
this conjecture, explaining that not all convergences in thought have to be 
based upon influence. The same happened to him with respect to Hegel, 
he admits. He would have had to refer to Hegel’s writings, had the right 
passages been known to him. He then expresses this phenomenon in the 
following words: “In the world more thinking is going on, than one thinks.”4
In Laughing and Crying, Plessner criticizes a philosophical attitude that 
appears to have all the traits of ‘pure’ existential phenomenology, although 
he does not give it this title. Here, Plessner must have been attacking Hei-
degger’s position rather than Merleau-Ponty’s. He describes this attitude as 
one that is opposed to Cartesianism in a manner that evades the problem 
of being a body and having it as a thing altogether, by “going back to an 
allegedly unproblematic primordial level of existence.” Thereby all forms 
of human behavior are characterized right from the start in such a way that 
“the cleft between ‘inner’ and ‘outer’ does not appear at all” (1970, 30-31). 
They are, of course, exactly the phenomena of laughing and crying that 
demonstrate the inadequacy of this philosophical position. We laugh or cry 
whenever we are unable to respond as a person to meaningful affordances 
of the situation we f ind ourselves in. Plessner explains that this is where 
we let our body take over the task of answering. Laughter occurs when the 
person’s normal behavior is blocked by an irreducible ambiguity, which 
is a typical trait of the comic situation. We burst into tears when we are 
overwhelmed by a feeling of powerlessness, because we fail to come to terms 
with the fact that we lack control over the circumstances we happen to f ind 
ourselves in. When the body takes over the answer from us as a person, it 
3 This is my interpretation of a passage from Plessner’s Stufen 1975, 293, f irst paragraph.
4 His reference to Hegel is interesting in itself. One can indeed recognize the use of certain 
oppositions in Plessner’s arguments, but the terms in the oppositions are not lifted to a higher 
level, in which they are assimilated or reconciled (aufgehoben) with each other, as is structurally 
the case in Hegel’s dialectics. The higher level is a new stage of life. But that is a different subject, 
on which I will not dwell now.
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expresses exactly that we do not know which position we should take in 
that situation. By doing so, it takes ‘our stand.’
To what extent does Merleau-Ponty’s existential phenomenology take 
into account this ambiguity, or rather this double aspectivity, of man being 
both an embodied creature and a creature in a body? As mentioned before, 
in his account the body remains inconspicuous, completely on the side of the 
perceiver, it does not appear as something in the f ield that is perceived. So if 
there is something wrong with our body, this is not directly noticed by us, but 
seems to become apparent to us only through the resulting distortion or loss 
of our world. If one subscribes to Plessner’s principle of eccentric positionality, 
this cannot be the whole story. Using Plessner’s distinction, Merleau-Ponty’s 
phenomenology seems to show an inclination to overemphasize the living 
body (Leib) at the cost of the body as a thing (Körper). As a consequence 
Merleau-Ponty’s account leaves little room for Plessner’s notion of the person, 
since what makes us a person depends on how we actually deal with the 
relation between being our living body and having our body as a thing.
Body and world
How, then, do humans deal with being a living body in a body-thing? 
Plessner specif ies the necessary fundamental possibilities that humans 
have at their disposal when coping with all kinds of situations in their 
lives in terms of three basic “anthropological laws”: the laws of natural 
artif iciality, mediated immediacy and utopian standpoint (Plessner 1975, 
309ff.). These laws explain how eccentric positionality manifests itself in 
human conduct, by specifying three typical oppositions humans have to 
struggle with as they try to lead their lives.
Again, my aim in this article is to demonstrate how Plessner’s philo-
sophical anthropology can provide a line of thought which allows us to 
reconcile the following two approaches to human embodiment. I endorse 
the phenomenological position that our openness towards the world, as in 
perception and in action, is grounded in our bodily existence, but I want 
to f ind a way to combine this view with an account of how our own body 
can be experienced as ‘something’ amidst other things in the world that is 
perceived by us and in which our conduct takes place.
In my opinion, a discussion of the second anthropological law has the 
most to offer in this respect, which I therefore choose as my starting point. 
It would be a mistake to think that the principle of mediated immediacy 
implies that humans have two different but parallel kinds of connections 
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to their world: an immediate one in as far as they are open to what the 
world has to offer, and a mediated one in as far as humans reflect upon 
the world. Given its dualistic character, such a way of thinking would be 
reminiscent of Cartesianism. In the Stufen, Plessner gives a very precise 
description of what he means by a relationship between two terms that 
is governed by mediated immediacy. In an immediate relation, the terms 
are connected without any intervening terms; in a mediated relation, the 
terms are linked to each other through one or more intervening terms. 
A mediated-immediate relation is “that form of binding […] in which the 
mediating intervening term is necessary in order to establish or ensure the 
immediacy of the connection” (Plessner 1975, 324).5
Both human and animal life are organized in accordance with this 
principle of mediated immediacy. For Plessner, this is a consequence of 
the specif ic way in which a living body realizes its boundary between itself 
and its surroundings. He discusses the notion of ‘boundary’ extensively 
in an earlier chapter of the Stufen. In order to avoid having to deal with 
complications that are irrelevant for our purposes, let us restrict ourselves 
to higher forms of life, i.e. animals and humans. We never actually look at 
a thing from all of the possible different angles and distances. Yet, while 
only one particular aspect of it is directly perceived by us, in each aspect the 
perceived thing is nevertheless given as a whole.6 We see an ‘exterior’ that 
cannot exist without indicating the ‘interior’ of the thing, i.e. its substantial 
core. Conversely, the ‘interior’ of the thing is perceptually present to us even 
if we only see its ‘exterior.’ Our perception of specif ic spatial characteristics 
of a thing would not be possible without this double aspectivity in which 
the thing’s exterior and interior are bi-directionally linked. Due to this 
structure of perception, we see things delineated from their surroundings 
by a contour or boundary.
All perception is governed by this principle of double aspectivity, whether 
the things in our perceptual f ield are inanimate or alive. But in the case 
of living beings, the perceived distinction between exterior and interior 
emerges as a proper characteristic of the mode of being of the living thing 
itself. This is demonstrated by the fact that living beings have to be capable 
of preserving themselves as a self-sustaining entities by distinguishing 
themselves from their environment (the ‘inward’ aspect) in order to stay 
5 The translation is mine, as of all of Plessner’s texts in German of which there did not already 
exist an English translation.
6 This is in concordance with Husserl’s account of perception, according to which things are 
only given to us in adumbrations (Abschattungen), e.g. Husserl 1982, 9.
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alive, which they can only manage by realizing a specif ic openness towards 
their environment (the ‘outward’ aspect). Thus, we perceive that living 
things realize their own delineations or boundaries, as opposed to when 
we look at inanimate objects, which borrow their distinctions amongst 
themselves from our act of perception. In Plessner’s own words: “When in 
the intuition (Anschauung) of a corporeal thing a fundamentally divergent 
relation between outer and inner appears as belonging objectively to its [the 
thing’s] being, it is called living” (Plessner 1975, 89 and 98). The boundary is 
part of the living body itself (ibid., 127), and therefore it is also the body that 
marks off what is its other, i.e. its environment, with which it is in immediate 
contact across its boundary. It positions itself in its environment by living 
both beyond and within its boundary, “beyond itself” (über ihm hinaus) 
and “into itself” (in ihn hinein) (ibid., 129). When the living body actually 
realizes its boundary itself, it follows that the mediating term that secures 
the immediate relationship between the organism and its environment, is 
not a separate third entity, but the body itself.
What I have said until now about the law of mediated immediacy holds 
for animal and human life alike. Yet, according to Plessner, both forms of 
life differ qua mode of being fundamentally from each other. An animal 
only performs the mediation of its immediate relationship with its environ-
ment, e.g. by noticing something or setting its body into action. An animal 
oscillates between coinciding with its body and operating with it, but it 
remains totally submerged in this alternation. For humans, this relationship 
is also present as a relationship which always needs to be actualized in one 
way or another. The animal is placed at the point where the mediation is 
performed in such a way that it cannot break out of its absolute nearness to 
itself (ibid., 238-239); or, using an expression of Plessner’s himself, animal life 
is characterized by a “centric positionality.” Only man lives eccentrically, 
meaning that he, “as the living thing, that is placed in the middle of his 
existence, knows about this centre, experiences (erlebt) it, and therefore is 
beyond it” (ibid., 291). Again we see that eccentric positionality entails that 
man, in contrast to animals, has a relation to his (mediated-immediate) 
connection with his environment. For Plessner it is obvious that this should 
not be misconstrued in a Cartesian fashion as if there were a separate mind 
that is reflecting upon the movements of a mediating body. It must be man 
as an embodied being, who establishes this relation.
But what does that imply for human corporeality? First, insofar as man is 
a living body (Leib), he mediates his (immediate) contact with the world by 
getting his physical body (Körper) to do things. In this respect, animal and 
human life are similar. Secondly, while the animal’s ‘instrumental use of the 
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body’ is wholly bound to the momentary situation in which the animal is 
active, man experiences or perceives that he puts his own body into action 
when he uses it as an instrument in order to mediate his immediate contact 
with the world. The term ‘perception’ here is not meant to refer to some kind 
of scientif ic observation, but rather to the everyday perception that takes 
place when we are f inding ways to cope with the things in the world. This 
would be in concordance with how Merleau-Ponty understands perception, 
with the exception that he would not accept that there are situations in 
which one does not only perceive one’s body as it “makes itself explicit in the 
language of external perception” (Merleau-Ponty 2002, 239), but one also – to 
some extent – experiences one’s own body as a thing present in a perceptual 
f ield, while one perceives other things when one is in the process of respond-
ing to solicitations of affordances that emanate from the perceived world.
So the human body is an embodied subject, experiencing the relationship 
between both aspects of the body, namely the living body he is (that is 
open to an environment) and the physical body he has (that can be used 
instrumentally). Moreover, man also experiences this relationship as being 
performed by himself when he realizes his openness to affordances in 
the world. Plessner uses the terms ‘object’ and ‘instrument’ without much 
hesitation. His phrasings must seem rather objectivistic to someone who is 
accustomed to Merleau-Ponty’s style of language. But, in my opinion, one 
should not interpret Plessner as if he would imply that an instrumental use 
of something would require a representation of what has to be done. The use 
of the body he has in mind is of a practical kind, like when one uses one’s 
arms to pull oneself upwards. So when the body aims at fulf illing a task, it 
mediates its movements with which it accomplishes the task.
Let us now turn our attention to the f irst anthropological law, which 
states that human life should be understood from the standpoint of natural 
artif iciality. It would be fallacious to assume that human features can be 
divided into two distinct and opposing categories, natural and artif icial. 
Rather, artif iciality belongs to man’s very nature, i.e. to his mode of ex-
istence. What does this mean? As we have seen, the human living body 
must actualize a relationship to itself as it realizes its connection with its 
environment. This requires that the living thing is in control of its own 
body, which is indeed the case, because the living creature is its body and 
has it as something that can be put into motion.
Both animals and humans meet this requirement. However, an animal 
cannot detach itself from its connection with the particular occasion in 
which its body notices and affects its surroundings while responding to 
solicitations of affordances. Only man has the capacity to use his body 
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explicitly at his disposal. Having the inherent instrumental nature of the 
own corporeality disclosed to oneself is a privilege that is restricted to 
humans (cf. e.g. GS VIII, 321). Consequently humans are the only creatures 
confronted with the fact that their bodies can suffer from certain short-
comings when they are in the process of performing a task. They have to 
create artif icial means with which they supplement their ‘naturally grown’ 
bodies in order to have a full corporeal existence. Furthermore, they have 
to transform things they come across in their surroundings into artifacts 
in order to fully satisfy their needs. Man can live only insofar as he leads 
his life in a specif ic manner and only insofar as he succeeds in turning 
himself into what he is, but not only into that what he already is. Artif icial 
by nature, humans make use of technical artifacts and lead their lives in a 
cultural context (cf. Plessner 1975, 309-310; GS VIII, 192; GS VIII, 321).
Thus, man is not simply at home in and with his body in the way animals 
are. Nor is his body an external thing he can own or appropriate. On the 
basis of his specif ic eccentric positionality, his body has to appear to him as 
something that is both familiar and strange to him. In human embodiment, 
familiarity with and alienness to oneself are intertwined.
I shall only brief ly discuss the third anthropological law, as it only 
marginally relates to the issue at hand. Eccentricity forces man to accept 
that he can never f ind a position in the world that is def initely secure, but 
at the same time it demands from him that he, nevertheless, always takes 
a stand. “Eccentrically positioned, he stands there where he stands, and 
at the same time he does not stand there where he stands” (Plessner 1975, 
342). It is not given to man to know for certain where he stands and what 
his world is like. Having to take a stand without being able to f ind a secure 
footing anywhere, he perpetually longs for an absolute grounding of his 
world. Yet, if he wants to be true to his eccentric existence, he must doubt 
any conception that appears to fulf ill this longing def initively.
One may wonder why I am spelling all this out in such detail. In my opinion, 
we have arrived here – on a very low level, so to speak – at the point where 
a fundamental difference arises between Merleau-Ponty’s and Plessner’s 
understanding of human embodiment. In Merleau-Ponty’s account of hu-
man corporeality in the Phenomenology of Perception, the body is exclusively 
described as being on the side of who is perceiving; it does not also turn up as 
a thing in the perceptual f ield into which the perceiving body is geared. That 
my body is in pain, for example, only has significance insofar as this affects 
my openness to the world. The painful body doesn’t become an annoyance to 
me at all. Yet, in Plessner’s philosophical anthropology, my body can always 
become a burden I have to carry. This possibility is even a necessity, on the 
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basis of man’s eccentric positionality. Along the example of pain, I would like 
to quote Frederick Buytendijk, who, very much in agreement with Plessner, 
writes: “The essence of pain we have now learned to understand as man being 
stricken in his utmost intimate unity, his psycho-physical naturalness, through 
which the ego comes in conflict with its own body, whereas it nevertheless 
remains bound to the body in all its painfulness” (Buytendijk 1943, 170).7
This is a vivid example of how the tension between being one’s body and 
having it (as a thing, and being in it) can cast a shadow over human life. In 
Plessner’s line of thought, one might say that the body (I have) mediates 
my immediate co-existing (as the body I am) with the things in the world. 
Perhaps this merges the two philosophical vocabularies a little too far into 
one another. I chose this expression to emphasize that one should not take 
Plessner’s characterization of the human condition in terms of eccentric 
positionality as being in conflict with Merleau-Ponty’s characterization of 
the human being-in-the-world primarily in terms of motor intentionality. 
In my interpretation, the mediation of the immediate can be seen as a 
complementary principle in which the body-thing (Körper) is introduced 
in addition to the living body (Leib), while the concept of the living body 
ultimately undergoes changes as well.
The body is not only familiar with the world, but also alien to itself
What bearing does Plessner’s view on human corporeality have on Hubert 
Dreyfus’s well-known phenomenological account of skilful action, of which 
he has offered an increasingly more comprehensive exposition throughout 
the years (cf. e.g. Dreyfus 2008; Dreyfus 2002; Dreyfus and Dreyfus 1986)? 
Most notably, it challenges the cognitivistic model of human expertise, 
according to which human intelligent behavior depends on knowing 
facts and following rules. This assumption is made by researchers in a 
f ield called knowledge engineering. They claim that it is possible to build 
computer-based expert systems, which, within a well-delineated domain, 
could perform equally well as human experts. A good example here is a 
computer system that can diagnose a disease on the basis of a set of objecti-
f ied data thought to represent the patient’s condition. For such a system to 
display the same intelligent behavior as a human doctor, one allegedly only 
needs to be able to analyze the situations that are relevant for the specif ic 
domain in terms of objective, context-free features, subsequently create 
7 Original in Dutch; my translation.
122 MAArten coolen 
formal systems which relate these features to one another, and f inally 
def ine explicit rules for determining actions on the basis of these systems, 
which are considered to represent the situations in which the competent 
performance is expected.
But such systems have consistently failed to exhibit expertise. This fail-
ure, Dreyfus argues, shows that the cognitivist conception of human skills 
is not at all supported by empirical evidence. More importantly, drawing on 
Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology of embodiment, Dreyfus develops a phe-
nomenological description of how adult humans acquire a new skill when 
being delivered explicit instructions (cf. 2002, 368f.). This is different from 
how skills are acquired by trial and error or by imitation, the predominant 
modes for learning at early age. Such a learning process would typically 
start with an instructor telling us which specif ic objective features of the 
task environment we have to pay attention to and which rules we have to 
follow in order to act on the basis of these features, much like a computer 
following a program. This means that it requires us to step back from the 
immediately experienced situation, reflect upon which movements we have 
to make, and explicitly monitor our actions as we are performing them. But 
we can only be an expert at a skill if we can let go of this monitoring and 
allow ourselves to be drawn into an absorbed coping in which our bodies 
respond to solicitations of affordances present in the situation.
Dreyfus raises a similar concern in his debate with John McDowell, 
deliberating on how our openness to the world should be understood (cf. 
McDowell 2007, Dreyfus 2007). Dreyfus interprets the difference between 
their positions as follows. For McDowell, the world we have direct access 
to consists of propositionally structured knowledge of facts about what 
affords what. We know, e.g. that apples can be eaten. Dreyfus, on the other 
hand, understands the world to which we are directly open as a multitude 
of solicitations of affordances. When I am hungry, I am attracted to the 
apple without having explicit knowledge about its properties. According 
to Dreyfus, McDowell holds the view, that a key characteristic of our open-
ness to the world is our “capacity to step back and criticize any particular 
proposition about what is the case and any reason for one’s actions.” Dreyfus 
himself takes the view that this openness is brought into practice by our 
“capacity to let ourselves […] respond to some particular constellation of 
attractions and repulsions” (cf. Dreyfus 2007, e.g. 357).8 One could say that 
to a beginner, the specif ic world with respect to which he is learning a new 
skill may look like McDowell describes it. Once he has become an expert 
8 Dreyfus refers to McDowell 2006.
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in the skill, he simply knows how to act in response to what the situation 
demands of him.
In this debate, I personally endorse Dreyfus’s side. However, the issue I 
want to address here is a different one. As Dreyfus acknowledges, humans 
have the capacity to step back and reflect, and, as I would add, to observe 
their surroundings and their own actions in an objectifying manner. But 
we can only notice objective features and explicit reasons on the basis 
of our “everyday absorbed coping”; and even then, this coping must go 
on in the background, if we are to have a stable world we can step back 
from and reflect upon (2007, 363). Although I agree with Dreyfus on this 
point, it nevertheless seems necessary to pose the question what it is that 
makes us move from absorbed coping with our situation to reflecting upon 
our environment. Dreyfus is also aware of this problem: “[T]he existential 
phenomenologist also has his problems. He owes an account of how our 
absorbed, situated experience comes to be transformed, so that we can 
experience context-free […] substances with detachable properties” (Drey-
fus 2007, 364).
I would like to emphasize the phenomenological nature of this task: we 
need a description of the kind of experience we must live through, before 
we give up our absorbed coping. But why would we ever want to do that? 
Or why must we? Why don’t we just go on coping, continuously changing 
from one task to another, without ever having to face a breakdown that 
would force us to step back and ref lect? How do we differ from animals, 
which never ‘revert’ to ref lecting, but just go on responding to solicita-
tions?
We have to f ind an answer to these questions without falling prey to the 
fallacy of taking humans as animals whose essential feature is a mental 
capacity to reflect. We are in need of a philosophical account of how human 
embodiment differs radically from the animal way of being embodied. 
This is a key objective of Plessner’s philosophical anthropology. An animal 
puts its body into action in order to respond to what is afforded to it by its 
environment, and by doing so its body mediates its immediate contact 
with the environment which it depends on. But an animal coping with 
its environment in such a way does not experience that its body plays a 
mediating role in this process. To the animal, its own body is never present 
as such; it vanishes as it performs its mediating role. Humans and animals 
alike cannot cope with their environment without the mediating aid from 
their bodies. But in my understanding, Plessner distances himself from 
Merleau-Ponty when he clarif ies that the characteristic human mode of 
being in the world connected with eccentric positionality forbids us from 
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leading a life in which we experience our own body “only in its mediality, 
in its mediating role” (GS VIII, 291).9
Animals are superior to humans in that they are able to be totally ab-
sorbed in the flow of doing things through their bodies, while humans are 
denied any such possibility. Humans, on the other hand, are always capable 
of getting their bodies to develop completely new skills, as many examples 
of mastering new athletic disciplines demonstrate. This presupposes that 
humans are able to take their living bodies as things that can serve as 
an instrument, or to put it differently, that they can have an objectifying 
stance towards their bodies. But the objectif ication that is involved here 
is not of the theoretical kind, as is realized in the modern natural sciences 
through abstraction and representation. Quite to the contrary, it is a practi-
cal objectif ication materialized in the form of an actual intervention in the 
forms of mediality that the body already possessed when it entered into 
the flow of doing something (GS VIII, 291-292). That is why we can be taken 
by surprise when our body is hindered in its movements by an unexpected 
external obstacle or when it suddenly loses one of its functionalities.
Our specif ic eccentric openness to the world forbids our body to merge 
fully with its role of mediated coping. Therefore, we can always be thrown 
out of the flow of our absorbed coping, thus being forced to step back and 
reflect. We do not only know about this by taking a theoretical attitude 
towards ourselves, it is also an unavoidable part of our experience of the way 
we do things in our lives. By virtue of his eccentric positionality man always 
is also capable of looking at himself from an outside perspective, in which 
his body is presented to him as a thing external to himself in contrast with 
the lived body that allows him to be in direct contact with the world around 
him. In this specif ic sense one can say that his body is something alien to 
him. We do not experience ourselves as a thing, because there are things 
around us; it is the other way round: because of our capability of an outer 
perspective on ourselves, we can make sense of what it means to be part of 
a world of external things. Of course, we cannot actually be concerned with 
other things without their de facto existence, but the latter is not the basis 
upon which the capability of this concern rests. So, according to Plessner, the 
9 Martin Heinze (2009, 122) states the opposite: he thinks that Plessner holds “that ‘ec-
centric positionality’ means, amongst other things, ‘to live and experience one’s own body 
only through its mediality or in its mediating role’” (GS VIII, 291). This misinterpretation is 
most likely caused by a faulty translation of Plessner’s words on the mentioned page: “was ich 
als das Charakteristische menschlichen In-der-Welt-Seins zu fassen versucht habe, mit der 
exzentrischen Postionalität, die uns verbietet, den eigenen Leib nur in seiner Medialität, in 
seiner vermittelnden Rolle zu leben und zu erleben.”
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world of external things, or outer world (Außenwelt), has to be understood 
as the form in which man understands his own bodily position as located 
in the realm of organic and physical things (cf. 1975, 293f.), or in Plessner’s 
own words: “[man as t]his positional whole stands […] in the outer world 
as do all the other things” (Plessner 1975, 294).10
Anybody who tries to acquire the motor skills that are needed to become 
proficient in a new athletic discipline will have to train specif ic movements 
that are initially unfamiliar to his body, and in most cases this also involves 
the handling of external objects, e.g. in speed skating. How does one learn 
to get the body to make the right movements? Here the description of the 
body responding to solicitations of affordances has to be supplemented by 
a description of how the body is put into motion. In acquiring a skill like 
skating, the body is both the body-subject which moves and the body-thing 
that is moved or has to be moved. But, of course, my body cannot be an 
object that is moved insofar as it itself is moving objects. As Merleau-Ponty 
rightly points out, “[w]hat prevents its ever being an object, ever being 
‘completely constituted’ [here he refers to Husserl’s Ideas II], is that it is 
that by which there are objects” (Merleau-Ponty 2002, 105). In the context 
in which Merleau-Ponty makes his remark, he is only concerned with the 
permanency of one’s own body that perceives the world, not at all with the 
possibility of experiencing one’s own body as a thing one has to deal with. 
When I try to learn skating, I can be receptive to the experience that my 
body does not always comply with what I would like it to do. For my body 
to acquire the habit of speed skating, it may be necessary but not suff icient 
to follow given instructions to help me determine which movements my 
body should undergo, treating it like nothing but a passive object completely 
under my control. I would soon learn from this experience that sometimes 
my body does not obey my practical attempt to make it move in a specif ic 
way. Acknowledging this failure is even essential for improving my skating 
skills. As the habitual living body I am, my body lets me be familiar with 
the world I live in; but I also experience my body, insofar as it is an instru-
ment that mediates my immediate coping, as something that resists being 
absorbed in my body schema, as a thing that retains a certain alienness 
with respect to me.
In order to elucidate my point a little further, I will make some short 
remarks about why eccentric positionality entails that humans have techni-
cal artifacts at their disposal. Humans, as the law of natural artif iciality 
explains, have to supplement their bodies with artif icial artifacts, which not 
10 This is parallel with his Mitwelt, see Plessner 1975, 302.
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only enhance the motorial functionality of their bodies, but also augment 
their openness to the world. The simplest examples of technical artifacts 
are tools we use with our hands. In our time, the artif icial objects with 
which we can improve our body’s capacities have become increasingly 
more sophisticated. Yet in principle, at least insofar as I am concerned 
here, the argument remains the same. What makes it possible for us to 
employ external objects as instruments? If one goes along with Plessner’s 
philosophical anthropology, one must answer: the basis of this capacity is 
that our eccentric embodiment allows us to make instrumental use of our 
own bodies. On the basis of the anthropological law of mediated immediacy, 
it can be explained why it is not signif icantly different whether a ‘part’ of 
the body or a thing in the outside world is involved in the performance of 
a skill. From the perspective of Merleau-Ponty’s motor intentionality, one 
can conclude that the enhancement of the body with an external object 
will only succeed when this alien object is incorporated into the motorial 
scheme of the coping body. In accordance with Dreyfus’s account of skill 
acquisition, it follows that the more proficient someone is, the less he notices 
to which extent the tool contributes to the greater capabilities of his body. 
But we should bear in mind that the immediacy which is attained in the 
expert handling of the tool is mediated by the body using a thing that is 
alien to it – which it can do because the body is alien to itself.
When I directly respond to solicitations that stem from what is afforded 
by my surroundings, then, according to Dreyfus, I don’t experience my 
body as mine, I only experience my ongoing coping (Dreyfus 2007, 356). On 
this point he is only partly right. Indeed, insofar as I am simply in the flow 
of doing something, i.e. insofar as my body’s absorbed coping is going on 
quietly in the background, the double aspectivity of my body may remain 
hidden from my view. But even then my eccentric bodily existence prevents 
me from coinciding with the lived body I am. My body appears to exhibit 
some kind of resistance against being swallowed up in its mediating role 
as I open up to the world. A human being differs from an animal in that 
he has to experience his body as his, whatever his body is involved in.11 
Eccentric positionality constitutes both the possibility and the necessity of 
experiencing a distinction between what is internal and what external to 
the body. When someone experiences his body as his, he is aware that it is 
both familiar with the world, insofar as it is attuned to its world, and alien to 
11 We can even experience this alienness in the environment created by some works of 
installation art. Cf. my article (2008). There I argue that these works give us the opportunity to 
experience that our ref lexive relation to ourselves has an origin in human corporeality.
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itself, insofar as it is a thing amidst other things. On the basis of this peculiar 
alienness that adheres to their bodies, humans are capable of stepping back 
from the world of solicitations to which they immediately respond, allowing 
them to reflect on it and take an objectifying stance towards it. This enables 
them to conceive the preconceptual world of affordances they are attuned 
to as a universe of detachable features.
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6 Plessner and the Mathematical-
Physical Perspective
The Prescientif ic Objectivity of the Human Body
Jasper van Buuren
Two interpretations of Plessner’s concept of the physical body
One of the aims of Plessner’s The Levels of the Organic and Man [Die Stufen 
des Organischen und der Mensch, 1928]1 is to base natural science on a 
concept of human life. Plessner considers man’s bodily existence as both 
the foundation and origin of the perspectives of physics and biology, but 
the human body can only play this role if it is itself understood primarily 
in a non-scientif ic way. However, some passages in Plessner’s Levels seem to 
conflict with this primacy of everyday experience: the human body seems 
to be def ined from a mathematical-physical point of view.
In one of the crucial passages in the Levels (GS IV, 365-368), Plessner bases 
the mathematical-physical perspective on his concept of the human body 
as physical body (Körper) as opposed to the living body (Leib).2 The passage 
raises suspicions about the concept of the physical body not merely “lead[ing] 
to” the mathematical-physical perspective (GS IV, 367), but is rather defined 
by that perspective from the outset. Plessner describes the physical body as 
“a thing among things,” in a “continuum in which directions are relative (ein 
richtungsrelatives Kontinuum)” (GS IV, 367). In the space of physical bodies, 
according to Plessner, there are no orientations like above, below, left and 
right. When interpreting this passage, we have to take into account that in 
everyday life, we always experience space as organized by directions, like 
above and below. From a mathematical-physical perspective, orientations 
like above, below, left and right, are merely relative. So Plessner’s concept 
of the physical body refers to an object in the mathematical-physical rather 
than to bodily experience in of everyday life sense. The scientif ic objectivity 
of our bodies seems to acquire a fundamental status within the concept of 
1 Plessner 1981; hereafter referred to as Levels.
2 The translations of these terms, Körper and Leib, are borrowed from James Spencer Churchill 
and Marjorie Grene’s translation of Plessner’s Lachen und Weinen (Plessner 1970), e.g. 34. Unless 
specif ied, translations in this article are mine.
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man, which would mean that Plessner undercuts his own aim of descending 
to a prescientific level of human existence, so that it may constitute a ground 
for scientif ic perspective.
However, the following alternative on how to interpret Plessner is more 
attractive for several reasons.3 Here, man’s physical body is indeed an object, 
but not primarily in the mathematical-physical sense. The objectivity of the 
body is primarily prescientif ic. As such, it is not def ined from within the 
mathematical-physical perspective. It renders possible this perspective in 
the f irst place. Mathematics and physics are then secondary to everyday 
experience. In this chapter, I develop the second interpretation of Plessner 
by using the f irst as a stepping-stone. I take this detour in order to further 
our understanding of the passages mentioned, as their degree of diff iculty 
may easily lead to misunderstandings.4
Before I start, let me say something about how I use the words “subject” 
and “object.” When interpreting Plessner, in what sense can we legitimately 
speak of human beings as subjects? Although Plessner uses “personhood” 
to describe the eccentric position, this notion does not make the concept 
of subjectivity superfluous. In the section on the second anthropological 
principle (GS IV, 396-418), Plessner frequently uses the terms “subject” and 
“subjectivity” to express his own thought. When applied to human beings, 
these notions should not be confused with the “centric positionality” of 
the animal: contrary to animal subjectivity, human subjectivity has an 
eccentric structure, viz. a form of “mediated immediacy” that gives man’s 
world the double structure of immanence and transcendence. Subjectivity 
is man’s f irst distance to his body, which is modified by the second distance 
(the eccentric position). This is also the position from which man has his 
body. All these concepts will be further clarif ied below.
Plessner uses the word “object,” both in reference to the scientif ic subject-
object opposition and in a prescientif ic sense (e.g. GS IV, 405). I will follow 
Plessner in this. At the same time, I will deviate slightly from Plessner’s 
usage of this term. Although Plessner speaks of the human body (Körper) as 
a thing (Ding), he does not call it an “object.” In order to highlight a certain 
dialectic between objectivity and subjectivity, I prefer the word “object” 
to “thing” as a signif ier of the human body as Ding – even when the body 
is not the object of perception, consciousness or action. The systematic 
argument for this choice is that something that can, in principle, appear 
3 The second reading is influenced by Coolen’s contribution to this volume.
4 In fact, I leaned towards the f irst interpretation myself for some time and presented this 
as a hypothesis at the IVth International Plessner Conference, to which this book is dedicated.
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as an object to a subject, must in some sense already be an object before it 
appears as such. This principle also holds for the human body. The fact that 
in the English language, the words “object” and “objectivity” have a broader 
meaning than their German equivalents – object is also Gegenstand – may 
allow me to swerve away a little from Plessner’s vocabulary.
In the next section I will situate “physical body” and “lived body” within 
Plessner’s anthropology. This is a preparation for the more elaborate descrip-
tion of the problem in the third section. With the term “physical body” 
(Körper), Plessner tries to capture an aspect of our body that encompasses 
the properties it has in common with non-living things. For example, a bag 
of cement weighing 75 kilograms has the same effect on a scale as my own 
body does. My body is also subordinate to gravitation in the same fashion 
as is the bag of cement. This trivial example illustrates that man’s physical 
body concerns his body’s objectivity or “thingness” in the strong sense of 
interchangeability with non-living things. For this reason it is interesting to 
compare Plessner’s conception of the physical body with his phenomenology 
of the thing at the beginning of the Levels. I shall discuss this further in the 
subsequent section.
The phenomenology of the thing departs from a criticism of the Cartesian 
res extensa. In Plessner’s view, the essential difference between phenomenal 
thing and res extensa is that the former is given to a subject of experience, 
whereas the latter remains divorced from the res cogitans. I argue that this 
difference implies another difference concerning space: while phenomenal 
space is structured by directions like above and below, the space of res 
extensa cannot be assigned such directions. This inference, which I hold 
to be valid, can cause us to suspect a contradiction between Plessner’s 
conception of the physical body and his understanding of the phenomenal 
thing. The physical body that exists in the continuum “in which directions 
are relative,” one might reason, resembles not so much the phenomenal 
thing, but rather Descartes’s res extensa. In the last section, I will show that, 
upon closer inspection, there is no such contradiction within Plessner’s 
view. Although it is true that my own physical body is not phenomenal, we 
have to acknowledge that it does not f it in the concept of res extensa either.
Physical body and living body
In order to situate the body as both physical body (Körper) and living body 
(Leib) within Plessner’s anthropology, we need to understand Plessner’s 
three-step approach. Firstly, the distinction Plessner makes between the 
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organic and the inorganic prepares his conception of human life as emerging 
from the organic. Secondly, his comparison within the realm of the organic 
between man and animal guides us to the place of the body within human 
existence. Thirdly, we need to understand Plessner’s division of the concept 
of world into three worlds – external, inner and social world – in order to 
see where the distinction between physical body and living body f its in. 
Let us f irst turn to the distinction between the organic and the inorganic.
Plessner bases his concept of human life on a philosophy of organic life. 
This philosophy, in turn, is based on the distinction between living and 
non-living things. Living beings, according to Plessner, are characterized by 
the fact that the boundary separating them from their surrounding belongs to 
the living being itself. In other words, the living thing autonomously realizes 
this boundary. Living things not only have a place, Plessner says, they take the 
place they have. This is called “positionality.” Contrary to plants, animals are 
characterized by “centric positionality.” The “centre” in “centric positionality” 
refers to the distance the animal has to its own body, which means that it not 
only is, but also has its body. This renders possible that the animal can use 
its body as an instrument, for instance to hunt for prey. Man also is and has 
his body, but, in addition, he relates to both this being and having the body. 
He not only operates from the centre that is at a distance from the body: he is 
“eccentric” in that he lives at a distance even to this distance itself, so that a 
double distance to the body is realized. This is man’s “eccentric positionality”: 
“the living is body, in the body (as inner life or soul) and exterior to the body 
as the point of view from which he is both. An individual that is positionally 
characterized in these three ways is called person” (GS IV, 365).
According to Plessner, the world we live in has a triple structure (GS 
IV, 365-382). Plessner regards what we generally refer to as “world” as a 
constellation of three worlds: the external world (Außenwelt), the inner 
world (Innenwelt) and the sociocultural world (Mitwelt). Each of these worlds 
is the correlate of one of the three moments of our being. The external 
world correlates with us being our body, the inner world with us having our 
body (the “soul” that is also the subject of having the body), and the social 
world with our eccentric position. Plessner uses the word “double aspect” 
to denote the relationship between body and soul, i.e. between external 
and inner world. However, “double aspect” is used differently on other 
occasions. When Plessner focuses solely on the external world and the way 
our bodies are part of it, the double aspect at stake is that between physical 
body (Körper) and living body (Leib). Consequently, we should regard this 
double aspect as a further differentiation within the more general double 
aspect of body and soul. Let us look at this differentiation a bit closer.
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According to Plessner, we are both “[i]n the world and against the world 
([i]n der Welt und gegen die Welt)” (GS IV, 379). With a slight variation 
on that formulation, we can clarify the double aspect of body and soul 
by distinguishing between two meanings of “being in the world.” On the 
one hand, man is in the world in the sense of placed or positioned in that 
world – as body or “object” in the broad meaning of the word. On the other 
hand, he is in the world in the sense of being open to the world: as a subject. 
Since subjectivity can only be realized in a living body, we are dealing 
with a “living-body-subject” (Leibsubjekt), or, to use a more ordinary term, 
an embodied subject. In addition, man relates to both these aspects of his 
situation. The standpoint from which he does this is the eccentric position. 
In the critical passage regarding this topic (GS IV, 365-368), the difference 
between physical body and living body is a double aspect within the aspect 
of the objective human body in its entirety. The soul-aspect is only ad-
dressed after that passage (GS IV, 368-373), which is not until the section on 
mediated immediacy (GS IV, 396-418), the soul-aspect is transformed into 
the concept of subjectivity, i.e. of true openness to the world. Consequently, 
Plessner must be using “living body” (Leib) in two ways. When the double 
aspect of physical body and lived body is discussed, the notion “living body” 
cannot yet refer to the embodied subject.
Let us broaden our perspective to Plessner’s Laughing and Crying: 
Inquiries to the Boundaries of Human Behavior [Lachen und Weinen. Eine 
Untersuchung nach den Grenzen menschlichen Verhaltens, 1941]. Here (GS 
VII, 239-242), the emphasis lies on the double aspect of being a living body 
(Leib-sein) and having a physical body (Körper-haben). This distinction 
suggests that our body, insofar as we have it, is only the physical body, 
whereas the same body, insofar as we are it, is the living body and nothing 
else. The living body, then, is the embodied subject (Leibsubjekt) that has the 
physical body. As noted, the physical aspect of the body refers mainly to the 
possibility of its being used as an instrument. However, the instrumental-
ized body cannot always be identif ied only with the human body insofar as 
it is interchangeable with non-living things. When I use my hand to grab a 
pencil, I am using my body as an organic unity. The point is that Plessner’s 
use of words should not be taken as placing the physical body univocally on 
the object-side, and the living body on the subject-side of having the body.
Instead, Plessner’s terminology points to a dialectic between subjectivity 
and objectivity, whereby “higher” forms of objectivity (here: the body as 
instrument) include “lower” forms of subjectivity (here: the living body, not 
the embodied subject). In other words, physical body and living body are 
used in both a narrow and wide sense. In both Laughing and Crying and in 
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the f inal part of the Levels (i.e. after the discussion of the external world), 
the term “physical body” (Körper) can be understood broadly or narrowly. 
In the narrow sense, it is used to signify the body that we have. But as the 
example of grabbing a pencil shows, the organic aspect is already part of the 
body that is used in instrumental action. So the body that we have, is the 
Körper in the broad sense of the word: the unity of both the physical body 
(in the narrow sense) and the living body (in the narrow sense). Therefore, 
Plessner calls the body that we have not only “physical body” (Körper) but 
also “physical lived body” (Körperleib). The same holds for the body that 
we are: the embodied subject that has the physical lived body is itself a 
living body (Leib) in the broad sense, i.e. not the organic aspect as distinct 
from the physical aspect, but the unity of both. It includes the physical 
body insofar as this renders possible subjectivity. This is why Plessner also 
uses the term “physical lived body” (Körperleib) for the body that we are. 
Consequently, it is the physical lived body that has the physical lived body. 
Plessner uses spatial terms to express this: “as physical lived body – in the 
physical lived body” (Plessner 1970, 36; in the original: “als Körperleib – im 
Körperleib” [GS VII, 240]).
Is the organic aspect of the human body not already some kind of subject? 
After all, the living body is distinguished from the physical body because it 
is not merely a thing among other things, but rather an organism in a sur-
rounding (Umfeld) which is organized in terms of directions like above and 
below. If the living body would be a subject of some sort, how can we insist 
that it differs from the embodied subject? Plessner wants to arrive at the 
double aspect of body and soul, which is mediated by the eccentric position. 
He starts from the way the human body is part of the external world. This 
means that, in this phase, he prepares the concept of the embodied subject 
without explicitly thematizing subjectivity in its fully developed form. 
Within the framework of a philosophy of nature, discussing subjectivity 
straight away would amount to neglecting it being rooted in the objectivity 
of the body. In other words, the question Plessner answers at this point is: 
how does the double aspect of being “positioned in the world” (object) and 
being “open to the world” (subject) announce itself within the sole aspect 
of being “positioned in the world” (object)?
When Plessner discusses the organic aspect of the body, he refers to “man” 
as a “lived body (Leib) in the middle of a sphere, that, in accordance with his 
empirical form, has an absolute above, below” (GS IV, 367). At this stage of 
thought, the “sphere” is not yet described as a “world,” and the “above” and 
“below” of the sphere are not yet conceived of as projections by a subject, 
but as the mere correlates of the “empirical form” of the subject’s body. By 
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“empirical form,” Plessner does not mean an appearance only accessible to 
empirical science. Rather, he is referring to properties which are relatively 
contingent albeit pointing to an entity’s essential way of being.5 Let us look 
at a situation in which man seems almost completely reduced to his empiri-
cal form: a patient who is under narcosis before an operation. The doctor 
who operates on the patient is, at that very moment, not concerned with 
him as a subject (or person) but rather with the body as an organic thing. 
Nonetheless, the distinctively human appearance of the body alludes to the 
subjectivity for which it is the natural precondition. In this situation, the 
patient’s face is not the boundary through which he is directed at his world, 
but to the doctor it remains a tacit empirical indication that the “thing” 
on the table is a human subject. The human body has a top and a bottom, 
regardless of the position of the body in space. (Think of the expression “He 
looked at me from head to toe.”) The fact that a human body has an “above” 
and “below” differs essentially from the fact that a non-living object has, for 
us, such directions. In the case of the human body, these directions point 
to the possibility of projecting such orientations into the world from within 
the body itself. They refer to subjectivity. But when we focus on the technical 
manipulation of organic tissue, we do not see this subjectivity at work. We 
see a living body and the way its empirical form prefigures subjectivity. Only 
later, when the patient awakes from his narcosis, do we see the projection 
of spatial orientations being realized: following the patient’s gaze through 
the room, we experience his presence as an openness to the world to which 
we can immediately relate. We no longer see his face as a mere token of 
subjectivity; we see perception and expression at work. We have thus made 
a change of perspective: we have moved from the experience of the lived 
body (Leib) to that of the embodied subject (Leibsubjekt).
In other words, the specif ic “empirical form” of the human body – it hav-
ing a face and an above and below – is the objective-organic prefiguration of 
subjectivity. This is how subjectivity announces itself within the aspect of 
the objectivity of human existence. So the notion “body as object” can refer 
to two things: a) the physical aspect of the human body, i.e. its thingness in 
the sense of interchangeability with non-living objects, and b) the organic 
aspect, i.e. the thingness of the body as the objective-organic pref iguration 
of subjectivity. The “pre-” in “pref iguration” has of course a logical, not a 
temporal, meaning.
5 I interpret the “empirical form” of the human body in terms of “indicatory essential proper-
ties” (indikatorische Wesensmerkmale) (GS IV, 166-171).
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The problem
According to Plessner, physical body and lived body (each taken in the 
narrow sense discussed above) constitute a “double aspect,” which forms 
the basis for two scientif ic world views: the mathematical-physical and 
the organological world view. The problem I want to address concerns 
the relationship between physical body and the mathematical-physical 
perspective.
Let us look a bit closer at this double aspect. In general, the term “double 
aspect” means that two poles of a being are united, not through synthesis, 
but through being both connected to the eccentric position. With regard 
to physical body and lived body, Plessner puts it as follows: “With the ec-
centricity of the structure of the living being corresponds the eccentricity of 
the situation, or the irreconcilable double aspect of his existence as physical 
body [Körper] and lived body [Leib], as thing among things in arbitrary 
places within the one spatiotemporal continuum and as a system that is 
concentrically closed around an absolute middle in a space and in a time 
of absolute directions” (GS IV, 367).
The “spatiotemporal continuum” is the “emptiness” in which objects ap-
pear to us, i.e. their being surrounded by “nothing” (GS IV, 367). The human 
physical body is our body insofar as this is part of that same continuum. In 
other words, the human body is physical insofar as it is interchangeable with 
non-living things. Contrary to non-living things, the human physical body 
is “materially” (GS IV, 367) at the same time a living body in a “surrounding 
f ield” (Umfeld) which is structured by an above, below et cetera. We cannot 
separate physical and living body from another, as they constitute one and 
the same entity. And yet we can never entirely make sense of this, because 
there is no transition between the two aspects: they are “nicht überführbar” 
(GS IV, 367). “Both aspects exist next to one another, mediated merely in the 
point of eccentricity, in the unobjectif iable I” (GS IV, 368). In the following 
passage (partly quoted above), Plessner states that the division into two 
aspects leads to two separate world views:
This is why both aspects of the world are necessary, man as lived body 
[Leib] in the middle of a sphere, that, in accordance with its empirical 
form, has an absolute above, below, before, behind, right, left, earlier and 
later, an aspect that serves as the basis of the organological world view, 
and man as a physical thing [Körperding] in an arbitrary place within a 
continuum of possible events, in which directions are relative, an aspect 
that leads to the mathematical-physical conception (GS IV, 367).
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While the organic aspect of the body forms the basis for the organological 
world view, its physical aspect “leads to” the mathematical-physical per-
spective. The problem we need to address concerns the latter relationship. 
Plessner suggests that the physical aspect of our body has the fundamental 
status of a foundation for the mathematical-physical perspective, but he 
also describes the physical body as already part of “a continuum of pos-
sible events, in which directions are relative.” The form of the lived body 
mirrors spatial directions. In the space of the physical body as such, there 
are no orientations like above, below, left and right, or these orientations 
are interchangeable. I think that, in everyday life we always experience 
space as organized by directions such as above and below, whereas in 
mathematical space, these directions are relative and interchangeable. So 
the physical body, the way Plessner conceives it, appears to be an object 
in mathematical-physical space rather than a thing as we experience 
it. Is Plessner’s description of the human physical body fundamentally 
determined by the mathematical-physical perspective? If it is, how can it 
constitute the foundation of that perspective?
These questions give cause to a comparison between Plessner’s descrip-
tion of the physical body and his phenomenology of the thing at the begin-
ning of the Levels (GS IV, 128-133). Here, Plessner develops his concept of the 
phenomenal thing as an alternative to Descartes’s res extensa. In Plessner’s 
view, the difference between phenomenal thing and res extensa is that the 
f irst is given to a subject who is positioned in the same space as the thing, 
whereas the second – according to its idea – f ills a purely objective space. 
I argue that this difference implies a second disparity: while phenomenal 
space is structured by directions like above and below and left and right, the 
res extensa is without any such directions. This difference forms the basis 
of the comparison of man’s physical body with both phenomenon and res 
extensa: why does the physical body, the way Plessner understands it, seem 
to show greater similarity with the res extensa than with the phenomenal 
thing?
Physical body and res extensa
Plessner’s phenomenology of the thing fulf ils the aim of recovering the 
thing, and through the thing the external, natural world as a whole, from 
Cartesian dualism. What is at stake is the precedence of philosophy of nature 
over natural science: “In the identif ication of physicality (Körperlichkeit) 
and extension, and the equation of extension and measurability implied 
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therein, the alternative-principle res cogitans – res extensa certainly entails 
the postulation of mathematical natural science as fundamental” (GS IV, 79).
Plessner’s criticism of Descartes addresses certain discrepancies between 
our everyday experience of the thing and the Cartesian, mathematical-
physical approach. The res extensa is extended matter in a mathematical 
space, abiding to laws of nature. The properties that according to our 
perceptual experience are qualities of the thing, can only be understood 
“mechanically,” by “dissolving” them “into quantities” (GS IV, 80). The 
Cartesian alternative to treating qualities as “objective” quantities, is to 
consider them as “contents and products of our interiority” (GS IV, 80). The 
attempt to make properties objective by quantifying them, turns into its 
subjectivist counterpart. As a result, the properties of a thing are located 
either in the res extensa or in the res cogitans, and “appearance as such 
remains inconceivable” (GS IV, 81).
Plessner’s answer to Cartesian dualism is his phenomenology of the thing. 
The properties of a thing can neither be the product of the res cogitans, nor 
can they be mere quantities, says Plessner: they are given as properties in 
their unity with the thing as a whole. “Every thing that is perceived in its 
full nature as thing, appears, according to its spatial limitation, as a unity 
of properties organized around a core” (GS IV, 128). Only some of these 
properties appear, while others remain hidden. The properties that appear 
are called “aspects” (in a different sense than above) and “adumbrations.” 
Despite only some properties appearing, the ‘thing’ appears as a unity, so 
there must be intrinsic, immediate relationships between all the properties 
of the thing. Furthermore, this coherence logically presupposes a core-
substance, i.e. the core of the thing, which is the “bearer” of all its properties. 
The given properties not only refer to each other and to the hidden proper-
ties, but also to the core-substance of the thing. This multidimensional 
“referring to,” Plessner calls “transgredience” (GS IV, 130).
The language in this section of the Levels is reminiscent of Husserl. Pless-
ner indeed draws on Husserl’s phenomenology, but he rejects the idealistic 
tendencies in it, as well as later idealistic interpretations of Husserl’s phi-
losophy (GS IV, 131; cf. Krüger 2006, 204-206). An idealistic phenomenology of 
perception will equate aspectivity with subjectivity: the sides of the object 
that appear are considered contents within my own consciousness. Pless-
ner does not accept such immanentization of the perceived: “Aspectivity, 
therefore, is not yet subjectivity at all; it is only the possibility, guaranteed 
from the part of the appearance, of its being opposed to a subject” (GS 
IV, 131). Plessner’s point is not that the nature of the thing be conceivable 
without the tacit assumption of subjectivity. Some of the thing’s properties 
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show themselves while others remain hidden. This is due to the fact that 
the thing appears to “something” which occupies a specif ic position within 
the same space. This something is man as the subject of perception. In other 
words, aspectivity is the objective correlate of subjective perception. The 
very concept of aspectivity evokes the idea of subjectivity, its counterpart.
On the basis of this interpretation of Plessner, we can draw certain con-
clusions with regard to the nature of the space in which the phenomenon 
appears. The question of which properties show themselves and which 
remain hidden depends on the position of the subject. For example, if I stand 
in front of an object rather than behind it, certain properties are revealed 
and others are hidden from my perspective. I am not hovering above it, nor 
am I looking up to it. The presence of the subject within the same space as 
the thing is what defines the space as one with f ixed directions, like above, 
below, left, right, et cetera. Since the notion of phenomenal space implies a 
subject that is positioned in it, that space is inconceivable without spatial 
orientations. The space in which a thing appears is by definition organized 
in terms of directions like above and below.
Now let us return to the human body as a unity of physical and living 
body, and focus on these aspects in terms of space. Insofar as the body is 
living, it is positioned in a surrounding f ield (Umfeld) that is characterized 
by “an absolute above, below, before, behind, right, left, earlier and later” 
(GS IV, 367). Insofar as the body is physical, it is part of “the spatiotemporal 
totality in which directions are relative” (GS IV, 366). The latter def ini-
tion of space seems to apply to space as an absolute objectivity, i.e. the 
mathematical space from which the subject is expelled. That is the space of 
the res extensa, in which there are no blind spots because there is literally 
nobody that would bring these along. Since there is no subject in this space, 
the object has neither front nor back; it is solely characterized by absolute 
transparency and absolute relativity of directions. Comparing the physical 
aspect of the human body with either the phenomenal, as signif ied by 
the spatiotemporal totality in which directions are relative, determine a 
situation that answers strictly to the position of the eccentric organism. 
Just as this is outside of its natural place, outside of itself, object or the res 
extensa, the physical body appears to have more in common with the res 
extensa than with the appearing thing. How can Plessner def ine the space 
of the physical body as “the spatiotemporal totality in which directions 
are relative” and at the same time reject Descartes’s res extensa? Is this a 
contradiction in Plessner, or is it a faulty interpretation?
In the very passage where the description of the physical body resem-
bles Descartes’s res extensa, the eccentric position is thematized in a way 
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that reminds us of the res cogitans: “Things in a homogeneous sphere of 
movements which are arbitrarily possible non-spatial, atemporal, placed 
nowhere, placed in nothing, in the nothing of its boundary, the physical 
thing [Körperding] of the environment is ‘in’ the ‘emptiness’ of relative 
places and moments in time. And the organism, in virtue of its eccentricity, 
is to itself merely such a physical thing” (GS IV, 366f.).
The eccentric organism, which is “outside of its natural place, outside of 
itself, non-spatial, atemporal, placed nowhere, placed in nothing” seems to 
be a “subject” that does not participate in the world. It seems to stand above 
objective space, without creating any blind spots in it that would render 
its gaze a f inite one. This appears to make it very similar to Descartes’s res 
cogitans.
We should, of course, always keep in mind that the physical body is only 
one of two aspects of the human body, with the other aspect being the living 
body, which is the objective-organic prefiguration of man’s openness to the 
world from within. The correlation between physical body and eccentric 
position is part of something much richer. Therefore, there is no reason 
to claim – not even hypothetically – that Plessner remains within the 
Cartesian framework. If criticism would be justif ied, then it would concern 
the way Plessner transcends the framework created by Descartes. The crux 
would be that Plessner tries to overcome Cartesian dualism by integrating it 
into a larger whole. This is the hypothesis we have been exploring: Plessner’s 
concept of the physical body answers to Descartes’s def inition of the res 
extensa, and the mathematical-physical def inition of reality is thus given 
fundamental anthropological status.
Physical body and object
One of the premises of the hypothesis is that Plessner def ines the eccen-
tric position as a position in “nothing.” Plessner thus seems to envisage a 
Cartesian pure mind, divorced from the external world. However, upon 
closer inspection, Plessner’s description of the eccentric position suggests a 
different reading. In the passage being discussed here, Plessner indeed states 
that the “eccentric organism […] stands in nothing,” but he adds that it is 
placed “in the nothing of its boundary” (italics mine). Hereafter, the bound-
ary is specified as one “which can only be approximated asymptotically” (GS 
IV, 368). This addition implies that according to Plessner, we, as eccentric 
beings, do not fall together with “nothing”; our position is always at some 
distance from this negativity. In Plessner’s view, the double distance that 
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man has to his own body never enables him to fully detach himself from 
it. The distance is always also an achievement of the body itself that he is.
If we zoom in on the two aspects of that body again, we see that in this 
regard the relationship between the physical and the organic aspect is not 
symmetrical. The passage quoted in the previous section purported that, 
just as the eccentric organism is “placed in nothing,” the physical things, 
among which our own bodies, are placed “‘in’ the ‘emptiness’ of relative 
places and moments in time.” Plessner considers these physical bodies the 
most radical antipole of the eccentric position. It is not man’s organic body 
that fulf ils this role. We could say that the organic aspect is a Zwischen-
schicht: an intermediate layer in between, on the one hand, the eccentric 
position with its boundary in nothing, and on the other hand, the reality of 
physical things. The soul, the embodied subject who has the physical lived 
body, and even the eccentric position itself insofar as it is an organism or 
a constellation of subjectivity and objectivity, are all intermediate layers 
between the interior boundary of eccentricity and the human physical body 
as a thing among things in directionless space. As living human beings, we 
are always in between these two poles; philosophical reflection springs 
from this intermediate position as well.
Precisely because the physical body and the boundary of eccentricity 
are each other’s antipoles, they have something important in common. The 
passage that introduces the concept of an asymptotic approximation makes 
this clear. The “aspects” mentioned are still physical body and living body: 
“Both aspects exist next to one another, mediated merely in the point of 
eccentricity, in the unobjectif iable I. Just as this [unobjectif iable I], ‘behind’ 
physical body and lived body, constitutes the vanishing point of one’s own 
interiority, of one’s own being oneself, i.e. the boundary which can only 
be approximated asymptotically, the thing in the external world, as the 
appearance of an inexhaustible being, as the constellation of rind and core, 
shows the very same structure” (GS IV, 368).
The idea of an asymptotic approximation applies to the boundary of 
the eccentric position, which here is called the “vanishing point of our 
own interiority.” Regarding the reality of physical bodies, we read that 
“the thing in the external world […] shows the very same structure.” The 
“same structure” refers to the principle of asymptotic approximation. So this 
principle also holds for the objective correlate of interiority: the physical 
body in the external world – be it my own body or an object simple – can 
also only be approximated asymptotically.
My interpretation scrutinizes every element in Plessner’s formulations, 
since Plessner himself does not go any deeper into the matter. He does not 
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explicitly argue why we are unable to get a full grasp of either boundary. 
I think the reasons slightly differ depending on which boundary we focus 
on. The boundary of interiority is the negativity of the eccentric position, 
the “nothing” in which we stand. According to my interpretation, this 
“nothing” can be approximated merely asymptotically, because we remain 
bound to the external world, the extreme limit constituted by the world of 
interchangeable, non-living things. We are never univocally nothing: we are 
always in between the negativity of a pure mind and radical externality. Life, 
subjectivity and interiority are the modes of this “between.” Logic suggests 
that any movement in the opposite direction, from “nothing” towards physi-
cal bodies, can be specified analogically: our approximation of the objective 
world of non-living things is necessarily asymptotic, because we remain 
bound to the limit of interiority, the “nothing” of our eccentric position.6
How do we approximate the reality of physical bodies? I think we f irst 
need to differentiate between the physical body that is my own body (which, 
materially, falls together with the living body) and the physical bodies as 
simply all non-living things surrounding me. For the sake of simplicity, I 
leave out the physical aspect of the bodies of other subjects than myself 
and only deal with the non-living things surrounding my own body. How, 
and to what extent, are they accessible to me?
There appears to be a tension between two elements in the passage 
quoted above. Although Plessner is still concerned with the physical reality 
of non-living things – “the thing in the external world” – he also describes 
the thing as a phenomenon with a “rind” of appearing properties and a 
“core.” My comparison between physical body and phenomenal thing led 
to the conclusion that the physical body cannot be a phenomenon, because 
this assumption produces a contradiction between the two concepts of 
space involved: the space of the physical body is without directions like 
left and right whereas the space of the phenomenon is organized by such 
directions. However, there must be a connection between the phenomenal 
world and the non-living things that surround my own body within physical 
reality.
I think the quoted passage actually helps us understand this relationship. 
Plessner suggests that the thing’s “rind” is the same as its “appearance,” and 
that the “core” is equal to its “inexhaustible being.” I interpret this as follows. 
The inexhaustible being of the thing is the thing itself, which precedes its 
6 I am leaving out that, in the f inal sections of the Stufen, Plessner explains the eccentric 
position in terms of the social world. My perspective here is limited to the relationship between 
the human body and the external world.
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own appearance to a subject: this is the thing as part of physical reality. 
We can only speak of the transcendence of a thing, which is nonetheless 
somehow given to us; we cannot separate appearance from being itself. 
Such ambiguity is what generally characterizes Plessner’s use of the word 
“double aspect.” Therefore, I propose that we interpret the relationship 
between physical reality and phenomenal world as itself a double aspect: 
the thing is part of physical reality insofar as it precedes and transcends 
its appearance to a subject. To that extent, space is not organized in terms 
of an above, below, left or right.
I want to introduce another notion in order to clarify the relationship 
between thing in itself and appearance: I propose that the thing itself is the 
transcendent condition for the possibility of the phenomenon. The notion 
of a transcendent possibility condition complements that of transcendental 
conditions: a subject is needed for the thing to appear, but at the same time 
appearing to a subject is also a possibility of the thing itself. Moreover, we 
need the thing itself for the appearance to occur. The thing in itself is the 
transcendent condition for the possibility of the experience of the external 
world. In terms of space: although the objective space of non-living objects, 
insofar as it precedes our experience, is in itself not organized by f ixed 
directions, its nature does render possible the experience of directions. 
The interdependency between subject and object is not symmetrical, but 
it is reciprocal. Whenever appearance is realized, the thing shows some of 
its properties while others remain hidden: aspectivity implies subjectivity 
and a space in which directions are unavoidably given, because they are 
relative to a positioned subject.
Consequently, if we want to conceive of the physical “world” as such, we 
need to bracket off aspectivity, subjectivity and the space that is organized 
by an above, below, left and right. Then, it occurs to us that physical reality 
is not a world in any familiar sense: “Strictly speaking, the term ‘external’ is 
not applicable to the world of physical things (Körperdinge) as such. Only 
the surrounding field (Umfeld), that has become a world, that has integrated 
itself into it, the environment (Umwelt), is external world” (GS IV, 368).
According to Plessner, the physical world is not external until the lived 
world, the environment of the organism, is integrated into it. However, if 
the predicate “external” does not apply to the world of physical things, then 
the term “world” itself becomes problematic as well. It is for this reason 
why I think we should refrain from saying “physical world,” but rather limit 
ourselves to “physical aspect of the external world” or “physical reality.” 
Plessner calls into question the externality of this reality, because he has 
bracketed off living body, subjectivity, aspectivity, and phenomenality. Only 
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a thing that appears can be external as opposed to internal. Consequently, 
it is impossible to experience, imagine or depict physical reality as such. 
We could, for instance, imagine a landscape that consists exclusively of 
non-living matter: sand, rocks, water and air, but this conception would not 
be true to the nature of physical reality. Imagination shares with percep-
tion the phenomenological principle that aspectivity implies subjectivity. 
Although nothing in the imagined landscape is alive, it does appear as 
“something” which occupies a specific position in the same imagined space. 
This living being, the subject, projects an above, below, left and right into 
that space.
Nonetheless, our own body must be part of this reality of non-living 
things. This is precisely what we have been calling the physical aspect of the 
human body. Plessner’s formulation that, within physical reality, “directions 
are relative” should not be taken as saying that a space without directions 
simply exists. This proposition would amount to a univocal aff irmation of 
absolute objectivity, of the res extensa. Instead, the physical aspect of our 
bodies purports that they “already” occupy space “before” they organize 
that space: directions are as yet inconceivable and irrelevant. This is how 
we should understand Plessner’s formulation that the physical aspect “leads 
to” the mathematical-physical perspective. The physical aspect of our being 
in the world is not defined by that perspective from the outset. The physical 
body primarily renders possible everyday experience, and secondarily the 
various scientif ic perspectives that spring from such experiences. It is our 
body insofar as it is not yet subject and insofar as it does not yet reach out 
for a world that transcends it, even insofar as it is not yet organic. This “not 
yet” is not temporal; it refers to an a priori logic.7 We deduce the necessity 
of physical reality from the transcendental structures of experience, but we 
have no experiential access to it. This is the reason why our approximation 
of physical reality is at best asymptotic.
In everyday life, we know about certain properties of our bodies, which 
it shares with non-living things. We constantly take these properties into 
account, for instance when we decide that we are too heavy to get into 
the elevator together, or simply when we make room for each other on the 
sidewalk. This always concerns a “technical” moment of our behavior: we 
try to avoid doing something that goes against the limitations of what is 
technically possible, according to the mechanical constitution of reality. 
7 This is not an idealistic a priori logic, but rather a hermeneutic approach which springs 
from experience itself and explores, from within, the preconditions that render that experience 
possible.
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This is how our knowledge connects with the mechanical nature of non-
living things. At the same time, our knowledge of the causality of everyday 
life is embedded in that life. For example, the information about my weight 
and spatial dimensions constitute a reason (not a cause) for me not to enter 
the elevator. The information is thereby integrated in my experience of 
the space in which I recognize an above, below, left and right. A direct 
experience of matter in directionless space is impossible.
At the same time, I can only be open to the external world because my 
own organism and subjectivity are rooted in the same physical reality as 
the appearing thing. The physical aspect of my body is a condition that 
renders possible my experience of the world, but the condition is neither 
transcendental nor transcendent. It is not transcendent because I am this 
physical body. Only the physical reality of the non-living things surrounding 
me could constitute a transcendent condition. However, the physical aspect 
of my body cannot be a transcendental condition for my openness to the 
world either, because only a condition that is immanent to experience, that 
can be analyzed from within this openness, can be called transcendental.8 
We are rather concerned with a condition that can only be established by 
logical deduction from such transcendental conditions – a sub-immanent 
condition for the possibility of experience.
What does this mean for the mathematical-physical perspective, and 
the way it is based on the physical aspect of the human body? There is 
much to say about this. I will limit myself to a few remarks, referring only 
to mechanics and three-dimensional space. Insofar as mathematics and 
physics include living things in their f ield of research, they carry out a 
phenomenological reduction of the living to the non-living (and of artifacts 
to natural objects). Physics always has one foot in the everyday world of 
phenomenal experience, if only because the f irst step of reduction is carried 
8 I mean “transcendental” not exactly in a Kantian but rather in a hermeneutical sense. The 
hermeneutical exploration of conditions for the possibility of experience not only focuses on our 
factual, f inite experience of the world but also springs from that experience. Although it takes a 
step back from experience, it always remains bound to its natural and historical determinations. 
(I cannot go into the discussion here about whether this makes all transcendental truth merely 
relative; I think it does not.) Transcendental philosophy is thus part of a hermeneutical circle 
(cf. De Boer 1983, x-xi and 32). The phenomenological moment of philosophy renders the circle 
an open rather than a closed one, since phenomenology gives it a content that is not merely 
produced in the process of interpretation (Ricoeur 1975). I think this is in accordance with 
Plessner’s understanding of philosophy. I agree with Krüger, who explains that Plessner explores 
the conditions for the possibility of experience but he does not locate these conditions in “an 
original self-conception” (Krüger 2001, 93).
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out within the phenomenal world.9 I want to focus on the position of the 
other foot: the abstract reconstruction of that phenomenal world, which 
really marks the difference between exact science and everyday experience 
and knowledge.
That other foot steps into an even more radical reduction of the living to 
the non-living. As noted above, the phenomenal world implicitly refers to 
the subject, which is a living thing. Physics therefore seeks to reconstruct 
the physical aspect of reality by separating it completely from its possibil-
ity of appearing to a subject. The reconstruction of the world is not its 
phenomenal recreation but rather a world picture in which things just are, 
objectively, without appearing to a subject. Although this view derives its 
truth value from the fact that it is based on data from the phenomenal world, 
it negates the essential conditions for the possibility of the appearance of 
that world to a subject. The mathematical-physical perspective is secondary 
to everyday phenomenal experience of the external world. It starts from 
that experience, only to bracket off subjectivity as it proceeds. This is not 
a strategy for an asymptotic approximation of physical reality; rather it is 
done in the confidence that, within the domain of its abstract models, this 
parenthesization can be carried out in full. This relative alienation from the 
phenomenal world renders necessary that the formal laws and quantitative 
data are constantly reintegrated into that world. This task is partly fulf illed 
by physics itself, insofar as it still refers to things and events we know from 
our prescientif ic, everyday lives.
The falling of an object, for instance, is explained on the basis of the 
theory of gravitational force, which remains unspecif ied with respect to 
our normal experience of above and below. A drawing of the earth and the 
falling object held up side down, so that the object seems to fall upward 
towards the earth, works just as well for the physicist as the same picture 
without flipping it. While everyday perception takes into account that the 
experience of an object, in virtue of the aspectivity of the phenomenon, 
implies subjectivity, physics reconstructs space as a res extensa in which the 
subject has no place. The reconstructed object is in principle fully transpar-
ent: it has neither core nor inner depth. Everyday reflection immediately 
integrates knowledge of physical bodies into phenomenal space with its 
f ixed directions like above and below. By contrast, scientific models preserve 
the relativity of directions that characterizes the primordial space of physi-
cal bodies. Insofar as we use representations of this reconstructed space, 
9 For the sake of simplicity, I am leaving out social interaction as also constitutive of scientif ic 
practice.
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we project directions like above and below into the representations, but 
this projection is scientif ically irrelevant. Insofar as such representations 
of space contain data about objects and formal relations between them, 
we might feel inclined to say this space is “directionless,” but in fact it is, 
to this extent, not a space at all. This illustrates that the bracketing off of 
subjectivity can never be carried out fully.
Direct experience of physical reality is impossible, because experience 
belongs to the intermediate layers of the organic, the living body and sub-
jectivity. The concept of physical reality is not empty: knowledge about it 
is possible, but this knowledge is either abstract, as in the case of science, 
or it is deduced from the transcendental structures of the experience we 
analyze from within that experience. Our knowledge of physical reality is 
of a kind that cannot be “internalized”: although I know that it exists and 
that its space is without directions, I cannot teach myself to experience or 
imagine such space. Nonetheless, perceptive experience remains essential 
to our understanding of physical reality. Whenever we think of reality 
“itself,” we mean that reality out there, unfolding before our eyes, of which 
we are part of and to which we are open towards. That is why the attempt 
to conceive of it is not like a game of chess the mind plays with itself. It is a 
double movement: by bracketing off all of its worldly aspects, approximating 
the boundary of interior “nothing,” ‘the thinking I’ reaches out to reality 
beyond appearance.
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7 The Body Exploited
Torture and the Destruction of Selfhood
Janna van Grunsven
I have said that the soul is not more than the body,
And I have said that the body is not more than the soul.
– Walt Whitman
Torture and the destruction of selfhood
In At the Mind’s Limits, philosopher and holocaust survivor Jean Améry 
recounts his experience of torture at the hands of the Nazis. Having en-
countered a fellow human being as an absolute “antiman” who treated 
the boundaries of his skin and the experience of his pain as meaningless, 
Améry suffered from what he calls an irrecoverable destruction of his sense 
of self. He writes:
The boundaries of my body are also the boundaries of my self. […] The 
other person […] with whom I can exist only as long as he does not touch 
my skin surface as border, forces his corporeality on me […] and thereby 
destroys me. […] The tortured person never ceases to be amazed that 
(what) one may […] call his soul […] or his identity, […] is destroyed when 
there is that cracking and splintering in the shoulder joints (Améry 1980, 
28, 40).
Searching for the proper language to express what exactly it means to have 
one’s identity destroyed, Améry alludes to the idea of having lost his “human 
dignity,” only to quickly brush this aside for being too vague a notion: “I 
must confess that I don’t exactly know what that is: human dignity” (ibid., 
27). What he does know is that, having been tortured, he “stayed tortured” 
and that staying tortured meant two things. Firstly, it meant living with a 
permanent loss of trust in the world:
As an element of trust in the world, and in our context what is solely 
relevant, is the certainty that by reason of written or unwritten social 
contracts the other person […] will respect my physical, and with it also my 
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metaphysical being. […] Whoever has succumbed to torture can no longer 
feel at home in the world. The shame of destruction cannot be erased. 
[…] That one’s fellow man was experienced as the antiman […] blocks 
the view into a world in which the principle of hope rules (Ibid., 28, 40).
Secondly, staying tortured meant living with a permanent loss of trust in 
himself.1 Like countless of other victims of torture but also of rape, Améry 
specif ies that this is importantly tied to how his very own tortured body 
turned against him, how it was “(his) own body weight (that) caused luxa-
tion” – thus betraying him during the event (ibid., 32, my italics). Susan 
Brison makes this though even more explicit in Aftermath: Violence and 
the Remaking of a Self, where she recounts her violent subjection to rape: 
“My body was now perceived as an enemy, having betrayed my […] trust 
and interest in it” (Brison 2002, 44).
Améry’s testimony provokes some important thoughts about the 
conditions constitutive of human selfhood. Not surprisingly, our modern 
philosophical tradition, with its Cartesian-Kantian heritage, has delivered 
very few accounts that stand up to the task of conceptually accommodating 
Améry’s experience. After all, a self predominantly understood as funda-
mentally a ‘thinking substance’ or a ‘rationally self-determining will,’ who 
in his deepest or most ‘dignified’ core is pictured as undetermined by others 
and by bodily experience, cannot be permanently undone as the result of 
a violent attack by another on his body. To take the testimony of Améry’s 
suffering philosophically serious is to work towards a conception of human 
selfhood as recognitively constituted and bodily mediated.2 The aim of 
this paper is to make some headway towards such a conception by offering 
an account of human corporeity that can conceptually underpin Améry’s 
experience. More specif ically, what I try to account for is how my very own 
body, which, in Améry’s words makes up not only “my physical, (but) with 
it also my metaphysical being” can simultaneously f igure as the most direct 
expression of myself as an agent – opening me up to a world of familiarity 
that I effortlessly feel at home in through my ongoing worldly projects – and 
how it can be encountered as a kind of alien force that turns itself against me.
1 In addition to Améry’s account, see also Honneth 1995, 132, and Brison 2002.
2 Jay M. Bernstein is currently f inishing up his latest book in which he argues that modern 
moral philosophy has trouble capturing the widely and rightly held intuition that torture and 
rape are paradigmatic cases of moral harm – where, in turn, the notion of moral harm requires an 
embodied recognitive conception of human selfhood. This essay grew directly out of Bernstein’s 
graduate seminar “Torture and Dignity,” taught in the spring of 2008 at the New School for Social 
Research.
the body exPloited 151
To this end, I will begin by looking at David Sussman’s illuminating essay 
titled “What’s Wrong with Torture?” (Sussman 2005). There, Sussman argues 
that the specif icity of torture’s moral harm lies in the purposive exploita-
tion of it’s victim’s body such that he is forced to involuntarily, yet actively, 
participate in his own abuse, ensuing in potentially irrecoverable feelings of 
self-betrayal. While Sussman accurately depicts the victim’s self-experience, 
I argue that his commitment to a Kantian framework prevents him from 
conceptually underpinning his descriptive insights. Sussman characterizes 
the self-betrayal that victims of torture are forced to undergo in terms of 
their “agency (turning) against itself” (ibid., 30). There are, I argue, two 
problems with this characterization. Firstly, as a Kantian Sussman is unable 
to ascribe a fundamental role to the body within his conception of agency. 
Secondly, a conception of the self qua agent is insufficient to account for the 
possibility of involuntary yet active participation in one’s own abuse and the 
encounter of one’s very own body as enemy. What we need is an account of 
the self that distinguishes between my body as lived, as something that I 
am; something through which I am open to a world that I am invested, and 
my body as a kind of thing; as something I have such that I can encounter 
it as a kind of alien object that is nevertheless me.
That human corporeity is marked by this double structure is the central 
insight of Helmuth Plessner’s philosophical anthropology. In Plessner’s 
words, “Man has, not a univocal, but an equivocal relation to his body, 
[…] his existence imposes on him the ambiguity of being an ‘embodied’ 
(leibhaften) creature and a creature ‘in the body’ (im Körper), an ambiguity 
that means an actual break in his way of existing” (Plessner1970, 32). It is this 
ambiguous relationship as lived body to our body as thing that is exploited 
in torture and that enables the feelings of self-betrayal that are astutely 
registered but conceptually misunderstood by Sussman. Furthermore, we 
will see that the notion of boundary (also translatable as border) plays a key 
role in Plessner’s account of how this ambiguous relationship between the 
body as lived and the body as thing is enacted. This will allow us to be more 
specif ic about Améry’s testimony of how the violation of his “skin surface 
as border” was able to irredeemably “destroy” him.
Forced self-betrayal as the distinctive element of torture’s moral 
harm
As I mentioned, Sussman presents his penetrating account of torture’s 
specif ic moral harm from within a Kantian framework. At the core of 
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Kant’s moral system lies the view that through an innate possession 
of free will and rationality, human beings are capable of acting as au-
tonomous agents. The capacity to freely choose our own ends and act as 
self-determining autonomous agents endows humanity with an intrinsic 
value, the respect for which should be upheld in all our actions. This is 
something that takes effort for our will is largely driven by personal in-
clinations and desires in determining the ends that motivate our actions. 
By doing so we not only fail to exercise our capacity for self-determined 
autonomous action, but we also run the risk of treating others as mere 
means in order to satisfy our own subjectively desired ends. In Kant’s view 
this is immoral, since we would thereby fail to respect the intrinsically 
valuable autonomy of others, who, as beings capable of determining 
their own ends could not rationally subscribe to being treated as a mere 
means in the pursuit of another person’s end. The only way to avoid 
treating others as mere means to our ends and instead respect them 
as ends in themselves, is by stripping our will of any object of desire as 
a reason for action and making a purely rational law, which conforms 
with the intrinsic value of the autonomy of all rational beings, as the 
guiding principle of morality. This purely formal principle is expressed 
in the categorical imperative, which in its most general formula holds 
that “I ought never to act except in such a way that I could also will that 
my maxim should become a universal law” (Kant 2002, 4: 402). Kantian 
morality is thus geared towards the intersubjective promotion of and 
respect for each other’s ability to act as autonomous agents – where, 
crucially, autonomous agency is characterized in terms of the will’s 
capacity to act in accordance with the formal law.
Thus, according to the orthodox Kantian view, torture’s moral harm lies 
in the intense disrespect that the torturer portrays with regard to its victim’s 
autonomy by “using someone as a mere means to purposes she does not 
or could not reasonably share” (Sussman 2005, 13-14). Sussman holds that, 
for the traditional Kantian, there is some room to incorporate the specif ic 
moral wrongness of pain infliction, by understanding pain as something 
that obstructs autonomous agency. As Sussman puts it:
Pain characteristically compromises or undermines the very capacities 
constitutive of autonomous agency itself […] when suff iciently intense 
pain becomes a person’s entire universe and his entire self, crowding out 
every other aspect of his mental life. Unlike other harms, pain takes its 
victim’s agency apart ‘from the inside,’ such that the agent may never be 
able to reconstitute himself fully (Sussman 2005, 14).
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Although I am sympathetic to the attention Sussman draws to the victim’s 
relation to his own pain and the possibility for this to destroy a person’s 
self-relation “from the inside” it seems to me that Sussman moves too 
quickly here. Without an elaboration on the relation between the Kantian 
notion of autonomous agency, understood as the rational exercise of free 
will, and that which suffers the pain, that is, the body, it seems to me that 
it remains unclear what this ‘inside’ is for the Kantian. Moreover, since the 
body itself is not the locus of agency for Kantians, it seems impossible to 
understand how the Kantian agent can be permanently damaged as a result 
of having been tortured once the immediate pain has disappeared. In order 
to make the claim that torture can permanently affect its victim’s agency, a 
traditional Kantian, understanding autonomous agency as essentially our 
capacity to act on purely formal reasons, would have to show how torture 
no longer enables its victims to act on the categorical imperative. It seems 
wrong to say that victims of torture lose their ability to be autonomous in 
the Kantian sense of the word. Moreover, this doesn’t capture what makes 
the after effects of torture so particularly tragic, namely the loss of trust in 
oneself and the world.
Although Sussman does not fully engage with these diff iculties for the 
Kantian model, he does see the need to expand the orthodox Kantian view 
by offering a more detailed phenomenology of what pain is and how it relates 
to our agency in order to account for the specif ic moral harm of torture. 
What motivates Sussman to do so is that the orthodox Kantian can draw no 
signif icant distinction between the obstruction of agency through pain on 
the one hand and other forms of agency obstruction (e.g. through pleasure) 
on the other hand. Sussman sees that, “If torture is morally distinctive in 
the ways that our intuitions suggest, there must be something about what 
pain is, and about its special relation to our own agency, that makes some 
important moral difference” (Sussman 2005, 19). In other words, he wants to 
expand the explanatory power of Kant’s moral system by showing that there 
is “some signif icant moral difference between being used as a mere means 
in general, and being used as such a means through one’s own distressing 
affects and bodily responses” (Sussman 2005, 19). In order to show how this 
works Sussman offers the following phenomenology of pain:
Pain has a peculiar quality. On the one hand, we experience it as not a 
part of ourselves. […] It is something that just happens to us, neither im-
mediately evoked nor eliminated by any decisions or judgments we may 
make. On the other hand, pain is also a primitive, unmediated aspect of 
our agency. Pain is not something wholly alien to our wills but something 
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in which we f ind ourselves actively, if reluctantly, participating. My pain 
is, after all, my pain (Sussman 2005, 20).
There is a certain hesitance in Sussman’s characterization of pain as a 
primitive aspect of our agency. Sussman acknowledges that “understood 
as a kind of expressive voice, my pain is not unproblematically an exercise 
of my agency (the way my reflectively adopted commitments might be)” 
(Sussman 2005, 21). But as a Kantian it seems he cannot place this “kind of 
expressive voice” that is both intimately me and experienced as something 
working against me, anywhere else but within the bounds of agency. As 
such, Sussman ultimately settles for the conclusion that although pain is 
“not unproblematically an exercise of agency,” it is “neither […] something 
fully distinct from such agency,” adding that human agency is thus marked 
by a “peculiar duality that the torturer sets out to exploit” (Sussman 2005, 
21, my italics). He offers the following account of this exploitation:
What the torturer does is to take his victim’s pain, and through it his 
victim’s body, and make it begin to express the torturer’s will. The 
resisting victim is committed to remain silent, but he now experiences 
within himself something quite intimate and familiar that speaks for the 
torturer, something that pleads a case or provides an excuse for giving 
in. My suffering is experienced as not just something the torturer inflicts 
on me, but as something I do to myself, as a kind of self-betrayal worked 
through my body and its feelings (Sussman 2005, 21).
Methods for inducing this experience of self-betrayal are not just limited to 
pain-infliction, but also include other ways of exploiting what Sussman calls 
“the most intimate aspects of (our) agency” (Sussman 2005, 23). Prisoners of 
Guantanamo Bay, for example, have reportedly been forced to soil themselves 
and to masturbate before the eyes of others. The shame and humiliation we 
are prone to experience even in ordinary intersubjective settings when we 
exhibit such involuntary bodily reactions at the wrong moment, indicates 
that relating to ourselves as autonomous agents requires that we have some 
control over when and where we portray such bodily reactions. What torture 
establishes, Sussman suggests, is “a deliberate perversion of that very value 
(of oneself as a rational self-governing agent), turning our dignity (as self-
governing agents) against itself in a way that must be especially offensive to 
any morality that fundamentally honors it” (Sussman 2005, 19). And he sees 
that this “especially offensive perversion” of our self-relation as autonomous 
agents is brought about by “the body (being) touched in ways that make 
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the most personal and intense feelings manifest themselves publicly and 
involuntarily (e.g. in erection, lubrication, sweat, shivering, urination, defeca-
tion, and centrally, spontaneous cries)” (Sussman 2005, 23).
While clearly sensitive to the fundamental role that the specific exploita-
tion of the victim’s embodiment plays in the involuntary induction of her 
self-betrayal, the problem with Sussman’s account is his characterization 
of the involuntary dimensions of our embodiment as “a primitive, unmedi-
ated aspect of our agency” (Sussman 2005, 27). There are several issues to 
be distinguished regarding this conceptually awkward characterization. 
Firstly, it is not clear what exactly it would mean for sensations of pain 
and involuntary movements and reactions of the body to be ‘unmediated 
aspects of our agency.’ Specifying this would require a developed account 
of how the body has a place within a Kantian notion of agency, understood 
as the will’s ability to act on the categorical imperative. Secondly, even if 
we grant that Sussman could make room for a notion of embodied agency, 
my claim is that this is not enough to make sense of the phenomenon Suss-
man describes, in accordance with Améry and Brison. What we need is an 
account of how I, as an embodied agent, can also experience my body as a 
thing or object that is still, nevertheless, me. This experience of alienness 
within myself cannot be understood merely from an account of embodied 
agency. To clarify this point, I will briefly digress to a discussion of embodied 
agency as sketched out within the phenomenological tradition; a tradition, 
which has done more signif icant philosophical work than any other school 
towards bringing the phenomenon of embodied agency in view.
According to the phenomenological view, to experience oneself as an 
autonomous agent in the most primordial sense of the word is not – as the 
Kantian has it – a matter of rationally subscribing to the categorical impera-
tive. Rather, it is to experience oneself as the initiator of one’s actions in the 
form of a very minimal “thin, pre-reflective awareness of what I am doing 
as I am doing it” (Gallagher and Zahavi 2008, 158). This thin pre-reflexive 
awareness is the experiential sense of agency that we have when we execute 
much of our everyday actions. We tend to, for example, effortlessly ride a 
bike through heavy traff ic, walk up the stairs, or take up an appropriate 
distance from other people while conversing with them without having to 
reflect on ourselves or on the objects and people we are dealing with during 
these actions. Although we do not need to reflect on ourselves qua agents 
while performing these actions, we do have a minimal sense of ourselves 
as their self-moving initiators.
What makes this pre-reflective agential self and world relation possible, 
according to phenomenologists such as Merleau-Ponty, is that the body is 
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not just a mechanistic object amongst other objects that requires explicit 
mental guidance in order to be brought to action, but that it is instead lived. 
The lived, or agential body, can be understood as a nexus of perceptual and 
motor skills that we are born with and continue to integrate throughout our 
lives and through which we are always already meaningfully engaged with 
our environment, an environment which is in turn shaped through our em-
bodied relation to it. It is because I have learned how to ride a bicycle that I 
can immediately, and pre-reflectively perceive a situation as best responded 
to by jumping on my bike, and as such my bodily skills correlate with the 
meaning that the world has for me. As Merleau-Ponty puts it, the lived body, 
engaged with the world through action and perception is “a system which is 
open on to the world, and correlative with it,” (Merleau-Ponty 2012,526, n115) 
and as such it “guarantees our vital communication with the world (and) 
makes it present as a familiar setting of our life” (Merleau-Ponty 2012, 53).
The lived or agential body thus anchors us to the world; it forms our 
perspective onto it. Rather than being the object of experience it is its 
source. As such, it is characteristic of lived or embodied agency to remain 
pervasively in the background while we skillfully execute our everyday 
activities and tend to be thematically directed at other things. While an 
account of embodied agency or the body as lived seems vital for beginning 
to make sense of the mutually implicated collapse of self and world that 
torture brings about it cannot by itself explain the peculiar experience 
with which we have been preoccupied, namely the encounter with our 
own body as simultaneously alien to me and intimately me, as something 
that can involuntarily turn against me while still being me.3 Maarten 
Coolen raises this as a concern in his contribution to this volume when 
he writes that:
He [Merleau-Ponty] clearly points out how we get things done without 
having to make representations of what we are aiming at. But in Merleau-
Ponty’s phenomenology of skilful coping the body itself seems to ‘vanish’ 
when it is in action, in favour of the world that is opened by it. It gets, 
so to speak, swallowed up in its being attuned to the world (Maarten 
Coolen, this volume, 113).
What we need in order to bring the specif icity of our relation to our own 
body as object into view is an account like Plessner’s that highlights the dual 
3 For a compelling account of the mutually dependent collapse of self and world brought 
about through torture that draws on the phenomenological tradition, see Scarry 1985.
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aspect of our corporeal being in the world, reminding us of our ambiguous 
self-relation “of being an ‘embodied’ (leibhaften) creature and a creature 
‘in the body’ (im Körper)” (Plessner 1970, 32) For a Kantian, who holds that 
you are an autonomous human self insofar as you are a willing agent, and 
for whom something can only be mine if it is part of this agency, this dual 
bodily relationship that constitutes human existence cannot be adequately 
brought in view. Nevertheless, Sussman makes strides in understanding 
the role that the victim’s corporeity plays in the self-relation that torture 
destroys. And although conceptually flawed, we will see that his description 
of human agency in terms of a “peculiar duality” is intuitively close to 
Plessner’s approach to human selfhood. It is to this account that I turn now.
Eccentric positionality: The continuous task of being and having 
a body
I started this paper with a citation from Améry, who experienced how “the 
other person […] with whom I can exist only as long as he does not touch my 
skin surface as border forces his corporeality on me […] and thereby destroys 
me.” We have been exploring how this destruction of the self resulting from 
this crossing of our skin surface as border is partly possible because our 
body, which we are, can at the same time be experienced as something 
alien to us – something that works against us, thereby corroborating in our 
destruction. The objective of this section is to show that Plessner allows us 
to better conceptualize this.
A helpful avenue into Plessner’s conception of human corporeity is via 
the notion of boundary, which plays a central role in his philosophical 
anthropology. To this end, I will offer a few general remarks about Plessner’s 
overall project, which is to articulate the distinction between living things 
and inanimate objects. Whereas inanimate objects are separated from 
one another by contours that do not belong to either object but are simply 
located in between them, living things, Plessner urges, have their own 
boundary. This boundary, which guarantees simultaneously a living thing’s 
autonomy within and openness towards its environment just is a living 
thing’s body. Plessner writes: “The boundary belongs to the body itself, the 
body is the boundary of his self” (Plessner 1975, 127).4
4 My translation. Original text: “Die Grenze gehört dem Körper selbst an, der Körper ist die 
Grenze seiner selbst” (Plessner 1975, 127).
158 JAnnA vAn grunsven 
As bodily beings that actively realize the boundary between themselves 
and their environment, human and non-human animals take up a position 
in their environment.5 This fundamental characteristic of human and non-
human corporeity is expressed in Plessner’s term “positionality” (Plessner 
1975). Plessner goes on to analyze the difference between human beings 
and animals in terms of the similarities and differences in the nature of 
their positionality. A fundamental commonality between the positionality 
of humans and animals is that they both actively realize the boundary 
between themselves and their environment through their motility. What 
makes this possible is that the structure of their corporeity is characterized 
by a fundamental ambiguity, or, to use Sussman’s term a “peculiar duality.” 
Both humans and animals are their (living) body, while simultaneously 
having access to this body as something they can insert in order to achieve 
something. Living as body in a body thing is what makes the self-moving 
lives of humans and animals possible. As Plessner puts it, “no movement, 
no leap […] would be possible without it. The animal too must put its body 
into action, employ it according to a given situation; otherwise it does not 
reach its goal” (Plessner 1970, 37-38).
Plessner holds that, because both human and non-human animals have 
and are their body, they have a body-center, or as he also calls it, a self, 
through which they can initiate interactions with their environment.6 
This means that the notion of selfhood on Plessner’s view entails being an 
autonomous, self-moving perspective onto a certain environment or world, 
but it equally means that the contours of selfhood are moveable, malleable 
and transformable by one’s environment or world. Characteristic of non-
human ‘selfhood’ is that the being and having a body through which the 
animal sustains itself in relation to and in separation from its environment 
is instinctively performed. The positionality of non-human animals is, as 
Plessner puts it, “centric,” meaning that they do not experience themselves 
as a self positioned in an environment: “Insofar as an animal is a self it is 
absorbed in the ‘here-now,’ […] Animals live from their center, within their 
center, but they do not live as center. […] It forms a reflexive system, an itself, 
but it does not experience itself (as self)” 7 (Plessner 1975, 288, my italics). 
5 Since it is not relevant for my paper I will leave aside Plessner’s discussion of plants.
6 Plessner also characterizes the notion of body-centre in terms of ‘Mitte,’ ‘Kerne,’ or ‘Zentrum.’ 
7 My translation. Original text: “Insoweit das Tier selbst ist, geht es im Hier-Jetzt auf. […] Das 
Tier lebt aus seiner Mitte heraus, in seine Mitte hinein, aber es lebt nicht als Mitte. […] Es bildet 
ein auf es selber rückbezügliches System, ein Sich, aber es erlebt nicht – Sich” (Plessner 1975, 288, 
my italics).
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As such, living through the ‘peculiar duality’ of their embodiment doesn’t 
emerge as a problem for animals.
This is different for human positionality, which is marked by what Plessner 
calls an “eccentric” structure. Although we always remain tied to our body as 
center, we are fundamentally aware of our body as center, which simultane-
ously expels us from it.8 As such, we are never instinctively absorbed in our 
environment in an unproblematic way, but are condemned to constantly 
establish our position within it. This constitutes the aforementioned “break” 
or “brokenness” that fundamentally determines human existence. Because 
we not only have and are our body but also have a relationship to this 
“peculiar duality,” the establishment of the boundary between ourselves 
and our environment emerges as an explicit task for us. Plessner writes,
Even if man can come to no decision between these two orders (of his corpo-
reity), the one related to a center and the other not, he must nevertheless find 
a relation to them. For he is totally merged in neither. Neither is he just living 
body, nor does he just have a body. Every requirement of physical existence 
demands a reconciliation between being and having (Plessner 1970, 36-37).
To be a human self, for Plessner, then, is to continuously reestablish the 
boundary between oneself and one’s environment by coming to terms with 
one’s having and being a body – where this is not performed instinctively, 
but can emerge as an explicit, normative task for us. Two ways in which we 
establish our bodily mediated relation to our environment is by using our 
body as instrument and through the body’s own expressivity. Most of the 
responses we give to our environment are established by instrumentally 
employing our body to initiate actions. In these situations, which we can 
call expressions of embodied agency, we routinely catch a ball that someone 
throws at us or ride a bicycle without having to reflect explicitly on what we 
are doing. Although human beings always have to live out the relationship 
of having and being a body, this doesn’t occur as an explicit problem during 
these instances. We do not experience the body as thing but as lived. We 
simply act, skillfully yet effortlessly, while enjoying an experiential sense 
of autonomous agency. As Plessner writes,
Usually, in unequivocal situations which can be unequivocally answered 
and controlled, man responds as a person and makes use of his body 
8 My translation. Original text: “Er ist in seine Grenze gesetzt und deshalb über sie hinaus” 
(Plessner 1975, 292).
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for that purpose: as an instrument of speech, as a grasping, thrusting, 
supporting, and conveying organ, as a means of locomotion, as a means 
of signaling, as the sounding board of his emotions. He controls his body, 
or learns to control it (Plessner 1970, 34).
In Plessner’s account, eccentric positionality thus makes embodied agency 
possible. It is precisely because we both are and have our body, that we are 
able to acquire and continuously enrich our lived relation to the world as 
described by phenomenologists. As Plessner puts it: “From the day of his 
birth on, everyone must come to terms with (the) […] double role (of his 
corporeity). Every kind of learning, e.g. grasping and the correlation of its 
effects with visual distance, standing, running, and so on, takes place on 
the basis and within the framework of this double role” (Plessner 1970, 34). 
In other words, on Plessner’s account, to have acquired a certain bodily 
skill such as walking, balancing ourselves, or riding a bicycle just means 
“that the reconciliation between having a body and being one […] take(s) 
place readily and quickly” (Plessner 1970, 37). The ‘peculiar duality’ of our 
corporeity may not emerge as an explicit task in these everyday actions, but 
it is nevertheless what makes them possible. Plessner’s notion of eccentric 
positionality reminds us that our bodily mediated selves gain an increas-
ingly effortless hold on the world in a gradual manner. And because our 
grip on the world is acquired and sustained through the body, the body is 
equally a locus of fundamental vulnerability, making it a constitutive aspect 
of human existence to just as easily lose our grip on the world.
There are numerous ways (both desired and undesired) in which our 
sense of embodied agency and our effortless, familiar connection to the 
world gets disrupted as our body announces itself as a kind of thing and 
responds for us, often in spite of us. Plessner explores this primarily via the 
notion of the body’s own expressivity, which, “like the instrumentality of 
the body […] corresponds to that tension and entwinement which we are 
always having to adjust between being a body and having a body” (Plessner 
1970, 43). Whereas our everyday responses to our environment tend to be 
characterized by the effortless control of our body as an instrument, al-
lowing for a general experiential sense of agency, our body’s expressivity 
has the capacity to ‘take over’ and respond for us when we are no longer 
able to respond as agent. I take this to be the insight Sussman wanted to 
highlight when he characterized pain as “a kind of expressive voice, (that is) 
[…] not unproblematically an exercise of my agency (the way my reflectively 
adopted commitments might be)” (Sussman 2005, 21, my italics). Plessner 
notes that it is under more equivocal circumstances, “involving (for example) 
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shame, anxiety, terror, repugnance, and disgust,” that the body’s expressivity 
becomes “largely removed from (the individual’s) voluntary influences,” and 
portrays involuntary reactions such as “blushing, turning pale, sweating, 
vomiting, coughing, and sneezing” (Plessner 1970, 33). These involuntary 
bodily reactions, the significance of which Sussman registered but could not 
conceptually account for, can now be understood as a fundamental aspect of 
our eccentric positionality; of how we are placed in the world and respond to 
our environment. We are beings who both are and have our body and who 
have to continuously settle this ambiguity that marks our existence. We can 
learn to control our body to such an extent that in univocal situations we 
are able to respond effortlessly as embodied agents without our ambiguous 
situatedness in the world emerging as an explicit task, but the possibility for 
us to encounter our body as alien to us, as something out of our control, as 
something that can respond for us in spite of us to unequivocal situations 
is always given as a possibility with our existence. 9
Plessner’s philosophical anthropology, which locates human selfhood in 
the structure of human corporeality and the manner in which this forces us 
to continuously establish our own boundary. Because being a human self, for 
Plessner, just is being caught up in this continuous task, involuntary bodily 
reactions are just as much a way of establishing our bounded selves as the 
intentional actions of embodied agency. The difference is, however, that 
when we respond by using our body as an instrument, we respond as autono-
mous agents. In contrast, when our response to a situation is determined by 
involuntary reactions, our usually pervasive body takes over and interrupts 
our autonomous control over it. There are countless circumstances under 
which this ‘taking over’ of the involuntary regions of the body is precisely 
what we are after. Think, for example, of the various ways in which our 
body takes over to make possible the pleasure of consensual sex or of how 
9 The phenomena of laughing and crying are the most telling here, because unlike blushing, 
sweating or burping – i.e. bodily reactions that I experience as disruptive of my ability to respond 
to a situation as fully ‘me’ – when we laugh and cry we respond to a situation as fully ourselves 
precisely by having our body take over and do the responding for us, thus stressing the possibility, 
given with our human corporeity that our body is expressive of me precisely by taking over and 
responding for me: “Laughing and crying make their appearance as uncontrolled and unformed 
eruptions of the body, which acts, as it were, autonomously. Man falls into their power, he breaks 
out laughing, and lets himself break into tears. He responds to something by laughing and crying, 
but not with a form of expression which could be appropriately compared with verbal utterance, 
expressive movement, gesture, or action. He responds – with his body as body, as if from the 
impossibility of being able to f ind an answer himself. And in the loss of control over himself and 
his body, he reveals himself at the same time as a more than bodily being who lives in a state of 
tension to his physical existence yet is wholly and completely bound to it” (Plessner 1970, 31).
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it responds to a comic scene with a joyous burst of laughter. But because 
our body can respond for us beyond the reach of our control it is also the 
involuntary regions of our corporeity that make us deeply vulnerable to oth-
ers, who can induce our involuntary bodily expressions despite our consent.
As Sussman perceptively registered, this is precisely what happens to 
victims of torture who experience themselves as “simultaneously powerless 
and yet actively complicit in (their) own abuse” (Sussman 2005, 4). Plessner’s 
framework now allows us to make sense of this experience conceptually. 
Even though the victim is rendered completely defenseless at the mercy 
of another subject as she is obstructed in her autonomous control of her 
body, her eccentric positionality makes it impossible for her not to take up 
a position. It is precisely because we are condemned to always take up a 
position, and because we do this even when we have no autonomous control 
over our body, that through the purposive exploitation of the victim’s body, 
torture can turn the victim’s body against herself, causing within the victim 
a permanent distrust not just towards the world, but towards herself.
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8 Plessner’s Theory of Eccentricity
A Contribution to the Philosophy of Medicine
Oreste Tolone
Although Plessner did not directly deal with medical anthropology or the 
philosophy of medicine, aside from some essays written during his youth, 
his ideas have certainly had signif icant influence on these two disciplines. 
His def inition of man as a positional and eccentric being actually includes 
the concept of health, disease and the doctor-patient relationship, which 
has certainly contributed to the controversy in contemporary medical 
anthropology, influencing writers such as Gadamer, Jonas and Habermas.1
Being a body, having a body: The lack of equilibrium in human 
nature
In his most important work, The Levels of the Organic and Man [Die Stufen 
des Organischen und der Mensch, 1928] (Plessner 1975), but also in Laughing 
and Crying [Lachen und Weinen, 1941] (Plessner 1982), Plessner stated the 
idea of human nature as composite, characterized by man’s complex rela-
tionship with his own body. From birth, man is called upon to harmonize 
this contraposition between being a body and having a body as a physical 
object (Leib-sein and Körper-haben); between being in agreement with his 
own corporeality, like all the other animals, while at the same time never 
being completely in agreement with it, allowing a certain degree of external 
and internal distance. Indeed, thanks to a particular characteristic in his 
limit (Grenze), man is simultaneously “a body,” “in the body” and “outside 
the body” (Plessner 1975, 293). He is eccentric, which means that “he is con-
fronted with his own existence as something he controls or expels, which 
he uses as a means or an instrument: he is within it and, to a certain extent, 
coincides with it. To man, corporeal existence is therefore a relationship, 
not univocal but twofold, between him and himself” (GS VII, 67).
1 Cf. Gadamer 1993, Jonas 1985, and Habermas 2001. We have consulted the original work by 
Plessner and Weizsäcker. Therefore all quotations in the text have been translated from German 
into English by the author. The bibliograf ic references relate to German works.
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This means that man can prove to be both, an object and the inside of 
this very object (GS VII, 75); not only a part of the outer world, but also 
that, which the outer world appears as; as a body as well as within the 
body. Certain human phenomena like laughing and crying attest strong 
emancipation in a person’s bodily processes and thus the precarious nature 
of this union. Nevertheless, man is like an animal that is bound to its physi-
cal existence, despite the conflict. “In man’s relationship with his body, this 
conflict is more frequently the basis of his existence; it is the source but 
also the limit of his strength” (GS VII, 63).
Struggling with this conflict is something that makes man completely 
different from other animals, as they cannot experience their interiority, 
and are not aware of their closure from the world; thus they do not need to 
overcome any conflict within or with the outer world. The animals’ being 
and having a body coincides. Their sense of being a body in the world is 
closed off entirely. It is not possible for them to perform something for which 
the instincts are not equipped and that could place them in a diff icult 
situation. As Plessner stated: “donkeys do not venture on ice” (GS VII, 61), 
while man is constantly called upon to achieve his own oneness, to reconcile 
his being and having a body, what he is and what he wants to be, all of which 
he can never fully achieve.2 But it would be wrong to think that man must 
choose between these two aspects of his existence. As tempting as it may 
be to accept this dichotomy, the specif icity of human life consists precisely 
in f inding a harmonious balance between being a body and having a body:
If man cannot make a decision between the two aspects, that is, whether 
or not to relate to one centre, he must in any case f ind a relationship 
with both. But this relationship is not fully achieved in either position. 
Man is not just a body, nor does he just have a body. Every requirement 
in physical existence demands harmony between being and having; 
between within and without (GS VII, 69).
Downgrading to the animal level or upgrading to the level of angels are 
not practicable hypotheses. The compound nature of man does not allow 
him to reject or to embrace just one of the two poles, relating to one centre 
while ignoring the other one. This leads man to the constant search for 
his own identity, precariously balanced between being a part of nature or 
being outside of it; he is destined to expressivity intended as the original 
way in which he makes up for the fact that he never totally coincides with 
2 If not in the def initivum of religion (cf. Plessner 1975, 364).
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himself. Thus, expressivity does not only represent man’s way of making up 
for his def iciency, but also the fundamental motion produced by history, 
creating a new cultural world, thanks to which nature discovers its true 
meaning. His constitutional lack of balance, and his needy, fragmented, 
exposed being, forces him to transcend towards another homeland, where 
his artif icial and cultural actions f inally allow this natural being to be in 
harmony with himself (Plessner 1975, 339).
The three anthropological laws: health and illness
Plessner’s three anthropological laws clearly express this natural com-
position that man must deal with, highlighting the human condition is 
characterized by natural artif iciality, mediated immediacy and a utopian 
standpoint (GS VII, 63). All of these concepts try to underline the work and 
tension that nature subjects man to. Such a characteristic is the source of 
all great cultural constructions, the origin of perennial ‘transcendence’ and 
the basis of all human evolution, but it is also man’s intrinsic instability 
and precariousness, his groundlessness and structural alienation – even 
in his look (GS VIII, 93) – his being without a homeland (Heimatlos) and 
based on nothing. The two opposing poles immediately become dangerous 
and negative, should either of them be regarded as something absolute. To 
be wholly natural or wholly artif icial, immediate or mediated, rooted or 
eradicated, any of these radical endpoints are bad for man’s health. It is 
as if the balance he is entitled to as a human and eccentric animal were 
substituted by a balance he has no right to – that is, the animal balance 
completely absorbed by itself and its own environment, the pneumatic one, 
completely detached from its own body. “He cannot be entitled to unlimited 
openness to the world. This is only possible for one who were incorporeal 
or having a pneumatic body, like the angels described in medieval religion” 
(GS VIII, 187).
Partial openness therefore assures mental health and humanity in that 
it does not rule out reconsideration of one’s own world, stopping man from 
disintegrating and from being held hostage by an unbearable opening. The 
third anthropological law, in particular, gives us a glimpse of the possibility 
of eradication of the utopian (or atopic) standpoint, which may somehow 
result in behavioural disorders. This law represents, more so than the other 
two, man’s vulnerability, and his innate dangerousness, which consists 
precisely in total absorption in his centrality (or rootedness) or total loss 
of centrality (or eradication).
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Taking man’s structure, as we can deduce it from Plessner’s anthropology, 
we can hypothesize not only man’s ideal structure and health, but also his 
pathological predisposition and the type of vulnerability he is subjected to.
We could even state that the idea of health can play an important role in 
the understanding of man’s anthropological statute. Health thus becomes 
a criterion of the human condition: this does not mean that eccentricity in 
itself is synonymous with pathology. If that were the case, we should claim 
that man as such is pathological. Instead, it is the typically human way 
of being vulnerable to disease and health that is closely bound to his ec-
centricity. Being able to exist outside of his centre gives way to new forms of 
imbalance and new ways of experiencing and managing such an alteration.
A healthy way to deal with one’s body and the world would therefore be 
to manage how to balance the tension between the two poles, allowing both 
to coexist. A healthy man is he who accepts the “game” of life (Krüger 2000, 
289-317) and manages to stay in balance between naturality and artificiality, 
mediacy and immediacy, rootedness and utopia, without thinking he can 
f ind salvation by suppressing one of the two poles. The same applies to 
Romano Guardini’s “polar opposition” and Simmel’s “axial rotation of life” 
[Achsendrehung des Lebens], whose concepts Klages (Fischer 2008, 87-88) 
found he could compare to Plessner’s eccentricity. This does not mean there 
is a universal standard for health: the balance between opposing poles can 
change according to each individual, his age, evolutionary phases, but even 
according to historical context. As Martin Buber (Buber 1947) pointed out, 
periods in history alternate: there are periods in which a sense of rootedness, 
of coincidence and of setting up a home prevail and periods, which may be 
open to risk but are also more creative, in which a sense of non-coincidence 
with the self and eradication prevail; such eradication can reach an extent 
that man experiences his relationship with himself, his body, his mind and 
the world around him in an unnatural, painful and unhealthy way. Indeed, 
health is not a statistic average between the two extremes, but rather the 
balance which comes from feeling well, and in this balance, as Gadamer 
said “we are resourceful, open to knowledge, forgetful of ourselves, and 
hardly feel overwork and stress” (Gadamer 1994, 122).
Thus, health is like a condition of intrinsic adequacy and agreement with 
oneself, which is truly only present when it is absent, that is, unnoticed. It is 
the feeling of immediate coincidence with the self, despite our mediacy; of 
naturality despite our artif iciality; of transcendence despite our rootedness. 
In this state of mercy, our body does not send us messages; ideas are no 
longer cumbersome and the world does not appear hostile, but actually 
quite friendly.
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In conclusion, being healthy can be understood as mastering the dual 
situation of being a body and having a body without any major conflicts, 
to the point where we may even forget about the dichotomy. To conclude in 
Gadamer’s words, it’s like learning “to ride a bicycle” (Gadamer 1994, 170), a 
sudden establishment of balance, that hides, however, the constant effort 
it takes to reconcile opposing tensions.
On the other hand, disease awakes us from our peaceful co-existence 
with the world. When we are ill, the dichotomy is suddenly present and 
the previously evolved union between the self and body ceases. It is as if 
eccentricity, normally able to recognize the Körper and Leib as identical 
or united, weakened and allowed the two poles to become separated. The 
person’s wholeness becomes fragmented. This occurs mainly in psychiatric 
illnesses; it is as if man were unable to maintain a balance between his 
animalitas and his utopian spirit, his eccentricity and his centrality. Man 
is temporarily defeated in his attempt to f it into the world through his dual 
nature. Dialectic in the three anthropological laws is temporarily suspended 
in favour of a spectrum ranging from a proliferation of possibilities to 
decrease in the distance from the self. This decrease in eccentric distance 
determines relative autonomy in the being body and the having body, which 
compromises man’s connection with the world. The ill body and ill mind are 
different means of disturbing their peaceful co-existence. Through physical 
pain and suffering, man’s ill body and mind draw attention to the self until 
man is completely absorbed and goes back to coinciding with them. The 
“being a body” can expand until it coincides with the entire world, thus 
becoming the only experience one can sensibly talk about. In this case, 
it is the healthy counterbalance of the “having a body” that ceases. In the 
opposite case, it is the healthy counterbalance of the rootedness in a body 
that ceases (GS VIII, 213).
According to Plessner, disease in an eccentric animal is not just the 
analytical assessment of an alteration, that is, the measurement of diversity 
coming from the outside, but rather the deterioration of eccentricity, the 
interruption of “spontaneous” identity, the disappearance of balance, which 
can no longer be neglected. While laughter and tears represent temporary 
interruption linked to external events, sickness and pain reveal structural 
vulnerability within the eccentric being (Gadamer 1994, 62-63). There is a 
disturbing element, a symptom that makes us aware of our bodies and our 
minds, to such an extent as to make them inconvenient or troublesome. The 
reconciliation between being-a-body and having-a-body becomes a critical 
endeavour. Such a loss of integrity disrupts the normal ability to react and 
relate to the world; the entire concept of being-in-the-world is changed. 
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The common result is retrocession of one’s existence, a mutilation of future 
prospects. In any case, however strong the division and the tendency to 
be re-absorbed into one of the two dichotomies or to lose total union may 
appear, the ill person still maintains a part of his eccentricity, that is, a 
residual ability to distance himself from his own illness. In case of physical 
illness, the person tends to refuse his illness, making it foreign rather than 
recognizing it as his own, feeling as if “something were inhabiting him” 
(Spinsanti 1991, 79). He must free himself from it. In the case of mental 
illness, one’s distance from the illness becomes indispensable for the patient 
to recover, so that he does not identify himself totally with his psychic world. 
Just like man’s humanity allows him to distance himself from himself and 
thus become mentally disoriented, this human condition also assures that 
this disorientation is not definite or total. That which allows man to go mad 
also allows him to regain his sanity. This is one of the main assumptions in 
anthropological psychiatry.3
The limits of medical intervention: Habermas
Apart from the actual use Plessner derived from the concepts of eccentricity, 
being and having a body, and the three anthropological laws, they are all 
useful tools at the disposal of medical anthropology. More specif ically, 
they seem to throw light on such controversial ethical issues, such as the 
doctor-patient relationship and the new frontiers of genetics.
The role of doctors and medicine is to guarantee harmony between 
being-a-body and having-a-body, to preserve the balance between each 
of the three spectrums: mediacy-immediacy, naturality-artif iciality, and 
rootedness-eradication. Overlooking this means raising a number of ethical 
questions regarding the limits of medical intervention. Current questions 
regarding man’s ability to manipulate the human genome without compro-
mising the patient’s dignity, arise precisely at the same moment when man 
himself becomes an object of manipulation. The absolute power of science 
to intervene on the corporeal aspect of life (to reduce man to his Körper) 
makes us forget that the artif icial must be in agreement with the natural. In 
other words, that with which we are provided artif icially (and which will be 
3 Psychiatric anthropology originates as criticism of the notion of complete insanity. Sup-
porters of this tradition besides Philippe Pinel are well-known scholars like Eugen Bleuler, Jakob 
Wyrsch, and John Strauss. Pinel who all support the notions of “nosodromic” and “partiality of 
insanity.”
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an integral part of what makes us human) must enhance and not obstruct 
the immediate and natural being-a-body. When the body is modified geneti-
cally or with prostheses, it shouldn’t stop health from withdrawing into 
the background, or forbid artif iciality to be natural. As Jürgen Habermas 
pointed out, “[i]nsofar as man’s body is part of this sought-after intervention, 
the old phenomenological distinction by Helmuth Plessner, ‘being a body’ 
(Leib-sein) and ‘having a body’ (Körper-haben) becomes extraordinarily 
present-day. The previous distinction between the nature we are and the 
organic features we acquire vanishes” (Habermas 2002, 15).
In other words, today we can acquire genetic features (Körper) that can 
change the basis of our future harmony between being-a-body (Körper) 
and having-a-body (Leib) and thereby limit our immediacy. We would then 
be in the presence of absolute supremacy over any potential artif iciality 
(prostheses, genetic manipulation), which, becoming a natural part of man, 
would impose the conditions of balance in the future. In other words, in 
the future, ordinary human balance will be the result of the prosthesis or 
eugenics employed. Mediated artif iciality will then determine the natural 
immediacy and therefore the limits of compatibility.
Despite that, Plessner asserts that man is an “[e]ccentric being, with no 
balance, no time or place, eternally exposed to nothing, constitutively out 
of his element, having to become something in order to f ind balance; he 
can only f ind it with the help of extra-natural things which derive from his 
creation” (Plessner 1975, 334).
In any case, it should not be forgotten that the ultimate aim of the super-
natural is achievement of harmony, existing in a second nature, “tranquillity 
in a second innocence” (Plessner 1975, 334). If the objective is withdrawal 
from unbearable eccentricity, then any technical support should not as-
sume the characteristics of what is merely produced by man, but what is 
discovered, that is, “the right move” (Plessner 1975, 345), allowing man to 
be in tune with himself and his world, giving way to new innocence. “His 
existing beyond must guarantee the vital immediacy between self and the 
surrounding f ield” (Plessner 1975, 350) deep down. The right move is the one 
in which reality, represented even by the human body, is not “submitted to 
the subject, conditioned by his own observations, experiences and calcula-
tions” (Plessner 1975, 358). It isn’t the counterimage of his possibilities, but 
the compromise – well known to doctors – between personal centre and 
reality itself.4 The move is creative and successful when “it manages to 
4 Authentic self-realization is based solely on the unity of anticipation and adaptation.
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adapt specif ically to the objective world” (Plessner 1975, 345). This is also 
expressed in the law of mediated-immediacy.
Thanks to Plessner’s assumption, the doctor traces those limits (to self-
exploitation) beyond which the intervention is no longer ameliorative for 
the person, but becomes instrumental and arbitrary instead. These limits 
protect what Habermas called the “unreceptive and inviolable” nature of 
man (Habermas 2002, 23). If the critical phenomenon is the disappearance 
of the boundary between we are naturally and the organic features we give 
to ourselves, Plessner helps us understand that there is a limit we should not 
cross. In summary, we can say that we are the features we give to ourselves, 
but we give to ourselves the features that are in line with our nature. No 
intervention should be allowed to undermine the future possibility of 
an eccentric relationship, which is balanced between being-a-body and 
having-a-body; in such a relationship, the complexity of the body should 
not be perceived and health should somehow return in the background. 
This could be the case for all of preventative gene therapy approaches, and 
invasive therapies or prostheses. Such an assumption is also in line with 
the awareness of medical anthropology, which, since Weizsäcker (1986), 
has been trying to save the relationship between doctor and patient from 
the subject/object type of model.5
The doctor-patient relationship
The fact that medicine has progressively made man the object of technology 
(Technisieerung der Menschennatur) (Habermas 2002, 43) is evidence of 
an imbalance towards mediacy and artif iciality, to the detriment of unity. 
This has had repercussions on the role of medicine, specif ically for the role 
doctors play.6 Medical science tends to be undermined and absorbed by 
processes that make technology autonomous: the procedures employed 
when applying technique to the practice of medicine make any intervention 
and personal evaluation, in which the doctor and patient take part entirely, 
superfluous. Thus, it is technique itself that imposes the conditions to its 
application, freeing both the doctor and the patient from having to take 
part. Therefore, in the relationship between doctor and patient, an ontic 
or positivistic approach prevails, guaranteeing a scientif ic approach, but at 
5 Refer to the four possible ways of interpreting the issue of the patient’s welfare covered by 
Pellegrino and Thomasma 1988.
6 Refer to the need for doctors to reconsider their notion of death in Jonas 1985, 120.
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the same time reducing the patient to being merely an “object to be studied” 
(Jaspers 1991, 16-42). This approach confirms the notion that medical science 
tries to dominate and regulate nature and its course rather than re-establish 
health in a patient or restore his balance. Using depersonalizing techno-
logical equipment, introducing a single case in the general case history, 
reducing the individual to a species or just a bureaucratic f ile, etc., all these 
practices represent a gradual detachment in the doctor-patient relationship 
taking place in today’s society. Such a detachment conjectures disease as 
a quantitative alteration, health as restitutio ad integrum, the patient as 
an object of study and the doctor as a cognitive subject. This unbalanced 
medical practice makes such detachment necessary and even desirable so 
that any interference deriving from the doctor-patient relationship may 
be minimized. Weizsäcker regarded such a practice as negative, def ining 
it as “therapeutic nihilism” (Henkelmann 1991, 17-75) in that, such an effect 
generates a “paternalistic” relationship model in which only the patient’s 
body is treated and the patient obeys, by behaving as is asked of him, putting 
his own personal unity aside 7. Reducing the patient to only being-a-body, 
in turn, brings the doctor’s sentient unity to a cognizant and objectifying 
aspect. The doctor only limits himself to treating the patient’s corporeal 
dimension.
According to this model, Plessner expressed the need for an epistemologi-
cal change in the doctor’s approach to the patient and to life tout court. 
During his youth, he dealt with this issue indirectly in two essays dedicated 
to Driesch’s theory on vitalism.
Sources of medical knowledge
Between 1922 and 1923, Helmuth Plessner and medical doctor Viktor von 
Weizsäcker exchanged opinions on the pages of the journal Wiener Klinische 
Wochenschrift. Helmuth Plessner was then 30 years old and a Privatdo-
zent (unsalaried university lecturer) at the University of Köln and Viktor 
von Weizsäcker was head of the Neurology Department at the Heidelberg 
Medical Clinic. The discussion was based on the debate on vitalism8 and 
7 Cf. Paper of Bernhard Casper, “Anthropologie der dialogischen Verantvortung,” at the 
conference Neue Medizin und neues Denken. Medizinische Anthropologie im Kontext jüdischer 
Denktradition, 23 October 2003, Wittenberg.
8 Both had Hans Driesch as professor. Plessner continued with him and Max Scheler to achieve 
his degree when he meet Weizsäcker personally; he was his professor at Heidelberg.
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included reasoning over the different cognitive meanings of Erklären and 
Verstehen. Plessner’s categories and language were different from those 
used in anthropological philosophy. Nevertheless, these two essays have 
provided useful information that has helped us to better understand how 
Plessner’s ideas have contributed to medical philosophy. In fact, their 
subject of discussion soon moved towards medical theory and its sources 
of knowledge. Both aimed at understanding, above all, how vitalism and its 
subsequent rejection of mechanistic reductionism modified a doctor’s aims 
and work. The fundamental idea expressed in Vitalism and Medical Thinking 
[Vitalismus und ärztiches Denken, 1922] and in On the Knowledge Source of 
Doctors [Über die Erkenntnisquelle der Arztes, 1923]9 is that the acceptance 
of several fundamental principles related to vitalism (recovery of the body 
as a total entity (Ganzheit) rather than the sum of its parts; the inability to 
accept the mechanistic theory according to present knowledge (GS IX, 18); 
return to the idea of individuality force us to radically change the basics 
of general pathology (GS IX, 7) and the way doctors relate to their patients.
According to Plessner, a body must be perceived by the doctor as a har-
monious whole whose health cannot be restored simply by operating on 
his cells or on single parts.10 Every body appears as an individuum ineffabile 
that can be perceived both in a physical and in an expressive dimension. 
But for this to happen, the doctor must also, as a whole, relate to the living 
unity before him without reducing it to a mere physical body. Only a whole 
person can perceive life from its creative (das Schöpferische), enigmatic, 
unpredictable and original aspect, from the way it interacts dynamically 
with the world.
“A personal life is not given to a conceptual being who is purely logical, or 
to a perceiving being, who is calculating. Involvement, sympathy for the life 
of others and understanding of the others’ motivations, must already be part 
of the being so that personal life may seen” (GS IX, 50) and its expressions 
and symptoms may be identif ied. This requires the doctor to have certain 
key qualities. He must acquire information from his senses, but he also 
needs non-sensorial qualities like:
9 The essay “Vitalismus und ärztliches Denken” (Plessner 1922) received a comeback from Vik-
tor von Weizsäcker, “Über Gesinnungsvitalismus” (1923), to which followed Plessner’s rejoinder 
was “Über die Erkenntnisquelle der Arztes” (Plessner 1923).
10 Hence Plessner’s inclination towards the works by Martius, Kretschmer, Koffka, Köhler, 
and Wertheimer, which were oriented towards establishing man’s individuality: these works 
started out with a combinational explanation to reach a functional explanation.
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sympathy, intellectual and psychological understanding, and intuitive 
observation. […] When illness is also affected by the mind, when the 
person as a whole is involved and the clinical picture shows a steady cor-
relation between physical and psychological symptoms, then diagnosis 
as well as therapy must be carried out with the help of ‘non-scientif ic 
observation.’ ‘Intelligence from the heart,’ kindness towards men, 
tactfulness, sensitivity, strength of character and the quintessence of 
his charismatic qualities are diagnostic and therapeutic tools and not 
a never-ending stop-gap in the eternal discrepancy between scientif ic 
evaluation and the actual situation (GS IX, 53-54).
Herein lies the fundamental reinstatement of the family doctor, whose role 
is to f ind the use of medical science for the specif ic needs of his patient. In 
the scientific context, which he is a steady part of, “[he] has his own spiritual 
centre in the art of knowing and treating people; it is on the strength of his 
tactfulness and general historic education that his service to man becomes 
important” (GS IX, 25).
The general practitioner should be able to intuitively understand his 
patients and treat them as objects of science and a subject of the spirit. This 
is why both science and intelligence of the heart are required. Thus Plessner 
believed that the approach to knowing a person could not be purely scien-
tif ic, and the key to treating the complexity of the human being required 
the hermeneutic skill of a doctor’s whole personality. We can thus state 
that the doctor’s action must take into account the patient’s being-a-body 
(Körper) as object of scientif ic investigation, and his having-a-body (Leib), 
as an incorporated living, sentient and proprioceptive subject.
These priorities are in conflict with what Plessner def ined as double 
antinomy, which creates tension for the doctor, who must relate to his pa-
tient in his entirety while his f ield of labour continues to become extremely 
specialized. The f irst antinomy is based on “the immeasurable gap between 
life and science, standard procedure and theory, intuition and knowledge” 
(GS IX, 53). This is because science proves to be limited and concepts relate 
to life as a whole like a tangent to a circumference: it is always touched 
point by point, but it is never grasped as a whole. The second antinomy 
is divided into two definitions (GS IX, 53). The real antinomy, however, is 
the one between the objectifying character of knowledge and receptivity; 
comprehensive opening (verstehende Aufgeschlossenheit), thanks to which a 
“person,” as such, f irst becomes visible and then easily influenced. Plessner 
seems to accept Weizsäcker’s altered idea (Weizsäcker 1923, 31) that the 
philosophy of medicine originates in this irreconcilable situation, not from a 
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philosophical necessity, but rather from the doctor’s duty to put the patients’ 
needs f irst. Medical philosophy would be possible in the intrinsic antinomy 
that the doctor and patient are subject to, in their relationship.
Plessner did not cover this theme in an explicit way in his subsequent 
writings, but he did leave us some guidelines concerning the epistemological 
statute of medical science and the doctor-patient relationship, which I 
introduced in the f irst part of this essay. First of all he stressed that medical 
science should: 1. Reject a summing conception of the human body; 2. Favour 
collaboration among sciences (GS IX, 50); 3. Keep together laboratory activity 
and confidence in experimental research, knowing that there is an expres-
sive dimension in life that goes beyond the laboratory; 4. Arouse interest in 
other methods and ways of operating and intervening therapeutically. For 
instance, characterology and typology (GS IX, 51)11 investigate aspects of hu-
man beings that cannot be analyzed quantitatively but serve as experience; 
5. Carry out research on the individual (Plessner was particularly in favour 
of the medical studies conducted by Conrad-Martius and Kretschmer.12); 
6. Rediscover the importance of the general practitioner; 7. Appeal to that 
“intelligence of the heart,” which was not really appreciated by Weizsäcker, 
to understand the whole phenomenon of that three-dimensional reality 
(body, corporeality, I) which we call person.
Conclusion
As we have seen, relationships among human beings, even therapeutic 
ones, must take into account the fact that man cannot be reduced to purely 
physical parameters. Here too, though with the use of vitalistic categories, 
it is confirmed that life cannot be enclosed within the limits of a body to be 
analyzed, but must be lived through constant involvement, decision-making 
and overcoming of diff iculties, within the environment. This implies unpre-
dictability and requires the setting in motion of medical knowledge and the 
wisdom rooted in a person’s sensitivity. A person acts in an eristic manner 
to protect the complexity that has been defined as the mediate-immediate, 
natural-artif icial way of relating to one’s own life, to one’s body and to one’s 
world. The individual’s constructive, free, utopian, mediate and artif icial 
11 They study the layers of human personality which are subject to experience, although 
impossible to analyze quantitatively (Kretschmer). See GS IX, 23.
12 From which emerged that even from the psychiatric point of view something in the indi-
vidual remains unexplainable.
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dimensions of life all contribute to his own development and decline, as 
they are natural and immediate. Medical doctors in today’s society should 
therefore take into account how much the patient’s personality contributes 
to his illness, and how much he himself contributes to his patient’s recovery. 
This is why Weizsäcker concluded that disease must always also be seen as 
a biographical event. Through his vitalistic premise and his anthropological 
theory on eccentricity, Plessner implicitly contributed to the philosophy of 
medicine and to philosophical anthropology.
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9 The Duty of Personal Identity
Authenticity and Irony
Martino Enrico Boccignone
Personal and collective identity
The central topic of this paper concerns personal identity, understood 
broadly as the identity of a person through its changes over time. I wish to 
show that approaching this issue requires a special focus on the relationship 
between personal and collective identity. I will not, however, deal with the 
epistemological or psychological issues of personal continuity or the mind-
body problem. I also do not intend to develop a systematic theory of the self 
or of self-consciousness. Instead, my starting point is the simple statement 
that everyone experiences himself or herself consciously as “someone,” as a 
person, as an “I,” no matter how this is defined or understood ontologically. 
In particular, I will refrain from dealing with the general criticism against 
identity, advanced by postmodern “difference”-thinkers as a critical trend 
against modern (especially idealistic) conceptions of identity. The identity 
I wish to describe is not a totality that swallows and annihilates every 
difference, but rather a “relative identity,” an intersection made up of both 
identity and difference as its constitutive dimensions. Although I will not 
go any further into this topic, I would like to stress the fact that this is 
not an attempt of relaunching an old concept of absolute identity. In fact, 
postmodern philosophy has concentrated upon difference as opposed to 
identity, since the latter has been seen as a kind of metaphysical remainder 
of modernity. It is possible to agree with the need of refusing a static or 
essentialistic concept of identity, but this does not imply that the idea of 
personal identity as such has to be refused. As I will try to show, identity 
can be conceived as an open and dynamic structure where difference is 
also involved in the form of change and openness to self-correction and 
re-orientation.
The following reflections intend to apply to the individual human being 
in general, i.e. to everyone independently from his or her geographic and 
historical context. Of course I do not want to deny that there are cultural dif-
ferences in the general understanding of personal identity and in the way it 
is affected by the social or cultural context. Nevertheless, I presuppose here 
that it is generally possible to deal with the issue of personal identity without 
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having to focus on a specif ic culture. However, the issue comes to have a 
special interest in the context of contemporary society, in which the general 
anthropological duty of understanding and shaping one’s personal identity 
is somewhat sharpened. While the emerging phenomenon of globalization 
opens up individuals to new views and perspectives, it also makes it more 
diff icult to let one’s personal identity be shaped by traditional models and 
paradigms. Despite the weakening of some cultural bounds, it is still possible 
to react by observing substantial attempts to strengthen particular cultural 
or religious collective identities. These circumstances create a confusing 
tension between modernity and tradition, so that individuals feel more 
strongly about the challenge given by the need of an orientation in their own 
lives and by the interpretation and design of their own personal identity. 
Even if there are many conservative and reactionary cultural movements, 
people become increasingly more aware of the plurality of cultural options 
and paradigms. Living in multicultural societies, travelling and moving 
to other countries, contact with people from all over the world enabled 
by social media; all this makes it diff icult, especially for new generations, 
to simply accept traditionally conveyed ways of life and sets of values. To 
put it very simply, the more freedom one has from social constraints and 
traditional religious or cultural influences, the more diff icult it can be to 
f ind one’s way and to understand, def ine and plan one’s personal identity. 
From this point of view, the present situation represents a challenge, while 
at the same time enabling unexpected chances of personal self-planning 
and of self-determination of one’s own identity. Reactions to this situation 
vary. Some might say that the present age is marked by the overcoming of 
closed cultural identities, while others identify it as the age of the return to 
strong collective identities. Both views are intertwined and characterize the 
present historical situation with its internal tensions and contradictions.
From this point of view, it is easy to see how the issue of personal identity 
is connected with the theme of collective or cultural identity. The problem 
is most clearly dealt with in the debate about the self between communitar-
ians and liberals in Anglo-American philosophy. Against an oversimplif ied 
basic liberal point of view, which would see the individual as a solipsist 
determining itself independently from social context and historical root-
ing, communitarians claim that personal identity is tightly linked with 
collective identity assigned by a group or community: the “sources of the 
self” (Taylor 1989) are said to be found in the respective tradition and shared 
values.
Now of course it cannot be denied that each individual is born and bred 
in a social context which somehow affects their self-perception and view 
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of life. However, in my opinion it is necessary to point out that the very 
fundamental constitution of the human being makes it possible to critically 
distance oneself to some extent, from ones cultural and traditional origins. 
As a result, I would principally argue in favor of the openness of personal 
identity.
However, I will not simply accept the methodical solipsism or the un-
historical tabula rasa conception of a standard liberal theory of the human 
being. In order to advance my argument about personal identity, I would 
like to take the point of view of Helmuth Plessner’s Philosophical Anthro-
pology, as it gives an interesting insight into the constitution of human 
nature, by taking into account both the embeddedness of the individual 
in a sociocultural context and the possibility of an emancipation from it.
Plessner’s contribution to personal identity
In his writings on social theory, Plessner deals with questions concerning the 
relation between individual and social context. In his early work from 1924, 
The Limits of Community: A Critique of Social Radicalism [Die Grenzen der 
Gemeinschaft. Eine Kritik des sozialen Radikalismus (GS V, 7-133)], Plessner 
distances himself from any radical notion of “community” by distinguish-
ing between an untouchable sphere of intimacy and a public mask that is 
required in order to let individuals meet on a common ground of “social” 
relationships. In his later works on sociology and social philosophy he often 
comes back to this theme by taking into account new theoretical elements 
and by deepening the divide between private and public through a theory 
of social roles. The dimension of the individuum ineffabile, i.e. the inef-
fable individual, is assured then by the distinction between social role and 
inviolable sphere of personal freedom. This means that individuals should 
not understand their own personal identity as if it would coincide with their 
social role: everyone is a “Doppelgänger” (“double”), i.e. everyone has both 
a private and a public dimension.1 Concerning the relationship between 
individuals and their social context, Plessner uses the same viewpoint in 
order to criticize what he calls the “alienation theorem,” which is based 
on the romantic idea that individuals have to be completely integrated in 
their own community. In this respect, Plessner claims that because of the 
fundamentally “broken” constitution of the human being, individuals are 
1 See the essay from 1960: “Social Role and Human Nature” [“Soziale Rolle und menschliche 
Natur”, (GS X, 227-240)].
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more than just their social mask or social role. Here, the double structure is 
said to be a specif ic human feature rather than a sign of alienation caused 
by a particular form of society and its labour conditions.2 Of course, such a 
polemic opinion against the Marxist-based social criticism of the Frankfurt 
School does not allow us to simply understand Plessner as an apologist of 
the political and social system or as a conservative thinker, though it is clear 
that he supports a liberal point of view. His approach can seen as a critical 
theory of society, though not explicitly leftist.3
With this in mind, I would now like to focus more closely on Plessner’s 
anthropological work, rather than on his social theories. In his philosophical 
anthropology, Plessner investigates the def inition of the human being in 
general instead of focusing on the def inition of the individual. Therefore 
I will analyze some of his central notions and will then shift from the 
general anthropological dimension to the individual level. In Plessner’s 
work, it is possible to f ind many important concepts and theories which 
can contribute in a fecund way to the issue, but in the following sections I 
will focus only on two main aspects, namely the inscrutability of human 
beings (§ 3) and their natural artif iciality (§ 4).
In this regard, it is necessary to mention at least one very important 
distinction made by Plessner, especially in his later works. However, it is 
not possible to deal extensively with the distinction between world and 
environment (“Welt” and “Umwelt”), openness to the world and environmen-
tal attachment (“Weltoffenheit” and “Umweltgebundenheit”). This theme, 
which is already anticipated from a different angle in the early works, was 
developed more explicitly in the 1950s and 60s, where Plessner shows a 
larger interest for the biological constitution of man. Taking into account the 
theories of Jakob von Uexküll, Plessner deals with the relation of the human 
being to its environment and tries to develop an approach that bridges both 
the environmental bounds and the openness to the objective dimension 
of the “world.”4 Here it is important to note that Plessner criticizes Erich 
Rothacker’s view, which conceives the different cultures in the same way as 
the closed and somewhat separated “environments” of the different species 
2 See the essays “The Problem of the Public Sphere and the Idea of Alienation,” [“Das 
Problem der Öffentlichkeit und die Idee der Entfremdung” (GS X, 212-226)] from 1960, and 
(“Self-Alienation, an Anthropological Theorem?” [“Selbstentfremdung, ein anthropologisches 
Theorem?” (GS X, 285-293)] from 1969.
3 For a “progressive” interpretation of Plessner’s philosophy and social theory, see, for example, 
Dallmayr 1974 and Ehrl 2004.
4 See the section concerning this theme in The Question of the Conditio Humana [Die Frage 
nach der Conditio humana (GS VIII, 180-189)] from 1961.
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of living beings. Plessner states that “cultures do come in touch with each 
other and they do not always simply decay, for example, through the contact 
of a primitive culture with a higher one. There rules also the relation of 
reciprocal fecundation and enrichment, of the continuity in the exchange 
of understanding, and this happens by virtue of a [shared, M.B.] human 
root which asserts itself again and again” (GS VIII, 189).
With regards to the question of personal identity, this means that 
individuals are not confined in their own cultural environment. On the 
contrary, they can participate and contribute to the intercultural discourse 
and mutual understanding. This circumstance constitutes a big chance for 
the personal development and cultural “enhancement” of every individual. 
Plessner’s late view on the possibility of mutual fertilization between dif-
ferent cultures can be read as a strong and exciting intercultural approach 
ante litteram (see Dejung 2005).
Inscrutability: Homo absconditus
In many of his works, especially in the “political anthropology” exposed in 
his work from 1931, Power and Human Nature: An Attempt at the Anthropol-
ogy of the Historical Worldview [Macht und menschliche Natur. Ein Versuch 
zur Anthropologie der geschichtlichen Weltansicht (GS V, 135-234)], Plessner 
points out that man is necessarily inscrutable (unergründlich). By means of 
reflections about Wilhelm Dilthey’s philosophy of life and history, Plessner 
explains his principle of “inscrutability,” by which human nature is neces-
sarily indef inable: the human being is opaque, it cannot be thoroughly 
known, it is somehow hidden from itself and has to remain an open ques-
tion. This very basic principle justif ies the conception of man as a power 
that acts within the open historical process – or better: man is conceived 
as a power which “opens” history as such and it is therefore essentially a 
political being (GS V, 185-191). In some of his later works, Plessner refers to 
the hidden nature of the human being as using an expression, which was 
originally related to God from the point of view of a negative theology (Deus 
absconditus). In the essay “Homo absconditus” from 1969, Plessner states: 
“The boundlessness of the human being, which we can anchor anyhow in 
its specif ic life-structure, entitles one to speak of Homo absconditus […]. 
Being open to itself and to the world, it is aware of its own concealment” 
(GS VIII, 357).
Now my point is that this general anthropological thesis also implies 
the inscrutability and opacity of personal identity on the level of the in-
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dividual human being. The task of self-knowledge and self-interpretation, 
as expressed by the Delphic Motto “Know Thyself,” has to face the limits 
given by the eccentric constitution of man. Human beings cannot see their 
personal identity isolated from their environment.
It is important to emphasize that, in Plessner’s view, the principle of 
inscrutability does not just constitute a cognitive def icit, as if the “true” 
identity were just too diff icult to grasp for our cognitive faculties, but is 
principally accessible through a sort of intellectus archetypus. Indeed, the 
inscrutability of both human nature and personal identity are both due to 
the fundamental structure of the human being, which is never completely 
f ixed. As Plessner argues by examining the relationship humans have with 
their bodies, the specif ically human “positional form” implies a fundamen-
tal brokenness as well as a constitutive indetermination.5 Now these are not 
merely limiting conditions of human beings, because they also imply their 
special openness and potentiality when compared to other living beings. 
On the level of the individual, this means that there is never a given and 
f ixed identity: the construction of personal identity represents a diff icult 
challenge and is a never-ending task. Thus, the Motto “Know Thyself” does 
not simply represent the theoretical task of exploring one’s personal nature, 
but it also has a practical meaning, as it implies the task of shaping one’s 
individual identity.6
Artificiality: Natürliche Künstlichkeit
In order to strengthen the link between the theoretical and practical 
aspects of self-knowledge and self-design respectively, I will focus here on 
the “fundamental anthropological law” of natural artif iciality, as developed 
by Plessner in his masterpiece, The Levels of the Organic and Man [Die Stufen 
des Organischen und der Mensch, 1928].
5 Here it is neither possible nor necessary to explain in detail Plessner’s attempt to a founda-
tion of philosophical anthropology. See the next section for some short remarks about the 
specif ic positional form of the human being.
6 In the context of the relation between philosophical anthropology and politics Dallmayr 
makes some interesting reflections about theory and praxis which can be applied to the present 
issue as well: “human existence is not simply a f ixed or pre-ordained destiny, but embedded in 
man’s ongoing self-interrogation and self-interpretation; as an ‘open question’ human nature 
remains in principle inexhaustible. Self-interpretation, however, is not merely a theoretical or 
speculative but a practical undertaking” (Dallmayr 1974, 57).
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By thoroughly analyzing the different “positional forms” of the various 
living beings, his work highlights human eccentricity as it represents a 
further development of the structural centrality of other animals. Indeed, 
in the special case of the human being, the centre of positionality has 
reached a distance from itself, so that the whole living system has become 
reflexive (GS IV, 362). At this level, the living being knows about itself and 
it has become an “I” (GS IV, 363). Now this means that the human being is 
both “in” its body (as it is the centre of the organism) and “outside” of it (as 
it is also the subjective perspective which allows the reflection process); it 
“is” its body and at the same time it “has” its body. It is broken and equivocal, 
it has a different relation to its own life and to its own body than other 
animals do; its particular structure can be described as a “fracture.” The 
relation between “being a body” and “having a body” is more precisely 
examined in Plessner’s popular book “Laughing and Crying: A Study of 
the Limits of Human Behavior [Lachen und Weinen. Eine Untersuchung der 
Grenzen menschlichen Verhaltens, 1941], in which Plessner develops a theory 
of human expression based on the structural fracture present in the relation 
of the human being to its body.
Because of this particular complication in the existence of the human 
being, which experiences itself as an object as well as a subject, its form of 
life is not just given by nature: it has to be made (GS IV, 383). As Plessner says, 
“The human being lives only by leading a life” (GS IV, 384).7 Of course, every 
form of life is a performance, an execution (Vollzug), but the specif ically hu-
man form of life has to be understood as a special form of realization which 
has to be “lead” and “done” from the (eccentric) centre of its positionality. 
Because of this, it always remains an open-ended process: it cannot be the 
simple development of a preprogrammed core conceived as its nature or 
quintessence. Moreover, by virtue of their peculiar subjective dimension, 
humans are also aware of the impossibility of a direct and natural life, such 
as that of other animals.
Given this form of existence, man is said to be “artif icial by nature”: 
“natural artif iciality” is the name of the f irst of the three fundamental an-
thropological laws formulated by Plessner in the last chapter of Stages. The 
eccentric being lacks balance. It is without place and time, stays on nothing, 
and is constitutively homeless. Thus, it has to “become something” in order 
to produce its own equilibrium (GS IV, 385). The law of natural artif iciality, 
i.e. the fundamental need for compensation given by human eccentricity, 
is the theoretical basis, which allows us to explain the necessity of culture. 
7 In German: “Der Mensch lebt nur, indem er ein Leben führt.”
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The artif icial dimension of culture is a kind of “second nature”: Plessner says 
that this artif icial ground represents a second ‘fatherland,’ where man finds 
its homeland (Heimat) and its absolute rootedness (Verwurzelung), both of 
which are not provided by its ‘f irst’ nature (GS IV, 391). Here, man is said 
to be the “apostate of nature,” since it must exit the natural condition by 
creating and setting up a new cultural world (GS IV, 395).8
Up to this point, Plessner’s analysis indicates that the artif icial roots 
given by the cultural ‘second nature’ allow the human being to nullify 
and overcome the void of natural rootedness due to eccentricity. He says, 
for example: “Artif iciality in acting, thinking and dreaming is the inner 
medium through which the human being as a living natural being stays in 
harmony with itself” (GS IV, 391). Yet, Plessner points out that this compul-
sion to perform (Vollzugszwang) does not operate within a single stroke. 
This cannot simply happen once and for all, as if after reaching the balance 
of a second nature eccentricity were def initively overcome: human beings 
have to perform recklessly and develop continuously towards new horizons 
and achievements. In order to reach their (temporary) balance, they will 
always have to strive for something new, surpassing their own deeds in an 
eternal process (GS IV, 395). My interpretation here is that man is not only 
the apostate of nature, but also the apostate of culture. What I mean is not 
the apostate of culture as such, since humans have to live in an artif icial 
cultural environment, but rather the apostate of every particular culture 
that was provisorily established in history as a second nature or absolute 
ground for human existence. Due to their natural artificiality, human beings 
have to perpetually redesign themselves into new forms within an open 
and unpredictable historical process.
The openness of the historical situation and its connection with the 
political dimension of the human being are most extensively dealt with 
in Power and Human Nature. In my opinion, though, the political theory 
exposed in this work is not satisfactory and it represents a sort of conserva-
tive slip in Plessner’s thinking, since it strongly links the individual to the 
collective identity it is meant to belong to, i.e. to a given cultural, political 
and historical situation. Curiously enough, the very work in which he 
develops his concept of inscrutability and openness of the human nature 
ends with the thesis that ties the individual to its nation or Volk (GS V, 
228-234). Here the openness of the human nature somehow turns out to be 
the justif ication of its opposite for what concerns the individual, which is 
8 In the essay “Mensch und Tier” (“Man and Animal”) from 1946 Plessner uses the effective 
expression “emigrant of nature” (GS VIII, 64).
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closed and confined into the contingent political horizon of its particular 
nation, seen as a homogeneous cultural unity. In other words, in this work 
the critical potential of the principle of inscrutability is inverted, meaning 
the conservative acceptance of the contingent political situation. This is 
particularly striking because he wrote it in Germany just two years before 
the takeover of the Nazi Party (NSDAP). For biographical and political 
reasons, Plessner develops some critical analysis about the political and 
moral responsibility of philosophical anthropology in his later works and 
expresses a far more sceptical position towards the contingent political 
situation. There he does not show any rhetoric of ‘power’ or ‘belonging,’ 
but rather points out the need of protecting human dignity in every single 
individual from social and political oppression.9
Returning to the idea of human openness, I would like to shift from the 
general anthropological perspective to the level of individual human beings 
who have to cope with their own lives. In my opinion, the fundamental 
openness and rootlessness of the human being generally applies to the 
individuals as well, who have to lead and perform their lives in their own 
personal way. Just like human nature cannot be rigidly determined once 
and for all, but individual identity is not a “thing” or static essence either. 
It is a rather open project, a work in progress and at the same time the 
most comprehensive and diff icult duty of every single human being, since 
it comprehends habits, beliefs, moral principles, axiological standards, 
long-term plans and existential goals, as well as single decisions in diff icult 
isolated situations. Also due to the fundamental human openness and 
rootlessness, the individual identity is neither f ixed by nature nor com-
pletely determined by its social or cultural context (in other words, by its 
particular and contingent “second nature”). The law of natural artif iciality, 
i.e. the principle of “performance” and “agency,” the reckless need for always 
achieving new accomplishments, the nomadic compulsion to surpass every 
balance towards new horizons: all of this also applies to each single personal 
individuality; even a “conservative” lifestyle based on repetitive actions 
and on closed and static opinions needs the continuous aff irmation and 
endorsement of some basic behavioral patterns vis-à-vis new situations.
9 See, for example, the essays “Die Aufgabe der Philosophischen Anthropologie” (“The Task 
of Philosophical Anthropology,” GS VIII, 33-51) from 1937 and “Über einige Motive der Philoso-
phischen Anthropologie” (“About Some Motives of Philosophical Anthropology,” GS VIII, 117-135) 
from 1956. For a study of the critical and normative potential of the human inscrutability, see 
Kämpf 2005.
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One may compare personal identity to an inimitable musical perfor-
mance that was spontaneously composed while playing. Personal identity 
is a sort of lifelong improvisation, sometimes as a solo, sometimes in a more 
or less consonant jam session within a social context. It may be possible 
to determine the key or the tonality and the instruments the piece begins 
with, but it is not possible to foresee whether it is going to change key, how it 
develops, if some other instruments and clang colours coming from different 
cultural landscapes will enrich the sound, if it will often change in tempo 
or not, if there will be a harmony between the parts or if it is going to be 
completely experimental with noises and cacophonies, and – f inally – when 
and how it is going to come to an end. Both a highly experimental piece 
and a rigorous contrapuntal work will require a continuous composition 
and simultaneous performance. I have deliberately chosen the metaphor of 
music for three reasons. First of all, the musical world is a perfect example 
for the mutual influences which have been taking place and which are still 
taking place nowadays between the different cultures (for what concerns 
composition rules, expressive forms, instruments, etc.). Secondly, a piece 
of music, even if composed, must be performed with proper timing and is 
an artif icial process which develops by continuously exploring new ways 
of combining acoustic sounds. Finally, a piece of music is a continuum 
made up of all of its parts, even if they cannot be simultaneously present 
because of its processual character; the preceding parts may influence the 
following ones, but they do not determine them completely. The coherence 
of the parts among themselves and the iteration of variations based on a 
fundamental theme is only one out of many possibilities for the composition 
of the “whole,” which as such is actually never given.
The artif iciality of personal identity is opposed to both the naturality of 
animal instinctive life and the implicitness of cultural views or traditional 
sets of rules. Here I would especially like to highlight the second opposition, 
which grants the individual a certain emancipation from the collective 
identity it supposedly belongs to. In fact, the distance from oneself enables 
a critical position towards one’s cultural background and allows a positive 
approach to other cultures and even the exploration of new possibilities of 
personal self-design. This can happen in a solitary way or within a collec-
tive movement searching for new social forms of life: the openness of the 
individual personal identity should not be interpreted as individualistic or 
anti-communitarian. Here I would like to point out in particular the pos-
sibility to link this kind of analysis with the reflections of the intercultural 
philosophy (Wimmer 2004). Intercultural philosophy aims at a process 
of reciprocal knowledge, communication and enhancement between the 
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various cultures in the particular f ield of philosophy, which of course is 
much more specific than the general aspect of individual self-interpretation 
and self-design. Either way, intercultural communication, in contrast with 
the emphasis on collective identity, can contribute to a broader variety of 
possibilities for the individual self-design, while at the same time fostering 
the development of a common ethical basis for human coexistence.10
Authenticity and irony
So far I have tried to show how Plessner’s theories on human being, especially 
the fundamental anthropological law of natural artif iciality, contribute to 
the idea of personal identity as an indefinite and essentially open process. 
While on the one hand individuals who are trying to know or discover 
themselves, meet a sort of opacity and inscrutability, they also have to 
design and create themselves through ‘performance.’ Every single human 
being has to be conceived as a non-transparent process, an open ‘construc-
tion area’ or an ongoing ‘execution’ of a piece that is being composed as we 
go. The indeterminate character of its agency means the possibility of a 
relative emancipation from both natural and cultural environments and 
their constraints. From this point of view, natural artif iciality is not just a 
negative divergence or aberration from the naturality of other living beings, 
but it is also the basis for individual freedom and self-determination. To a 
certain extent, it is the ground for individual responsibility.
Here I would like to add some short reflections on one’s attitude towards 
one’s own personal identity. In particular, I claim that a too naïve romantic 
conception of authenticity becomes problematic if we try to get to the 
bottom of its anthropological presuppositions. Indeed, it is impossible to 
recognize one’s ‘true’ and ‘authentic’ identity as a static essence: this means 
that the individual actually does not have any objective reference point 
which would allow him to determine his own ‘real’ self. From this point of 
view, it is not possible to take the decision to be ‘faithful’ to one’s ‘authentic’ 
self: this is just a rhetorical expression which can be used to justify certain 
decisions and behaviors as well as their opposites.
Obviously this is meant to be a critical thesis opposed to the existential 
pathos of the concept of ‘authenticity,’ since this concept presupposes the 
determination of the “most authentic possibility of one’s existence” (Hei-
degger 1927, § 58). Referring to one’s true self is as speculative as referring to 
10 See, for example, Erpenbeck 1996.
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the constitution of one’s ‘soul,’ understood as an essence precisely defined in 
its particular and individual qualities. Both the decision of aff irming one’s 
habits and the opposite decision to change them radically can be justif ied 
by adopting one’s supposed true identity. In the f irst case, the individual 
may think that it has always been faithful to itself and that it has to keep on 
following the same track, while in the second case the individual may think 
that it has always misunderstood itself and that it has to change in order to 
‘return’ to its own real being. In both cases, the justif ication is nothing but 
speculative and rhetorical, misconceiving the principles of inscrutability 
and of natural artif iciality, by which identity is not a monolithic reality. 
Rather, identity is always temporary, it is a continuous event which ‘is’ 
what it ‘becomes.’ Personal identity is never f inished, it simultaneously ‘is’ 
and ‘becomes’ through a process which always balances in new forms of 
difference and repetition of sameness.
Concerning ‘collective’ identity, another notion of authenticity as faith-
fulness, congruence or belonging to a given tradition or cultural identity 
is not devoid of problems. Firstly, it is theoretically weak, as it presupposes 
collective identities intended as well-def ined and static entities, as holistic 
things clearly separated from each other by absolute boundaries, denying 
the historical process of mutual contamination between cultures and tradi-
tions. Secondly, the request for authenticity can often have an ideological 
ground, as its purpose is the simple reproduction of the given situation. 
The reference to a given identity prevents the possibility of free decision 
by individual self-design. On another level, a f ixed ideological image of 
what a collectivity is supposed to be can be used by some elites as a means 
to prevent or deny the internal development and differentiation of the 
collectivity itself: the identity-formula sounds like “Don’t forget what you 
are: this is what you are and what you have to be.” Of course this way of 
thinking can be the theoretical basis for different kinds of discrimination, 
since it makes it possible to identify and possibly reject other individuals 
as foreign and different. On the other hand, this is a major ideological 
instrument for conservative political decisions.11
11 A particularly striking and embarrassing example of this kind of thinking is given by the 
decision of Italy’s conservative Berlusconi government not to accept the recent ruling of the 
ECHR (European Court of Human Rights) about the presence of the crucif ix in Italian public 
schools (Judgment 819, 3 November 2009). After discussions involving the UAAR (Unione Atei 
Agnostici Razionalisti), the case arrived at the ECHR, which eventually declared the crucif ix 
in the classrooms in public schools as “contrary to parents’ right to educate their children in 
line with their convictions and to children’s right to freedom of religion” (ECHR 2009). The 
sentence was very negatively commented on by the CEI (Conferenza Episcopale Italiana), by the 
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I think that the appropriate attitude to one’s personal identity is a sober, 
relaxed and confident irony. It has to be said that the concept of irony has 
come to have many different meanings during its long history, thus it can 
sound somehow confusing. At the same time, it should be clear that this 
is not the romantic concept of irony, but rather a sort of sceptical irony 
oriented against the pathos of authenticity. Plessner himself, referring to 
the right attitude to one’s philosophical standpoint mentioned in a letter to 
Josef König on 22 February 1928 that he chooses irony as a non absolutistic 
approach, as an approach between earnestness and its contrary (Lessing 
and Mutzenbecher 1994, 179-180; see also Schürmann 1997). In my view, 
irony means the quiet awareness of the relativity of every determination, an 
awareness which does not lead to despair but rather to a peaceful balance 
between acceptance of what is necessary one the one hand, and a practical 
engagement and openness to what is possible on the other hand. As an 
attitude towards life, it may be understood as a hybrid of responsibility 
and serenity, involvement and distance, critical reflection and spontaneity, 
earnestness and joy of playing, engagement and composure.
The recognition of the indetermination and openness of the self allows 
one to take a critical distance from oneself as well as from one’s tradition of 
belonging. This irony does not mean at all a loss of earnestness and sense of 
responsibility, but rather implies a conscious acceptance of one’s freedom 
and of the duty of performing one’s very personal and unique life through 
changing situations and challenges. The ironic self accepts the possibility 
of even setting itself into the indefinite spaces between cultures and may 
operate with creativity in order to achieve new forms of cultural synthesis.
As I already mentioned of course, this does not deny the fact that every 
human being is always set in a determinate situation which gives him a 
particular starting point. Instead, it means that, beyond the ‘fact’ given by 
the context, the individual always has a dimension in progress. I would like 
to add here that self-interpretation and comprehension of one’s cultural 
origin can be important tools for approaching other people and cultures 
as well as for creatively shaping new ways of life and new cultural options. 
In this regard, it is possible to make an example by referring to the musical 
metaphor I used: a musician who is educated in his or her own musical 
conservative Berlusconi government and by many opposition representatives as well. Though 
the explicit statement of the secularism in the Italian Constitution and though a consistent 
part of Italian society and public opinion show Italy to be open to be a really laicist country, the 
political authorities as well as the Vatican representatives repeat again and again that Italy is a 
Catholic country and that it cannot forget and leave its tradition, roots and identity.
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tradition can at best acquire some new competencies in other musical 
traditions or in other musical instruments, which give him or her a broader 
spectrum of expressive possibilities. At the same time, instruments and 
musical forms undergo changes and continuously develop because of their 
different uses and new receptions.
Ironic self-interpretation and self-design of the individual becomes neces-
sary and possible, especially in the modern globalized world. On the one 
hand, the process of modernization and globalization causes a sort of loss 
or weakening of the cultural and traditional bounds in the individuals, who 
experience a sense of bewildered rootlessness, since an ingenuous cultural 
self-identif ication has become more diff icult and may collide with the 
framework of the modern liberal state or more generally with the context 
given by modern homogenized and functionally organized societies. On the 
other hand, the broad offer of cultural patterns and paradigms given by plu-
ralistic multicultural societies and by the global intercommunication gives 
individuals the instruments to develop intercultural competencies which 
enable a more open self-design. The ironic approach to the self allows one 
to interpret and comprehend the coexistence of both human aspects, the 
need for belonging and self-identif ication due to the sense of rootlessness, 
and the possibility of a free individual development of one’s personhood. 
Particularly the contact between different cultures provides the basis for a 
multilateral development and cross-cultural adaptation of individuals, who 
may open themselves for “intercultural personhood” (Kim 2001; Kim 2008).
Far from being a plea for a form of radical individualism, my reflections 
intend to give a theoretical justification of a conscious, responsible, and open 
approach between individuals in contemporary society that is character-
ized by growing multicultural complexities, religious plurality, huge global 
migrations, and a widespread sense of cultural uprootedness. The ironic 
attitude to oneself and to one’s origin represents an emancipated form of 
self-understanding, which is ready for intercultural recognition of diversity, 
self-correction and possibly self-reorientation. The ironic self can be seen 
as an equilibrist, always trying to keep a diff icult balance between lack of 
a homeland and cosmopolitanism (Heimatlosigkeit and Weltbürgertum).
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10 Anthropology as a Foundation of 
Cultural Philosophy
The Connection between Human Nature and Culture by 
Helmuth Plessner and Ernst Cassirer
Henrike Lerch
Introduction: Philosophical anthropology as a new key
At the beginning of the twentieth century, the phenomena of culture and 
history became a great challenge in philosophy. The discovery of new 
cultures and other social structures, as well as the emergence of historism 
relativized our view on Western culture, kicking it of the podium as the 
natural way of being. The modern natural sciences have branched off quickly 
as the f ield that attempts to determine and explain the real world. Going 
back to the works of Kant was regarded as a possibility for developing a 
philosophy that could satisfy these requirements. Yet, going back to Kant 
meant going back to new circumstances. Dilthey expressed this with the 
phrase “Critique of historical reason,” which hints at the need for develop-
ing a foundation for historical sciences and humanities as Kant did for 
the mathematical sciences. But there was more to it. It meant f inding a 
basic principle that holds true for all sciences, i.e. referring to the ascent of 
historism and cultural sciences, new forms of reason had to be reflected in 
the critique of reason, and you could not afford to focus only on the most 
abstract and general, namely the mathematical sciences. One possibility 
was to return to the point before reflective structures, to f ind the origin of 
the different forms of science – humanity and mathematics.
In this new scientif ic vantage point, the human being is faced with new 
difficulties, which caused problematic moments for him. On the one hand, it 
became obvious that man could not be reduced to the pure forms of reason, 
since there were other cultural forms in the world and human concepts 
were recognized to be relative compared to others in history. On the other 
hand, the integration of man into natural history received new attention. 
The Aristotelian question was reformulated: After Darwin, it was no longer 
interesting to ask how something could exist without being animated by 
God. Rather, one became more interested in asking how a natural thing, an 
organism, could even have a soul (Kather 2003, 69). For this, two strategies 
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were introduced, the naturalistic and the culturalistic one. Naturalists have 
seen the human being only as a product of nature and tried to explain, for 
example, the functioning of the brain via chemical processes, in order to 
locate the mind within it. In contrast, many cultural and philosophical 
arguments have reduced human nature to reason and skills based on reason 
or mind. But the situation required a concept of the human being that did 
not reduce him to only one skill or perspective, while it also enabled this 
concept to be at the centre of reference in a new philosophy.
Ernst Cassirer, as well as Helmuth Plessner, published mainly in the 
“Golden 20s”; a decade referring to German philosophy in which a variety 
of central works were published in order to f ind an answer to this situation: 
Ludwig Wittgenstein’s Tractatus logico-philosophicus (1921), Georg Lukác’s 
Geschichte und Klassenbewusstsein (1923), Martin Heidegger’s Sein und Zeit 
(1927) and of course Ernst Cassirer’s Philosophie der symbolischen Formen 
(1923-1929) and Helmuth Plessner’s Die Stufen des Organischen und der 
Mensch (1928). There is a reason why this chapter focuses only on the last 
two authors, Plessner and Cassirer. Both can be read as taking the effort 
to postulate a new formulation of philosophy under the aspect of culture 
and cultural science. Moreover, these philosophies are integrative. Both 
offer a concept for the different forms of science in the ‘comprehension 
of expression’ (Ausdrucksverstehen), and both develop a new concept of 
what it is to be a human being. Plessner and Cassirer have been extensively 
discussed in the last 20 years because of their concepts, which have opened 
new possibilities for contemporary philosophy (Orth 1996).
Although Plessner and Cassirer come up with a similar idea, they deal 
with it in different ways. Cassirer develops a critique of culture which 
replaces Kant’s critique of reason. Comprehending the world, no matter 
how, is based on parity. Nevertheless, analyzing forms such as myth, 
language or science, in his main work Philosophie der symbolischen For-
men, Cassirer specif ies symbolizing as their common mental capacity. 
This capacity amounts to the difference between humans and animals: 
the human being is an animal symbolicum. In short, Cassirer develops a 
philosophical anthropology which is both a culmination and a foundation 
of his cultural philosophy. In contrast, Plessner’s argument takes this 
stance as its point of departure. In his main work The Levels of the Organic 
and Man [Die Stufen des Organischen und der Mensch, 1928], he outlines a 
philosophical program in three steps. In order to establish the humanities 
(cultural science) as hermeneutics, we need a philosophical anthropol-
ogy. But for all that, we need to evaluate a philosophy of living beings 
in general, which can be called a natural philosophy. Furthermore, this 
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natural philosophy is exactly the part that makes the difference between 
Plessner and Cassirer. Plessner clarif ies his point by criticizing Cassirer 
for being someone who knows that human beings have bodies, without 
making philosophical use of this knowledge (cf. GS VIII, 242). Plessner 
regards the positionality of the embodied individual, together with its 
capacity of eccentric positionality, as the basis of the cultural aspect of 
human life. This natural artif iciality, as Plessner describes culture, is also 
spelled out in Cassirer’s work.
In this chapter, I will compare and contrast Plessner’s and Cassirer’s ac-
counts by characterizing the concept of the human being and the role of this 
concept as a foundation of cultural philosophy. To explain the differences 
of these concepts, I will compare their comprehension of expression, the 
point where nature and culture overlap with one another. All in all, one 
has to conclude that each of them is approaching this point from a different 
angle, yet in some sense towards a common direction. We need to consider 
both in order to fully understand culture.
The foundation of humanities and the concept of expression
Dilthey’s approach
Dilthey’s famous thesis of the distinction between natural sciences and the 
humanities is based on the idea that one should distinguish sciences that 
have nature as their subject from sciences that study the social and histori-
cal reality. Connected with this distinction is Dilthey’s idea that natural 
sciences and humanities have a distinct methodology: explaining versus 
understanding. In Dilthey’s view all sciences, not only humanities, have 
their foundation in life. Dilthey wanted to supplement Kant’s Critique of Pure 
Reason by developing a Critique of Historical Reason [Kritik der historischen 
Vernunft]. Dilthey wanted to apply the transcendental method, which Kant 
used in his foundation of the natural sciences, in the foundation of the 
humanities. The critique of historical reason ought to give humanities an 
epistemological foundation and should remove the human being from the 
natural context in order to place him into the context of history and culture. 
A reason for that can be found in Dilthey’s critical epistemology, in which 
the transcendental structure no longer, as in the case of Kant’s philosophy, 
is considered to be timeless and invariant, but becomes a historical a priori. 
Moreover, Dilthey does not restrict his analysis, as Kant does, to the know-
ing subject, but he focuses on the human being as a whole:
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No real blood flows in the veins of the knowing subject constructed by 
Locke, Hume, and Kant, but rather the diluted extract of reason as a 
mere activity of thought. A historical as well as psychological approach 
to whole human beings led me to explain even knowledge and its con-
cepts […] in terms of the manifold powers of a being that wills, feels, and 
thinks; and I do this despite the fact that knowledge seems to be woven of 
concepts derived from the mere contents of perception, representation, 
and thought (Dilthey 1989, 50).
The philosophy of life assumes a foundational role in this argument, because 
it uses the concept of life as opposed to reason. Ultimately, it is the concept 
of life rather than the concept of reason that is the starting point of the 
foundation. Life means a full reality, which is given in a common and evi-
dent form. This reality cannot be explained by natural science, but is given 
in everyday experience. In fact, it is a pre-scientif ic concept, which can be 
immediately experienced and understood but not explained. If understood, 
it can play the role of the foundation of human sciences. However, as Dilthey 
is preoccupied with the foundation of humanities, he refers to life as being 
spiritual (geistiges Leben). His concept of life is a terminological centre of 
reference in form of an entity with all kinds of interaction between the inner 
and outer sphere. Only if a body is in proportion to the interaction with its 
surroundings in the structure, so that motion follows impression, thinking 
becomes possible (cf. Dilthey 1982, 345f.). Insofar as this pre-theoretical 
concept of life already has categories, Dilthey argues, the formal Kantian 
categories are based on these categories of life (Dilthey 2002, 248ff.; Dilthey 
1982, 334ff.).
Life, as the opposite of reason, is an irrational given in the sense that life 
cannot completely be explained by concepts of theoretical reason alone. 
Dilthey, instead, demonstrates the fundamental role of life by referring to 
the possibility of understanding. At this point, he formulates his theory of 
hermeneutics, which is based on the triad of lived experience (Erlebnis), 
expression (Ausdruck) and understanding (Verstehen). By applying this 
triad, he argues that life functions as the foundation of humanities as well 
as of thinking in general. He often uses the phrase “Life comprehends 
Life.” But life could not understand life just by itself. Understanding needs 
a detour. Life has to express itself, and these expressions must then be 
understood. The nexus of life (Lebenszusammenhang), i.e. the interaction 
of surroundings, men and work, is the basis of understanding. Individu-
als are interactive temporal entities, each differently connected to their 
surroundings. The specif ics of this interaction is depicted by Dilthey as 
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lived experience (Erlebnis), characterized by an impulse and resistance, 
pressure and release (Dilthey 2002, 248). Although lived experience has an 
immediate character, in order to fully understand it, we have to relate it to 
the whole historical nexus of life.
Meaning can be found in every expression of life. Examples of such 
manifestations or objectif ications of life are linguistic expressions, human 
action, and institutions, such as law. They have to be understood in relation 
to the totality of the nexus they are part of. Together these expressions form 
a common world, in which human beings can understand the life of others 
and of themselves. Here human life can comprehend spiritual life (geistiges 
Leben). But despite all that, the nexus of life as a whole remains utterly 
incomprehensive; it cannot be explained by reason because it cannot be 
completely thought of in concepts. Ultimately, life remains the pre-reflective 
foundation of thinking. Moreover, the plurality of relations and experience 
are inherent to the concept of life, which can never be entirely resolved.
Plessner and the phenomenon of expression
In The Levels of the Organic and Man [Die Stufen des organischen Lebens und 
der Mensch, 1928], Plessner explicitly adheres to Dilthey’s argument in that 
the function of philosophy consists of making the process of understanding 
comprehensible (cf. GS IV, 59). He follows the hermeneutical approach by 
saying that history and cultural science comprehend human life by the 
expressions of life. Philosophical hermeneutics have to systematically an-
swer how it is possible for living creates to understand their own existence 
through the medium of history. Just like Dilthey, Plessner continues Kant’s 
transcendental project. However, whereas Kant only asks for the conditions 
of the possibility of mathematical science, Plessner, inspired by Dilthey, asks 
for the conditions of the possibility of understanding and interpretability 
(Deutbarkeit), and he also starts from the presupposition that we can only 
understand life via its expressions. He claims that the investigation of the 
“structure of expression” (Strukturgesetze des Ausdrucks) and the “science of 
expression” (Wissenschaft vom Ausdruck) is the basic task of philosophical 
hermeneutics (GS IV, 60; Pietrowicz 1992, 229f.).
Yet, for Plessner, the theory of expression is a part of philosophical an-
thropology, because questions of the natural structure of expression are 
part of philosophical anthropology equally as much as they are questions 
about the importance of the body for the expression (GS IV, 61). The most 
important question for Plessner’s philosophical anthropology concerns how 
we can think of a human being as one point of experience, where nature and 
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mind are intertwined (GS IV, 62). The phenomenon of expression, especially 
that of mimic expression, is a phenomenon which excels at demonstrating 
this intertwinement (Verschränkung) of body and mind. Thus, Plessner’s 
interest lies even less in the expressive objectif ications of cultural forms 
than in the embodied expressions of mental states.
Plessner analyzes the phenomenon of expression primarily by investigat-
ing the understanding and perception of movement. His main claim is that 
living beings cannot be understood by their kinematics, but only by their 
behavior. If we understand movement as behavior, we have an interpretation 
of movement. Living beings exist as a wholeness (Ganzheit), which means 
that the living body (Leib) interacts with its environment (cf. GS IV, 149-163, 
176; GS VII, 75-82). Plessner demonstrates that there cannot be any percep-
tion without an immediately given sense (GS VII, 85). Of course this sense 
could err at times, because it always remains a kind of interpretation. But 
Plessner does not give any kind of explanation as to how this interpretation 
depends on the context or on other forms of perception. In contrast, Cassirer 
gives some explanations in this respect, as we will see below.
In addition to this demonstration of the understanding of an immediately 
given sense Plessner analyses the intertwinement of body and mind in 
the phenomenon of expression (GS IV, 64; GS VII, 215, 235; GS VIII, 209). 
Dilthey’s hermeneutical concept of understanding is extended to the sphere 
of organic behavior, insofar as perception of bodies is only possible with 
interpretation and understanding of sense. Alternatively, the sense or 
intention of an expression is given in an image, and there is only one way 
to ascertain the intention of it. It is not the organic body (Körper), but rather 
the living body (Leib) that is perceived. Therefore, in the movement of the 
living body, sense manifests. This is not a perception of a body, which is 
controlled by the mind or something else. It is an indifferent psychophysi-
cal entity. Evidently, facial expressions constitute a kind of expression of 
an inner mental state, but Plessner transcends this traditional idea when 
he focuses on the relation between the living body, the environment and 
behavior. The inner, mental sphere and the external world are primarily 
connected in the phenomenon of expression and the understanding of 
expression. The division into different spheres is based on this primordial 
unity. Plessner’s concludes the phenomenon of facial expression to be an 
entity in the form of a neutral psychophysical (Psycho-physisch neutrale 
Indifferenz) and f igural-sensual indifference (bildlich-sinnliche Indifferenz). 
He uses this example to demonstrate the indifference and to clarify that the 
human being is a living being. In the end, he adds that the mental sphere 
cannot be expressed without the organic sphere (GS VII, 83f.).
AnthroPology As A foundAtion of culturAl PhilosoPhy 201
Cassirer’s foundation of his philosophy of symbolic forms
At the beginning of the f irst volume of his Philosophy of Symbolic Forms, 
Cassirer formulates his problem in a way that reminds us of Dilthey, but 
without mentioning him. He wants to transform the Critique of Reason to a 
Critique of Culture by incorporating every form of understanding the world, 
instead of reducing the critical approach to the highest form of knowledge, 
i.e. the form of mathematical sciences (Cassirer 1968, 80). Furthermore, he 
doesn’t ask for the conditions of the possibility of meaning (Bedeutung) 
in a dualistic way like Plessner does when he confronts the mathematical 
type of explanation with historical and cultural understanding (Graeser 
1994, 28). Instead, Cassirer emphasizes the plurality of symbolic forms, as 
it is his goal to provide a basis for the factum of cultural sciences. Nev-
ertheless, there are some aspects, which suggest commonalities among 
Cassirer’s and Plessner’s ideas. Cassirer describes his work as a “general 
theory of cultural forms” (Cassirer 1968, 69; the German original uses the 
term “generelle Theorie der Ausdrucksformen” (literally: “general theory 
of the forms of expression,” Cassirer 2001, vii), in which he talks about 
the symbolic forms of “objectivization” (Objektivierung) just like Plessner 
when utilizing Dilthey’s term “objectif ication” (Objektivationen) (Cassirer 
1968, 78).
Cassirer uses the term expression in two different ways. First, expression 
is the objectif ication of a mental content, so that it can be bound up with 
the body, just as we have seen it being used in Plessner’s theory of facial 
expression, or manifested in symbolic forms, like language, art etc. Second, 
Cassirer uses the term expression as being one of the three functions of 
consciousness: Expression, representation (Darstellung) and significance 
(Bedeutung), which provide the structural framework of our perception 
(Schwemmer 1997, 71ff.; Möckel 2005; 192ff.; Meuter 2006, 148ff.).
Beginning with the symbolic form of language in his first volume, Cassirer 
describes the simple facial expression (einfacher mimische Ausdruck). This 
facial expression, as we know it from examples like anger or fury, shows an 
immediate external expression of an inner state, indicating that our inner 
state and external expression are interlaced. In this case, it seems that there 
is a distinct boundary between expression and the corresponding mental 
state. It also seems that we have the same distinct emotional expression 
as animals. Cassirer criticizes this clear-cut connection and the natural 
interpretation of these f irst and simplest expressive forms. He thinks that 
the human being is a product of nature. Human expression, unlike facial 
reactions in animals, is rather an answer and yet, the simplest expressive 
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forms are infused by mental articulation. This difference is most evident 
in forms of articulation like language, art or myth etc.
In his third volume of the Philosophy of Symbolic Forms, Cassirer describes 
his method in the following way. He wants to experience the area of symbolic 
forms in order to get to the sphere of subjectivity by a deductive and recon-
structive examination (Cassirer 1963, 67). The symbolic forms can be seen as 
mental expressions. They are defined as the primary phenomena of the spirit 
and can be shown, but they cannot be ascribed to anything (Cassirer 1958, 11). 
Thus, mental expressions are final entities with their own standards in every 
form. Their epistemological status is not based on metaphysical speculation, 
but on their phenomenological perception and can be found in the world, 
and they are subject to historical, cultural and social changes. “This forms are 
endlessly divergent and, yet, they are not without unified structure” (Cassirer 
1960, 144). Additionally, symbolic forms are meaningful final entities, because 
they are specified as energies of the spirit, where every meaning is tied to a 
concrete sensual sign and inheres this sign (Cassirer 2004a, 79).
Seeing mental expressions in symbolic forms enables Cassirer to point 
out our mental efforts. The three principle forms – myth, language and 
science – correspond to our three mental capacities – expression, represen-
tation and signif icance (Neumann 1973, 136). Though Cassirer shows in his 
phenomenology of the single forms that every form has its own movement 
and follows the steps of expression, representation and signif icance, in 
the end, we have to think of these three mental capacities as a plan of 
orientation, in which every symbolic form can be placed. These symbolic 
forms are not set at one point only, but rather have a distinct position in 
every historical phase to each of the three poles of expression, represen-
tation and signif icance (Cassirer 2004b, 262). On top of that, every form 
has an ideal relation to these three capacities. Myth, language and pure 
science are characterized as symbolic forms by their demonstration of one 
specif ic mental capacity. In each of them, the other capacities are almost 
repressed, so that there is talk of the ideal symbolic form of expression in 
myth, the ideal form of representation in language and the ideal form of 
signif icance in pure science. Other forms, like art, are hybrid forms, which 
cannot be reduced to one single mental capacity. Regarding art, expression 
and representation are mixed with one another (Cassirer 2004b, 267).
In order to examine the relation between a symbolic form and its corre-
sponding mental capacity, we first have to look at the relation between myth 
and expression. Myth is the generic reason giving rise to all other symbolic 
forms. In myth, things have an expressive character. They do not display 
the structure of an object-like thing (Dingstruktur). Therefore, perception 
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is formed by expression and the world is conceived as fluid, indifferent and 
emotional; things do not have a fixed character and there is a lack of concrete 
entities. Every expressive experience has an immediate meaning, which 
changes permanently and is not structured like things and properties (Dinge 
und Eigenschaften). It is a perception that is conceived prior to the dualistic 
division of body and mind. In order to get to know anything about this form of 
perception, which is unusual for us given that we live in a science dominated 
world, we have two possibilities: a subjective and an objective method. The 
subjective method consists in analysing psychiatric studies about the chil-
dren’s development; the objective method analyses the objective form myth.
The mythical world and the expressive character are only primary phe-
nomena. Certainly, its function is just as important as the function of other 
forms, but we have to ask ourselves how a world with f ixed characters – our 
own scientif ic world does not have the characteristics of a mythical one 
– can be developed in a world with a fluid and varying character. Cassirer 
f inds his solution in language, inasmuch as language has the capacity of 
representation and f ixing things. While one can describe the expressive 
characters of myth, the other cannot think of myth without a structure 
of representation and signif icance. In the end, we have to think of these 
mental capacities as being adhesive to each other, but entailed in symbolic 
forms, in which one capacity is much stronger than the others. Cassirer 
expresses this thought by using the term symbolic pregnance (symbolische 
Prägnanz). He defines symbolic pregnance as a form of perception, where 
a sensual experience has an intuitive meaning (anschaulicher Sinn) and 
brings it to an immediate and concrete signif icance. As a consequence, 
we always see everything as depending on the context. To illustrate this, 
Cassirer frequently mentions the example of a line, which is seen as a 
curve by a mathematician, as a periodic vibration by a physicist, and as an 
artistic ornament by painters. By understanding the expressive capacity, 
it is possible to understand the immediacy of this kind of understanding. 
But to understand context-dependency, we must regard the interaction of 
this capacity with representation and signif icance. Only then, we gain a 
bottom-up theory of symbolization, with which we can go on to def ine the 
difference between a human being and other animals.
Cultural-philosophical and natural-philosophical anthropology
The difference between man and animal is one of the most important themes 
in philosophical anthropology. When Cassirer discusses the phenomenon of 
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expression, he still f inds a point where it seems that the boundaries between 
the human being and an animal are obliterated. But at the point where he 
exhibits the difference between man and animal, he is only interested in 
the difference and not in the animal basis of human beings. According to 
him, cultural philosophy represents the only way of demonstrating this 
special conditio humana, because here, the human being can be shown 
as an active and free constructor who perceives the world. In contrast, 
Plessner does not have any problems with a biological or organic foundation 
of the human being when he comes up with the phenomenon of expression. 
He emphasizes that we share the immediate understanding of sense in 
expressions with animals, even if we do not know anything about the sense 
an animal might have or might understand, even though we can carry out 
experiments showing that this immediate understanding of sense is given 
to animals, too. That is why I call Plessner’s approach a natural-philosophical 
anthropology and Cassirer’s approach a cultural-philosophical anthropology. 
Certainly, Plessner’s anthropology also has a cultural-historical dimension, 
and we would be neglecting half of his theory if we just focused on the 
natural aspect. To get the whole dimension of the anthropological approach, 
it is relevant to clarify what is meant by natural philosophy. In order to 
emphasize the difference between Plessner’s and Cassirier’s concepts, the 
words “natural” and “cultural” seem most suitable to me.
Cassirer’s cultural-philosophical anthropology
Philosophical anthropology obtains an increasingly more fundamental role 
in Cassirer’s methodical approach. Philosophical anthropology was quite 
popular in the period Cassirer wrote his book and it became one of his 
goals to show the relation of his own cultural philosophy to philosophical 
anthropology. Philosophical anthropology provides the opportunity to re-
flect the symbolic forms (Hartung 2006, 239ff.). The human being becomes 
a vanishing f igure, because he is the last entity of a pluralistic world, of a 
world of varieties of forms. Moreover, by designating the human being as 
this last instance, Cassirer sets the vanishing point in the secular and not 
in a metaphysical sphere. While getting an insight into the basic framework 
(Grundstruktur) of the different activities of the construction of reality 
and understanding them as an organic whole, he formulates the task of a 
philosophy of the human being in An Essay on Man (Cassirer 1944, 68). In the 
manuscripts for the unpublished fourth volume of the Philosophy of sym-
bolic forms, Cassirer deals with the subject of philosophical anthropology 
as a severe contemporary philosophy. He basically focuses on Max Scheler’s 
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work Die Stellung des Menschen im Kosmos, but also mentions Plessner and 
writes with reference to him that the only way to f ind the essence of the 
human being is his own Philosophy of Symbolic Forms (Cassirer 1995, 36). 
From thereafter, he f inds a correlation between the results of Plessner’s 
critically founded natural philosophy and his own cultural philosophy, 
even though they came to these results in a different way (Cassirer 1995, 60).
According to Cassirer, cultural philosophy is the only possible way for a 
philosophical anthropology, as the conditio humana presents the difference 
to an animal life and cannot be annulled. The mental or spiritual world is 
categorically distinct from the organic one, so human symbolizing breaks the 
stimulus-reaction behavior of animals whereby the human being is excluded 
from the group of organic beings. Cassirer’s thesis that the human being 
becomes a human being by creating culture and using symbols looms large. 
In addition, philosophical anthropology has to explain the use of symbols 
and how it transforms the unmediated world of animals into a mediated 
world of human beings. His Philosophy of Symbolic Forms explains exactly 
this web of symbols, which is a step in between the web of perception and the 
web of effects. This web of symbols, analyzed by the philosophy of symbolic 
forms, is characteristic of the human being (Meuter 2006, 138f.). Philosophical 
anthropology has to point out the function of the human being as an entity; 
it has to show the universal dimension of the human being in the plurality of 
symbolic forms (Cassirer 1960, 144; Meuter 2006, 140). Compendious, Cassirer 
states symbolizing as the universal anthropological activity; in this sense, 
the human being is an “animal symbolicum” (Cassirer 1944, 26).
Thus, philosophical anthropology has a double function for Cassirer. On 
the one hand, his cultural philosophy culminates in questions of anthropol-
ogy, as there are questions about the difference between human beings and 
animals; and the big question, namely how we can describe the human being 
as a principle, as an organic whole. On the other hand, Cassirer’s cultural phi-
losophy can be seen as a method to f ind out the structure of every symbolic 
form and to compare the particular ones at the end. Engaging in philosophical 
anthropology in this way, however, means one remains faithful to the cultural 
side. Furthermore, it means seeing the difference between human beings 
and other animals in cultural functions; and by seeing the difference it is not 
necessary for Cassirer to look at the animal or biological side of human beings.
Plessner’s naturalistic foundation of philosophical anthropology
Referring to Cassirer’s Philosophy of Symbolic Forms, Plessner wrote in 
1963: “Cassirer knows that the human being is a living being, but he makes 
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no philosophical use of it” (GS VIII, 143). He criticizes Cassirer’s reduc-
tion of the functional signif ication (Funktionssinn) of the symbolic forms. 
Plessner misses the subject of action and form building. His philosophical 
anthropology is about the nature of the acting and symbolizing being, 
which is insinuated by the use of the proposition that the human being is 
a living being. His purpose is to explain human nature without the need 
for any naturalistic argument. The fact that the human being is a living 
being implies a double intertwinement of the natural and mental world 
(GS IV, 58). In this context, Cassirer’s cultural philosophy and anthropology 
represent a reduction of the human being to his mental capacities. Plessner’s 
intention is to comprehend human existence in the aspect of experience 
(Erfahrungsstelle), which entails ‘nature’ and ‘spirit.’
In The Levels of the Organic and Man, Plessner claims that a philosophy of 
nature, which is to be understood as hermeneutics of nature, offers a means 
to the end of making philosophical use of the fact that the human being is a 
living being. The pivotal question of this philosophy of nature is “What does 
being alive mean?” It seems that Plessner wants to place the cultural-mental 
sphere into an organic-natural sphere. Yet, at the beginning, hermeneutics 
of nature does not provide an explanation, which could be given by natural 
science but rather with an ordinary understanding of nature. In Levels, 
Plessner commences with the phenomenology of ordinary experience of 
double aspectivity (Doppelaspektivität), which means that things are seen 
as spatial things and likewise as things with a nuclear essence (kernhafte 
Mitte). The appearance in space and the external side of objects, cannot 
be developed from the inner essence. Conversely, their physicality cannot 
be deduced from the mental interior. Referring to the expression of double 
aspectivity, Plessner shows that dualism can’t be modif ied, neither by 
monism, nor by assuming a dialectic process. This expression also shows 
that dualism, or one of these two sides, as experiences show, should not be 
hypostatized. Every object appears by the means of the double aspectivity 
(Körper erscheinen kraft des Doppelaspekts), but living beings appear within 
the double aspectivity (Lebendiges erscheint im Doppelaspekt) (GS IV, 137f.; 
Beaufort 2000, 93).
This difference is explained by the special relation each thing has to its 
own boundary. ‘Boundary’ is def ined, in contrast to contour, as a barrier, 
which separates the interior from the exterior and vice versa. The boundary 
itself is part of the living thing and not only an intermediate between two 
things, because the boundary is also the link between interior and exterior; 
it is located, where the interior is expressed in the world. The living thing 
is not only bounded. It also has a connection to the world as well as an 
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interaction with it. In this context, a living being is transcendent beyond 
itself. Moreover, an organism that is positioned in space and, which has an 
independent relation to its surroundings (Umwelt) is given by the boundary. 
Furthermore, Plessner uses the term positionality for the circumstance 
that living things are placed by their boundary, have a relation to their 
surroundings and while also being limited by them. Things with a positional 
character do not only have a boundary; to some extent, the boundary has 
to be realized. The essential a priori feature (apriorisches Wesensmerkmal), 
which Plessner calls positionality, can be shown in demonstrative forms of 
motion and movement (GS IV, 157ff.; Beaufort 2000, 48f.).
Plessner shows three formal possibilities of relating to positionality, 
which together explain the characteristic differences among plants, animals 
and humans. First, there is a set of things that have positionality without 
having any relation to itself; these are plants. They have a relation to their 
environment, but they do not place themselves in this environment. They 
are dependent on their environment. In contrast, animals do possess a 
relation to their positionality. They live self-contained in their environment, 
which can be seen by their movement in space. Animals are ordered towards 
their centre (Mitte), centrically organized and thus have the form of centric 
positionality. Human beings, like animals, also have a relation to their 
positionality, but in addition, they are aware of their positionality.
The human being lives like an animal in and beyond his boundary, 
although he experiences this experience. It does not only have a boundary as 
a limitation and distance to its environment. The human being is also aware 
of the boundary as a difference of interior and exterior and as a bridge to 
transport inner to outer and vice versa. Having this knowledge, the human 
being does not only have a representation of his body (Körper) in form of a 
living body (Leib), but he can also focus on the body as a body and see the 
difference between a body and a living body. This new element of reflection 
makes the centric positionality of animals an eccentric positionality for 
humans. The human being does not focus on the centre, because he has the 
view of an outsider. His exterior view toward the centre is a view, which is 
not in the centre anymore, but it is a different approach from the centre by 
the human being himself. The two aspects, body and living body, (Körper 
and Leib), which go together in a centric form or positionality, are diverged 
by the awareness of such difference.
Because of the exterior view to oneself, the concepts of interior and 
exterior change completely. The human being does not live in just an 
environment; he lives in a world, whereby living in a world means having 
a grasp of things, not only of aspects and the immediacy and directness of 
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experience becomes mediated perception. The human being has to form 
things and himself, because the immediacy of the relation between animals 
and their world is lost. Culture and history are forms, which should take 
root in this unstable condition. Thence, the understanding of him and the 
world results from history. These forms and objectif ications in culture are 
creations, which can be seen as reactions to the loss of immediacy and 
directness and are a mode of handling a bizarre situation. Because of the 
eccentric position, the human being is placed in nothing (GS IV, 365). Where 
should a human being get his appropriateness from, when he cannot even 
f ind the centre point, which he is himself, due to the double aspectivity 
he has, when the world is open and indeterminate to him? The world he 
constructs in culture and history is a world of mediated immediateness 
(vermittelte Unmittelbarkeit), where the immediate nature is a mediate 
culture. Beside the external and internal world, the human being lives in 
a shared world (Mitwelt), a social world, which he forms with others and 
where he and others regard him as a person.
Conclusion
The human being is seen as distinct to animals; both authors refer to Kleist’s 
Marionette Theatre, to illustrate the consequences of being a human being. 
After Kleist’s marionette has discovered that he is a marionette, he cannot 
remain the same anymore. The same applies to the human being. A human 
being can no longer live in an immediate world as soon as his world is sym-
bolically mediated, i.e. as soon as he has learned about his own positionality. 
In return, Cassirer focuses only on the cultural side. After a break of the 
immediacy of organic-nature, cultural forming is regarded as what makes 
the difference and thus becomes the subject of examination. Cassirer sees 
nature as mediated by symbolic forms, so that coming up with organic 
nature, cannot be an option for him. He works out a formal determination 
of the human being without any reference to biological structures and gains 
the general rule of symbol building from the fact of culture. In contrast, 
Plessner crosses nature and culture in a human being and, with the idea 
of double aspectivity, obtains a concept, which embraces the ambiguity 
of a human being as an entity composed of physical body (Körper), lived 
body (Leib) and spirit (Geist). He features the possibility of reflexivity in 
a concept of the living and thus locates the break with immediacy in the 
concept of life without deriving it from biology (i.e. without naturalistic 
argumentation). He can explain the special mental and spiritual state in 
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a formal stage of life, so that he gives culture a foundation, although he 
only has an undifferentiated view of the cultural phenomena and their 
differentiated functions. In this case, it is Cassirer who announces the 
different functions of culture. Of course, Plessner has an historical-cultural 
argumentation, too, but Cassirer shows how we can f ind a framework of 
the human being by analyzing culture. In contrast to Plessner, Cassirer fails 
to see man as a living being. All in all, Plessner and Cassirer use different 
ways to formulate answers to the same question, namely what it means to 
be a human being, without having to reduce it to purely culturalistic or 
naturalistic arguments.
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11 Bi-Directional Boundaries
Eccentric Life and Its Environments
Robert Mugerauer
Organism-environment dynamics
Current research and reassessments of natural and social phenomena using 
complexity theory, self-organization, phenomenology, enactivist approaches 
to cognition, and developmental systems theory are making advances be-
yond dualisms and reductive neo-Darwinism by developing “a middle way” 
to understand the co-generative dynamics between organisms and environ-
ment (Lewontin 1995). There is direct continuity between Plessner’s ideas 
and many of these contemporary interpretations of organism-environment 
relationships at the level of life itself, and in cultural manifestations such 
as architecture. Indeed, much of this work was pioneered by Plessner, who 
did not shy away from the big question of “what it means to be alive” (Grene 
1968, 65). Our understanding today can be deepened by recovering and 
applying his theory of organic modals, which deals with the characteristics 
or qualities of life, especially his insights in The Levels of the Organic and 
Man [Die Stufen des Organischen und der Mensch, 1928] concerning eccentric 
positionality (which replaces old dualisms with a dynamic view of the 
sustained tensions of human existence) (GS IV).
We take for granted not only that our environments influence us, but 
that we shape – or even create – our environments. But taking common 
ideas for granted does not mean we understand what they mean, espe-
cially with regards to their underlying assumptions and implications. To 
investigate organism ↔ environment dynamics, tracing the continuity 
from organisms to humans in order to better understand what is shared as 
well as our distinct characteristics, there are many phenomena well worth 
considering, amongst others: plasticity, porosity, developmental processes, 
self-regulation, niche selection and construction, the co-constitution and 
co-evolution of organisms and their environments (Grene 1968, 9, 33). Here, 
I focus on one such phenomenal motif, namely boundaries.
Boundaries are certainly important across the entire range of organic 
and human domains, as is apparent from analogies commonly used by the 
natural and human sciences as well as by built environment disciplines 
and professions:
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membrane:: skin:: wall
cell:: body:: house or city
Taken at face value, these analogies are at best misleading, and at worst 
straight out dangerous. Thus, it is essential to examine each pair as well as 
the entire set if we are to better understand life. As a general, but not insistent 
tactic, I f irst review the f indings of current scientif ic and phenomenological 
theory and research. I then include the formulation of the situation by 
Maturana and Varela, because they are exceptionally clear and among the 
most fruitful heirs to Plessner and Merleau-Ponty (and other philosophical 
anthropologists). Finally, I bring forward Plessner’s Promethean ideas, both 
to document the lineage and to further illuminate the subject matter as it 
stands today. The result demonstrates that, to an astonishing extent, the 
views of contemporary scientists (unaware of Plessner’s ideas) as well as 
more informed phenomenologists (such as Maturana and Varela) coincide 
with the main outlook of Plessner.
Boundaries: Membrane and cell
First of all, membranes generated from hydrophobic lipids allow the basic 
differentiation of material from the bio-chemical environment and the 
collection of chemicals and fluids that can develop in a unique manner, 
establishing the fundamental energy transfers that constitute an organism’s 
metabolism (Morowitz 1992). Here, with the beginning of life as unicellular 
organisms, we f ind the emergence of a unity that has an identity – the cell; 
but, crucially, this identity is formed insofar as there is both a selectively 
permeable membrane (boundary) and porosity (allowing a dynamic ex-
change with the surrounding milieu) (Niehoff 2005).
The plasma membranes of a cell designate the outer boundary of the 
system and distinguish between the ‘inside’ and ‘outside’ of the system. 
[This is] a property of compartmentalization that allows a concentration 
of chemicals (inside) for biochemical reactions. […] Once a space has been 
enclosed, then communication across the boundary becomes essential, 
both for transportation of nutrients and wastes and for cellular responses 
to the external environment. [As selectively permeable, membranes 
have a] more complex function than just establishing boundaries (for 
example, in trans-membrane transport and signalling) (Morowitz 1992, 
Yeagle 1992).
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Some of the more complex transfers across boundaries include the following:
– Bacteria trade genes in a casual and quick manner (a mode of gene 
acquisition): strands of DNA may be traded in plasmids or as viruses. 
In some bacteria a cell bridge forms between the one donating its genes 
and the other one receiving them (Margulis and Sagan 1995, 93-96).
– Cells merge into composite beings: in endosymbiosis one being lives 
inside another; here organic beings merge and produce new individuals 
(Margulis and Sagan 1995, 120-121).
– Cells grow: “How the state of one region [in time and space] depends 
on the state of neighboring regions def ine[s] a f ield, the behavior of a 
dynamic system that is extended in space. Here, the cytoplasm can be 
regarded as an elastic skin, kept under tension (stretched) by the osmotic 
pressure pushing on the cell wall, against which the cytoplasm is closely 
apposed. […] This process is like a traveling wave that rises and falls 
with an irregular periodicity. […] [T]his is called a moving boundary 
[phenomenon], described by a category of f ield equations in which the 
boundary of the f ield moves as the result of patterned growth, as in a 
growing crystal, or, in our case, a growing cell” (Doyle 1997, 96, 104).
In the nowadays referred to as ‘classic’ characterization by Maturana and 
Varela (1980) and colleagues, life occurs “where the biochemical closure 
of membrane constitution and metabolic repair make the cell a viable 
self-distinguishing autopoietic unit,” with “the ability for self-organization 
and self-maintenance (e.g. metabolism) and the generation of relationships 
with neighboring elements” (Varela and Bourgine 1992, 170-171).
The basic life processes […] are the result of an organized complex 
system of molecular interactions that occur within and also produce 
the system’s physical boundary structure. [Thus autopoiesis] is the 
organizational pattern of life processes, including the notion of dynamic 
compartmentalization – that is, that an inside space is made different 
from an outside space by virtue of a closed, spherical cell-like boundary 
that is itself a product of those life processes (Fleischaker, Colonna, and 
Luisi 1994, xii).
Maturana and Varela describe the double dynamic of life (centripetal 
and centrifugal) in terms of a) organizational stability and b) structural 
coupling (where each is dependent on the other). Every living system is a 
composite unity that exists in at least these two non-intersecting domains: 
the organizational domain where it interacts as a unity and the structural 
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domain of the operation of components (Maturana 1980). Note the technical 
connotations of the terms:
– Organization: the autonomous cell is a self-contained unity, where the 
relation among components remains invariant (necessary for a composite 
unity if it is not to change its class of entity – e.g. for a table, legs support-
ing a flat surface) (Maturana 1980, 45, 48).
– Complementarily, the structure is the ensemble of actual components 
and the relations among them that realize something as a concrete entity 
in space, e.g. the particular oak legs and grained board of a table. Here the 
“organizational closure does not imply interactional closure or isolation 
from the environment”; the point is that “such interaction also continues 
the ongoing processes of autopoiesis” (Maturana 1980, 48; Mingers 1995, 
206).
Thus, “these two aspects form part of a circular, self-sustaining process. The 
result of organizational closure is autonomy – the organization demarcates 
itself from its environment [by constantly specifying its boundaries in the 
space in which they exist] and, through its own self-referential process, 
maintains itself” while being structurally open in physical space to operate 
with regards to materiality and energy (Mingers 1995, 206). Here, I will not 
treat Plessner’s position on cellular life, but only point out that, as we know 
from the preface and afterword to the second edition of Levels, he felt his 
ideas concerning “the way an organism bounds itself” (Begrenzung) were 
confirmed by then-current research as to how the cellular “entity is enclosed 
in a semi-permeable membrane.” As it turns out, his views are even more 
substantiated in light of today’s research f indings (GS IV, 30-32, 434-438; 
Grene 1968, 74-75).
Boundaries: Skin and body
The f irst order autopoietic whole (cell) is the simple unity from which 
emerges the possibility of second order composite unities, such as a multi-
cellular organism with specialized organ tissues. As autopoietic phenomena, 
animals and persons are understood as integrated multi-cellular systems 
of elements (Maturana and Varela 1980). Plessner’s view of an organism as 
“an organized body which has as parts the organs which in their totality it 
is” certainly seems to already articulate the position developed some sixty 
years later, which holds that the self-organization that characterizes life at 
the level of organisms is such that the autocatalytic loops through which the 
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organism maintains its integrity (continually producing itself in the course 
of its life) simultaneously result from and define the constituent organs, 
tissues, and systems (GS IV, 155, 181-182; Grene 1968, 94).
The site of the distinctive identity and growth that we discern in em-
bodied organisms such as mammals most dramatically coincides with 
and is marked by the skin, which encompasses the entirety of our body 
(Oyama 2000, Keller 2001). The skin that bounds the body articulates 
the individuality of the organism as it moves and behaves in space and 
simultaneously serves as the point of exchange between the self-regulating 
internal systems and the external environment upon which the organism 
depends (Cavalier-Smith 2005). Note that here, identity does not amount to 
an “inside” operating in terms of an “in/out” dualism as it does in the modern 
model of the body-person, where the skin is taken as the boundary separat-
ing the self-inside and environment-outside. A case in point would be the 
Paris School’s reinterpretation of the immune system as homeostatic. This 
new approach challenges the dominant model in which the immune system 
is taken to operate from inside by detecting and subsequently destroying 
foreign agents from outside. Instead, the autopoietic conception shifts to 
seeing it as a distributed system maintaining organizational stability during 
perturbations (Tauber 1994).
Insofar as the skin of an animal or person is that organism’s boundary, 
the demarcation of an individual helps “contain” conditions by maintaining 
internal processes, and as selectively permeable it allows environmental 
responses (e.g. sweating as part of thermal self-regulation), similar to how 
a cell’s membrane functions. But in contrast to the cellular level, on the 
organismal level, the whole organism is interacting with the world. The 
skin, though important, is only one aspect of the body. Still, it does manifest 
features of the organism’s modes of situatedness and life. The skin certainly 
is more than the outer boundary of the body: it is a means of the organism’s 
interaction with the community of life beyond the individual. Portmann 
has clarif ied, for example, how the patterns on animals’ skins are “for the 
other[s].” “The highest expression of individuals, i.e. the possibility of mani-
festing their internal condition, is of use in helping them f ind one another. 
Only the most outstanding organic forms, which reach the highest measure 
of individuality, have been endowed with the ability to break the ban of 
isolation so as to possess that common life which rests on a rich inwardness 
and on preformed organs of mutual recognition” (Portmann 1967, 196).
Furthermore, what Plessner says about positionality and display helps 
us to see that the skin is a dimension of the animal that helps it, as a living 
thing, “take its place” such that – to comprehend the whole phenomenon 
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it “arises in its environment, is dependent on it, and yet opposes itself to it.” 
Indeed, in its frontality, the animal confronts the world; it does not merely 
take a place, it can be said to take a “stand” (Grene 1968, 100).
The skin and fur, then, are means for an organism to display or camou-
flage itself. The lack of pattern on a human’s outer surface would seem to 
indicate a signif icant difference. However, we tattoo our skins, aff irming 
through the process and the image that we belong to a given community 
or displaying a chosen aesthetic. Makeup, clothes, and jewels, Luce Irigaray 
argues, are the artif ices through which woman, so long deprived of a place 
of her own, constitutes her own envelope in order to situate herself (Irigaray 
1993, 11, 35). While these behaviors do exhibit a trajectory of having some 
continuity with animal life, the difference to animal behavior is substantial. 
By modifying our skin, our bodily consciousness is already reflexive. Clearly, 
here we see our bodily consciousness as already reflexive. As Husserl and 
then Merleau-Ponty put it, this is the
circle of the touched and touching: […] [my] initiation to and the opening 
upon a tactile world can happen only if my hand, while it is felt from within, 
is also accessible from without, itself tangible, for my other hand; [only] 
through this crisscrossing within it of the touching and the tangible, [that 
occurs as] a veritable touching of the touch, when my right hand touches 
my left hand while it is palpating the things, where the ‘touching subject’ 
passes over to the rank of the touched (Merleau-Ponty 2003, 133-134, 143).
As Grene so clearly explicates, in Plessner’s view: “life […] sets itself to itself 
as its own.” Our “double-aspect character” is not a matter of an inner/outer 
duality, but rather, “the body [is], through its relation to its boundary, both 
directed out beyond the body that it is and back into it again” (GS IV, 418; 
Grene 1968, 78).
Human self-perception is a mode of engagement with the world where 
we are aware that and how we appear to organisms outside ourselves. We 
consequently modify our appearance in response to that exterior realm 
in an intentional attempt to elicit a certain exchange or outcome from a 
set of somewhat predictable alternatives. Our attempts to manipulate the 
phenomality of the skin demonstrate that the body is the site and means 
of self-knowledge and intended performance, but more precisely, that the 
distinctive human capacity is the ability to reach beyond the centripetal 
realm of processes inside our skins. Rather, as persons, we transact with 
the world to which we reach out beyond our self-containment and then 
return, able to modify and continue the co-constitution of ourselves and 
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our environments. For Plessner, human “life has its natural place, as all 
animal existence has, yet is at the very same time detached from locality, 
is everywhere and nowhere” (GS IV, 365-366; Grene 1968, 104).
As whole organisms, we are situated in the world via our mode of embodi-
ment. Our centred life is directionally differentiated and thus valenced, 
providing a “non-arbitrary” orientation: with our upright posture, our heads 
are “up” and feet “down”; our faces, stomachs and genitals are “front” while 
our backs are “back.” Architect Juhani Pallasmaa emphasizes how “we 
touch, listen, and measure the world with our entire bodily existence and 
the experiential world becomes organized and articulated around the 
center of the body” by emphasizing haptic memory – how the body learns 
and remembers through the active involvement of muscles and bones. He 
reminds us that “as we open a door, body weight meets the weight of the 
door, legs measure the step as we ascend a stair, a hand strokes the handrail 
and the entire body moves diagonally and dramatically through space” as 
we stride through arcades and across the squares in the dense and complex 
experience afforded by cities. He also argues that “[t]he percept of the body 
and the image of the world turn into one single continuous existential 
experience – there is no body separate from its domicile in space, and 
there is no space unrelated to the unconscious image of the perceived self” 
(Pallasmaa 2005, 26-27, 44-45).
It is crucial to note here that this position is part of a larger movement to 
reaffirm the importance of the organism, in opposition to the long-dominant 
traditions which a) reduce away the organism with a one-sided over-emphasis 
on the gene at the micro-scale or on entire populations at the mega-scale, or b) 
see the organism as determined by interior drives or genetic “information, or 
as deterministically driven by “given” external environments. As Plessner and 
other philosophical anthropologists contend, prior to their being phenomena 
such as “adaptation” or “survival,” “there f irst must be an organism […] as-
sessed in its own right, by its own appropriate norm” (Grene 1968, 61). It is 
the whole organism that acts in the world and that provides the context for 
its constitutive dimensions. It is the whole organism – in its centricity – that 
provides the context for its constitutive internal dimensions, that interacts 
with what is external in a manner such that the organism and its environment 
are co-constituted and co-evolving (Lewontin 1995; Grene 1968, 89).
Maturana and Varela explore the reciprocal structural coupling that 
occurs between humans as organisms and our environments in terms 
of the body as the site where perception and cognition arise such that 
consciousness and language already involve being “out in the world” beyond 
the confines of our bodies.
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In an organism with a nervous system rich and vast as that of human 
beings, its realms of interaction open the way to new phenomena by 
allowing new dimensions of structural coupling. In humans this makes 
for language and self-consciousness. [In this third order social coupling,] 
what is peculiar to human beings in that, in their linguistic coordina-
tion of actions, they give rise to a new phenomenal domain. […] This 
comes about through the co-ontogenetic coordination of their actions 
(Maturana and Varela 1998, 176, 209).
More broadly, the continuing demonstrations that humans operate in 
the world as embodied consciousnesses, capable of cycles of reflexivity, 
self-recognition, artif ice, and directionality toward multiple possibilities 
both confirm and are illuminated by Plessner’s explication of positionality. 
This holds specif ically for the dynamics between two “directionalities,” the 
centric and eccentric, in which the human position is to stand both within 
our own perspective and at the same time outside of it (Landmann 1974).
Boundaries: Walls, house, and city
As humans, we all partake in the sphere of social life and artif ice. To an 
extent, all organisms are constituted by social relations. Yet, the position of 
higher vertebrates and certainly that of humans in our historical-linguistic 
communities means that we are individuals and at the same time members 
of groups that operate with some high degree of coherence in or across 
spatio-temporal milieu such as buildings, neighbourhoods, cities, and na-
tions (Margulis and Sagan 1995; Varela, Thompson, and Rosch 1991).
While it is well documented that animals do probe and manipulate their 
environments and both provide and benefit from learning opportunities, 
we are faced with the question of the continuity and difference of these phe-
nomena among humans (Sterelny 2001). Of course, we have not only created a 
world with language and symbols, but also with material things: equipment, 
art works, and everything else that we design and build. Plessner powerfully 
explains our “natural artif iciality,” wherein we “must make ourselves into 
what we already are” and elaborates how our existence is “contrived” to be 
achieved by way of non-natural things that “must be ‘real’ in order to satisfy 
our needs” (GS IV, 382; Grene 1968, 109-110). This emphasizes the importance of 
buildings and cities, and our civilized environment in general. With regards to 
understanding our built environments and ourselves by way of the concept of 
external phenotype, as DeLanda puts it, we can shift from an individual’s en-
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doskeleton to “the urban exoskeleton, in which bricks are turned into homes, 
monuments, and walls; however we also need to be cautious about comparing 
organisms and cities, especially insofar as “organic” often is taken to mean “in 
balance or stasis” whereas both need to be considered “as different dynamical 
systems operating far from equilibrium” – which is especially crucial in the 
case of cities because the latter seldom are in equilibrium, given the flows of 
matter, energy, money that pass into them” (DeLanda 1997, 27-28, 104).
Insofar as we consider the analogy with our bodies and skins, the wall seems 
to border the house and act as an intermediary between inside and outside. 
But, there are substantial caveats that need to be heeded in light of the fact that 
human skin is only an aspect of our whole embodied consciousness bringing 
forth a non-dualistic world. Parallel to that, walls are only a dimension of 
buildings which themselves are artif ices enabling us to continue the project 
of actualizing ourselves. For example, the house embodies a bi-dimensionality 
manifest in the ambiguity between the individual person and social group. 
Beyond the common notion of the “house as one’s castle” and the old archi-
tectural idea of house as a combination of both refuge and prospect, there are 
the hermeneutics of the house with regards to personal identity as relational, 
i.e. as a mode of belonging to community and of the house as the archetypical 
location of the family, both nuclear and extended (Cooper-Marcus 1995). Thus, 
walls indeed mediate inside and outside, not as part of any dualism but as a 
means of enabling the dynamic trajectory of ourselves as whole social beings.
Phenomenologists describe and analyze our houses and other buildings 
in terms that clearly correlate with, and yield even deeper meanings when 
interpreted using Plessner’s insights. The best approach would be to consider 
these descriptions (already sophisticated beyond ordinary observations) 
and explicitly apply Plessner’s ideas here in order to expose any dramatical 
insights we can gather from this process. However, given the limiting scope 
of this essay, let us keep in mind Plessner’s ideas of centric and eccentric 
positionality and artif ice as we go along, let us merely focus on the deeper 
resonance they can add to the primary phenomenological descriptions. I 
will concentrate on examples from architectural morphology, i.e. a descrip-
tion and analysis of built forms as spatial boundaries.
There are certain aspects where walls are similar to bi-directional cellular 
membranes and the skin, for example, by how they manifest boundaries 
that distinguish inside and outside: “Walls have multiple ways to bring forth 
a world: massive, opaque walls or even a ‘heavy and short skeleton system’ 
have a closed character, in contrast to the contemporary skeleton wall’s 
openness, facilitated through the use of glass: “In the clear glass wall, inside 
and outside seem to merge. […] Transparency and mirror-effect, therefore, 
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unite inside and outside like projections on a screen. […] The wall face and 
window face are seen as the boundaries of two different spaces. The wall 
face is the boundary towards the exterior and is perceived as the outer shell 
of the house. The window face, on the other hand, is a boundary relating 
to the interior, because through the window we glimpse the interior’s own 
life, which is held in check by the membrane of the window” – thus four 
choices for the location for the window face give highly different strengths 
of interior/exterior relationship” (Thiis-Evensen 1987, 189-191, 211).
Of course, the wall is no more impenetrable than are membrane and skin, 
though the openings facilitating connections are much more phenomenally 
obvious in/as thresholds and doors, entryways, windows, or other mediating 
elements. For example, (using a University of Oslo building as his example, 
Thiis-Evensen describes how “round and square columns differ in the 
relation between inside and outside – whereas the square columns and 
pilasters are seen as part of the delimiting wall, the round columns are 
intermediaries between inside and outside. One passes easily around and 
past them. They form the actual transfer point for the continuous flow of 
people moving freely between the fore-court and the great staircases” (1987, 
291, cf. 283-297). In the example of the floor attached to the walls, we can 
ask: “What importance, then, does the f irmly attached floor have in the 
insider-outside relationship?” It emphasizes security, as a “f loor marks a 
center, a f irmly anchored interior.” However, “at other times the emphasis 
is on the similarity between inside and outside, thus eliminating the differ-
ence between the interior f loor and nature’s f loor” as made clear in Frank 
Lloyd Wright’s Falling Water and the floor of a Gothic cathedral (1987, 53).
Even among the most basic forms of buildings, such as a house or dwell-
ing, we can already f ind the multi-directionality that characterizes the 
human mode of existence. Here, we can go on to appreciate (for all their 
continuity) the gulf that lies between the Umwelt or immediate surround-
ings of the individual organism as Von Uexküll masterfully sketched it out 
and “world” (Welt) in the full sense of what humans bring forth together 
(Heidegger); in Plessner’s terms our world consists not only of outer and 
inner realms, but in a “shared world” (GS IV, 369, 379; Grene 1968, 109). The 
“house both opens up to the surrounding world and is a retreat from it; 
because life in a house is a shared life, withdrawal does not mean isolation 
but the intimate meeting of private dwelling” (Norberg-Schulz 1985, 89).
Obviously, the issue of ‘human positionality not only deals with a merely 
physical proximity in space, but with the phenomena of dwelling, which 
again enacts both trajectories. Norberg-Schulz, an astute reader of Heidegger, 
explicates the novel of the Norwegian writer Vesaas, whose character Knut 
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“describes [his] place as something permanent […]. The place unites a group 
of human beings, it is something which gives them a common identity and 
hence a basis for fellowship or society” (Norberg-Schulz, 1985, 9). Note, the 
challenge of dwelling, including the emphasis on co-constituted belonging, 
remains in the midst of a perpetual dynamics. On the one hand, Vesaas’s 
character Knut’s
faithful heart […] needs a f ixed spot to return to, it wants its square 
house[, because] there exists an interdependence between the house and 
environment. […] To settle in the landscape means to delimit an area, a 
place. We stop our wandering and say: “Here!” Then we create an “inside” 
within the encompassing “outside.” The settlement is therefore a point 
of arrival – thus settlement is a center. Yet though settled, humans also 
are wanderers: This dialectic of departure and return, of path and goal, 
is the essence of that existential ‘spatiality’ which is set into work by 
architecture (Vesaas, 1971, translated by Norberg-Schulz 1985, 12-13, 31).
Buildings as well as people, DeLanda reminds us, “exist in collectivities of 
similar assemblages,” so that houses, for example, “form larger assemblages 
such as residential neighborhoods” (DeLanda 2006, 99). Maturana and 
Varela explain the spatial and social parameters within which distinct 
groups emerge: “The living system, at every level, is organized to gener-
ate internal regularities. The same occurs in the social coupling through 
language in the network of conversations which language generates and 
which, through their closure, constitute the unity of a particular human 
society” (Maturana and Varela 1998, 232).
At base, small social groups couple “their biological and cultural tradi-
tion.” Since “the common biological heritage is the basis for the world that 
we human beings bring forth together through congruent distinctions, 
[…] this common biological heritage allows a divergence of cultural worlds 
brought forth through situations of what can become widely different cul-
tural traditions” (Maturana and Varela 1998, 243-244). As Scheler pointed 
out, the realization of values depends on the diversity of local historical 
life-worlds, in which our embodied enactions and buildings bring forth 
existential modes of openness and a plurality of distinctive worlds with 
regions of identity within each of them (Scheler 1973).
This social-linguistic region, since it often has been characterized by 
a shared dialect and customs, and normally is situated adjacent to, but 
distinct from, the next unit, is properly understood as a neighbourhood 
(or quarter, district) (DeLanda 1997, 2006). Of course, Heidegger famously 
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interpreted “building” in terms of dwelling in the sense of the way we live 
together with those who are nearest, our neighbours (1971, 146-147). Like the 
cell and the bounded body, the neighbourhood would be a coherent place 
where and by means of which identity is especially enacted, and the site of 
the dynamic exchange with the surrounding milieu of other neighborhoods 
and the more distant realms (Odling-Smee, Laland, and Feldman 2003). That 
neighborhoods rarely ever have walls is not evidence of a lacking boundary, 
as is clear to any teenage gang member who knows that to enter the turf of 
a competing gang by so much as crossing the invisible line running down 
a street can be risking serious harm or even death.
Even a counterinterpretation such as that of Deleuze and Guattari, which 
essentially disputes the holism of much of phenomenology and philosophi-
cal anthropology, still emphasizes the importance of spatial boundaries 
within the realm of the neighbourhood: “The concept of territorialization 
must f irst of all be understood literally. Face-to-face conversations always 
occur in a particular place (a street corner, a pub, a church), and once the 
participants have ratif ied one another a conversation acquires well-defined 
spatial boundaries. Similarly, many interpersonal networks def ine com-
munities inhabiting spatial territories, whether ethnic neighborhoods or 
small towns, with well-def ined borders. Organizations, in turn, usually 
operate in particular buildings, and the jurisdiction of their legitimate 
authority usually coincides with the physical boundaries of those buildings” 
(DeLanda 2006, 13).
In the complete historical life-world of the space-time dimension of 
neighborhoods and communities, we f ind ourselves beyond the life of an 
individually embodied person. Spatially, it is in the settlement that we most 
clearly enact our social life, both in the streets and in public buildings, which 
partially generate the gestalt of the city and its skyline: our historically more 
monumental public buildings “rise out of the mass of houses” and therefore 
offer promise when seen from afar (Norberg-Schulz 1985, 63). Here, “the 
continuous boundaries” of the city constitute urban space and its distinctive 
f igural quality, one which greets us and holds out the promise of greater 
social possibilities; with regards to temporal extension and continuity, 
“interpersonal networks vary in duration: dispersed friendship networks 
do not endure longer than the persons that compose them, but tightly knit 
networks of neighbours living in proximity yield communities that survive 
the death of their parts [through] the overlap of successive generations” 
(DeLanda 2006, 42-44, 57-58).
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Of course, “meeting does not necessarily imply agreement; primarily it 
means that human beings come together in their diversities. Urban space, 
thus, is a place of diversity” (Norberg-Schulz 1985, 13).
Interpersonal networks are subject to a variety of centripetal and 
centrifugal forces that are the main forces of territorialization and deter-
ritorialization. Among the former the most important is the existence of 
conflict between different communities. Conflict has the effect of exag-
gerating the distinction between ‘us’ and ‘them,’ that is, it sharpens the 
boundaries between insiders and outsiders – hence the danger of solidar-
ity in time of conflict since it tends to social exclusion and homogeneity. 
[Stories] rigidify the identities of the conflicting parties, the narratives 
being part of a process of group boundary construction. In the case of 
ethnic communities, for instance, the enforcement of identity stories 
and categories occurs chiefly at the boundary. […] In the terminology of 
assemblage theory, stories of conflict (and the categories for insiders and 
outsiders associated with them) serve to code and consolidate the effects 
of territorialization on interpersonal networks (DeLanda 2006, 59, cf. 66).
Maturana and Varela share this perspective that differences are inevitable, 
but go on to examine its consequence (which either would be rigorously 
consistent or perhaps ironic), that we might f ind the only possible resolution 
through that same dynamic: “the only possibility for coexistence is to opt 
for a broader perspective, a domain of existence in which both parties f it 
in the bringing forth of a common world. […] A conflict can go away only if 
we move to another domain where coexistence takes place” (Maturana and 
Varela 1998, 24). Norberg-Schulz’s phenomenological reading offers perhaps 
the best positive assessment of our situation: “When we have a world, we 
dwell, in the sense of gaining an individual identity within a complex and of-
ten contradictory fellowship. Both aspects are important: fellowship means 
sharing in spite of diversity, identity means not to succumb to uniformity” 
(Norberg-Schulz 1985, 51). Here, if there were space at all, it would be fruitful 
to bring to light Plessner’s treatment of the tension between community 
and society as two of the basic modalities of life (Plessner 1999) – again a 
new and promising area of research unfolds itself to us.
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Boundaries: Borders and nations
The extension of our analogy from buildings and cities to nations can be 
treated more briefly because in this case, the analogies most completely 
break down, and when are not seen to do so, become the most dangerous. 
I would argue that both extremes – attempting to understand nations as 
encapsulated organisms (as it has been viewed by the ancients philosophers 
all the way to Kant and Hegel) and in terms of arbitrary assemblages (as it 
has been viewed by poststructuralism) – are the most problematic, which 
should also caution us against becoming too comfortable with extending 
what philosophical anthropology develops as a “middle way” (Mugerauer 
2009).
Ethics and politics, the sphere of our activities that deals with the well 
being of humans, animals, and the ecology, unfortunately provides us with 
the least reliable understanding. All too often, what we have learned to be 
true about individuals and communities no longer holds in the political-
national sphere. This includes our growing appreciation for biologically 
driven cooperation concerning the dynamic co-constitution of ways of life 
and local environments across the arc of life; from cells (with membranes) 
to organisms (with skin) to persons (with their built environments such 
as houses and neighborhoods). What is publicized as “natural political-
spatial wholes” are often forcefully “unified” and enforced by highly policed 
borders; as intentional social creations nations are anything but autopoietic. 
In the ethical-political sphere, the reduction of the living to the gene-centric 
or to undifferentiated populations to be managed has disturbing echoes 
of earlier attempts of social engineering and eugenics (Mugerauer 2010).
The social-linguistic realm described by Maturana and Varela, in which 
structural coupling brings together members of specif ic historical com-
munities and creates a distinguishing label from other groups, involves 
more than the physical-social boundaries of neighborhoods, settlements, 
and nations. In terms of general systems theory, this third order social 
domain also exhibits internal organizational stability, which is generated 
and maintained by yet another, complementary sort of boundary. Niklas 
Luhmann analyzes this latter self-organization and self-reference in terms 
of autonomous “social systems” – which he uses in a specif ic technical 
sense to refer strictly to communication systems (Maturana and Varela 
1995, 408-412). “Social systems use communication as their particular mode 
of reproduction. Their elements are communications that are recursively 
produced by a network of communications and that cannot exist outside 
of such a network. […] Whatever they use as identities and as differences 
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is of their own making” (Maturana and Varela 1990, 3). Social systems in 
this sense operate within the environment of the natural sphere and hu-
man consciousness, but are organizationally closed and distinct unities 
of information, utterance, and understanding (Luhmann 1995, 28-31). 
According to Luhmann, these self-organized systems are autonomous 
because each one of them differentiates itself from the rest by specifying 
its own boundaries and selecting what counts as communication: “Society 
is a system with boundaries. These boundaries are constituted by society 
itself. They separate communication from all noncommunicative events and 
states of affairs, and thus cannot be f ixed as territories or groups of persons. 
Insofar as this principle of self-constituting boundaries becomes clear, 
society distinguishes itself” (Luhmann 1995, 410). “A social system can never 
use operations outside its own boundaries. The boundaries themselves, 
however, are components of the system and cannot be taken as given by a 
preconstituted world” (Luhmann 1990, 7).
Furthermore, specif ic sub-systems (law, economy, science, religion), 
each with its own code and internally determined rules of selection, are 
autonomous by comparison to each other. For example, the legal communi-
cation system itself selects what is included within or excluded from it, the 
protocols and limits of what can be communicated in the system. As they 
continue this self-reference, generating successive recursive communica-
tive events from what historically has occurred, these systems maintain 
themselves as self-organizing: “In this sense boundary maintenance is 
system maintenance” (Luhmann 1990, 5; 1995, 17).
While from the viewpoint of the subsystems, the local interactions 
among information-utterance-understanding appear to be a closed net-
work, they are in fact open with regards to the structural coupling that 
requires humans for utterance and information may refer to the environ-
ment. From a meta-perspective, these social systems of communication 
reconnect with what Maturana calls “natural social systems” (families and 
political parties) (Maturana 1980). Here, as Plessner points out when analyz-
ing society (Gesellschaft), in the public sphere not only the relationships 
among nation-states but also the subordinate spheres of value (economy, 
law, education, etc.) need formal coordination, which is achieved through 
the “art of transaction,” that is, diplomacy and not merely the tact that is 
useful in everyday life (Plessner 1999, 149-170).
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Conclusion
As Merleau-Ponty argued, the human body certainly has a complex and phe-
nomenal interiority, while also being in constant interaction with its external 
environment, in a circularity marked by chiasm and coupling of our flesh with 
the flesh of the world, a circuit in which the human body is understood finally 
as open and transformable (Merleau-Ponty 2003). His vision of our “active 
manner of being” in a world with “a topography unfolding by differentiation,” 
“which [yet] holds together” in a sensible field is empirically supported by 
current research on organic growth in terms of dynamic boundaries (Rayner, 
1997). As Maturana and Varela explain: “What biology shows us is that the 
uniqueness of being human lies exclusively in a social structural coupling that 
occurs through languaging, generating a) the regularities proper to the human 
social dynamics, for example, individual identity and self-consciousness, and 
b) the recursive social human dynamics that entails a reflection enabling us 
to see that as human beings we have only the world which we create with 
others – whether we like them or not. […] Indeed, the whole mechanism of 
generating ourselves as describers and observers tells us that our world, as 
the world which we bring forth in our coexistence with others, will always 
have precisely that mixture of regularity and mutability, that combination 
of solidity and shifting sand, so typical of human experience when we look 
at it up close” (Maturana and Varela 1998, 246, 241).
Our generated human positionality and artif ice are means through 
which we enter and explore what can be called “the open,” as with Plessner’s 
“open positional f ield” (setting aside confusions that arise from Plessner’s 
differing use of “open” and “closed” with regards to both forms of position-
ality and of positional f ields) – a realm of undetermined possibility and 
freedom that houses, beckons, and characterizes human life (GS IV, 252; 
Grene 1968, 97-98). Our boundaries and buildings, in their delimiting and 
mediating dimensions, help us enact our identities and the capacity “to 
experience a total world as meaningful; along with orientation humans 
possess a world, and thus an identity. Today identity is often considered 
an ‘interior’ quality of each individual, and growing up is understood as a 
‘realization’ of the hidden self. However, because identity rather consists 
in an interiorization of understood things growing up actually depends 
on being open to what surrounds us. Although the world is immediately 
given it has to be interpreted to be understood, and although humans are 
part of the world, they have to concretize their belonging to feel at home” 
(Norberg-Schulz 1985, 20).
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In the terms of autopoiesis, our emergence as social-linguistic creatures 
is indeed the enaction of a distinct domain: “We human beings are human 
beings only in language. Because we have language there is no limit to 
what we can describe, imagine, and relate” (Maturana and Varela 1998, 
212). Hence, fully appreciative of philosophical anthropology and echoing 
Plessner on capacities and the possibility of becoming other, Gadamer can 
define health and well-being in terms of keeping all options open, “a feeling 
of well-being means we are open to new things, ready to embark on new 
enterprises and, forgetful of ourselves, scarcely notice the demands and 
strains which are put on us” (Grene 1968, 94; Gadamer 1996, 112). Though 
we all are centred in one specif ic historical realm, we are not bound there 
because of the possibility of some event “that lets us see the other person 
and open up for him room for existence beside us” – which is yet another 
way of saying what Plessner described as the perpetual dynamic between 
centricity and eccentricity, within which, particularly in the open space of 
our Spielraum, we always remain an open question to ourselves (Maturana 
and Varela 1998, 246; Grene 1968, 112).
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12 The Unbearable Freedom of Dwelling
Jetske van Oosten
Architecture and today’s postmodern society
Our modern society is changing. As a result of an increasing prosperity 
and mobility, social identities are becoming more complex and mutable. 
In the past, the identity of a person was closely related to that of places, 
for it was mainly def ined by the person’s social and regional background. 
Nowadays globalization has led to a state where the original identity 
of people and their connectedness to specif ic cities or places seems to 
disappear. Using networks that transcend place and time, the modern 
individual identif ies himself less and less by local communities and local 
spatial structures.
Globalization has led to an unprecedented degree of uniformity in life-
styles, value systems and patterns of behavior. This uniformity can also be 
observed in the way urban spaces are now specif ically designed to facilitate 
the urban activities. An overwhelming focus on creating ‘functional sur-
roundings’ is levelling regional differences to a point where cities are losing 
their identity. A multitude of spaces have very similar looks, regardless of 
their location or function. Buildings like off ices, shopping malls, fast-food 
restaurants and airports around the world are developing a striking resem-
blance all throughout. The contemporary city is predominantly consisting 
of so-called ‘non-places’: uniform places, without history or identity (Augé 
2008, 61-93).
In today’s postmodern world, authentic social identities, connected to a 
given place, are losing importance. This can at least in part be attributed to 
globalization, which has a great influence on the appearance of our built 
environment. But what does this mean for built environments in general? 
In other words: what is the influence of our changing postmodern society 
on the meaning of architecture and urbanism? Answering this question 
will be the central aim of this paper.
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A place to call home: The basic anthropological law of ‘natural 
artificiality’
For at moments like this, the city goes soft; it awaits the imprint of an identity. 
For better or worse the city invites you to remake it, to consolidate it into a shape 
you can live in.
– Jonathan Raban
In order to explore the meaning of architecture and urbanism within the 
context of today’s postmodern society, this paper starts by describing 
the encounter between the architectural work of Constant Nieuwenhuys 
(1920-2005) and the philosophical anthropology of Helmuth Plessner (1892-
1985). Plessner was one of the f irst philosophers who considered the spatial 
constitution of man as an important feature of his being, thus developing a 
philosophical framework that is very useful for the exploration of the mean-
ing of architecture and urbanism. His philosophy, as we will see below, is 
still surprisingly up-to-date and particularly well suited for the exploration 
of contemporary developments in architecture.
Plessner wrote Levels of the Organic and Man [Die Stufen des Organischen 
und der Mensch] in 1928. In this book, he established the foundation of his 
philosophical anthropology, def ining life by the notion of boundaries. A 
key characteristic of living beings is that they enter into a relation with the 
world around them through their boundaries. Only through boundaries, 
the distinction between what lies outside and what lies inside, comes into 
existence. Plessner explains how every living organism becomes part of 
its environment through its boundaries, just as the environment becomes 
part of the organism.
Elaborating on his notion of boundaries, Plessner moves from plants to 
animals to man. He thereby distinguishes between three different forms 
of life. He identif ies man as a living being that differs fundamentally from 
plants and (other) animals, because of the unique way a human being enters 
into the relationship with itself and its environment. On the one hand, hu-
man beings have a centric positionality just like animals, marked by a direct 
and unreflected relation to themselves and their environment. They relate 
to themselves and to their environment from the inside out. In contrast to 
animals though, human beings also have the ability to free themselves from 
this direct and unreflected relation by creating a distance to themselves 
and their environment. Human beings are able to have an indirect relation 
to themselves and their environment. With this detachment, they relate 
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to themselves and to their environment from outside in. Plessner refers to 
this as eccentric positionality (Plessner 1975, 292).
According to Plessner, the human being is centrally positioned in its 
directly embodied and unreflected relationship with the environment, 
while at the same time, it is located outside of this boundary (eccentrically 
positioned). As a result of his eccentric positionality, man is able to objectify 
himself and his environment. From this perspective, the world appears to 
man not only as it is, but also as it could be, for man can imagine the world to 
be different from what it is. Because he has the ability not just to see what is 
real, but to visualize what is possible as well, man is no longer directly bound 
to a specif ic place and time. Being located outside of his own boundary, 
freed from himself and the world around him, he is no longer confined to 
the ‘here and now’ reality. As a result of his eccentric positionality, one could 
say that man has lost his place in the world. In this respect, Plessner speaks 
of a “constitutive homelessness” of man (Plessner 1975, 309).
Having lost his place in the world, the human being still has to struggle 
with a no less constitutive desire to f ind a place to call home. This void can 
only be satisf ied artif icially, i.e. the human being will try to compensate for 
his homelessness by artif icially creating the world around him. By turning 
a once only hypothetical reality into (a new) reality, man establishes new, 
albeit artif icial, boundaries for himself. In culture, the endless possibilities 
that man is aware of as a result of his eccentric positionality, f ind their limits 
in space and time. What was once just a possibility becomes reality, when 
the not-here and the not-now are turned into the here and now. Conversely, 
the very notion of reality becomes a mere possibility, because the reality 
of today is not necessarily the reality of the future. Reality and possibility 
are united in culture, and therefore culture offers the human being a place 
to call home. As such, culture makes up an integral part of human life, as 
humans depend on cultural expressions such as language, art, technologies 
and science in order to resist their constitutive homelessness. Being both 
centrically and eccentrically positioned, whilst continuously having to 
f ind a balance with respect to this twofold constitution, it is part of man’s 
nature to be artif icial. Plessner therefore speaks of the natural artif iciality 
of man (Plessner 1975, 310).
It is this concept of natural artif iciality that reveals the f irst aspect of the 
meaning of architecture and urbanism for man. Architecture and urbanism 
have great importance as practices that (could) offer man a place to call 
home. They offer the artif icial means to turn those possibilities into reality 
which man sees for himself and for the world. In architecture and in the 
urban environment, the centric and eccentric positionalities of man can be 
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united. The practice of architecture and urbanism can provide man with 
a home in this world.
Now, let’s try to further explore the meaning of architecture and urban-
ism as means to create ourselves a home, by turning to the work of Constant 
Nieuwenhuys. Constant, as he called himself as an artist, became famous as 
a painter while being part of the international avant-garde art movement 
COBRA. Afterwards, he worked alone for almost twenty years – from 1956 
until 1974 – on an architectural project that he called New Babylon. Constant 
envisioned a world in which people would be free to create their own envi-
ronment according to their own needs and desires. Constant developed New 
Babylon as an architectural project, representing a world of total freedom 
and creativity, for “it is as a creator, and only as a creator, that the human 
being can fulf il and attain his highest existential level” (Constant 1974, 49).
According to Constant, it was only by means of a mutable environment 
that such a world could be actualized. That’s why he designed New Babylon 
as a f lexible environment in which no permanent building components 
existed. As a dynamic environment in which nothing is permanent, New 
Babylon offered its inhabitants the artif icial means to spontaneously carry 
out any desired change. New Babylon knew no restrictions. The inhabitants 
were activated to explore different possibilities by changing the shape of the 
spaces according to their own needs and desires. In gigantic spatial struc-
tures, consisting of mutable structures, the inhabitants of New Babylon were 
encouraged to use their creativity maximally. “Just like the painter, who 
with a mere handful of colors creates an infinite variety of forms, contrasts 
and styles, the New Babylonians can endlessly vary their environment, 
renew and vary it by using their technical implements” (Constant 1974, 54).
Using different creative techniques, Constant produced numerous models, 
maps, drawings and paintings. Over the years, New Babylon grew to become 
an enormous project. The drawings show seemingly unending structures, 
built on high supports, presenting an urban atmosphere that stands for 
freedom, openness and limitless possibilities. Different maps show how 
the structures were linked and stretched across the landscape on various 
scales from the scale of a small neighbourhood, to the scale of virtually the 
whole territory of the Netherlands. The models consist of flexible walls and 
transparent screens and are crisscross supported by columns and walls. Dif-
ferent levels are interconnected by stairs and movable ladders, providing the 
inhabitants with the opportunity to wander and explore. In the paintings, 
human silhouettes are wandering apparently aimlessly in all directions.
As an artist, Constant turned to architecture and urbanism, for he be-
lieved them to be the most useful means for establishing a world of total 
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freedom. He envisioned how a new way of living will emerge in New Babylon, 
based on the creativity of its inhabitants. For this, he designed New Babylon 
as a diverse and inspiring environment, in which the inhabitants had the 
opportunity to live their life according to their deepest desires. New Babylon 
was to offer them a world with endless possibilities. The inhabitants had 
the opportunity to create their own urban environment. New Babylon was 
to offer its inhabitants the artif icial means to create themselves a place to 
call home. New Babylon can therefore be seen as a project which aff irms 
the meaning of architecture and urbanism as derived from the natural 
artif iciality of man: architecture and urbanism are practices that provide 
man with a place in this world and in doing so offer man the opportunity 
to f ill his constitutive homelessness.
Reality’s resistance: The anthropological law of ‘mediated 
immediacy’
Cities, unlike villages and small towns, are plastic by nature. We mould them in 
our images: they, in their turn, shape us by the resistance they offer when we try 
to impose our own personal form on them.
– Jonathan Raban
Viewing human beings as both centrically and eccentrically positioned – 
Plessner formulated three constitutive anthropological laws. The f irst one 
relates to the natural artif iciality of man: man is artif icial by nature, for he 
relies on culture to compensate for the loss of his natural place in the world. 
The second law concerns ‘mediated immediacy’; it refers to the unintended 
and unpredictable autonomy of reality. In the cultural realm, the twofold 
constitution of man is united, since different possibilities can be turned 
into reality. However, when a possibility is indeed turned into a new reality, 
this new reality displays an autonomy, which cannot be totally deduced 
back to the original possibilities. This autonomous reality, once determined 
by man, determines the human being in return. The world around him 
shapes the human being by the resistance it offers when the human being 
tries to shape the world around him. On the one hand, the human being 
is thus an active being, dynamically def ining reality. Yet, in the sense that 
the human being is itself def ined by reality, he is a passive being, always 
influenced by reality’s resistance. The relation between human beings and 
their environment is always mediated, because expressions are always 
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bound to the media in which they are realized and through which they are 
communicated. Once bound to the media in which they are realized, they 
go beyond their original intentionality. As a result, expressions are always 
partly unintended and unpredictable in their effect on the human being.
The human being creates himself a place to be home by his architectural 
and urban expressions. In architectural and urban projects the possibilities 
that man is aware of become reality. But being realized, the projects display 
an autonomy, that cannot be totally deduced to the creative intentions of the 
designer. It is from the autonomous impact of reality that the second aspect 
of the meaning of architecture and urbanism can be derived. Architecture 
and urbanism form mediated expressions of the human being, yet at the 
same time offer their own impressions to the human being. As reality, 
architectural and urban projects, once def ined by a human being, def ine 
the human being in return.
Let us further explore the meaning of architecture as a reality that defines 
the human being by returning once more to New Babylon. Having produced 
numerous models, maps, drawings and paintings, Constant created a world 
of freedom and possibilities. These productions suggest endless possibilities 
of what New Babylon could be. Yet they do so, without ever f ixating the 
project in any given form. The sketches, for instance, evoke the construction 
principles of New Babylon rather than showing them in technical detail. In 
the case of the models of New Babylon, one cannot clearly ascribe definite 
functions to specific parts of the building. The paintings are without definite 
perspective, without a central point from which the spatial organization 
can be understood. And as for the maps of New Babylon: sometimes existing 
maps serve as background, yet at other times the maps are set in a completely 
abstract, neutral environments. Constant never clearly defined New Babylon. 
As a consequence, none of the models, maps, drawings and paintings seem 
to refer to an architectural reality. In New Babylon, the possibilities do not 
f ind an unambiguous f ixation. It is not a technologically developed design, 
ready to be built. The vast amount of paintings, models, sketches and maps 
of New Babylon show an architectural project which stays undetermined in 
its form and open to every possibility. While New Babylon proposes a world 
of possibilities in which man is not bound to a ‘here and now’ reality, it lacks 
the restrictions which reality consists of. New Babylon can only be seen as an 
illustration of possibilities, for New Babylon will continually and perpetually 
be constructed by the inhabitants themselves. “The real designers of New 
Babylon will be the Babylonians themselves” (Constant 1974, 72).
New Babylon depicts a world where people are liberated from all norms, 
forms and conventions. It offers a world of freedom, without a f ixed pattern 
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of habits associated with specif ic places. “In imagining a society in which 
each man is free to create his life, to give it shape according to his deepest 
aspirations, we will not have recourse to the forms and images of this long 
period of history” (Constant 1974, 32). The ordinary, everyday framework 
has been abolished in New Babylon. In order to achieve the goal of total 
liberation, all oppressive ties, all traditions have been destroyed (Wigley 
1998, 12-14). However, while there is something liberating about the endless 
possibilities of New Babylon, there is something stressful and deeply unset-
tling about it as well. Regarding New Babylon, one cannot speak of a newly 
def ined reality with an autonomy of its own. With all the possibilities it 
offers, it stays open and undefined. Yet being undefined itself, it lacks the 
possibility to def ine its inhabitants in return. Without even an attempt to 
resist reality, without an ordinary everyday framework of traditions and 
habits, the inhabitants seem to be losing their way in the labyrinth, as well 
as themselves. The freedom of New Babylon creates a threat to the identity 
of the individual, namely the threat of an identity dissolving into emptiness. 
Man cannot thrive in indeterminacy. It is therefore not a surprise that a 
dark tone is noticeable in this world of possibilities. The models, maps, 
drawings and paintings prove themselves to be frightening representations 
of a world of freedom. Paradoxically, in the world of possibilities of New 
Babylon, the possibility for man to f ind himself a home has disappeared. 
While offering man total freedom, New Babylon is unable to offer man 
a place to call home. For ‘being home’ calls for the recognition and trust 
of a resisting reality. ‘Being home’ presupposes habits and tradition, and 
exactly those are lacking in New Babylon. Without memories and history, 
there cannot be recognition and trust. Therefore, the project as expressed 
in its models, maps, paintings and sketches, gives a feeling of discomfort 
(Heynen 1994, 173).
Awareness of man’s desire not only for a freedom of possibilities, but 
also for the restrictions of reality, clarif ies how New Babylon, with all its 
possibilities, does not offer its inhabitants the security and trust of a home. 
Clearly, dwelling in a situation of pure indeterminacy does not respond to 
man’s deepest wishes and desires. Pure flexibility and permanent change 
are in conflict with the human desire for harmony, recognition, identity 
and trust. Therefore, in capturing a glimpse of a world of total freedom, the 
models, maps, drawings and paintings represent the horror of this totality. 
New Babylon arouses fear rather than desire, for man has no place in a 
world in which nothing is f ixed, only for the sake of making everything 
possible. Without a resisting reality, New Babylon can offer its inhabitants 
no resistance to the constitutive homelessness of man.
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New Babylon and today’s postmodern world
While Constant worked on the project of New Babylon from 1956 until 1974, 
the project is still surprisingly relevant in the context of today’s postmodern 
world. New Babylon was never built, yet in a way, some characteristics of 
the world of today resemble the characteristics of New Babylon.
Today’s postmodern world is characterized by the phenomenon of 
globalization. A growing number of individuals have access to spatial, eco-
nomic, technical and social networks that span over the whole surface of the 
earth. The individual already has instruments that place him in constant 
contact with some of the most remote parts of the world. Furthermore, the 
continuous development of new technologies for transportation, informa-
tion and communication indicate that this trend is certainly not curbing. 
By use of television, portable phones and computers, the individual can 
experience an environment that is wholly independent of his immediate 
physical surroundings. As a result of these networks, which transcend place 
and time, the authentic experience associated with a specific place and time 
is getting lost. Time and place are more and more experienced as flexible 
and arbitrary. Modern life is saturated with the sense of the fleeting, the 
transient and the contingent.
Globalization has led to the situation that the modern urban citizen 
no longer acts from a local framework. The modern individual identif ies 
himself less and less by his local communities and urban structures. Using 
networks that transcend place and time, his connection to specif ic cities 
or places vanishes. Likewise, the urban fabric is no longer characterized 
by a unique identity. The phenomenon of globalization changes the urban 
fabric itself and local differences disappear.
Globalization gives rise to spaces that do not abide to the logic of place. 
Today’s postmodern world is often described as a world of non-places. A 
place is a recognizable space, a space with historic meaning. It has features 
that provide a certain personality or identity. Non-places however, are 
spaces dominated by temporariness and transience: anonymous, unde-
termined spaces of transit. The contemporary city increasingly consists of 
such non-places. It has continuous spaces of transportation, communication 
and consumption without a unique identity. Projects for off ices, shopping 
malls, fast-food restaurants and airports around the world are all looking 
very much alike. Their spaces resemble the characteristics of infrastructures 
by directing and funnelling people. It can be extended indef initely and 
connected to anything. They control movement and behavior and can be 
described as spaces of f low and circulation. Features of continuity and 
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openness thereby have become increasingly more common in today’s archi-
tecture. The architecture and urbanism of today’s postmodern world can 
be described as anonymous and undetermined. Its homogenetic, endless 
spaces are lacking a distinctive recognition. As a result, they possess very 
few identif iable features. Former boundaries have ceased to exist. Stable 
concepts in architecture like ‘place,’ ‘identity,’ ‘history’ and ‘tradition’ suffer 
from inflation. In this respect, the architecture and urbanism of today’s 
postmodern world reminds us of Constant’s New Babylon.
The anonymous and undetermined spaces of today’s postmodern world 
and the absence of ‘place,’ ‘identity,’ ‘history’ and ‘tradition’ will lead to an 
impossibility of f inding a home in today’s postmodern world, just as it did in 
New Babylon. As a result, the current condition of postmodern man can be 
described as frightened and alienated. Indeed, many topical architectural 
discussions mention homelessness as a typical feature of postmodern man. 
Modern man f inds himself confronted with a desire for a home and for 
domestic security, which he cannot f ind in the modern world, where all 
boundaries have disappeared.
Where does this leave us human beings? Contemporary architectural 
debates mention homelessness to be a feature of postmodern man. Plessner 
even argued that homelessness is a fundamental property of human exist-
ence. Are we indeed doomed to have no place we can call home? Must we 
conclude, that the human desire for freedom is fundamentally irreconcilable 
with the human desire for security and trust? Are possibility and reality 
incompatible and never to be united? Is man in fact, not only as a condition of 
today’s postmodern world, but more fundamentally because of his eccentric 
positionality, forever without boundaries and without a home? I don’t think so.
Searching for a home: The anthropological law of ‘the utopian 
standpoint’
When Plessner refers to homelessness as a fundamental property of the hu-
man existence, this is not because he is of the opinion that the possibilities, 
that we as human beings are aware of, cannot be turned into a new reality. 
It is merely because every new (artif icial) reality will open new possibilities. 
As a result of the human positionalities, this is a perpetual process. Man will 
never cease to be open to these new possibilities, for he can never escape 
his eccentric positionality.
Man is constitutively homeless, but not because possibility and reality 
cannot be united in culture, but because the unity of possibility and reality, 
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and thus the home that culture provides us with, will always be temporary. 
Every possibility that man turns into reality will lead to new possibilities. 
Therefore, every attempt he makes to provide himself with a home, will only 
be greeted by a new feeling of homelessness. It is because of his eccentric 
positionality that every human being experiences his or her ‘constitutive 
homelessness.’ The constitution of the human being condemns us to an 
eternal quest for a new home.
However, as a fundamental property of the human existence, this con-
stitutive homelessness of man is not a state that the human being should 
passively give into or reconcile himself to. On the contrary, the historical 
and relative character of every newly found home demands action. It is 
the unease we feel about this constitutive homelessness that compels us to 
keep searching for the unreachable home. The constitutive homelessness 
of man forms the driving force of all culture and can be seen to ignite 
our productivity, for it is within the ongoing interaction of possibility and 
reality that the human being has the opportunity to develop himself and 
his culture. Possibilities can lead to new realities, and in return, every new 
reality will lead to new possibilities. It is within the ongoing interaction of 
possibilities and reality that man has the opportunity to define and develop 
his identity. The identity of man is not an immutable fact, it needs to be 
constructed repeatedly and successively. Identities are momentary and 
temporary, and always open to the future. In the absence of permanence, 
the human being will have to create himself over and over again. The new 
possibilities that come into existence in culture form the conditions for this 
historically ongoing (self)realization.
It rests on the temporary character of the unity between possibility 
and reality, and the obligation of man to realize himself over and over 
again, that Plessner refers to in his third anthropological law, as the utopian 
standpoint. He explains how man has not only the possibility, but also the 
obligation to realize himself over and over again within the interaction 
between possibility and reality. Man is himself responsible for repeatedly 
realizing himself, thereby aff irming his constitution. However, in search for 
stability and a clear and unambiguous reality, the human being will always 
be tempted to turn to religion or ideologies as absolute and ideal worlds 
to believe in. Yet, he should not admit to this temptation of a belief in an 
absolute God or ideal world, while these too can offer him no f irm ground. 
Every utopia in which man believes to f ind a permanent home, will in time 
turn out to be an illusion. The human being can only stay faithful to himself, 
accepting the irreconcilability of possibility and reality. Confronted with 
endless possibilities and the arbitrariness of reality, the human being has 
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to take the chance of creating his own world by choosing and favouring 
some possibilities over others to become reality. Only within this dynamic 
interaction can man f ind himself (Plessner 1981, 161-164).
The eccentric positionality of the human being condemns him to con-
stitutive homelessness. Even in architecture or urbanism, an ideal and 
eternal world cannot be reached. Architectural and urban projects will 
always confront man with the impermanent and contingent character 
of the unity between possibility and reality. A place to call home in this 
world, will always stay a receding ideal for the human being. However, 
this relative and historic character of architecture and urbanism does not 
diminish the very meaning of architecture and urbanism; if anything, 
it enriches its importance. Architecture and urbanism offer the human 
being the opportunity to create itself an identity, while at the same time 
confronting the human being with the temporary and tentative nature of 
this identity. The real importance of architecture and urbanism lies in the 
ongoing realization of possibilities itself. Architecture and urbanism have 
meaning, not as means to a f inal end, but as practices and never-ending 
processes of building and creating.
Furthermore, it is within the temporary and tentative nature of identities, 
where the human being can find freedom. For true freedom exists, not in the 
endless possibilities that the eccentric positionality offers him, but in the 
perpetual interaction between possibility and reality, i.e. in the repeatedly 
established relation between the centric and eccentric positionality of man. 
Only within this dynamic interaction can the human being really be free. 
Only through the confirmation of a new reality can a dynamic occur in 
which new possibilities come into existence. Therefore, it is the transience 
of the unity of possibility and reality itself that offers freedom. True freedom 
of man cannot be found in the existence of absolute freedom of possibilities, 
but only in the ongoing realization of these possibilities.
According to Constant, the inhabitants of New Babylon would only be 
able to fulfill their destiny as creative beings if they were free from all habits, 
traditions and conventions. Therefore, Constant designed New Babylon as 
a world of possibilities in which man was no longer bound to any def ining 
reality. Constant deliberately refrained from f ixating the spatial environ-
ment. As a paradoxical result, the possibilities of New Babylon as a world of 
freedom became static and unchanging. For without the confirmation of a 
new reality, new possibilities could not come to existence. While aiming to 
fulf il the human desire for freedom, Constant disregarded the importance 
of reality. As a consequence, New Babylon denies rather than affirms its 
inhabitants the possibility to fulf il their destiny as creative beings.
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However, the importance of the project does not lie in the realization of 
an ideal world of freedom, for this would only be a flight into utopia. The 
real meaning of the project lies in the process of creating itself. Here, the 
real liberating moment of New Babylon takes place: in the embodiment of 
Constant’s vision in the models, maps, drawings and paintings. The world 
of New Babylon was never def ined as architectural reality, and was merely 
meant to trigger and stimulate the creativity of the inhabitants themselves. 
However, in the models, maps, drawings and paintings, specific possibilities 
do f ind their limit in space and time. In this respect, New Babylon is more of 
a work of art, than an architectural work. The new reality that Constant cre-
ated, is not an architectural reality, but an artif icial expression nonetheless.
Furthermore, the fact that New Babylon does not represent an architec-
tural reality doesn’t mean that an architectural possibility can never be 
turned into an architectural reality. The mere existence of New Babylon as 
a world of freedom without limitations, does not mean that the possibilities 
that we as human beings are aware of, cannot be limited at all. The fact 
that New Babylon offers no boundaries to its inhabitants doesn’t mean that 
architecture itself can offer us no boundaries. The possibilities that man 
dreams of can become reality in architecture. Architectural projects can 
be built. In architecture, man can creates artif icial boundaries for himself.
The meaning of architecture and urbanism in today’s 
postmodern world
Plessner’s philosophical anthropology provides us with a framework to 
understand (contemporary developments in) architecture. He explains how 
on the one hand, the centric positionality of human existence entails that 
human beings are confined to the psychophysical boundaries of themselves 
and their surroundings. Yet on the other hand, the eccentric positionality of 
human existence offers endless possibilities for freedom, as a consequence 
of which humans live in a world of freedom. The incompatibility of the 
centric and the eccentric positionality of human existence creates the 
fundamental drive to overcome this contradiction artif icially. The human 
constitution forms the driving force of culture, and of architecture and 
urbanism in particular, for architecture and urbanism are practices in 
which man can resist his constitutive homelessness in a unique way. As 
practices that deal mainly with physical boundaries, architecture and 
urbanism are prominently suited to offer man artif icial boundaries and 
a place to call home.
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As cultural practices, architecture and urbanism act on the brink of 
possibility and reality in the sense that in architectural and urban projects, 
man tries to unite the two. In the long term, these efforts are in vain, as 
possibility and reality are in fact two sides of the same coin and can never 
be permanently united. The unity between possibility and reality can only 
be temporarily. Architecture and urbanism will therefore never be able to 
offer man a f inal home and thus, man will always remain homeless.
However, this does not lead to a relativism regarding the meaning of 
architecture and urbanism as practices which offer man a place to call home. 
On the contrary, it rather confirms their relevance. For it is in the historical 
and relative nature of architecture and urbanism that we f ind their true 
meaning: the human opportunity of ever continuing (self)realization. As a 
consequence, architecture and urbanism have no meaning as f inal embodi-
ments of a perfect world, but all the more as a temporary and relative moment 
of (self) realization. Architecture and urbanism form a fundamental element 
of human life, where the freedom to create repeatedly encounters the human 
call for reality of place and matter. This call for reality, for boundaries, for 
security, for tradition and for identity, is a call that particularly in these 
postmodern times, architecture should take into account.
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The recent renewed interest in the work of Helmuth Plessner also sparked 
the use of his philosophy, theories and concepts in other f ields of science. 
Immanuel Kant, who from 1756 onwards taught geography for more than 
thirty years,1 has already coined the crucial meaning of philosophy for geog-
raphy as well as for history. Nevertheless, the disparity between philosophic 
reflection and applied human geographic research is sometimes substantial. 
Certainly, most theoretical positions within human geography are well 
founded on established philosophical positions, but as the philosopher Jeff 
Malpas reminded us of at the 2010 Meeting of the American Association 
of Geographers, there is a difference between consuming philosophical 
insights and having a dialogue among geographers and philosophers 
about these insights. On one side, this involves ref lections on different 
philosophical positions and arguments about certain philosophical issues 
for geographers. On the other hand, this also involves gaining insights in 
the more practical use of philosophical arguments in geographic research 
for philosophers. This chapter focuses on the latter and therefore does not 
deal explicitly with the exegetic subtleties of how Helmuth Plessner’s work 
can be interpreted, but rather tries to show how his general views could 
productively be used and developed further in the field of human geography. 
Human geography in general, and Dutch geography in particular, has a long 
tradition in applied research in service of sometimes also rather imperi-
alist ruling powers (Ernste 2008; Ernste 2009). However, today’s human 
geography is strongly influenced by a critical and emancipatory tradition 
(Habermas 1972). Independent of whether it is based on a critical stance or 
from a more mainstream point of view, in both cases, human geographers 
want that their research matters in practice for today’s society (Massey 
and Allen 1985). As such human geographic research is problem oriented. 
Of course, it is a well-known fact that Helmuth Plessner was also not wary 
of critical thinking and political and social philosophy (Plessner 2003a; 
1 http://www.manchester.edu/kant/Notes/notesGeography.htm
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Plessner 1999). In this contribution, I therefore would like to explore how 
the core concept of eccentric positionality coined by Helmuth Plessner, can 
be used for the analysis of current societal problems and how it contributes 
to the related social theories.
In the following I will focus on a f ield of application at the core of human 
geography, namely urban development and urban living. The urban envi-
ronment represents a specif ic spatial setting, which also calls for a specif ic 
way of life, or to put it in contemporary human geographic terminology, a 
specif ic human sociospatial practice. This is a specif ic example of the more 
general relationship between space and human being, which is the classical 
focus of human geographic research. As a starting point, I approach this 
relationship from a geographic action theoretic viewpoint (Werlen 1992; 
2009a; 2009b), although my elaborations will also lead me to some outlooks 
to post-structural theories of practice (Bourdieu 1977; 1990; De Certeau 1984; 
Schatzki 2001), which are currently enjoying great popularity in human 
geography. I criticise both theoretical approaches on the ground that, to 
a large degree, they neglect a thorough conceptualization of the human 
being in their relationship with the environment, even though critical 
human geography has the pretention to put human beings in the center. 
Certainly, human geography is not just about human beings, but also about 
space and spatiality. Strangely enough, space and spatiality is nevertheless 
given much more thought by human geographers than the human being. 
To explain what I mean, let us f irst return to urban life as an example for 
such a concrete relationship between human being and space. One way 
to approach urban living would be by means of a fashionable theoretician 
like Henri Lefebvre (Soja 1996). But in this case, I prefer not to celebrate 
fashionability but rather focus on the argument itself. To do so, I chose to 
focus on one of the classics, Georg Simmel, who actually was one of the f irst 
to address this relationship so poignantly.
Urban development
In 1903, Georg Simmel wrote his famous essay “The Metropolis and Mental 
Life.” In contrast to the later Louis Wirth (1938), Simmel did not compare 
urban life with rural life, but rather distinguished modern urban life from 
pre-modern life. At the beginning of the twentieth century, the heyday 
of modernism, he described urban life as characteristic for a modernistic 
way of living. Simmel actually grew up in Berlin, at the corner of Leipziger 
and Friedrichstraße, during a time when the city was undergoing a trans-
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formation from a provincial administrative capital into a cosmopolitan, 
industrialized, modern metropolis. At that time, Berlin was the world’s 
f ifth largest city in population size (Scaff 1988; Jung 1990). Simmel’s deep-
est commitments and mental instincts were formed in a setting in which 
aesthetic culture, art, psychic nuance and emotive expressiveness linked 
to the oppositional identity of Jewish intellectuals (Käsler 1984, 357-385) 
and to the turn-of-the-century Viennese bourgeoisie milieu (Schorske 1981).
For Simmel, social life in modern cities was noncommittal and un-
engaged. Surrounded by the many others with whom one has no direct 
relationship, one can actually only do one thing, namely to (partly) ‘switch 
off’ or acquire a selective distance. This seems to be a recipe for how to 
deal with the big crowds in the city. It would not only be impossible, but 
also unnecessary, to actively engage with everyone one encounters. Such 
encounters happen, for example, when people sit next to you on the bus, 
when you stand in front of a traff ic light next to another car, or whenever 
you are in an elevator with many others, not talking to each other, not even 
looking at each other, almost as if you are alone in this world. But even 
then, this kind of behavior has to be qualif ied as social behavior, as you do 
take the presence of the others into account. This peculiar kind of solitude, 
which seems so typical for modern cities, is a kind of togetherness based 
on uncommitted detachment. Being ‘alone’ in a full train is indeed not the 
same as being alone in an empty one. It demands that one coordinates one’s 
own use of space with the movements of others, and that one communicates 
with each other by means of an implicit social language of indifference.
At another accession, Simmel assumes the special character of urban 
psyche as follows: the human being is essentially a differentiating being. 
People create meaning and make sense of their surrounding by selectively 
distinguishing different sensual impressions. We determine when and what 
we perceive, how we endorse certain tones and sounds, and what we simply 
ignore. However, this ability to f ilter our perceptions is heavily strained by 
our urban environment. In the city, we are confronted with an explosion of 
sensual impressions and rapidly changing sceneries, a continuously chaotic 
and almost random stream of impulses, which overburdens our ability to 
make useful distinguishments and selections about what deserves our 
attention. Mental life in modern cities is characterised by an overload of 
stimuli.
Following Simmel, Robert Park (1967, 40-41) writes in a similar fashion 
about the intensive stimuli of urban life, which, at least to a certain degree, 
may even be attractive for young and fresh nerves. The downside of this 
situation, especially for those with somewhat older and worn nerves, is that 
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one is torn somewhere between excitement and powerlessness. Such a bom-
bardment of our senses also carries the risk that one is literally distracted, 
and often even agitated, causing us to respond with a blaze attitude, a kind 
of chronic disengagement and indifference towards our surrounding. At 
the time of Georg Simmel in early-twentieth-century Berlin, distancing 
oneself from the urban jungle still required active and perhaps forceful 
effort. Today, with all our mobile technologies, ranging from MP3 players 
to smartphones, one does not even need to appropriate such an attitude, 
as the technical aids pick up on this logic of detachment in a perfect way. 
Immersed in our private soundscape or involved in a talk with someone 
else at the other end of the phone, one can easily detach from the city as 
shared perception space or social space.
This subjective attitude also corresponds, according to Simmel, to a more 
fundamental aspect of modern social interaction. In this modern urban 
context, an increasing number of aspects of social interaction are reduced 
to market transactions, or the logic of our monetary economy. Walter Ben-
jamin calls this the ‘theatre of buying and consuming’ (Benjamin 1986, 40). 
The dominance of monetary economy in modern cities also has specif ic 
effects on people’s personalities, as not just the urban social constitution 
but also the monetary exchange relationships imply a functional, succinct 
impersonal way of relating to other people and the material world around 
us (Simmel 1997, 176). In Simmel’s eyes, this latent antipathy and a kind 
of pre-stage of practical antagonism affect the distances and aversions, 
without which urban life would be impossible.
The rules of repulsion or non-participation are a part of the spatial 
economy of the city, according to which bodies in space are sorted and 
kept at a distance to minimize social exchange. This social logic on the 
one hand produces anonymity amongst the crowd and on the other hand 
encourages the urban actor to stand out and make a good performance in 
order to tell apart oneself from that same crowd. If nobody listens to you, 
it is diff icult to be heard, even by oneself (ibid., 184). On the street, nobody 
seems to be watching, while at the same time we are all trying to present 
our selves to the others (Goffman 1959; Davenport and Beck 2002).
The anxiety of anonymity is the driving force, which turns the city to a 
stage for the performance that mediates between the individual and the 
collective. This is the place where the tension between the recognition and 
respect of others, as an ethics of identity, is played out against the isolation 
of the self and the current social differences. Urban life is a continuous 
dilemma between individual concretizations and the possibilities for urban 
sociality. What is crucial in Simmel’s observations is that he problematizes 
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the idea of a harmonic urban culture. He characterizes modern urban life 
as under-determined, f lowing, permanently becoming and overcoming 
(Jensen 2006).
Simmel’s ideas have shown to be path breaking in urban research and 
have been picked up and developed further by many others. One of the most 
influential followers was Louis Wirth, who in 1938 wrote a seminal essay 
with the title: “Urbanism as a Way of Life.” Here, Wirth proposed a research 
agenda for examining how cities produced forms of social interaction that 
is different from those of rural settlements, hence aiming to determine how 
urban and rural ways of life could be distinguished.
Wirth attempted to analyze urban culture by distinguishing three ‘inde-
pendent variables’ – size, density and heterogeneity – which he identif ied 
as causal factors behind urban cultural life. In his own words:
Large numbers count for individual variability, the relative absence 
of intimate personal acquaintanceship, the segmentation of human 
relations, which are largely anonymous, superf icial and transitory, and 
associated characteristics. Density involves diversif ication specialisation, 
the coincidence of close physical contract and distant social relations, 
glaring contrasts, a complex pattern of segregation, the predominance of 
formal social control, and accentuated friction, among other phenomena. 
Heterogeneity tends to break down rigid social structures and to produce 
mobility, instability, and insecurity, and the aff iliation of the individuals 
with a variety of interesting and tangential social grounds with a high 
rate of membership turnover. The pecuniary nexus tends to displace 
personal relations, and institutions tend to cater to mass rather than 
individual requirements. The individual thus becomes effective only as 
he acts through organised groups (Wirth 1938, 1).
All three traits mentioned by Wirth were seen as being characteristic 
of urban rather than rural life: only cities had large numbers, and dense 
heterogeneous social relations. Wirth thus implied that there was some 
connection between the type of settlement and psychic life; that certain 
sorts of personalities, psychic traits, and attitudes towards life, were closely 
associated with being in the city.
It is clear that Wirth drew not just on the work of Simmel, but also on 
Ferdinand Tönnies’s (2002) distinction between community (Gemeinschaft) 
and society (Gesellschaft).
Although Louis Wirth’s work sparked a tremendous body of research in 
the f ield of urban geography and even nowadays still seems to have some 
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sway over policy-makers, the idea of there being a generalizable ‘urban 
way of life’ was rejected as it showed that even in some of the largest urban 
environments, collective life persists in segregated groups. Many inner 
city populations consist of relatively homogeneous groups, with social and 
cultural moorings that shield it fairly effectively from the suggested conse-
quences of number, density and heterogeneity (Gans 1968, 99). Furthermore, 
a number of counter examples were produced to the supposedly anonymous 
and anomic patterns of urban life, but also to the integrated community 
of the countryside. In summary, the evidence for the urban-rural contrast 
was found unconvincing.
However, it would be premature to completely write off Wirth’s contribu-
tion, as some – mainly American writers – have recast Wirth’s framework 
in somewhat different terms. Claude Fischer (1982), for example, argues 
that urban life allows the proliferation of subcultures and identities, since 
people can always choose a variety of bases on which to identify themselves. 
Urbanism allows such subcultures to proliferate, since a critical mass for the 
formation of a distinct culture is often only possible in a city of a certain size.
In general, Wirth’s work went through a period of reappraisal in which it 
was recognized that the original critiques were, albeit justif ied, vastly over-
stated. Indeed, the issue of conflict, dispute and negotiation was often too 
neglected in this search for counterexamples. Furthermore, ethnographic 
studies continue to demonstrate that local contexts and spatial arrange-
ments do matter. Finally, it was shown that these contradictory conditions 
and phenomena, such as community and society, usually co-exist with one 
another. So it might not be invalid but just more complicated.
And as we shall see below, the work of Simmel seems to point the way to 
go, by stressing the double sidedness of modern urban life; a double sidede-
ness, which Plessner analogously describes as both, the centric and eccentric 
positionality of human being. Simmel’s description of the double sidedness 
of urban life was also picked up by later authors such as Urry (1990), Jay 
(1996), Berman (1984), Gregory (1994), Harvey (2009), Frisby (1992) and many 
others. Marshall Berman, for example, writes about the double sidedness 
of modern urban life (1984, 123). The freedom of human beings to develop 
and change themselves cannot be separated from the insecurity deriving 
from the uncertainty of urban possibilities. Here, Berman conceives the 
street as a microcosm of modern life and the struggle for public space as 
the core of modernist striving. Encounters on a street in a big city are very 
unpredictable. As we walk down a busy street, we never know who we 
are going to meet, or what will follow as a result. On the one hand, this 
represents an enormous potential – for example, to meet the love of our 
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lives, or to meet a potential employer or an old friend – but on the other 
hand it is very distressing – we could be robbed, attacked, or even killed.
These ethnographic descriptions do not just show an urban setting that 
has certain affects on human behavior and on human mental life. They 
are also more than just a description of the typical materiality of urban 
forms and urban society, as they are not only facts about urban life, but are 
mutually constitutive in a complex way, from which we do not just gain a 
better understanding of the urban but also of the human life, as well as 
their intricate relationship.
What is central here is the relationship between urban environment 
and social relations or society, which the human being is a part of. Thus, 
the physical form of the city is a crucial element. In traditional sociol-
ogy, as well as in traditional human geography, the material objects in 
the urban environment are conceived as objects on which we project a 
certain meaning and which we use for the expression of socially determined 
meanings. Space as such is symbol for society. However, this view assumes 
a fundamentally binary world order, in which society is, in the end, kept 
separate from the physical environment. Life in the city is conceived from 
a sociocentric point of view, irrespective of whether we, in doing so, refer to 
‘rational choices’ (Becker 1978), ‘sense making actions’ (Werlen 1992), ‘pure 
communication’ (Luhmann 1996), ‘binding institutionalisations’ (DiMaggio 
and Powell 1991; Hall and Tayler 1996) or determining societal discourses 
(Foucault 1970). In all cases, the non-social disappears behind the social, 
even though, as Heike Delitz (2009) expressed it, we are surrounded by these 
physical artefacts. These artefacts are still seen as passive objects, serving 
only as the symbolic representation of the social, which was constituted 
beforehand and to a large part independently of the physical urban forms.
An alternative possibility, Delitz (2009) continued, lies in allowing urban 
space to play a much more active role, i.e. treating space as an active medium 
of the social. A number of scholars already made propositions in this direc-
tion. For example, Benjamin (1999) conceived urban structures, especially 
shopping arcades, as expressions of the modern consumption society, while 
at the same time, such shopping arcades also played an important role in 
the construction of the consuming subjects. Also, Michel Foucault (1984) 
emphasized the role of spatial configurations in the genesis of power rela-
tions. An example worth mentioning here would be the Panopticon. These 
early proposals do allow a two-sided relationship between urban space on 
the one hand, and human being and society on the other. Nevertheless, none 
of these scholars were able to fully overcome the classic Cartesian duality. 
For this task, we are in need of other conceptualizations.
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One possibility can be traced back to the French sociology of life, of which 
Gilles Deleuze is an important representative, as he conceived urban life as 
an immanent process, as a ‘becoming of difference.’ This urban sociology, 
inspired by philosophy of life, does not only conceive social being as just 
consisting of intentional acting subjects, but rather also includes all ‘bodies’ 
in an active constellation, which can only be described in combination, as 
a whole, as a Gestalt (King and Wertheimer 2005; Marks 1998). A similar 
approach is conducted by Bruno Latour (2005), though he uses different 
terminology. Given the limiting scope of this chapter, I cannot go into more 
details with respect to these approaches.
Instead, as Delitz (2009) suggested, another non-Cartesian alternative, 
derived from philosophical anthropology, is of interest here. This school of 
thought is also founded on philosophy of life and enables to think of human 
corporeality and urban artefacts together with the social. In contrast to the 
French vitalism, the philosophical anthropological approach inspired by 
German idealism, emphasizes the special position of human beings and 
their ability and necessity for stabilizing human life. This implies that one 
does not rush to conclude the constructive character of human nature, but 
takes into account the special character of human biology. Following the 
work of Henri Bergson (1911; see also Deleuze 1991) and Hans Driesch (1909), 
life is conceptualized as a process of creative differentiations and as the 
formation of an own individuality. In addition, the theory of environment 
of Jakob von Uexküll (1909; see also Von Uexküll 2001) contributed substan-
tially to this school of thought. In his theory, each living organism is bound 
to its own niche, which f its to its inner world. Philosophical anthropology 
goes one step further, as it assumes that the human being is, after all, not 
just like any other animal, but rather is a uniquely unspecialized animal that 
is characterized by a profound world-openness. These insights turn out to 
be more than mere philosophical speculation, as the special position of the 
human being is increasingly also biologically (specif ically evolutionarily) 
founded (Portmann 1970).
It was especially the biologist and philosopher Helmuth Plessner who 
has systematically developed and elaborated this position. His main work 
was published in the same year as Martin Heidegger’s Being and Time and 
indeed shows a number of parallels. However, while Heidegger takes time 
as a starting point, Plessner places the metaphor of space as his point of 
departure (Schatzki 2007; De Mul 2003). In this sense, Plessner argues that 
all living organisms constitute themselves by bordering themselves off 
from their environment. ‘Living things’ are ‘border realizing things.’ They 
therefore have a ‘position’ in space. However, not all living creatures are 
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the same. While non-human animals are bound to their niche, they do not 
just react automatically on impulses from the environment, but have the 
virtuous of choice, spontaneity, consciousness and intelligence. Yet, their 
choices are subject to the primacy of the practical, which coordinates their 
reactions (Eßbach 1994, 23f.). Human beings are different (though from 
an empirical point of view, the development from non-human animals 
to Homo sapiens sapiens may be gradual). The stimulus-response cycle, 
which still dominates animal behavior, is interrupted for human beings. 
The relationship between the inner world and the environment is not direct 
or f ixed. Humans are not restricted to react to their environment from the 
central position only. This hiatus is the basis of human reflexivity. Human 
beings are at distance from their own living-centred bodily being (Leib) 
and thus have their own corporeal body (Körper) at their disposal and 
are, as Helmuth Plessner calls it, ‘eccentrically positioned.’ Like all living 
creatures, human beings also have to maintain their bodily boundaries. 
The main difference is that the human beings are aware of this, and 
therefore experience it as a task. Human beings are, as such, unadapted 
and unspecialized, not just with respect to their outer world but also with 
respect to their own inner world. The complexity of the unspecified stimuli, 
which patter down on us from the outside as well as the complexity of the 
excessive unspecif ied drives needs to be reduced. Here we can observe 
a characteristic similarity between Plessner’s conceptualization and the 
autopoietic systems postulated by Varela and Maturana (1980). The human 
being, thus, needs artefacts, routines and institutions, to actively manage 
this border relationship. Through these artif ices, affections, motives, ac-
tions, perceptions, imaginations and social relations are channelled and 
habitualized. As a consequence, human beings are artif icial by nature. 
At the same time, the human being is not separated from this artif icial 
environment, but rather forms a unity with it. The whole human existence is 
therefore an embodiment. Institutions, but also the built environment and 
even the natural environment become an embodiment and objectivation of 
his actions. Since this embodiment is artif icial, it is contingent and can be 
changed. From this profuse vitality, as Delitz (2009) described it, all cultural 
processes are fed, history is made, and geographic differentiations emerge; 
or to use Benno Werlen’s words, “everyday geography [is] made” (Werlen 
2009b). So what the philosophical anthropology of Helmuth Plessner does 
not do, is defining the substantial essence of human being. To the contrary, 
instead of trying to essentialize the human existence, Plessner understands 
it as a permanently becoming. Plessner describes the human being as the 
Homo absconditus, the inscrutable being, inscrutable for others but also 
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for one self. The human being is to itself as well as to others, dependent on 
an expression, a mask, a role, a performance to become what it is. All the 
while, this mask or outer skin, also hides and distances the self from the 
outer world, and as such creates space for change.
The human eccentric positionality is the position of the self-conscious-
ness. It is a place that cannot be located on any map. It is the point of view 
from a utopian position, from which the human being still experiences 
itself in its concrete here and now in the directness of its relation to the 
objects in the environment and to itself. But at the same time, the human 
being feels distanced from its own direct experiences from this eccentric 
position; a position beyond space and time from which the human being 
becomes aware of the contingency and relativity of concrete life (Plessner 
2003b, 363). From this position, the human being also becomes consciously 
aware of individuality and the non-differentiated sociality (ibid., 375). In 
this non-differentiated sociality, the human being experiences himself 
as possibly equal to others, as part of a shared ‘we’-world. It is the sphere 
between things and human beings and – last, but not least – also between 
places (Entrikin 1991). It is a utopian place, and seen from this place each 
concretization in life with all its restrictions in time and space cannot 
succeed. The eccentrically positioned human being, therefore, cannot 
avoid having to start over again, to continue to act, to create anew and to 
reinvent himself. Helmuth Plessner summarizes these insights into three 
anthropological laws:
1. The Law of natural artificiality, which suggests that each human being 
must create his or her own life to compensate for the natural place he or 
she has lost through the process of hominization (Nennen 1991, 20ff.).
2. The Law of mediated immediacy, according to which the relation between 
eccentric human beings and their environment is actively mediated by 
human corporeality and its artificial relatedness to the social and physical 
environment, enabling humans to objectify (and subjectify) themselves 
and their environment. Human being and identity is therefore partly 
created and limited by these physical, technical and cultural media.2 On 
the other hand, the eccentric positionality allows the human being to 
aware of that which enables him to create a distance between himself 
and the environment and to transcend the limitations of a particular 
2 In the context of urban life forms, the issue of the resistance or inherent logic of cities and 
their repercussions on the urban way of life is currently coined by Martina Löw, see e.g. http://
www.stadtforschung.tudarmstadt.de/media/loewe_eigenlogik_der_staedte/dokumente_down-
load/artikel/martinaloew_intrinsiclogicofcities.pdf.
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mediatedness. Be that as it may, humans still cannot entirely avoid being 
somehow mediated (Hammer 1967, 170).
3. The Law of utopian position points to our eccentric positionality. From 
that position, we are at a distance with our own physical existence and 
our passive experience in a world of praxis. Because of this eccentric 
positionality, every human being experiences his or her ‘constitutive 
homelesness,’ which impels him or her to transcend the achieved and 
thus perpetually search for the unreachable ‘home’: a position of unam-
biguous f ixation, a place in this world, and a clear identity for the self 
and the world around it. The eccentric positionality leads to a positioning 
in a counterfactual utopian home, a kind of ‘smooth place’ (Deleuze 
and Guattari 1987, 383) or ‘non-place’ (Augé 1995, 75f.), or perhaps also 
counterfactual ideal speech situation (Habermas 1984) can be seen as 
related to this utopian position with real concrete effects. In this utopian 
position, we feel related to the ‘other’ excluded from our own factual 
concrete being, doing, and saying. This detached positionality, which is 
constitutive of human subjectivity, is also the power of putting oneself 
in the place of any other person, indeed, of any other living thing. Where 
there is one person, Plessner says, there is every person. Thus, a particular 
being, in one’s own limited, parochial situation, can be seen as a non-
utopian concretion of this utopian generality, thereby providing a general 
basis for the sociality of human actions. But there are different sides to 
the transcendence of the particular through the postulation of, or even 
religious believe in, a concrete utopia. On the one hand, it is the human 
eccentric positionality, which makes this need for transcendence to a 
human a priori. But on the other hand, that same positionality towards 
this transcendence is unveiled as an unreachable utopia (Hammer 1967, 
185ff.).
In one of my previous essays, I have already tried to show that these laws, 
which, because of their paradoxality, already sound very postmodern, 
indeed could mediate between classical late-modern action theories and 
post-structural approaches (Ernste 2004). Putting that aside, let us now 
return to the issue of understanding urban life.
Some patterns, as they were described earlier by Simmel and Berman, 
now gain a clear anthropological meaning. Urban life seems to be exemplary 
for the double aspectivity of human life as proclaimed by Helmuth Plessner. 
The law of natural artif iciality expresses itself both in the performativity 
(Butler 1997; Jacobs 1998; Rose 1999) and in the hiding mask or blazé-ness of 
urban life. The law of utopian position shows that the idea that the human 
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being can live in perfect harmony and stability within its own niche, as 
Wirth’s idealized description of the living on the countryside (in contrast 
to urban life) presupposes, is unfeasible or even impossible. The inherent 
discomfort with the actual embodiment and objectif ication of human 
life urges us to continue acting, to become creative and to search for new 
possibilities. The special attractiveness of cities seems partly explainable 
on the basis of these anthropological insights, as the vast potentialities and 
contingencies of cities, at least in some respects, seem to come closer to what 
has been described as eccentric positionality. It almost seems as if modern 
urban life provides a partial realization of what we would otherwise only 
experience from our eccentric positionality. Does urban living indeed strive 
towards an eccentric existence? What Georg Simmel described as process 
of modernisation might then in philosophical anthropological terms be 
understood as a process in which we try to get closer to an eccentric urban 
world. An eccentric urban world in which the city is formed in such a way 
that it offers a maximum of different possibilities, different forms of com-
munity with many different groups and in which the city is experienced as 
a playground for creativity, for masking and de-masking in multiple ways, 
and for socialisation and privatisation, for performativity and for selectivity. 
While we set boundaries in the city, we also transgress these boundaries 
and move on. In this sense, these anthropological insights in urban life are 
also an important input for the currently popular theories on cultures of 
mobility (Sheller and Urry 2006), where urban life can be conceptualized as 
being permanently on the move, as a continuous becoming and overcoming. 
Seen from this point of view, creating a city environment is an enormous 
challenge for the concretization and design of urban life.
But before we hurry to go and create ‘the eccentric city,’ a word of caution 
should also be given. One has to be careful when trying to determine how 
the utopian position or a particular utopian city should look like, as such 
kind of objectif ications are bound to be unsuccessful. The oppositions in 
the three anthropological laws declare that we cannot be either/or and that 
we always have to be both at once: natural and artif icial; immediate and 
mediated; utopian and concrete.
Conclusion
What we learn from these elaborations is that a philosophical anthropologi-
cal approach to urban geography can indeed bring forward both a critical 
scrutinization of hitherto conceptualizations, as well as a number of hints 
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for future urban design. While the work of Simmel shows a number of 
relationships to the philosophical anthropology of Helmuth Plessner, 
the conceptualization of the urban by Louis Wirth does not reflect this 
anthropological sensitivity. This becomes understandable once we take a 
look at the broader setting in which Georg Simmel and Louis Wirth oper-
ated. As Rudolph Weingartner (1960), and subsequently Deena and Michael 
Weinstein (1993) show, Georg Simmel felt a close relationship with the new 
philosophy of life, which he tried to synthesize with the neo-Kantian legacy 
(Windelband, Rickert, Dilthey). At an early stage, he already dealt with the 
founding fathers of the philosophy of life, including Schopenhauer and 
Nietzsche, as well as with the work of Henri Bergson, whose Creative Evolu-
tion [L’Évolution créatrice, 1907] at Simmel’s instigation was translated into 
German by his student and mistress Gertrud Kantorowicz (Jung 1990, 13). 
Simmel is fascinated by the interplay between Life and Form. While Life, in 
the view of Simmel, should be understood as a continuous stream, forms are 
the points of rest and fixation as objectifications of the process of life, which, 
as such, also develop their own inherent dynamics. So mankind expresses 
itself in objectif ications, which Hegel designated as ‘objective spirit.’ These 
objectif ications reach from societal and state institutions, all the way to 
moral rules, habits, law, religion, art, and science, and not to forget, to 
architecture and urban design. While human beings need these objectif ica-
tions to survive, they are at the same time bound, restricted and reduced 
by them. Life needs forms, but simultaneously also needs more than just 
these forms, which once established, always hamper the pulsating stream 
of life (Jung 1990). The tragedy of life is that it is compelled to constantly 
objectify itself in forms. Unable to ever f ind comfort in these same forms, 
life is urged to transcend them in a perpetual cycle. Life appears both as 
unbounded continuity, as well as a bounded ‘I.’ Life always strives for more 
life (Simmel 1918, 12). Simmel describes this as a double boundary, implying 
that our existence can only be described in such paradoxical terms as ‘we 
are bounded in every direction, and we are bounded in no direction,’ and 
‘man is the limited being that has no limit’ (Weinstein and Weinstein 1993, 
105). In other words, human beings are defined as boundaries of boundaries, 
never able to be just one thing, and always remaining elusive (ibid. 219). 
In this way, the individual urban dweller is ever-resistant to absorption 
into the urban social totality. The metropolis is the site of critical tension 
inherent in the atrophy of individual culture through the hypertrophy of 
objective culture (109). This ambivalence of urban life shows great resem-
blance with postmodern thought. As such, Simmel can be characterized as 
a postmodernist avant la lettre at the height of modernism.
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Louis Wirth, on the other hand, took Simmel’s description more on its 
impressionist face value and applied it in a modernist way, which we can 
also describe as a behaviourist approach, describing urban forms – size, 
density and heterogeneity – as causal factors or independent variables, 
determining human behavior and human attitudes. This also suggests 
that one can inf luence human behavior by providing a certain spatial 
setting in such a way that the urban dweller can feel at home and in a way 
that lets urban communities f lourish. Thus, Louis Wirth was a child of the 
modernist tradition of his time. Even if one does not follow his generalized 
conclusions nowadays and accepts that urban realities are more complex, 
the behavioral and modernist implications of his observations can still 
hold some merit. What is missing in Wirth’s conceptualization of urban 
life, and in the work of many urban geographers in the same tradition, 
are the philosophical anthropological insights Georg Simmel anticipated. 
Not only are they extensively elaborated in the work of Helmuth Plessner, 
but they gained renewed relevance in the face of today’s late-modernist 
(Werlen 2009b) and post-structuralist (Baudrillard, Lyotard, Derrida, see 
also Weinstein and Weinstein 1993) social constructivism (Ernste 2004).
From this philosophical anthropologically informed point of view, we can 
at least enjoy an improved understanding of the dialectics of urban life, as 
Simmel described it. At the same time, we can better imagine urban designs, 
which anticipate the eccentric positionality and double boundary of the 
urban dwelling, as well as the eccentric and becoming qualities of the city.
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14 Strangely Familiar
The Debate on Multiculturalism and Plessner’s 
Philosophical Anthropology
Kirsten Pols
The groundlessness of multicultural society
For the purpose of inviting a new perspective to the debate of multicul-
turalism, I would like to present an account of what it is like to live in 
a multicultural society. This account is not from a personal or political 
perspective, but rather a description of two concepts (indeterminacy and 
embodiment) that are found in Helmuth Plessner’s philosophical anthro-
pology and political philosophy. These concepts highlight the aspects of 
subjectivity, intersubjectivity and culture, all of which are important when 
one wishes to investigate the tensions, problems and possibilities that arise 
in multicultural societies. They can help us understand why living in a 
multicultural society can be a liberating experience for some, while it can 
also cause anxiety to others, which then can lead people to change their 
attitude towards others from being open to becoming more defensive and 
exclusive. The key concepts in the following account are indeterminacy and 
embodiment. I took both concepts from Plessner’s work, and in this paper 
I will f irst briefly put these concepts in the context of Plessner’s own work 
and time, and subsequently make some suggestions as to how they will 
help us give an account of what it is like to live in our own time and society.
I will begin by giving a very short introduction to the debate on multi-
culturalism, after which I will leave this debate for what it is and try to give 
what I think is the best possible description of life in multicultural society. 
My account starts with Plessner’s ideas on culture and identity, which I will 
use to formulate what I imagine Plessner’s idea of cultural identity would 
look like; in Plessner’s social and political philosophy, our sense of identity 
is a continuous process of familiarizing with the unfamiliar and vice versa. 
I will illustrate this understanding of cultural identity with a short descrip-
tion of Plessner’s own experiences during his exile in the Netherlands. The 
aspect that is central to this experience, in a philosophical sense, is what 
Plessner – following Dilthey – calls the principle of Unergründlichkeit, 
a term that Plessner used in his political philosophy to emphasize the 
openness, unfathomability, and indeterminacy of human nature. This 
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principle of indeterminacy – as I will translate this term from now on for 
reasons I will explain in the next section – is found in Plessner’s three laws 
of philosophical anthropology and also in Plessner’s political philosophy. 
I believe it to be of importance for this paper because it opens the way to 
something unfamiliar and indeterminable that is part of our identity. The 
principle of indeterminacy also lies at the foundation of Plessner’s concept of 
power in his political philosophy. According to Plessner, politics is a process 
relying on the ability to familiarize oneself with the unfamiliar, and the 
power behind this ability is grounded in our indeterminacy. Indeterminacy 
is the power of the possible; it endows us with freedom and potentiality.
There is another aspect, however, that features mainly in Plessner’s 
philosophical anthropology, but which is also very important when it 
comes to an account of cultural identity, namely the aspect of embodi-
ment. Indeterminacy is not just part of our existence, but it is part of our 
life in society. This life is always experienced, f irst and foremost, in an 
embodied way. The relation between indeterminacy and embodiment will 
be explained in a short description of Plessner’s thoughts on laughing and 
crying. In the end, I hope to have demonstrated why Plessner’s concepts of 
indeterminacy and embodiment are important when we want to think of 
the best possible account of life in multicultural societies.
Multiculturalism
Commenting on multiculturalism requires me to give an overview of the 
most prominent positions in the discussion so far, and explain where I 
myself side and why I do so. The discussion on multiculturalism emerged 
out of previous discussions on subjects such as the level of representation 
of African American literature or feministic literature in the curriculum of 
universities, the legal situation of minorities, such as the French speaking 
Canadians. In this discussion, multiculturalists such as Will Kymlicka 
(Kymlicka 2002) and Charles Taylor (Gutmann 1994) have made important 
contributions in arguing that cultural identity should be recognized as an 
essential aspect of citizenship and the rights regarding this cultural identity 
should be protected and put forward as (at least) equally as important as 
economic rights. Liberal philosopher John Rawls puts forward an unencum-
bered subject at the foundation and center of his Theory of Justice (Rawls 
1971) and gives priority to redistributive justice rather than recognition. 
This stance put him and some similar kindred philosophers in opposition 
to communitarians who prioritize the importance of cultural recognition.
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As it becomes clear from Amy Guttmann’s book on multiculturalism 
(Gutmann 1994) and from the numerous other books and articles that dealt 
with the subject after that, the discussion on multiculturalism has far more 
than just two positions from which one can argue from. Furthermore, the 
focus and label of the discussion can range from “identity politics,” “politics 
of recognition,” to “politics of difference” and many more. The scope of 
the issue of multiculturalism – even just in the philosophical realm – has 
become too broad, too diverse, and too complex for me to attempt to touch 
on all of it in this article.
Fortunately, the most important aspect of the discussion with which 
this paper is concerned, does not require us to f irst get acquainted with 
all of the aspects, goals and players in multiculturalism. The recurring 
problem that I wish to highlight is the difference of opinion on what aspects 
of subjectivity and culture are of importance when it comes to political 
and social justice. While evaluating this discussion, I tried to answer two 
questions: 1. Is a (comprehensive) theory of the subject a necessary element 
in the discussion on multiculturalism, and if so, 2. What should such a 
theory look like in order to give the best possible account of the subject of 
life in multicultural society? For both these questions I have found Plessner’s 
work to be of utmost importance.
Cultural identity
Our ideas about our identity are as contingent as the concepts within 
our horizon to which these ideas relate. They have no ground outside 
of the horizon within which they originate. At the same time, when 
confronted, I can come to realize that my horizon is the one I am put up 
with: it is an inevitable part of me that I did not choose, yet for which I 
am nonetheless held responsible and accountable. Whenever we don’t 
take our horizon completely for granted, for example, when it is put into 
questionably someone else, it can also mean that our sense of identity 
and our self-image are put into question. That means that the contingent 
character of our cultural horizon can be felt as a threat to our sense of 
identity. In the normal f low of life, we may take our sense of identity for 
granted, as we are absorbed in the roles we have taken up, the roles and 
patterns that were obvious to us. That sense of identity also def ines our 
sense of integrity; as long as we act according to the roles, with their 
corresponding values, they give us a sense of direction and a sense of 
structure.
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The experience of losing that sense of structure and familiarity can be 
a disconcerting experience that truly shakes the ground under our feet. 
As an example, I shall use the experiences that Plessner described from 
the time he was forced to live as an immigrant in Groningen (Dietze 2006, 
99-186). Before he moved to Groningen, he was a citizen of Germany, but 
this was probably not a role by which he primarily used to def ine himself. 
More likely, he def ined himself as a scholar, a sociologist and philosopher. 
He came from a background of affluent German citizens. As a well-educated 
reflexive personality, he was capable of distancing himself from any rigid or 
absolute definitions of his cultural heritage or social class. Nevertheless, he 
described his time in Groningen and his attempt to f it in, as diff icult, pain-
ful and sometimes confusing. One of the f irst obstacles was that Groningen 
did not live up to his stereotypical expectations of the Netherlands (Dietze 
2006, 102). This impeded his integration efforts, since even stereotypes 
could have at least given him some clues to what he could expect and what 
would be expected of him in his new societal role. Instead, he found that 
he would have to reconsider what he thought he knew about the Dutch 
culture, what the rules, practices and customs were. This he could only learn 
through experience, by observing customs and regulations or bumping 
into taboos and sensitivities he did not know. He had to experience f irst 
hand that he could not simply grasp a situation, follow intuitions, but he 
had to develop a new sensitivity to the structure of situations. He lost the 
familiarity with which he used to address situations and persons. But he 
also described that in this process, he lost the familiar way in which he 
used to see himself, that for the f irst time, he started to see himself as a 
German. That must undoubtedly have lead him to the question of what this 
German identity meant, what it encompassed, which was certainly not a 
simple task at a time when the entire German identity was being redefined 
in the National Socialist regime. It is important to note here that what he 
encountered was not something strange that determined him from outside, 
but something strange that had already been a part of him. He encountered 
the Unergründlichkeit in himself, which always included the strange as part 
of the ‘own’ (das Eigene).
Plessner’s experience illustrates a concept, which he used in his philo-
sophical anthropology as well as his philosophical sociology, namely the 
Unergründlichkeit of human being (GS V, 161). As with many German con-
cepts, this one is diff icult to translate. Unergründlichkeit speaks for the fact 
that we can never get at the center of our being, never fully grasp what we 
are, even though it is exactly this concept of Unergründlichkeit that points us 
in the direction of who we are. It means that we have no essence, although 
strAngely fAMiliAr 265
Plessner is certainly not an existentialist. Since Unergründlichkeit also 
entails the fact that we are not determined by any essence of what we are, 
I prefer the translation of indeterminacy here. Though one must be careful 
not to confuse what I call indeterminacy with the idea of indeterminacy 
as something that has yet to be determined. This difference will become 
clearer in the following description of Plessner’s laws of philosophical 
anthropology.
The principle of indeterminacy is sometimes called Plessner’s fourth 
law of philosophical anthropology, though one could equally claim that 
the indeterminacy is a structure that is found in each of the three laws, 
the f irst of which is the law of natural artif iciality (Plessner 1975, 309). As 
a life form that is naked, split and incomplete, man has an artif iciality 
that is characteristic of his natural condition. Man, as a life form that is 
constitutively homeless, only has roots and a ground from which to exist as 
far as his natural artif iciality creates it and carries it. Culture, the realm of 
normativity, is the outcome of human existence and the only way in which 
he can exist: the cultural norms and values we live by have to have their 
own weight. Their necessary adaptation to the objective world grounds 
their validity as independent from us. This may seem contradictory to 
the idea that those norms are constructed by us, therefore it is important 
to remember that they are constructed by us only insofar as they are an 
outcome of our ontological condition, rather than being constructed by us 
in the constructuralist’s sense. The content of culture and normativity is far 
from absolute, but normativity and culture as such are an absolute part of 
the human being. They have their objectivity, which presents itself in that 
which we have to f ind or discover, as opposed to what can be constructed. 
Every product of culture has this structure of being dependent for its crea-
tion on human being(s) and being independent at the same time. Man, says 
Plessner, can only construct as far as he can discover.
As we bring culture into existence, we establish our relation to the world. 
This brings us to the second constitutional law of philosophical anthropol-
ogy, i.e. that of mediated immediacy (Plessner 1975, 321). In short, mediated 
immediacy encompasses the idea that, as man lives and at the same time 
leads his life, he does so in immediate relation to the world and experiences 
this relation in a mediated way. This means that we cannot speak of two 
parallel relations, a mediated and an immediate one between man and his 
world. It is f irst of all an immediate one, because man realizes the possibility 
that is already given in the life form of the animals. Yet, in light of his loss 
of innocence, this immediate contact has to be given to him in a mediated 
way. The loss of his equilibrial relation with nature, which animals still have, 
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is the key to understanding expressivity. Expressivity is the driving force 
behind the historical dynamic of human life. Our deeds and crafts, which 
are supposed to overcome the impossibility of an equilibrium, succeed in 
this task, but at the same time undermine this very relation they established, 
as they can only reach the natural world in an artif icial way. We try over and 
over again to become rooted in nature, each time with apparent success, 
but in the end to no avail.
The rootlessness that man tries to overcome in his mediated artif icial 
ways is grounded in a nothingness that constitutes our life form. The third 
constitutional law, the law of the utopian standpoint (ibid., 341), tries to 
describe mankind’s rootlessness in terms of the “nothing” that constitutes 
both man and his world. It claims that we always have to stand somewhere, 
be in and at a certain point in space and time, but at the same time, this 
position is not given to us immediately or unconditionally. We have to take 
a stand and be rooted somewhere and some time, but whichever standpoint 
we choose to take, it is always without a foundation in an absolute ground. 
There is no eternal or absolute point of view; there are always just positions 
we may occupy. These positions are necessarily groundless and so our 
position is always rootless. “As the eccentric positionality is precondition 
for the fact that man grasps reality in nature, soul and a world-along-with, 
so it simultaneously holds the necessity of recognizing its unsustainability 
and nothingness” (ibid., 346).1
In every one of these three laws, there is a tension between two aspects, 
aspects of being free and indeterminate and of being bound to the search 
of a natural equilibrium. This means that there is always an openness of 
the structure of the human being. This inevitably has consequences for the 
structure of our cultural identity, where the same principle of indeterminacy 
can be discerned.
The principle of the indeterminacy of the human being is important 
with respect to this paper, because it opens the way to including aspects 
of the unfamiliar within our sense of identity. If, according to Plessner, 
we always have to come to our familiarity through the unfamiliar, then 
our own self has carried within its boundaries aspects of the unknown or 
unfamiliar all along. The possibility of a subject that is completely familiar 
with every aspect of itself, thus completely transparent to itself, is excluded 
from this philosophy of human being: “The designation of eccentricity in 
terms of ‘transferral to the Otherness in one’s self’ (GS V, 231) leaves room 
1 The translations of citations in this text are all my own, except where no translation was 
needed, i.e. in the citations from Laughing and Crying (Plessner 1970).
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for an interpretation in which the self is already occupied by the strange, 
so the strange does not have to force entry from outside. The wavering 
frontline dividing the familiar and the strange is laid transversely through 
the self” (Arlt 1996, 115). Plessner did not create his philosophical anthropol-
ogy on the basis of the familiar characteristics of our species (rationality, 
language, meaning). Instead, he described structures that already include 
characteristics that we may not see as our ‘own.’ In this way he describes 
human being as constitutively homeless. Everything that is our home, that 
which we describe as familiar, natural, true to its nature and necessary, can 
only be attained if we abandon what we define as unfamiliar, unnatural 
and irrational. The friend-foe relation is one that transcends political and 
cultural relations between people and is always at work within every one 
of these relations. This is why this relation is central to what Plessner called 
his political anthropology (GS V, 139).
Political anthropology
Plessner starts with the observation that the question at the heart of po-
litical anthropology, i.e. the question about the relation between human 
being and politics, can only be adequately addressed within the domain 
of philosophy rather than within politics itself: “The foremost question in 
political anthropology: in how much does politics – the struggle for power 
in intersubjective relations between individuals, groups and the dealings 
of peoples and states – belong to the essence of man, seems to be only of 
philosophical relevance rather than political relevance” (GS V, 139).
Plessner deeply disagrees with such a division between politics and 
political theory on one side, and the issues of science, art, law and belief 
on the other. Practical politics needs to be pervaded with theory in order to 
lead to decisions, and forgetting this close relationship between theory and 
praxis can lead to bad politics as well as bad philosophy. “Here philosophy 
itself must interfere. It cannot do this by way of asking directly what the 
nature of the political is, pretending to comprehend it unprejudiced, instead 
philosophy must pay attention to the mode in which it asks the question, 
since philosophy itself will be put into question when asking about the 
nature of the political” (GS V, 141).
According to Plessner, the notion of power is what relates the f ields 
of philosophical anthropology to the f ield of political theory (or what he 
simply calls the political). His notion of power differs from the power of 
a leader, the political power of a state, or physical power. Instead, power 
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refers to a particular structure of human being. This structure arises from 
the indeterminacy, which I mentioned earlier: “that is why the possibility 
of humanity, which entails that which makes mankind into mankind, that 
is every human potentiality, must work with the stipulations set by our 
indeterminacy” (GS V, 161). The principle of indeterminacy is at work, not 
just in the object of philosophical anthropology, but also in the underlying 
framework from which philosophical anthropology works, and in every 
theory that aspires to touch upon aspects of human being, including politi-
cal theory.
A person – in the sense of Plessner’s anthropology – is never fully deter-
mined, neither by nature, nor by history. History itself is something that is 
always open to interpretation, something that can be taken up and changed 
according to who questions it. Thus mankind always begs a question that 
has no f inal answer. Man, never beyond question, is also power; since he is 
never fully determined by anything outside of himself, he will always have 
the power of possibilities. This shows striking parallels to Heidegger, where 
Dasein is determined as well as design (Heidegger 1927, 145). Only death 
may constitute the end of possibility (Heidegger 1927, 261). For Plessner, it 
is the process of ageing that signif ies the loss of some possibilities, yet is 
accompanied by the fulf illment of other possibilities. At the same time, it 
is also death that signals the limit of possibility (Plessner 1975, 169). Man as 
power is the aperture between history and future, only a snapshot moment, 
passed as soon as we begin to think about it. Yet no other species except for 
us has this aperture, this power to affect the future and history, endowed 
by our mere existence. According to Plessner, this structure, which he calls 
power, should have its proper place and signif icance in political theory. The 
structure of power endows man with potential, freedom and responsibility, 
and takes man as a force of change (GS V, 190, 200).
A political theory that incorporates Plessner’s notion of power as well as 
its implied idea of human nature and history, is opposed to political theories 
that reduce history to a single principle or to a purposeful movement towards 
a specif ic state of affairs. Any kind of essentialism, be it regarding a group 
of people, a culture, a race, or even history itself, is excluded from the kind 
of political theory Plessner’s anthropology implies. This also means that 
certain political systems could be criticized from the viewpoint of a political 
theory in which this idea of power has a place. The strongest example is a 
dictatorial system, where civilians are a mere complement to the dictator 
and there is no room for individual freedom. The principle of indeterminacy 
does not just exclude essentialism, historism and determinism with regards 
to our own Western culture, but it also affects the way we think about other 
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cultures and other eras “only in so far as we take ourselves as groundless, 
do we give up our position of supremacy over other cultures as is they were 
barbarians and only strangers, then we also give up on the purpose of a 
mission against the Other as were it an unabsolved and immature world 
and with that we disclose the horizon of our own history and present state 
unto a history that is open to heterogenic perspectives” (GS V, 161).
The principle of indeterminacy underlies power and our mental and 
practical skills. Our comprehensional skills are gained within the horizon 
of the familiar, which we strive to gain against the unfamiliar and the 
uncanny (unheimliche). This conflict between the familiar and the un-
familiar characterizes us as political beings, as everything we undertake 
is marked by the political struggle to gain the familiar at the cost of the 
alien (GS V, 191). The anxiety that accompanies our indeterminacy drives 
the political struggle. The anxiety that accompanies our indeterminacy 
has a structure that relies on our bodily existence. In order to give the best 
possible account of living in a multicultural society, we must therefore 
not forget to explain how this indeterminacy, which is such an important 
concept for Plessner’s political philosophy, is grounded in our embodied 
existence. The relation between our embodied existence and indetermi-
nacy is best described in Plessner’s account of laughing and crying, which 
I will brief ly elaborate on to highlight its relation and consequences for 
life in a multicultural society.
Our bodily existence in society
As I mentioned when explaining the three laws of philosophical anthropol-
ogy, we normally f ind ourselves having a position in the world, while we 
simultaneously have to take a stand in that same world. The world I am 
speaking of is a meaningful whole, a structure of sense, signif ication and 
intentionality. This entails the whole of meaningful situations in which we 
f ind ourselves in our daily lives and in which we can respond adequately 
most of the time. Plessner’s account of human expressivity in laughing and 
crying is founded in his theory of our eccentric existence as the embodied 
being we are. It is important to keep in mind that Plessner’s theory of laugh-
ing and crying only holds true if we discard the metaphysical tradition of 
treating body and mind as completely separate substances. Furthermore, we 
must start from the idea of our fundamental situatedness in the biological 
world, and our mediated and indirect relation in that same situatedness. 
As Plessner puts it:
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Animals behave according to the situation, follow its relationships (more 
or less), adapt to them or perish by them; man sees them [i.e. his relations, 
both in the world and between the world and himself. KP] and conducts 
himself in the consciousness of their organization – he articulates them: 
through language, through schematic projects for action and for shaping. 
He not only masters these relations, he also understands them as rela-
tions and can isolate the relation as such from the concrete situation. He 
must take them in some sense or other: concretely or paradigmatically, 
practically or contemplatively (Plessner 1970, 153).
But according to Plessner, we also f ind ourselves in situations in which 
we cannot adequately respond to the relations within and about it. It is in 
these situations that Plessner takes a special interest, because they mark the 
boundaries of our behavioral mastery. After the nature of our existence, it is 
a natural fact and at the same time our moral obligation to always respond 
to the situation we f ind ourselves in and take a stand in it.
Usually, in unequivocal situations which can be unequivocally answered 
and controlled, man responds as a person and makes use of his body 
for that purpose: as an instrument of speech, as a grasping, thrusting, 
supporting, and conveying organ, as a means of locomotion, as a means 
of signalling, as the sounding board of his emotions. He controls his body 
or learns to control it (ibid., 34).
According to Plessner, man has no choice but to respond somehow. At 
the same time, it is impossible to f ind an answer within the power of our 
ordinary expressive tools (i.e. language, action, etc.). It is in light of the 
absolute necessity and plight of taking a stand in answering to our situation, 
that a category of expressive movements, i.e. laughing and crying, can be 
specif ied as a singular category.
Plessner distinguishes expressive movement from gesture, bearing and 
gesticulatory language. Expressive movement is found in animals as well 
as humans, e.g. a dog wagging his tail, a chimpanzee baring his teeth, or an 
embarrassed girl who bows her blushing face. Expressive movements f ind 
a universal prevalence among peoples and periods; they have a compulsive 
onset and discharge in certain situations; and f inally they have a purely 
expressive and reactive character (ibid., 50-51). Expressive movements 
are opaque and immediate: “[t]he furrowed brow, the f lashing eye, the 
outthrust chin, and the clenched f ist are components of an immediately 
expressive language whose transparency refers ‘on its own’ to an emotional 
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state and is not f irst produced by the interposition of the person (as in the 
case of gesture)” (ibid., 54). In short: “[i]rreplaceability, immediacy, and 
involuntariness give laughing and crying the character of true expressive 
movements” (ibid., 56).
Plessner deals with this category by illustrating how a situation can 
make it impossible for us to answer to it as the person we are, while at the 
same time demanding such an answer from us nonetheless. This can be 
the case because a situation is ambiguous to such an extent that it cannot 
be resolved by gestures or language alone. In such instances, we erupt into 
laughter, our body responds in a move that is neither a gesture nor a posture, 
but still a meaningful expression. The expression is impersonal and direct, 
which means that the person we are recedes into the background and our 
body acts as the floor for an expression that comes from our impersonal 
embodiment. Its answer does not mean anything besides the expression 
of the fact that we are unable to respond to the situation through other 
means. There is no other adequate response, because any response can 
only touch one of the multiple layers of meaning, in a situation in which 
they overlap each other without neutralizing each other. Jokes usually use 
the ambiguity which they can provoke to make us laugh. They play with 
meanings and set them within a context in which we cannot make normal 
sense of what is meant, and we laugh. For example, this is why we laugh 
at the cartoon character Homer Simpson when he tells his wife, during 
what was supposed to be a deep and meaningful discussion: “Oh, Marge, 
cartoons don’t have any deep meaning. They’re just stupid drawings that 
give you a cheap laugh” (Irwin 2001, 92). That is also why we laugh when 
someone we take seriously as a person, all of a sudden pulls a funny face. 
We still recognize him in the situation as a person we take seriously, but 
in the same situation he acts in a non-serious way. We cannot choose to 
either take him completely seriously, because he is pulling a funny face. We 
also cannot simply abandon the usual serious attitude we have because the 
person pulling the face is still recognized as being the same person he was. 
The crossing point of the layers of meaning is what we understand as the 
point of the joke. And so we erupt into laughter, we retain the ambiguity 
of the situation and we manage to respond to the situation in one and the 
same movement. From here, we have no trouble regaining mastery over 
ourselves and the situation we are in, since we never completely lost that 
mastery, part of it remained in tact in the laughter.
However, a situation can also be unambiguous but laden with a meaning 
that is too overwhelming to be grasped by our comprehensive skills. We 
do not feel the tension of multiple layers of meaning overlapping, but we 
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feel incapable of grasping the full weight of the situation and respond to 
it adequately. Here we cannot respond with laughter, for in laughter we 
answer a situation directly and impersonally. In a situation that can lead to 
crying, there simply is no other adequate response because no response can 
do justice to the full scope of what is happening to us. It is not the intensity 
of a certain personal feeling that leads to crying, but instead, just as in 
laughter, it is the relational nature of the situation. We want to acknowledge 
the absoluteness of what is happening, and so we refuse to put things ‘into 
perspective,’ since for us there is no perspective in that moment, and so we 
surrender ourselves to our tears.
If we want to give an account of laughing and crying that reckons with 
the complicated psychophysical structure of these expressive movements, 
we must abandon the traditional split between body and mind and our 
conventional tendency reducing phenomena to either one of these realms. 
Hence, Plessner’s aim in describing laughing and crying is to explain and 
support his theory of eccentric positionality. In contrast to other bodily 
movements that we use meaningfully, e.g. speaking, shaping, acting, the 
body acts autonomously in laughing and crying. And only in a being that 
has an eccentric relation with his body, can the body act autonomously as 
the medium of meaning. Laughing and crying are exceptional because they 
make the unity of the body collapse, and they maintain it at the same time. 
The person retreats temporarily into the background as he let’s his body 
answer for him. The function of elaborating on these exceptional cases is 
to show the bodily nature of our existence and to emphasize the role of the 
body in the way we f ind and express meaning in our existence. That means 
it is also important to account for the role of our body in our relation with 
culture and society.
The cultural and the political
In light of the discussions on multiculturalism, I had posed the following 
questions at the beginning of this paper: is a (comprehensive) theory of the 
subject a necessary element in the discussion on multiculturalism? And if 
so, what should such a theory look like in order to give the best possible 
account of the subject who lives in a multicultural society? If we look at what 
Plessner said about the relationship between philosophical anthropology 
and political theory, the answer to the f irst question is aff irmative. The 
notion of power that is of central importance in political theory, is deeply 
connected to the way power features in the human being itself. The answer 
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to the second question is also derived from Plessner’s philosophy and has 
embodiment and indeterminacy as its central concepts.
If we want to give the best possible account of what it is like to live as 
a subject in multicultural society, we must also include our embodiment, 
as it plays such an important part in f inding and expressing meaning in 
our existence with each other. I think Plessner’s work is very fruitful in 
this respect, since his philosophical anthropology puts great emphasis on 
embodiment and at the same time gives an account of our embodiment 
that is open and complex enough to function well as a foundation for his 
political philosophical account of society. The openness that we f ind in 
his three laws of philosophical anthropology, and which accounts for the 
dual role that our body plays in situations such as laughing and crying, 
is the same openness that we f ind in Plessner’s account of power and 
indeterminacy when he writes about political philosophy. The fact that 
this openness is always correlated to our embodied nature closes the 
circle in which we tried to tie together his philosophical anthropology 
and political anthropology to give the best account of life in multicultural 
society.
If we agree with Plessner’s view of the political, which he sees as the 
matrix of relations that entails the exertion of our primary power in or-
der to familiarize the unfamiliar, then the political has been connected 
all along to the structures that we f ind in philosophical anthropology. 
Political theories that speak about society, always address the relations 
between groups and individuals, whether directly or indirectly. Any theory 
that wishes to do justice to those relations cannot avoid the principle of 
indeterminacy. The best possible account of what it is like to live in a 
multicultural society accepts that there is no singular relation between 
an individual and his or her cultural background, nor is there one between 
an individual and his or her body. Furthermore, it takes into account that 
the body plays an important role in the relation of a person towards his or 
her culture, not only in the sense that cultural expressions often involve 
the body, but also in that the relation towards the body is inf luenced 
by culture. None of the relations are straightforward or singular, all of 
them bear an ambiguity that we often wish to overlook in the hopes of 
simplifying the ethical discussions about cultural practices or group rights. 
A complex and ambiguous account of life in a multicultural society is not 
the easiest one to use in discussions on multiculturalism, but it might 
be able to build bridges in the discussions that more monistic accounts 
could not build.
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15 De-Masking as a Characteristic of 
Social Work?
Veronika Magyar-Haas
This article aims to examine the consequences for the analysis of the 
structural logics of social work, as well as for the analysis of professional 
social pedagogical acting, with Plessner’s interpretation of masks serving 
as a theoretical background. By referring to Helmuth Plessner’s approaches 
on “natural artif iciality” (GS IV, 383f.) and “ontological ambiguity” (GS V, 
63f.), it can be assumed that masks are indispensably relevant for social 
interactions. Masquerades presume a participant’s distance to himself, to 
others and to the situation. Analogously, de-masking is meant to reduce 
this distance by f ixing or suppressing behaviour with the help of certain 
contextual conditions. This interdisciplinary paper will tackle the empirical 
question of the constitution of agency in structurally de-masking, shameful 
situations.
The contribution is structured into f ive parts. After the introductory 
sequence (1) about the provoking undertaking to interconnect philosophical 
anthropology, social work and empirical research, I will sum up (2) the 
topicality of Plessner’s theory of masks. Next, I will reconstruct the pos-
sibilities of (de)masking on the level of structural logic (3) as well as in the 
actual practice (4) of social work. The paper closes with some continuative 
thoughts (5).
Interconnection of philosophical anthropology and social work
In the German context, the discipline of social work is not a discipline 
explicitly turning towards anthropological subject matters. Social pedagogi-
cal research deals with the reconstruction of circumstances and with coping 
the strategies of clients, as well as with the analysis of the conditions of act-
ing with regard to professionalism, organization, social structure and social 
policy. Despite all that, the renaissance of Plessner in the socioscientif ic and 
philosophical research appears – quite unhastily – in the social pedagogical 
context, too. This trend can be noticed when critics state that the discipline 
and profession of social work lacks an explicit, dispread and binding (or 
obligatory) idea of man. These opinions give rise to the propagation of 
276 veroniK A MAgyAr-hAAs 
Plessner’s concept of man. Carsten Müller even promotes it as an essential 
benchmark for professional orientation (Mührel and Birgmeier 2009, 201-11).
The idea to conceive an instruction for professional acting based on an 
anthropological perspective is somewhat naive, particularly if the anthro-
pology of Plessner is expected to foot the bill for this task. Plessner neither 
formulated an optimistic nor a pessimistic anthropological perspective. 
Hence, he did not draw univocal ethical conclusions from anthropology – 
which would be a fallacy according to Oelkers (1992, 159).
In this paper I argue that the force, strength, and the (social)pedagogical 
connectivity of Plessner’s anthropology is based precisely on his non-
categorical concept of man. On the basis of phenomenological analysis, 
Plessner reconstructs three “levels of organic being” (GS IV). Here, Plessner 
does not start with one’s own perceiving body, but with the distant object 
as it appears to perception (Fischer 2000, 271) and as it is related to the 
environment. Plessner conceptualizes human beings as “inscrutable” 
(unergründlich) and does not lay down any kind of catalogue of criteria 
(GS V, 160). Plessner applies the characteristic of “eccentricity” (GS IV, 364) 
as a metaphor for the insight that human beings are bound to the here and 
now, while at the same time create a distance to themselves, “put[ting] a 
gap between themselves and their own experiences” (GS IV, 363).
Thus, eccentricity is a “principally realized […] distance (Abständigkeit) 
of the human being to himself in his (outer-, inner-, con-)worldly references” 
(Schürmann 2006, 34). By this possibility of dissociation, by having broken 
up the bodily cohesion via eccentric circumstances, the human being 
may be and have a body at the same time (GS IV, 367). It is this ambiguous 
relation, the interconnection between being and having a body, between 
conditionality (Zuständlichkeit) and objectivity (Gegenständlichkeit), that 
the expressivity and instrumentality of the body (GS VII, 248f.) corresponds 
to as “two permanent dimensions of human expressive activity” (Richter 
2010, 12). In his philosophical work concerning expressivity, Laughing 
and Crying, Plessner marks the difference between mimic and gestural 
expression by means of the relation between the “form of expression” and 
the “content of expression” (GS VII, 260). Mimic insolvably merges the 
form of the expression with its intention or content. In contrast, gestural 
expressions show the separation of form from content and thereby the 
instrumental character of the relation to one’s own body. The interpretation 
whether an expression is actually mimic or a typically mimic expression 
(like the one expressing disgust) is utilized or stylized as a gesture (ibid.), 
though it depends on the social situation (ibid., 264) without having proof 
of the accuracy of the interpretation. In this sense, human beings cannot be 
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predefined, as the characteristic of a person (das Personenhafte) expresses 
itself by the performance between being and being-different.
Accordingly, after the reconstruction of Plessner’s approach at masks in 
the next chapter, the following questions seem to be relevant for the context 
of social work, in which “the preservation and the guarantee of the bodily 
and psychosocial integrity of each person in the sense of an accepted plan of 
the dignity of human beings” (Oevermann 1996, 88) serve as core criteria for 
professional acting: How does the constitutional non-fixability appear in this 
context? How broad is the scope for opportunity-relations? In which way do 
clients and professionals handle this scope? On the basis of these empirical 
questions, I will evaluate which new questions and cognitive interests arise, 
if Helmuth Plessner’s anthropology is used as theoretical frame of reference.
Plessner’s theory of masks
If Plessner’s anthropology (GS IV) is understood in relation to the philosophy 
of life of his time and to the discourses held about the difference between 
the animalistic and the human way of existence – which I consider to be 
necessary – then the current renaissance and topicality of Plessner’s theory 
may look amazing, but only at f irst sight.
The focus of anthropological reflections today lies on artif iciality. In 
the centre of these reflections, the potentialities of transformation (Ver-
wandlungsmöglichkeiten) of the human body by way of artif iciality have 
high relevance. The question is less that of the special feature of the human 
body. Instead, the question of interest could be: What exactly does sensory/
bodily perception mean, if this perception can be modif ied or switched off 
via artif icial implants, operations, the expunction of temporality, or of the 
presence of time of the body?1
In the following paragraphs, I will refer to the “anthropological fun-
damental law” (GS IV, 383) of “natural artif iciality” resulting from the ec-
centrical positionality. I will do this because, f irstly, the concept of natural 
artif iciality is related to current discourses, and secondly, because I think 
that this constitutional law explains human beings as by their nature be-
ing only conceivable as social (Rehberg 2008, 38), most explicitly in their 
socially graspable existence2. The existential brokenness of human beings 
1 I thank Rita Casale very much for these thoughts.
2 This is one of the arguments that Plessner had not conceptualized individual-related, rather 
a social-related ethics, as Fischer pointed out, too (Eßbach et al. 2002, 87).
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(GS IV, 383), the non-coincidence of the self with himself/herself, which 
constitutes the inscrutability, is also the foundation of the dependence on 
culture and artif iciality, and by analogy, the desire for masks. This non-
coincidence leads to a life of indirectness, serves as a decisive incitement 
of inter-subjective processes, and constitutes the interdependence of the 
self with others.
In The Limits of Community [Grenzen der Gemeinschaft, 1924], Plessner 
argues that because the soul is “becoming and being in one” (GS V, 62f.), it 
cannot sustain a definitive estimation or judgment and defends itself against 
any preliminary determination. But it is in need of authentic visibility, too, 
because “the soul suffers from nothing more than from being disregarded” 
(ibid., 64). Plessner metaphorizes this “ambiguous nature of the soul,” the 
simultaneousness of visibility and invisibility, of unveiling and disguising 
or covering, of recognisability and misjudgement as “ontological ambiguity” 
(GS V, 63). What follows are the two basic powers of human life: the urge for 
revelation, or the “need for recognition,” and the urge for restraint, called 
shamefulness (GS V, 63). The playful wresting (Entwinden) and the diverse 
possibilities of performance become obvious by this non-f ixability.
In conclusion, it may be stated that human beings are in need of (social) 
masks because their manner of existence is fulf illed in a dignif ied way 
(Haucke 2003, 41). Dignity – as a crucial point in Plessner’s philosophy – is 
“the idea of a harmony of the soul and between soul and expression, soul 
and body” (GS V, 75). Scopes and spaces of acting, possibilities of disguise 
and freedom of masks are essential for the protection of dignity and for 
granting this harmony, this balance between soul and bodily expression. 
Joachim Fischer sums up that “the mask is a desire of the soul, an invention 
of the mind and a performance of the body: it is an artif icial boundary of 
the expression” (Eßbach et al. 2002, 97). By limiting or preventing the scopes 
of acting (such as through complete frankness, as it is enforced by the com-
munity), by the momentary revelation of the soul, the harmony becomes 
brittle. The inscrutability seems to be voided by the f ixation of human 
beings and the limitation of their ability to mask. The loss of face resulting 
on the one hand from the risk of being laughed at, which is constitutive 
for the soul, and on the other hand from the conditions of social contexts, 
needs compensation, it has to be “dressed” via masks, or possibilities to 
disguise and to draw artif icial boundaries (GS V, 71f.), marked at the verbal 
or at the non-verbal level. These compensatory ways of behaviours allow 
for the protection of one’s own dignity and integrity.
Plessner is not the only one and not even the f irst who became fasci-
nated and stimulated by the manners of the seventeenth-century French 
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society aristocratic imprint, as Wolfgang Eßbach (2002, 73) pointed out. 
Dorothee Kimmich (Eßbach et al. 2002, 162) has shown the closeness of 
Plessner’s theory to the idea of mask freedom, Heinrich Heine’s “Masken-
freyheit” (Eßbach et al. 2002, 165f.). For Heine, the authentic expression 
of one’s own emotions – instead of playing with the masks – represents 
a kind of latent violence rather than a gesture of liberation. According 
to Kimmich, Heine connects the ethic of distance3 with the aesthetic 
of illusoriness. What makes Plessner so special is that he goes one step 
further: he explains certain elements of courtly-aristocratic performance 
by way of anthropology.
In the following section, I will analyze the relevance of this anthropologi-
cally sound social masquerade in the context of social work. The question 
becomes: Which scopes and spaces of acting, possibilities of disguise and 
freedom of masks are allowed, opened up, or constricted for protecting the 
dignity and integrity of the clients or addressees? The difference between 
client and addressee is not only semantic; as there has been a heavy theoreti-
cal discourse in the past few decades on these issues (Großmaß 2011).
De-masking features in the structural logic of social work
With the social-ethical reading of Plessner’s theory concerning artif iciality 
and the desire for masks (GS V, 41) there emerge three critical possibilities 
of connection on the dimension of the structural logic of social work. The 
f irst level concerns the construction of clients, the second level concerns 
conceptualisations of social pedagogical acting, and the third level of the 
analysis concerns research methods in the f ield of social work.4
The f irst level basically preoccupies itself with the question: social 
work – for whom? This question concerns the problem of identif ication 
and identif iability, which results from the social mandate with its nature 
of normalization. Potential addressees will be identif ied on the basis of 
3 Helmut Lethen explains (Eßbach et al. 2002, 39) this approach of distance-behavior by 
Plessner as a behavior of coldness. See the critical article to Lethen’s interpretation by Wolfgang 
Eßbach (2002, 63f.).
4 Some of the following paragraphs have been published in my article “Critique of the Com-
munity – Mask – Dignity: The Relevance of Plessner’s Ethics for Social Work,” published in 
Bettina Grubenmann and Jürgen Oelkers, eds., Das Soziale in der Pädagogik. Zürcher Festgabe 
für Reinhard Fatke (Bad Heilbrunn: Klinkhardt, 2009, 77-96).
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certain characteristics.5 Their circumstances and life plans will be accu-
rately described, and their situation becomes quite transparent through the 
process of software-based documentation. Thus, questions like: How could 
some kind of distance to the situation become possible, or how broad is the 
scope for playing with masks for possibilities to disguise, might become 
highly relevant here.
The second level of the interconnection hints at problems with some 
theoretical conceptions concerning social pedagogical, professional acting. 
The divergent procedure of prevention, social early warning systems, as 
well as the concept of evidence based practice, suggest the possibility of 
f ixation and predictability of prospective acting (Magyar-Haas and Grube 
2009), as well as the potential controllability of human relationships (GS 
V, 16). According to an article by Rabe-Kleberg, professionality lies in the 
active balancing of paradoxical situations, which in the context of social 
work can be countless (Combe and Helsper 1996, 285f.). The antinomy lies 
on the analytical level between two different ways of reasoning: f irstly, 
between the rationality of organization and the rationality of service, and 
secondly, by the double mandate to serve both the society and the client.
As a criterion of professionalism, Gildemeister und Robert postulate the 
development of strategies which are based on knowledge and are orientated 
towards the situation and towards the clients to recover from their hurt and 
vulnerable integrity (Müller et al. 2000, 319). Furthermore, professionalism 
means the realization of “communicative symmetry,” which presupposes 
cooperativeness as well as trust – on the part of the clients. It is remarkable 
that with most profession-theoretical concepts, the focus lies primarily on 
the professionals. Even if the relationship between client and professional 
is conceptualized as intersubjective and interrelational, a rather passive 
role is ascribed to the client. They are supposed to follow the intentions 
and guidance offered by the professional. Clients are supposed to cooperate 
and have trust in the setting, while professionals are supposed to manage.
Quite seldomly does the social-ethical perspective of the concept of trust 
(Brumlik 2002) come to the fore. This requires cross approval and respect, 
as well as possibilities to keep one’s distance, to wear and play with masks 
and the trust not to be f ixed or defined according to certain characteristics. 
The potentiality of de-masking appears particularly in the institutional 
5 Weakness and unwillingness to work are the most used characteristics in the political 
and public discourses. In the German context the clients of social work are strongly exposed 
to labeling as “new underclass” (Nolte 2004, 35, and also see the critical perspectives by Kessl 
2005 and the Kessl et al 2007).
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context. De-masking means – referring to Plessner (GS V, 70-76) and Heine 
(in Kaufmann 1972) – the demolishing or tearing down of masks and, in 
analogy to this, the narrowing of the possibilities of concealment and 
agency. In Helmuth Plessner’s anthropology, masks serve as constitutive 
elements of the human being, of being a person. According to this, processes 
of identif ication, “clientif ication,” or the tendency to make clients more 
transparent, would serve as an attempt for de-masking.
I come to the third level in my analysis of the structural logic of social 
work, where I will pursue the question of what kind of new knowledge and 
incitement arise on the level of social pedagogical research if the theory of 
masks, conceptualized by Plessner, serves as a theoretical background. The 
reading of Plessner’s approach scrutinizes the suggestion of the evidence-
based practice that research could provide explicit instructions for acting in 
professional practice. Analogous to this logic, the client would be construed 
as a passive “type” and accordingly, professionals could f ind the “problem 
to the solution” (Pfadenhauer 2005, 12). Furthermore, even in the case of 
evidence-based research results, applying generalities to individual cases 
would be as naive and inadmissible as to generalizing from one individual 
case to the whole population. Empirical research provides empirically based 
results and produces knowledge which can serve as a context of reflection 
for professional acting.
In the context of social work, there is a desideratum of research about 
the tactics of clients, about their handling of shameful situations in the 
context of social work. The question seems to be relevant to what kind of 
scope can be used for playing with masks and for gaining some distance to 
the situation in order to protect the integrity of professionals and clients.
In the article “The Social Production of Clients,” Sarah Hitzler and Heinz 
Messmer (2007) show through their research concerning the analysis of 
conversations in the semi-annual care planning reviews, the performative 
construction of clients via social addressment, identif ications, objectiva-
tions, and social categorization (in Ludwig-Mayerhofer et al. 2007, 47f.). 
The conceivable tactics of clients in this specif ic, hierarchical situation 
have no relevance for their interpretations. Paying attention to Plessner’s 
anthropology, the tactic of not saying anything could be seen as the last, 
scanty option of escaping from being completely f ixed (Canetti 2003, 337f.).
By concentrating on clients in the social pedagogical f ield under the 
perspective of freedom of mask, the sequences of the conversation during 
care planning reviews could also be analyzed, in spite of the dramatic situ-
ation, as a kind of context-sensitive play, as a self-determined actionability 
of the client: like engaging with the situation, staging himself/herself as a 
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client, bursting out with laughing, not signing the documents and so on. 
Such a performance requires a certain distance to the situation, which 
happens rather seldomly under hierarchical conditions.
De-masking features in the practice of social work
By exploring an empirical example,6 the fourth part of this paper focuses 
on the following questions: How and under which conditions do processes 
of de-masking emerge? How do clients and professionals handle situations 
characterized by de-masking? What kind of possibilities become obvious by 
the bodily-spatial action context? These questions will be pursued on the 
basis of audiovisual empirical data that was recorded at a youth centre, in a 
social-pedagogical context of open youth work. The social-scientific method 
of video-interaction-analysis (Knoblauch 2009) allows for the interpretation 
of nonverbal forms of expressivity such as gesture and facial expression, 
behaviour patterns and ways of life, as well as the analysis of processes 
of de-masking and potentially also re-masking in a certain context. A 
transcribed excerpt of a videographed girl’s parliament meeting, taking 
place bi-weekly, is shown below.
In the context of a girls’ parliament meeting at an open youth institution 
with 20 participants, Anne reports that Nicole, a girl “of their’s,” went 
to her friend Susy and told her that Anne was exploiting her. The social 
pedagogue asks the girls what they make of it. The girls sit on chairs, 
arm-chairs or on the sofa, all arranged in a circle. They predominantly 
look at the f loor in the middle of the circle or look at Nicole or Anne. 
Some girls have crossed their arms in front of their breasts and move 
towards the backrest, support their thighs with their hands or leave 
their hands rest on their laps. Helen, who is sitting on the sofa next to 
the social pedagogue, says while bending the upper part of her body 
forward: “Okay, eh, I think, sh, why should you, even if, let us say, let us 
say, eh?” and looks at the two others who are sitting next to her on the 
sofa with a grin. She looks backwards and laughs. “Eh, let us say, Susy is 
6 This abstract of a video-ethnographic report as well as several aspects of the following 
analysis have already been published in German language in my article “Subtile Anlässe von 
Scham und Beschämung in (sozial)pädagogischen Situationen,” in Arbeitskreis Jugendhilfe im 
Wandel, ed., Jugendhilfeforschung. Kontroversen – Transformationen – Adressierungen (Wies-
baden: VS, 2011, 277-289). See this article for further thoughts on theoretical approaches to shame 
and humiliation.
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exploiting Anne, eh, and we all know this, but after all, we don’t have any 
reason – excuse me – after all we don’t have any reason, have we? To go 
to Susy or to Anne and no. To Susy?” While speaking, Helen looks at the 
two girls sitting together and mutually caressing their arms alternatingly. 
“To Anne,” says Susy. Helen is smiling and continues, while focussing 
Nicole and bending forward even further: “To go to Anne and say, Susy 
is exploiting you. Because, what will she do? What will she do then? Yes, 
you all know very well, if she goes there, to Anne and says, yes, Susy and 
so, what will happen? Stress. Eh, trouble. And that is her aim, that is what 
she wanted to achieve. Eh, let’s ask Nicole, when you went to Susy and 
told her everything, what was your aim? What did you want to achieve?,” 
asks Helen, f irmly gesticulating with both hands while speaking. “I didn’t 
want to achieve anything,” Nicole replies while moving with her chair 
slightly out of the circle and looking at Helen. During Helen’s speech she 
looks at the floor or at the plush duck she holds in her hands. “And why 
did you say that?” asks Helen. “Because, I had said it already, for me it was 
a joke, but perhaps it is not a joke for you, so –,” she stops and throws the 
plush duck back and forth. “Yes, but what did you want to achieve with 
this? With this joke?” “I did not want to achieve anything,” says Nicole. 
“Why why why to them? Why, let us say, why didn’t you go to Monica and 
tell her this?” “Because, perhaps because Susy was then standing beside 
me?” A girl from the circle joins the dialogue between Helen and Nicole: 
“Eh only because of having fun or something like that?” “Okay, I won’t 
say anything at all” – says Helen.
In the presence of all the girls at the youth centre during the girl parliament 
meeting, a conflict between two girls is quasi-publicly discussed. In the 
following paragraphs I will give an analysis of the kinds of conditions that 
are straitening the ability of masking.
The social and off icial function of the girls’ parliament meeting is 
primarily education towards democracy, in the sense of Dewey (2002). 
In addition to the aspect of democracy, the establishment of a discursive 
setting has high relevance for professionals. Rituals provide reliability, have 
something confidential and make a contribution to integrate individuals 
into a group – or even a community. Yet at the same time, rituals are one of 
the most effective social strategies for establishing and intensifying social 
power as well as hierarchy structures in a very implicit way (Butler 1993).
In the girls’ parliament meeting, everyone is sitting in a circle. The circle 
is quite a popular shape in the various pedagogical contexts as outlined 
by Magyar-Haas and Kuhn (in Tchibozo 2010, 7-15). The idea behind it is 
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equality and a reduction of hierarchical relationships in order to have the 
possibility of looking into each other’s eyes and thereby receive the full 
attention of the other person. However, participants in circle rituals are 
always completely physically exposed to other people’s views, without 
any chance to avoid them. They cannot stay out of the group’s sight, which 
constructs a paradoxical situation. Based on his theory of recognition, Em-
manuel Levinas (1998) pointed out that others are constitutive for the self, 
particularly for self-awareness. At the same time, it is also the gaze of others 
which might make someone feel ashamed (Sartre 1993). Jean-Paul Sartre 
points out the existence and significance of others by the analysis of shame. 
There would be no shame for the lonely self. In the face of the shameful 
gaze of others, a person perceives and sees herself or himself compared to 
the benchmark set by others. Sartre considers the expression of shame to 
be chiefly an internalization of power. Due to the restricted possibilities to 
evade or compensate, the potential shamefulness of a situation becomes 
particularly increased when sitting in a circle. The possibilities to make a 
stand, and to compensate behaviour are limited in this potentially shameful 
and de-masking situation.
The reserved position of the bodies of the girls, such as folding their arms 
or pressing their bodies to the back of the chairs indicates the desire to 
keep some distance to a situation when they are discussing private affairs 
in public. In the scene presented above, the girls in the circle are discussing 
what somebody has done and why she did so. During the discussion about 
this topic, the girls’ parliament meeting gradually shifts into a tribunal. This 
occurs with reference to an orientation towards norms. On the basis of the 
differentiation between the dimensions of I and We, or from the analytical 
perspective, between private and public, it will be demonstrated by how 
little space is left for playing with roles and masks, in a setting which is 
predestined for role-playing.
The scene is a diametrical debate between Helen and Nicole. Helen’s 
dominating position results from the power of verbalism and from her 
bodily position, from her moving to the frontline. She argues while playing 
the role of an advocate. Helen demonstrates her solidarity with Anne and 
with the shared norms of the collective, which are symbolized through 
Anne. The girls stage closeness and intimacy by laughing together and by 
leaning their bodies towards each other.
During her speech, Helen addresses a girl sitting in the circle with her 
eyes, and after a while also verbally by saying “Let’s ask Nicole.” Nicole, 
holding a soft duck toy in her hands, avoids eye contact with Helen. She 
looks at the floor, at the girl beside her, at her duck and so on, but not at 
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Helen. Nicole uses the variability of this spatial arrangement and tries to 
move away with her chair from this pedagogically arranged circle. She 
keeps the others at a distance and is kept at a distance by the girl to her 
left. She will be construed and identif ied as “guilty” by means of a specif ic 
bodily-spatial context, by gazing at her and by repeating the same questions: 
“Why?” and “What did you want to achieve with this?” With these questions, 
Helen refers to the intentionality and responsibility of acting. She expects 
rational arguments from Nicole, but instead only receives the reply “for me 
it was a joke.” This seems for Helen not a reason at all. This setting (the form, 
the spatial arrangement and the discussed topic) do not really leave room 
or scope for getting out of the situation. The hurling of the duck by Nicole 
serves as a comment on the created constraints of justif ication.
The implicit topic of the setting is to f ind out if Nicole is part of the 
group, whether or not she is part of the “us.” This “we” is construed in the 
scene in a performative way: “and we all know this, but after all, we don’t 
have any reason.” Nicole takes up this differentiation. She addresses Helen 
not as a single person, but as a representative of the whole group with its 
shared norms. Nicole says: “for me it was a joke, but perhaps it is not a joke 
for you.” Because of the supposed intentional violation of the norms of the 
group, Nicole risks sanctions in the form of being excluded. In this sequence, 
Nicole has reduced possibilities of gaining some distance to the situation 
and drawing artif icial boundaries that are essential for saving one’s face 
and dignity. “Losing honour is losing face,” as Agnes Heller (1985) pointed 
out. Nicole is publicly exposed and unmasked by the de-construction of her 
status as a person, by tearing off her masks.
This conglomeration of space, setting and a specif ic topic, construct a 
potentially shameful situation. In this might lie the power of shame. On the 
basis of the allegation of guilt, the group is construed and the legitimacy of 
its norms is re-produced.
The lack of possibilities to compensate in shameful situations results 
from a situation of powerlessness. The social worker is sitting beside Helen, 
but she does not intervene and it seems that she does not really feel well 
about the situation.
Conclusion
If the mask is supposed to protect oneself from the tyranny of intimacy 
(Sennett 2008), it is relevant to consider the social and spatial conditions 
of masking and de-masking, too. The situation has shown that the room 
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for disguise or for handling potentially shameful situations like this may 
be quite narrow. Shameful situations can serve as a method for taking 
human beings to the common values of the group and for internalizing the 
predominant norms of the collective. According to this, the phenomenon of 
shame and of de-masking would be a method of socialization – and herein 
lies the power of shame (Heller 1985). Loyalty to the norms of the group, like 
the norm of appreciating the private sphere, serves as the most signif icant 
norm in the sequence. The paradoxical side of this is that precisely this 
norm of appreciating the private sphere is demanded through the lack of 
appreciation of this norm in the context. Because here, in this setting of 
the girls’ parliament meeting, a conflict between two girls is discussed in 
public, in the presence of all the girls at the youth centre. In this sense, the 
scene reminds of an ostracism.
In most pedagogical situations, moralization seems to be established 
as a method of integration of the youth into the predominant system of 
norms. In addition, social work fulf ils an explicit role of normalization. This 
is the reason why in social pedagogical f ields of acting, it is getting more 
important to consider the situational conditions of the genesis of shame. 
If we want to understand social work as a profession of justice (Schrödter 
2006), the right to dignity and integrity is of high relevance, too. These are 
formidable challenges for social work, which cannot be considered only 
at the intradisciplinary level but also require reliable interdisciplinary 
and international perspectives and debates. The connectivity of Plessner’s 
masks approach, even to the social work, could be illustrated at the level 
of discourse, research and actual practice.
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16 Helmuth Plessner as a Social Theorist
Role Playing in Legal Discourse
Bas Hengstmengel
Plessner’s social philosophy
Relatively independent of his anthropological groundwork in Die Stufen 
des Organischen und der Mensch (1928), Helmuth Plessner developed a 
philosophy of the public sphere in some of his other works. In his social 
and political works Grenzen der Gemeinschaft (1924), Macht und menschliche 
Natur (1931), Diesseits der Utopie (1966) and Die Frage nach der Conditio 
humana (1976), he presents a philosophy of public life as a sphere of social 
roles, prestige, ceremonial, tact, and diplomacy. Man is regarded as a role 
player who wears masks. Although Plessner does not develop a complete 
social, political or legal theory, his work contains important building blocks 
for other theories in these f ields. In my view, social role playing is a key 
concept for enabling Plessner’s work to contribute something fruitful in 
these domains. Given this connection, this concept is the central theme 
of this chapter.
Interestingly, Plessner’s thoughts on man as a player of different social 
roles has the potential to mediate between his anthropological theory 
and his social (or sociological) theories. One of the f ields of social theory 
in which role playing has a clarifying potential is that of legal discourse, 
more specif ically the purpose and function and functioning of the legal 
process. Legal subjects in a process can be regarded as prototypical role 
players, as their action potential is strictly framed by process law, practices 
and customs. Plessner’s notion of social roles can offer a model for the legal 
subject as an abstract bearer of rights and duties. Unfortunately, social role 
theory is rarely discussed among legal scholars. In this chapter, I try to f ill 
this void by presenting some elements of a Plessnerian theory into legal 
discourse. I relate Plessner’s thoughts on social roles and the public sphere 
to relevant thoughts of some other social theorists, especially to Niklas 
Luhmann’s sociology of law.
The chapter is structured as follows. Firstly, I discuss some key elements 
in Plessner’s social philosophy. Secondly, I briefly discuss some comparable 
elements in the thought of Sennett, Tonkiss, Arendt and Huizinga. Thirdly, I 
discuss Luhmann’s sociology of law, with an emphasis on the legal process. 
290 bAs hengstMengel 
Next, I try to integrate these perspectives into a more comprehensive ap-
proach. Finally, I make some concluding remarks by showing some threats 
in Plessner’s perspective to both the stability of the self and the stability 
and functioning of the legal system.
Plessner’s social role theory
Plessner elaborated the notion of the “indeterminacy” (Unbestimmtheit) of 
man, both as an ontological and social ambiguity. In Die Stufen, the ontologi-
cal ambiguity is understood as “eccentric positionality.” In his social and 
political works however, the position of man is not so much characterized 
by the recognition of man’s individuality in the ontological Mitwelt, but 
by the indeterminacy and invulnerability of the inner man in relation to 
his social surroundings. The emphasis is not on the ambiguity of human 
nature, but on the ambiguity of the human soul. It is the “despair of his 
inwardness” (Verzweiflung seiner Innerlichkeit) that forces man to search 
for “roads to invulnerability” (Wege zur Ungreifbarkeit) (Plessner 2002, 92). 
Here, the concept of social roles is crucial for understanding these “roads.”
In order to function in public life, man needs the equipment of a mask 
that hides his interiority, but at the same time enables him to interact 
with his environment. Because of the ambiguity of the self and the doubt 
about his interiority, man needs “roads to invulnerability,” just like he needs 
ceremonies and prestige (Plessner 2002, 79ff; Richter 2005, 165). Man has 
to play roles, but can never be def ined by any of them. In this sense, he is 
a “Doppelgänger”) (Plessner 1974b, 30). Man cannot do without continuing 
self-exegesis. He never is anything, but he constantly becomes something. 
He has to “lead” his life (Dallmayr 1981, 71, 73). He is neither an angel, nor an 
animal; he is the only one that appears as a Doppelgänger. He only becomes 
a self through the doubling as a role f igure (Plessner 1974b, 33). Because of 
his roles, he has an intimate sphere (Dallmayr 1981, 73).
Whereas on the outer side man is the f igure of his role, on the inner side 
he is a self (Plessner 1974a, 20). This self, however, cannot be conceived of 
as something separated from its social role, as it would thereby lose its 
humanity. In other words, there can be no inner man without an outer man. 
The outer man makes the inner man possible (Plessner 1974b, 30). On the 
inner side, man can never be one with his “self,” but can only be one with 
something, with someone, with “me.” On the outer side, he can only meet 
others through a role (Plessner 1974a, 20). The social role enables a person 
to stay socially untouched to a certain extent, and to have a zone of privacy, 
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intimacy and personal freedom. A role secures a certain respect for the 
individual and protects him from his public character (Plessner 1974b, 26). 
Therefore, he cannot escape his situation as a Doppelgänger.
Man as a “defective being” (Gehlen’s Mängelwesen), needs culture (“natu-
ral artif iciality”) to live and a role to have an identity. In the classical notion 
of the theatrum mundi, every man has a f ixed role to play in the order of 
being, that is to say, his identity is his role. With the birth of the modern 
“I,” the private identity is separated from the public one. The roots of this 
development can already be found in Augustine’s “inward turn” (Taylor 
2003). In contemporary, functionally differentiated society, one man can 
play many roles that need not be connected at all. His private identity “hides” 
behind the roles that he plays. Moreover, the inner side is often regarded as 
the “authentical” real, while the outer side is viewed as “unreal” and artificial. 
According to Plessner, however, there is no inner man without an outer one.
In Plessner’s conception of social roles, the playing of roles is not so much 
an alienation of the self, but to the contrary, the roles make it possible for 
man to embody himself. Through role playing, he can learn about himself 
and others (Dallmayr 1981, 76). Public life, according to Plessner, can be 
regarded as a “basic form of human coexistence.” It is essential for human 
beings to have a zone in which they are strangers to themselves. This zone 
is the public sphere (Plessner 1974a, 10).
The concept of public sphere or public realm is complex and much dis-
cussed, e.g. by Arendt, Habermas and Sennett (see for example, Delanty 
2007 and Lofland 2007). When talking about the public sphere, one can, 
for example, distinguish between the public-political, public-social and 
personal-social sphere (Van Gunsteren 1998, 138). Plessner loosely and 
sometimes ambiguously uses the term Öffentlichkeit (the public). It covers 
all the aforementioned categories. Öffentlichkeit is the opposite of man’s 
internal-psychological sphere; it is the opposite of the indeterminacy and 
invulnerability of the inner man in relation to his social surroundings. 
Therefore, man is as much a role player in family life as he is in, for example, 
his occupational life or in politics.
The public sphere, according to Plessner, is the open system of interaction 
between unbound people. It is loose enough to absorb the “fluctuations of 
life” in all its shades and let it pass through it. This open system of interaction 
particularizes into peculiar spheres in accordance with specif ic classes of 
values, such as the spheres of law, morality, education, the state, economics, 
and human interaction on the individual level.
According to Plessner, the public sphere is the sphere of Gesellschaft, i.e. 
the sphere of “the rules of the game” and the exteriority of the action (cf. 
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Max Weber’s Verantwortungsethik). This is contrasted with the sphere of 
Gemeinschaft, i.e. the sphere of seriousness, intention and conviction (cf. 
Max Weber’s Gesinnungssethik). Especially in Grenzen der Gemeinschaft, 
Plessner warns against a conception of society as a closely tied community. 
Even common values function to arrange human interaction. They are not 
the characteristics of a “real” community (Plessner 2002, 95).
The public sphere is a horizon of possible connections between a varying 
number and kind of people. It begins at the same boundary where love and 
kinship end. Just how there cannot be any identity or self without a role, 
there can be no closed community without there also being a public sphere 
(Plessner 2002, 55-56). The public sphere can be regarded as a “hygiene 
system of the soul.” It has the possibility to relax the “tense face of humanity” 
and to release it in a culture of impersonality (Plessner 2002, 133).
It is role playing that makes society possible at all, because if every self 
would throw off its mask, society would disintegrate into a war of everyone 
against everyone (Plessner 2002, 81). In return, it is also society that makes 
role playing possible. The role that an individual has to play in society can 
never be independent of other people and structures. A role makes demands, 
because it is part of the functional connection of the social whole (Plessner 
1974a, 19-20). In addition, a role brings along expectations.
The public sphere cannot do without forms. Social conflict and impulses 
need to be articulated, canalized, and sometimes even suppressed. In the 
public sphere, the observance of forms has the same purpose as the obser-
vance of the rules of a game. In public life, people appear in functions and 
roles, thereby making the public life become like a game in front of people’s 
true nature (Plessner 2002, 83).
The play of forms
The importance of keeping a healthy distance between an inner and outer 
life is also stressed by Richard Sennett in his work The Fall of Public Man 
(1974). Sennett suggests that an anonymous, impersonal public sphere is a 
necessity for human (social) life. Only by keeping a certain distance, life 
in the public domain becomes possible. Sennett very strictly separates the 
public domain from the private domain. The public domain here is “the 
world of strangers,” and specifically refers to urban people who do not know 
one another in person. Sennett rejects the “intimate society” in which an 
ideal of authenticity dominates, because according to him, “every self is in 
some measure a cabinet of horrors” (Sennett 1992, 5; Taylor 1991, 25ff, 43ff.). 
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Therefore, “the absorption in intimate affairs is the mark of an uncivilized 
society” (Sennett 1992, 340). Sennett emphasizes the importance of civility, 
which he describes as “the activity which protects people from each other 
and yet allows them to enjoy each other’s company.” In other words, “[c]
ivility is treating others as though they were strangers and forging a social 
bond upon that social distance” (ibid., 264). Civility is a formality, respecting 
a distance in order to prevent the public sphere from becoming unlivable. 
Through keeping people at a distance, living together becomes possible. 
Sennett points to the classical tradition of the world as theatrum mundi, 
the playing of social roles and the expectations associated with them. He 
also points at the wearing of “masks” that hide the individual’s feelings and 
emotions. He states: “Wearing a mask is the essence of civility” (ibid., 264). 
Sennett stresses the importance of suppression of emotional inner life more 
so than Plessner does. Plessner’s emphasis lies on man’s “indeterminacy,” 
although he does not ignore the necessity to suppress emotional inner life.
The wearing of a mask and the playing of a role could, to a certain extent, 
be regarded as an indifference towards the “real” person. Fran Tonkiss, a 
sociologist at the London School of Economics, seems to go further than Sen-
nett and Plessner in appreciating the function of distance in this context. In 
her studies on multicultural city life, she develops an “ethics of indifference.” 
She stresses that indifference is not necessarily bad. Living side-by-side is 
better than living face-to-face (Tonkiss 2003). She calls for a re-valuation of 
urban indifference as a moral minimum, for “indifference as a politics of 
tolerance, by default, as it were” (ibid., 301). That does not exclude aff inity 
groups. Tonkiss states that “an everyday politics of difference in the city at 
times works through an ethics of indifference” and “that there are positive 
claims for what can appear as a negative relation” (ibid., 309). This is an 
interesting approach, although I think the ethics of indifference needs 
clarif ication and specif ication concerning the handling of inevitable social 
conflict. Tonkiss would also have to clarif ies how indifference is shaped, i.e. 
is it just indifference to the difference of the other, or is the other as such 
ignored? In either case, Sennett’s and Plessner’s respect for social distance 
and social roles is aimed at forging a social bond and framing a structure 
of expectations, both protecting the self and the other.
The themes of masks, role playing and forms reappear in Hannah Arendt’s 
conception of the public domain. However, she adds the notion of law into 
the discussion. Longing to escape the meaninglessness of life, man has to 
leave the private domain and enter the public domain, in which continued 
recognition can be gained. An artif icial common space is necessary for man 
to speak and act in public. When individuals come together, there has to be 
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a certain distance between them at f irst. In this sense, the public domain 
is an in-between-space. It both separates and connects individuals. “The 
public realm, as the common world, gathers us together and yet prevents 
our falling over each other, so to speak” (Arendt 1998, 52). The law has 
the important function to structure communication through rules and 
procedures. An important aspect of this is the equality of individuals. Here 
the artif icial nature of the public domain comes clear, because people aren’t 
equal by nature. It is the law that makes them artif icially equal (isonomy) 
(Arendt 1990, 30-31). The law also brings continuity throughout generations. 
Laws “guarantee the pre-existence of a common world, the reality of some 
continuity which transcends the individual life span of each generation, 
absorbs all new origins and is nourished by them” (Arendt 1968, 465).
When entering the public domain, individuals need to put on a mask, 
as they simply cannot enter this artif icial sphere without it. For example, 
when entering a legal process, individuals cannot do without the mask of 
a legal person (legal subject). In this regard, Arendt discusses the Latin 
term persona: “In its original meaning, it signif ied the mask ancient actors 
used to wear in play. […] The mask as such obviously had two functions: it 
had to hide, or rather replace, the actor’s own face and countenance, but 
in a way that would make it possible for the voice to sound through. At any 
rate, it was in this twofold understanding of a mask through which a voice 
sounds that the word persona became a metaphor and was carried from 
the language of the theatre into legal terminology. The distinction between 
a private individual in Rome and a Roman citizen was that the latter had 
a persona, a legal personality, as we would say; it was though the law had 
aff ixed to him the part he was expected to play on the public scene, with 
the provision, however, that his own voice would be able to sound through. 
The point was that ‘it was not the natural Ego which enters a court of law. 
It is a right-and-duty-bearing person, created by the law, which appears 
before the law” (Arendt 1990, 106-107).
The artif icial persona enters the public stage, hiding our natural being, 
and presenting us as equals (Waldron 2000, 209). Through the mask, the 
play-character of the legal process can be recognized.
Plessner regularly refers to the book Homo ludens (1938) of the Dutch 
historian Johan Huizinga (Richter 2005, 178ff.). In a fascinating chapter 
about play and law, Huizinga writes: “Contest means play. […] The playful 
and the contending, lifted on the plane of that sacred seriousness which 
every society demands for its justice, are still discernable to-day in all forms 
of judicial life” (Huizinga 2003, 76). Three play-forms are recognized in the 
legal process, namely the game of chance, the contest, and the verbal battle. 
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Huizinga gives some lively examples, ranging from the drumming-contest 
among Inuits to the potlatch. Whereas according to Plessner, man needs 
culture to live, Huizinga claims that man is also a homo ludens who produces 
culture by playing. Plessner suggests that society as such lives “in the spirit of 
the game.” It is in playing that man reaches his highest freedom, because he 
then can gain a distance from himself. Too much directness would deaden 
the human soul (Plessner 2002, 91, 94).
Different terms are used by Plessner, Sennett, Arendt and Huizinga to 
denote the same phenomena. Whether it is called role, form, mask or play, 
it is artif iciality and formality that bring a healthy distance into human 
interaction. The legal process is a prototypical example of artif iciality and 
formality. Legal subjects are individuals who are acting with a persona, 
wearing a mask and playing a highly structured role.
Legal discourse
As I mentioned before, Plessner’s thoughts on man as a role player has 
the interesting potential to mediate between his anthropological theory 
and social (sociological) theories. His philosophy can, for example, give an 
anthropological basis for the theory of adjudication as developed by Niklas 
Luhmann in his book Legitimation durch Verfahren (1969). I will introduce 
the gist of Luhmann’s theory.
Luhmann’s sociology of law is based on systems theory. An important 
element in his approach is the way it deals with the complexity of the world. 
Reality encompasses a chaotic amount of potential actions. In other words, 
there is a huge contingency. According to Luhmann, modern society is so 
complex that each of us can only control and understand a small part of it. 
In order to function in this immense complexity, a reduction of complexity 
must take place. This is precisely the function of systems. Fundamental 
to the systems theory of Luhmann is the distinction between system and 
environment (Umwelt). Each system structures a part of the world. It offers 
a limited number of action alternatives and makes the behavior of others 
predictable. Social systems are meaning systems of social action and create 
normative expectations. Particular social activities are associated with a 
particular system and are marked off from the systems environment. We 
can connect this to Plessner’s notion of role playing and interpret a role as 
a part of the normative expectations in a certain system.
Luhmann regarded law as an autonomous subsystem of society. Society 
understood as a system, has a functional differentiation into various sub-
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systems. These subsystems (law, politics, economics, etc.) have a certain 
amount of autonomy, i.e. they have their own rules and roles. Focusing 
on the typical civil law process, Luhmann distinguishes between three 
dimensions of autonomy within the legal process. First, there is temporal 
independence; the legal system determines its own pace and terms. Then 
there is judiciary discretion: the judge is not a robot that applies rules, 
but has some autonomy. This makes the outcome of a process uncertain. 
Third, there is also social autonomy: there is a difference between being 
legally right (the “legal truth”) and being factually right. The legal process 
is separated from social life at large.
According to Luhmann, a role is a set of behaviours expected of a person 
in a certain position (such as judge or plaintiff). Parties themselves give a 
more specific interpretation of their role, also known as the process strategy. 
Because of their specif ic role (such as that of a plaintiff), the parties in the 
process do not participate with their whole person, or their whole self. When 
they lose the case, it is not the whole person that is affected, but only the 
person as a plaintiff, under a given article of the law, in this specif ic case. 
The decision is a “single binding decision” in a particular case (Luhmann 
1983, 41). This makes the loss more bearable.
The legal process also includes a specif ic communication and setting 
(terminology, forms of address, clothing, physical setting, etc.). This creates 
detachment from the rest of society. The courtroom does not encompass 
all aspects of reality. A person who enters the courtroom must therefore 
choose a certain role and operate in accordance to it. The party that does 
not want to observe this distance will lose the case. Without autonomy 
and distance, the decision of the judge will be harder to accept in society.
Because of the different roles, each party is forced to study the situation of 
the other party, creating a certain distance from their situation and position. 
This factor also contributes to making the outcome more readily acceptable. 
By choosing an interpretation of their specif ic role, parties choose to play 
the game, thereby getting “trapped” in their role. When they lose, one can 
say that it has been their own choice to follow a certain process strategy.
The legal process can be seen as a trap (like a f ishing pot), in which the 
conflicting parties are forced to reformulate their social conflict in legal 
terms. Everything that exists outside of the system of law, such as conflicts, 
interests, complexity, subjectivity, and notions of truth and justice, has to 
be translated into rights, rules, procedures and evidence that are accepted 
and acknowledged within the legal system. This is a reduction of complexity, 
since only those aspects of a conflict that are legally relevant are allowed to 
be included in the process. After the parties have been forced to focus on 
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the legally relevant aspects of the conflict and have given their views, the 
judge is obliged to make a verdict. In this process, a legal truth is developed. 
A judge’s verdict requires yet another form of complexity reduction.
Integrating perspectives
Luhmann’s theory of adjudication can be regarded as somewhat cynical 
and technical. At its core, the legal process has nothing to do with truth or 
justice, but only with the production of binding decisions. This is certainly 
a different discourse than the one of Plessner, who writes about law as a 
sphere associated with a specif ic class of values, as aforementioned. Justice 
is certainly one of these values (Plessner 2002, 95). There are, however, 
interesting elements in Luhmann’s theory that can very well be connected 
to Plessner’s anthropology.
According to Luhmann, the parties in adjudication are forced to study 
the situation of the other party because of the different roles they play and 
the strategies they follow. Likewise, in Plessner’s social thought it is through 
role playing that man can learn about himself and others (Dallmayr 1981, 76). 
Social relations are characterized by a “reciprocity of perspectives.” Man chal-
lenges and questions existing social arrangements and his relationship with 
others (Dallmayr 1981, 75). This can lead to a social conflict that can eventu-
ally be reformulated as a conflict in legal terms. This is a way to canalize the 
conflict, throwing a distance between the parties through which they can be 
reconnected. In the words of Chantal Mouffe, the battle between antagonists 
(“enemies”) should become a battle between agonists (“adversaries”). Thus, 
antagonism has to be transformed into agonism (Mouffe 2000, 103).
Here, Plessner’s notion of diplomacy can be introduced. Diplomacy is 
the art of solving conflicts in such a way that the dignity of the other party 
remains unaffected. The other party should be left with the impression 
that he is free to act or “surrender” on the basis of a voluntary decision, 
or should ascribe a victory of the other party to objective forces (Plessner 
2002, 99). Tact is related to diplomacy and respecting the other person. It 
is also the art of not getting too close to the other and not being too open 
to the other. Indirectness is a uniquely human ability, while directness can 
also be found in other animals (Plessner 2002, 106-107). Just like civility, 
diplomacy and tact constitute a buffer against social conflict. However, 
conflict cannot always be avoided.
Our society has built the structure of the legal process that allow us to 
translate social conflicts into legal conflicts and then f ind an appropriate 
298 bAs hengstMengel 
solution for legal conflicts. This legal solution need not be a real solution to 
the social conflict. It is only an artif icial solution to live with the conflict by 
forcing the conflict into an irreversible and f inal legal solution. Essential in 
Luhmann’s theory of adjudication is that parties can more easily accept the 
loss of a case because they are playing a role without being identical with 
this role. They are therefore able to identify with the other party’s position 
and arguments (Rollenübernahme). The forms of the process contribute to 
that. There is, however, another element of interest. Through his role, man 
is also like a mirror to other men. Through identifying with the other party’s 
position and arguments, man can learn not only about the other party, but 
also about himself from the perspective of the other party (Dallmayr 1981, 76).
Social roles construct a social identity, but also a self that is being protect-
ed by the role that one plays. Inevitable social conflicts have the potential 
to disarrange the proper functioning of roles by hiding the self behind the 
roles. A shield against social conflicts is formed by civility, diplomacy and 
tact. Law can also be regarded as a medium to structure societal life and 
to formulate binding expectations, thereby avoiding conflict. However, 
the legal system is also a safety net. When social conflicts arise, they can 
be reformulated into legal terms, thereby reducing the complexity of the 
potentially comprehensive conflict. The function of the legal process is to 
bring individuals together by separating them at f irst. The “rules of the 
game” provide equal chances to each party. By forcing the parties to play a 
specif ic role with a limited action potential, the conflict is reduced to the 
level of role playing. The self of the parties, especially of the losing party, 
stays relatively untouched. The legal process also has the potential of letting 
the each party learn about the other party as well as themselves.
Concluding remarks
Plessner’s notion of man’s Unbestimmtheit has interesting parallels to 
Arendt’s conception of the meaninglessness of the world and Luhmann’s 
emphasis on the complexity of the world. The public domain canalizes 
this contingency by offering social roles. In addition, Sennett emphasizes 
the social importance of role playing. The social role can be regarded as 
an instrument to explore the world and the self as well as a buffer against 
“undesirable intimacy.” The ambiguity of the human condition in Plessner’s 
conception parallels the ambiguity of the social role.
Applied to a legal context, the social role can be a fruitful concept for 
understanding the functioning of the legal system in general, and adjudica-
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tion in particular. Huizinga, Arendt and Plessner all agree on the acting-
character of the law, i.e. its roles, rules and symbols. Every person involved 
in a legal process is playing a certain role. Using the concept of role playing, 
Plessner analyzes human role playing at an anthropological level, while 
Luhmann analyzes it at a sociological level.
There are, however, different threats to both the stability of the self and 
the stability and functioning of the legal system. According to Sennett, 
the increasing public exhibition of the private sphere and the strive for 
authenticity are a danger to society. After the fall of the public man, legal 
discourse has become a dominant and common form in contemporary 
liberal society. However, the more the modern citizen identif ies with his 
comprehensive legal status, the more he is def ined by it, and the more 
he loses his self in this role. The relationship between private and public 
identity falls out of balance. When man has the illusion of no longer playing 
any role, but to “be” a legal subject, he endangers his self. This equates to a 
reif ication of man into legal structures. The tension between man and his 
roles eradicates (Dallmayr 1981, 76). As a result, the self gets “sucked” into 
the legal system, leading to phenomena such as the loss of any distance 
between a legal process and the full complexity of social reality.
According to Luhmann, the legal system, and more specif ically, the 
legal process, can only function when the “authentic self” is left outside 
of the courtroom. It is essential for role playing that there is a distance 
between the self and the role. The rejection of roles and the withdrawal 
into private “authenticity” makes society a hollow artifact (Dallmayr 1981, 
76). Ceremonies and other forms should not be discredited in a society, as 
they keep individual personality and human dignity at high esteem. It is 
a meaningful way to protect the individual soul (Plessner 2002, 87). Man 
inevitably has to be a Doppelgänger to protect the self and society.
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17 Habermas’s New Turn towards 
Plessner’s Philosophical Anthropology
Matthias Schloβberger
Habermas’s problems with philosophical anthropology in the 
1960s and 1970s
It is quite common for opposing views to shape the evolution of a writer’s 
theoretical approach. However, one might argue that Jürgen Habermas 
delineated his stance towards other authors or traditions of thought 
with exceptional clarity. One of the most important confrontations he 
sought out was his engagement with philosophical anthropology. From 
the late f ifties to the early seventies he was very critical of this tradition. 
His primary opponent was Arnold Gehlen, who focused on the human 
being as an agent and held that anthropology should be unequivocally 
empirical and free of metaphysics. These ideas were not too far away from 
Habermas’s own project of developing an anthropological underpinning 
for human socialization (and thus also for the development of morality 
and his theory of communicative action) by engaging with each individual 
branch of empirical science. Yet, the political implications Gehlen derived 
were directly opposed to Habermas’s aims. Gehlen suggested that due to 
the indeterminacy and malleability of human nature, human beings need 
the protection of strict institutions. His recourse to human nature thus 
served to substantiate a normative political theory.
Habermas considered Gehlen’s theory of institutions conservative and 
reactionary, which led him to attack it in no uncertain terms. Both the 
overlap between his subject matter and Gehlen’s anthropological inquir-
ies, as well as the similarity between his ideas and Gehlen’s pragmatist 
answers increased his burden to provide a clear differentiation between 
himself and Gehlen.1 Here, he criticized Gehlen’s most basic anthropological 
assumption, namely the notion that human beings, unlike animals, are 
open to the world in the sense of being able to adapt to different environ-
ments. Habermas sided with Rothacker, who contended in contradiction 
with Gehlen that just like animals, human beings always live in certain 
environments (Habermas 1958), thus generally criticizing Philosophical 
1 See Habermas 1987.
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Anthropology as an attempt to ascertain commonalities among human 
beings. Habermas was concerned that the acceptance of anthropology 
as a foundational science of some kind might lead to the demand for it to 
also provide the standards for a social theory, which would undermine the 
idea of a developmental process of the species.2 The objection to Gehlen 
spread from its main target to Plessner’s and Max Scheler’s anthropological 
approaches – since Gehlen’s notion of human beings as open to the word 
originated in their work – even though Habermas ultimately had other 
crucial reasons to distance himself from Plessner. Thus, the shadow of 
Habermas’s critique of Gehlen touched Plessner as well, although the latter 
had consistently and explicitly opposed Gehlen’s theoretical claim that 
the lack that marks the human condition (menschliche Mängellage) neces-
sitates compensation by way of strict institutions (Plessner 1963, 50). This 
created the impression of a strict opposition between critical theory and 
philosophical anthropology, even though Habermas’s critique of Plessner 
was rooted in different a motivation. While Gehlen was seen to laudably 
and consistently emphasize the natural intersubjectivity of human beings, 
Plessner was casted as the philosopher of subjectivity. Habermas contended 
that Plessner derived all cultural achievements of the human species from 
some type of original subjectivity and thus could not properly understand 
the interrelation between symbolic mediation, work, and interaction.3
To this day, Habermas has neither revised nor modif ied his derogatory 
assessment of philosophical anthropology. Even though he used some of 
Plessner’s ideas in his latest works on the ethics of the species and the future 
of human life as a critical part of his argument, he still did not reconsider 
his earlier critical stance on philosophical anthropology in general.
In this essay, I argue that in order to introduce certain ideas of Plessner 
into his philosophical approach, Habermas would have to revise some of 
his basic assumptions. In his most recent publications, Habermas himself 
seems to recognize that his approach so far is lacking a certain explanatory 
2 See Lepenies 1971, 86. Wolf Lepenies clearly states that Habermas’s objection goes too far, 
since he argues against anthropology in general while making use of it for his own theoretical ap-
proach. “We can detect a recourse to anthropological constants in both Gehlen’s and Habermas’s 
writings: However, while Gehlen reacts to those who would change not only the institutions 
but also the mind with a resigned reference to biology, Habermas confronts the revolt with the 
vision of a utopia based on anthropology; the realization of this utopia requires the immediate 
transition to a domination-free communication and it is judged according to its achieved degree 
of realization.”
3 See the unoff icial transcript “Probleme einer philosophischen Anthropologie” [Problems 
of a Philosophical Anthropology] of a lecture 1966/67.
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power, but to date he has not clearly acknowledged the scope of the changes 
necessitated by this realization. I believe that it constitutes a paradigm 
shift away from the philosophy of language towards a philosophy of the 
expressions of living beings.4
I will proceed in three steps. First, I will present the problem and de-
scribe the position Habermas develops in his essay “The Future of Human 
Nature” [“Die Zukunft der menschlichen Natur. Auf dem Weg zu einer 
liberalen Eugenik?,” 2001], highlighting his favorable reference to Plessner.5 
Subsequently, I will outline Habermas’s original view of philosophical 
anthropology. Finally, using Habermas’s understanding of Plessner’s take 
on “laughing and crying” (Plessner 1941) as an example, I will show that his 
critical aff irmation of Plessner does not go far enough to allow him the use 
of Plessner’s philosophy of the living.
Habermas on the future of human nature: making use of 
Plessner’s distinction between being a body and having a body
The fact that advances in technology make pre-implantation diagnosis 
possible gives rise to the question of whether it would be permissible to 
make use of such technologies, and whether we ought to do it or not. We 
are in a position to make irreversible decisions about the “natural” traits of 
another person (Habermas 2001, 14). There are two problems that need to be 
addressed: f irst, the repercussions such an intervention by parents or other 
persons would have for the self-conception of the individual in question, 
and second, “whether the fact that one was conditionally created and had 
one’s right to existence and development dependent on genetic screening 
is consistent with the dignity of human life” (ibid., 20).
Habermas worries that the “knowledge of one’s hereditary features as 
programmed may prove to restrict the choice of an individual’s way of life, 
and to undermine the essentially symmetrical relations between free and 
equal human beings” (ibid., 23), as there can be no self-critical appropria-
4 The paradigm shift seems to announce itself in Axel Honneth’s writing and his theory of 
recognition, as well (Honneth 1992). There is no explicit debate about the linguistic paradigm, but 
in the early eighties Honneth, in cooperation with Hans Joas, criticized Habermas for deriving 
intersubjectivity from language, rather than deriving an account of language acquisition from 
the understanding of expression. See for a clear turn towards the paradigm of expression: 
Meuter 2006, and my own attempt: Schloβberger 2005, about the experience of the other by 
understanding his or her expressions.
5 The citations within this chapter refer to Habermas 2001.
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tion of one’s own developmental history under genetically manipulated 
dispositions (ibid.,14). He realizes that this is where his post-metaphysical 
abstention – or arguably his programmatic relativism – reaches its limits: 
“As soon as the ethical self-understanding of language-using agents is at 
stake in its entirety philosophy can no longer avoid taking a substantive 
position” (11). After all, this question involves the “inconspicuous normative 
interplay between the inviolability of the person which is imperative on 
moral grounds and subject to legal guarantees and the natural mode of 
the person’s physical embodiment which is something we cannot dispose 
over” (ibid., 20-21). He begins with a substantive statement articulated as 
an intuition: “On the one hand, we cannot, from the premise of pluralism 
ascribe to the embryo ‘from the very beginning’ the absolute protection 
of life enjoyed by persons who are subjects possessing basic rights. On 
the other hand there is the intuition that pre-personal human life must 
not simply be declared free to be included in the familiar balancing of 
competing goods” (ibid., 42).
It is crucial to note that Habermas falls back on a moral intuition. He 
does not try to hide that this question is very problematic for him. To the 
contrary, he has always been very clear on this point: “Only if they are 
neutral with respect to various worldviews or comprehensive doctrines 
can propositions on what is equally good for everybody claim to be, for 
good reasons, acceptable for all” (ibid., 10). The problem is that he did not 
previously develop a conception of human nature and of human life, or 
an anthropological account of the human species, beyond the statement 
that human beings are beings capable of language and reason. There is a 
reason for his passivity: his concept of the human being was based solely 
on the philosophy of language. According to Habermas, human beings are 
what they are because they live in an intersubjective language community. 
This has signif icant ramif ications for the concept of human dignity, and 
Habermas himself is very much aware of this fact. According to him, the 
concept of human dignity in a strict moral and legal sense is bound to the 
symmetry of relations intersubjectively constituted qua language. Thus, 
human dignity is not something we possess by nature, but is rather a func-
tion of reciprocal recognition within interpersonal relations (ibid., 33). “As 
a member of a species, as a specimen of a community of procreation, the 
genetically individuated child in utero is by no means a fully fledged person 
‘from the very beginning’” (ibid., 35).
This is why Habermas insists on a distinction between the dignity of 
human life and the human dignity guaranteed to every person (ibid., 35). 
In order to substantiate his intuition that selective genetic manipula-
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tions in the early stages of a human life are problematic because they are 
incompatible with the notion of the unavailability of a person’s fate and 
therefore undermine character development, as the person experiences his 
or her own fate as determined by others, Habermas falls back on Plessner’s 
anthropological theory. Because his theory of character development 
is based solely on the philosophy of language he has no concepts at his 
disposal to describe the early stages of human life – let alone the way 
human beings have related to their “living body” (Leibkörper) during the 
course of their whole life – and this makes Plessner’s theory very attractive 
to him.
Accordingly, Habermas writes with reference to Plessner:
A person ‘has’ or ‘possesses’ her body only through ‘being’ this body in 
proceeding with her life. It is from this phenomenon of being a body and, 
at the same time, having a body [Leibsein und Körperhaben] that Helmut 
(!) Plessner set out to describe and analyze the ‘eccentric position’ of man. 
Cognitive development psychology has shown that having a body is the 
result of the capacity of assuming an objectivating attitude toward the 
prior fact of being a body, a capacity we do not acquire until youth. The 
primary mode of experience, and also the one ‘by’ which the subjectivity 
of the human person lives, is that of being a body (Ibid., 50).
This argument from Plessner’s theory seems very convincing to me. We 
acquire the structure of eccentric positionality, the interplay of being a 
body and having a body, in the course of our socialization. If we no longer 
experience our living body with all its def iciencies as something naturally 
unavailable, but rather as determined by others, this would radically change 
the way we relate to it – and the outcome would most likely be highly 
problematic, since knowing that one’s own “nature” is determined by oth-
ers would surely make it much harder to deal with it. Our lives would be 
characterized by a violent moment of heteronomy that could never be 
reversed or corrected.
While I f ind Habermas’s argument very plausible, it seems quite prob-
lematic from the viewpoint of his own theory. In his previously espoused 
universe def ined strictly by the philosophy of language, there is no room 
for a sophisticated concept of human vitality as suggested by Plessner’s 
distinction between being a body and having a body. Although Habermas 
looked favorably upon Plessner’s idea of “eccentric positionality” during the 
seventies, he went on to criticize it in a way that seems to miss Plessner’s 
actual point. I will return to Habermas’s stance towards Philosophical 
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Anthropology at a later point to explain why he fails in his attempt to pro-
vide Plessner’s approach with a foundation in the philosophy of language.6
Habermas and the tradition of philosophical anthropology
Debates on philosophical anthropology during the sixties and seventies 
focused primarily on Arnold Gehlen, who seemed to pursue the project 
Scheler and Plessner had begun in the most thorough and topical fashion. 
However, the assumption that Scheler, Plessner, and Gehlen together form 
the core of a tradition of thought called philosophical anthropology is highly 
questionable. All the while, there are reasons for grouping them together 
in this way. There are a number of striking similarities in each of their 
famous central works of anthropology (Scheler 1928; Plessner 1928; Gehlen 
1940) marking them as, in fact, anthropological writings. All three authors 
make use of human-animal comparisons and refer to the same sources: 
They discuss Wolfgang Köhler’s experiments with chimpanzees, Jacob 
von Uexküll’s theory of environment (Umweltlehre), and other writings 
that describe human beings as open to the world. Furthermore, all three 
subscribe to an idea once succinctly articulated by Gehlen. The human 
being is by nature a cultural being (Gehlen 1950, 4).
However, this short list seems to already exhaust any unconditional 
commonalities. From here onwards, the three authors differ in the way 
they make use of human-animal comparisons and in their respective sub-
stantiation of the idea that the human being is by nature a cultural being. 
Though a more thorough examination will reveal other major similarities, 
these are restricted between Scheler and Plessner due to their common 
phenomenological starting point, and there are also a number of crucial 
differences. Both Scheler and Plessner start by positioning the human being 
as a living being within the chain of such beings. This approach should not 
be confused with a return to the pre-Darwinian Aristotelic Chain of Being 
(scala naturae). Rather, it attempts to discover interconnected moments 
on each level. It is also a phenomenological approach, both because living 
as such is taken to be a primitive non-derivative ontological category, and 
because the differing manifestations of life (roughly: plant, animal, human) 
are not seen as mutually reductive, either. This is not a rejection of the theory 
6 It is interesting to see that this in particular made him more receptive to Plessner’s ideas. 
Other authors with a very different philosophical background, such as Robert Spaemann, also 
mentioned this in a positive reference to Plessner (see Spaemann 1996). 
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of evolution. Philosophy is not charged with the burden of having to give a 
documented account of the actual transitions that occur in nature and that 
can be established within a complete history of evolution – even where they 
are no longer observable because certain links are missing due to extinc-
tion. Instead, it should demonstrate how certain characteristics are linked 
together on a given level of life and how those characteristics are integrated 
or taken up on the next level.7 Concerning the sphere of human beings, this 
involves the discovery of conditionalities: intersubjectivity is only possible 
because human beings can understand each other via the expressivity of 
their living bodies. They live both with and within their living body. Even 
though they can relate to it as an object, they are not in complete control 
of it, as phenomena such as laughing and crying illustrate. Scheler’s and 
Plessner’s basic idea could be described in the following way: none of the 
moments that characterize a human being as such can be derived from any 
other such moment. To understand them, we need to conceptualize them 
as interlocking and interacting components of a structure that can only be 
described but not deduced.
Plessner’s term for this basic structure is as apt as it is succinct: eccentric 
positionality (Plessner 1928). The human condition is eccentric, because 
similar to other mammals, human beings live outwards from their center 
(typically, they are not reflectively conscious of their bodies), but this pre-
reflective being-in-the-world can always be shattered in a way that is very 
different from traditional reflective self-consciousness. A human being’s 
reflective relation towards his living body is revealed in phenomena like 
shame: a being of pure reason could not be ashamed, since it has flawless 
control of its body. Human beings who are bound to their living body (Posi-
tionalität) feel the gaze of others. Not only are they incapable of escaping this 
scrutiny, but they also feel ashamed, because they realize the vulnerability 
of their living body no longer being within their own control.8
While Plessner used many ideas from Scheler’s anthropological writings 
when developing an original approach, he did not remain committed to 
7 Gehlen always rejected the idea of such a chain of stages and insisted on treating the human 
being as of a separate and independent natural design. See his seminal remarks in the f irst 
chapter of “Man: His Nature and Place in the World” as well as the posthumously published 
text “Über den Cartesianismus Nicolai Hartmanns” (1952).
8 Scheler, who does not use the terms centric/eccentric or positionality, but effectively 
describes the structure of the human condition in the same way as Plessner, used this example 
(Scheler 1957).
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the metaphysical charge Scheler gave them. This is why he is much more 
attractive to contemporary thinkers than Scheler.9
One difference between Gehlen’s theory and the approaches of the other 
two authors is that the human-animal comparison led him to the following 
contention, which is central to his theory: human beings are not governed by 
their instincts (Instinktentbundenheit). His description of human beings as 
naturally lacking (Mängelwesen) serves to underline this point rhetorically. 
His other thoughts, such as the idea that social institutions are needed as 
compensation – to safeguard the constantly endangered lives of human 
beings – build on this idea. Gehlen focuses on the question of how human 
beings can survive in light of the danger they face?
In Scheler’s and Plessner’s approaches, however, the human-animal com-
parison plays a very different role. They use it to show that the similarities 
between human beings and animals are linked to the differences between 
them. Their subject matter is the basic structure of the human condition. In 
Plessner’s terminology, if certain beings live their life in an eccentric way 
because beyond merely living, they also experience their own experiences – 
or, if for such a being “the alteration from being inside his or her own living 
body (Leib) to being outside of the body [is] an irreducible double aspect of 
his or her existence, a real fracture in his or her nature” – what then follows 
from this? They live on both sides of the dividing line, as soul and as body 
(Körper) and as a psycho-physically neutral unity of those spheres (Plessner 
1928, 292). The German concept of the living body is crucial for understand-
ing this point. It describes not merely the combination of body and soul, but 
rather an encompassing unity, the idea that body and soul as concepts, i.e. 
as categories we use to orientate ourselves in the world, are derived from 
the notion of the living body. Closely connected to this is the concept of 
expression. The idea of expression or expressive behavior is complementary 
to what is called living body in the phenomenological tradition. What can 
be observed about the living body in its behavior is called expression. Only 
the psycho-physically indifferent living body displays an expression, as the 
unanimated body alone is not capable of this. When we perceive a child’s 
joy in its smile, as Scheler’s famous example puts it, we do not see muscle 
contractions and subsequently deduce a certain state of mind. Instead, 
we immediately observe psycho-physically neutral expressive behavior. It 
is precisely in the smile of a child where we perceive its joy (Scheler 1923; 
Plessner and Buytendijk 1926).
9 For a more detailed explanation see Schloβberger 2006. In contrast, Fischer 2008 argues 
that the approaches to anthropology by Scheler, Plessner, and Gehlen are in fact closely related.
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Thus, taking the psycho-physical indifference of perception (psychophy-
sische Indifferenz der Wahrnehmung) as the starting point is a crucial choice: 
at f irst glance, we see neither a mental nor a physical phenomenon. All 
perception is perception of a psycho-physical expression. We only cultivate 
the two directions of perception (Anschauungsrichtungen), psyche and 
physis, and learn to differentiate between the living body (Leibkörper) 
and the souled or inspired body (Leibseele) in the course of our cognitive 
development (Scheler 1915). Human beings begin their lives within their 
living bodies facing outwards, and they only start relating to their bodies 
when the soul ontogenetically achieves eccentricity.
On the basis of this distinction, Scheler and Plessner examine the 
interplay within the fractured eccentric human condition by focusing on 
distinctly human types of expression (such as shame, laughter or crying) as 
reactions to the tension of being a body and having a body. While Gehlen 
engages in what he calls “empirical philosophy” (Gehlen 1956, 9), Scheler and 
Plessner use a phenomenological approach – broadly applicable, neverthe-
less clearly delineated.
Habermas called philosophical anthropology a “reactive philosophy,” 
meaning an approach that is no longer prima philosophia, but instead merely 
digests the results acquired in the individual branches of science (Habermas 
1958, 20). Although this description is quite apt for Gehlen’s anthropology, 
at least according to his own self-conception, it misses the mark when it 
comes to Scheler and Plessner. Their anthropology is a structural theory of 
the human condition, which includes the living form that human beings 
inhabit. In this sense, their anthropology is transcendental, and similar 
to Habermas’s conception of the human being within his philosophy of 
language. The crucial difference between them is the fact that for Habermas, 
the living form is irrelevant. This is apparent in Habermas’s theory of early 
child development. The early stages of human ontogenesis, during which 
symbiotic experiences forge the f irst orientation towards the world, are 
anything but resolved the moment the infant acquires a system of personal 
pronouns, and they are not even assigned a foundational role.10
It seems as if Habermas does not realize that his theory is not actually 
concerned with living human beings. A thought experiment will illustrate 
this point. There may very well be ways of achieving intersubjectivity 
through the medium of language that are independent of the living form 
characteristic of human beings. Referring to the precedence of the life-world 
10 For a critical account, see Nolte 1984, 529. According to Nolte, Habermas f inds an aspect of 
nature in the early stages of ontogenesis, “which the subject can only master by repressing it.”
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will not change this fact, as Krüger suggests against Habermas, since the 
life-world itself is constituted by a linguistic-symbolic referential nexus, it 
remains unclear “what the life-world has to do with living.”11
Habermas’s original critique of Plessner
In an open letter on the occasion of Plessner’s seventieth birthday, Habermas 
observed that Plessner manages to regard “the human species as a part of 
nature” without paying the “price of a philosophical naturalism” (Habermas 
1972). He contends that in The Levels of the Organic and Man, Plessner gave 
due consideration to the lower stages without positioning the sociocultural 
life-form too low for allowing the sapient human subject to achieve some 
form of emancipation from the unfree life-form of an animal.
Habermas considers the notion of the “eccentric position” an apt charac-
terization of the categorical distinction between human and animal forms 
of life. He explicitly states that Plessner’s “ingenious interpretation” of the 
phenomena of laughing and crying supports this concept by exemplifying 
the idea that for human beings, certain situations create a need to balance 
being a body and having a body. The divide between the body-existence 
as a type of state [zuständliche Leib-Existenz] and object [gegenständliche 
Körper-Existenz] must constantly be negotiated. Yet, in certain extreme 
situations, we are no longer capable of this feat. Here, the body takes over 
in the form of laughing or crying, stepping in for the person who no longer 
is able to control his body.
This provides the staring point for Habermas’s critique on Plessner’s Philo-
sophical Anthropology. He suggests that we laugh and cry about something, 
and that this ability thus sets the distinction between human beings and 
animals. Plessner and Habermas agree on this, but are led to this view by very 
different arguments. Habermas argues that animals can neither laugh nor 
cry because they do not possess language. We laugh and cry about something, 
and for Habermas this suggests that laughing and crying are propositionally 
structured. Only beings capable of language are also able to laugh or cry. This 
places Habermas in opposition to Plessner, who does not afford language 
such a fundamental role. Instead, he considers the interplay between being 
a body and having a body, another characteristic trait of human beings, to 
11 See Krüger 2006, 192: “The point is not that the philosophy of nature and the living is 
romantic, but that the confusion of language with the participants’ perspective of I and you is 
a hermeneutical projection.”
hAberMAs’s new turn towArds Plessner’s PhilosoPhicAl AnthroPology 311
be of crucial or basic importance. If an entity’s way of being is realized in this 
structure, then this entity is capable of language due to the intersubjective 
disposition of this structure. This is in fact what eccentric positionality is 
meant to convey. Habermas is therefore mistaken when he tells Plessner: 
“Now, you don’t derive intersubjectivity from language, but from the ec-
centric position.” This claim is problematic for two reasons: first, the idea that 
language precedes intersubjectivity, or that intersubjectivity can be derived 
from language, is not very convincing, and second, the point in question is 
not actual derivation but rather the logical sequence of conditionalities.12
Habermas’s argument turns out to be circular: children need to expe-
rience other beings – i.e. recognize that there is another being which is 
similarly to oneself and alive – before they can learn to make use of “I” and 
“you.”13 Habermas’s claim that laughing and crying are similar to language 
because we always laugh or cry “about something,” is equally questionable: 
the idea that all types of propositional knowledge have the character of 
language puts Habermas at odds with Husserl and every other writer in the 
phenomenological tradition. Consequently, he holds that the twin aspect 
of the living body and the body as object manifest solely within language, 
as well. This leads him to reject the idea that the eccentric position – what 
Plessner might call the intersubjective existence of a being living in the 
tension between being a body and having a body – is a precondition of a 
capacity for language; instead, he claims that language is a condition of a 
possible tension between being a body and having a body.
However, Habermas profoundly misjudges the character of strong affects 
like laughing and crying. Granted, one might argue that we laugh or cry 
“about something.” But this kind of intentionality does not necessarily take 
the form of propositional knowledge: even though we cry “about something,” 
we are often not even consciously aware of this “something” that is the rea-
son for our agitation. And even when we know all the reasons, the emotional 
turmoil is still an independent phenomenon in its own accord. Habermas’s 
position would imply that all emotions are only epiphenomena of insights 
we might rationally express. The utter absurdity of such a characterization 
12 See also Hans Joas and Axel Honneth’s criticism (Joas and Honneth 1980), in which they 
point out that there is no doubt at all about the fact that one’s self-identif ication with one’s own 
body takes ontogenetic precedence over the acquisition of a system of personal pronouns. It 
is not surprising that Habermas never took Plessner’s “interpretation of mimical expressions” 
from 1926 into account: had he considered this work and the radically intersubjective theory 
of Scheler, he would have realized that there are stronger arguments in favor of a priority of 
intersubjectivity beyond the linguistic paradigm.
13 For a more detailed critique, see Schloβberger 2005.
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provides us with another strong motivation for a fundamental revision of the 
linguistic paradigm. Without such a revision, Habermas cannot legitimately 
make use of a concept of human nature or account for the need to protect 
its unavailability in his opposition to liberal eugenics.
In summary, reconsidering the linguistic paradigm is not only necessary 
in order to explain the constitution of intersubjectivity, but also because it is 
of crucial importance to the field of ethics. Certain central ethical intuitions 
cannot be rephrased without taking into consideration that human beings 
are alive in a very particular way. If the distinct subjectivity that is integral 
to the rationality of human beings were language-based, phenomena such 
as humiliation would be inexplicable. The effectiveness of some of the most 
invidious types of humiliation depends on strategies of shaming that rely on 
the special way we relate to our living body. We experience the deliberate 
exposure of our living body in front of others as humiliating. This does not 
constitute a problem for beings whose intersubjectivity is based solely on 
language. Even if there were a coherent and consistent language-based 
theory of intersubjectivity, it would still be at odds with human behavior.
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18 The Quest for the Sources of the 
Self , Seen from the Vantage Point of 
Plessner’s Material a Priori
Petran Kockelkoren
The sources of the self
The philosophical quest for the sources of the self is as controversial today 
as the search for the sources of the Nile once used to be, and is in danger of 
coming to the same swampy end. Why is there so much recent interest in 
the sources of the notion of self? A lot is at stake: the notion of self belongs 
to a cluster of closely related concepts such as subject, author and agency, 
which are subsequently further qualif ied with epithets like autonomous, 
original, or authentic. The possibility of aesthetic and ethical discourse is 
predicated on these concepts. No moral ascription is possible without the 
idea of free agency. Similarly, no aesthetic creation seems possible without 
authentic self-expression. All the same, these crucial concepts came under 
f ire in the second half of the twentieth century (in poststructuralism and 
postmodern criticism). There was provocative talk about ‘the end of the 
author’ (Roland Barthes) and ‘the death of the subject’ (Michel Foucault), 
which called into question the principles of modern ethics and aesthetics. 
Conservative corrections, most prominently Charles Taylor’s Sources of the 
Self (1989), were published to counter the dreaded loss of self.
The notion of self has also undergone drastic changes in our everyday 
experience. The modern notion of self is relatively recent, but has neverthe-
less become f irmly anchored in the popular imagination. We believe that 
each of us has a highly particular influence on his or her own destiny. We 
behave as though we are free to organize our lives as we choose. Moreover, 
we like to believe that our lives form a constant entity that we direct with 
the aid of today’s media at our disposal, such as all kinds of photographic, 
video and audio technologies plus social networks such as Hyves, Facebook 
and LinkedIn. Despite all that, there is little individual about the inner 
worlds that we put on show. Our cherished interiors are furnished with the 
clichés of our era. The outside world of trendy brands and status symbols 
is internalized via the media, arranged to appeal to its particular target 
group, and then put on display as a highly individual creation. At most, the 
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self appears as a more or less consistent collage of consumer choices that 
collectively def ine our ‘lifestyle.’ Given this development, it is no wonder 
that so many fear the death of an authentic self in today’s society.
Nevertheless, the conservative philosophical approach and its celebra-
tory consumer variant are both inadequate for addressing this issue. They 
both regard the self f irst and foremost as a story that is told or as a narra-
tive construction. Almost all philosophers and psychologists erroneously 
treat the self as a narrative, as an exclusively linguistic construct, virtually 
excluding the body as even being a part of our self. In the mainstream view, 
the self is no more than a narrative grafted onto a body. Although Charles 
Taylor, along with some others, claims to pay attention to the material and 
physical aspects of the construction of self, his historical account of changes 
in the notion of self is confined to thinkers who discuss the body, as though 
they were the ones who exert the most influence on the construction of 
the self.
For example, in the concept of the self that Paul Ricoeur has developed 
in his influential hermeneutic philosophy, the self makes its appearance in 
three stages. First, there are all kinds of implicit motives for action at the 
level of everyday affairs. At the second stage, these motives are embodied 
in a narrative in conversations with others. That is the stage at which the 
actions crystallize, as though they were intended as they are put into words. 
Thirdly, people identify with the narrative that is being constructed in this 
process. Thus, the identity that functions as the source of our actions does 
not exist right from the start, but only takes shape through later explanation 
to others. The ascription of the action takes place once the self produced 
through narrative is itself projected backwards in time and celebrated as 
the source of action. This reversal is situated entirely in the medium of 
language. Ricoeur places strong emphasis on the narrative identity. He does, 
admittedly, pay attention to the tension between a corporeal self and the self 
constructed through narrative, but the release of this tension – in which the 
physical self is eventually identif ied with the narrated self – presupposes 
the mediation of talking to others (which is also the commencement and 
touchstone of ethics for Ricoeur), and that mediation chiefly takes place 
in language.
By giving priority to language or the narrated self, Ricoeur is in good 
company. The psychoanalytical tradition sets out from the same premise. 
For Freud, the body is the source of all kinds of impulses and instincts that 
can disturb the formation and presentation of the public person. However, 
if rational light is shown on the preconscious instincts by bringing them 
to the surface, they lose their disruptive force. One of the most prominent 
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followers of Freud, Jacques Lacan, gave the Freudian position an even more 
radical twist by claiming that the self is a linguistic construct, including 
the unconscious. So here, the notion of self belongs entirely to the symbolic 
universe, including the presumed vaults underneath it. The inherent ten-
sions cannot be cured in therapy, but at best, be socialized. That calls not 
for therapy, but for political engagement with the social production of the 
symbolic order.
This very outline of the predominance of the narrative notion of self 
indicates the problem that we shall tackle in this chapter. How is a nar-
rative view of the self linked to the body? The body grows and ages, but 
it still seems to be or belong to the same person. At any point in time, 
the identity of the person is constantly reaff irmed in the stories that are 
continually woven around the body. The metaphor most frequently used 
by philosophers and psychologists today to describe the relation between 
language and body is that of inscription: the narrated self is inscribed on the 
body, which confers physical continuity on it. The metaphor of inscription is 
derived from scratching resistant material with a stylus or a gouge. The body 
is thus supposed to offer resistance to inscription. In the following sections, 
I would like to use the work of Helmuth Plessner to combat this view.
Plessner developed the philosophy of human eccentricity. In his view, 
people are artif icial by nature. They arrive at a notion of self not only by 
means of language and image, but above all, through technological me-
diation. The self-explanatory narratives form derivatives of prior material 
mediations. That means that the origin of our ‘inner’ life today is, to a large 
extent, due to the mediatory technologies by which we can conceive, store 
and maintain an inner world. In Plessner’s anthropology, our interiority thus 
depends on the technologies with which we evoke and maintain it, and the 
way that is done changes depending on the media in vogue.
One of the f irst and most important technologies of the production of self 
was script and the book. Those who take the book as the model for their life 
story, tend to narrate it in chronological order. The book format, however, 
can hardly do justice to the constant alternation of good intentions and 
regrets. The f lashbacks and montages of f ilm offer a better medium for 
the private inner life than the book. One could even argue that it was the 
technology of f ilm that f irst made it possible to bring our turbulent inner 
selves to life. In the last few years, people have started to tell their life story 
on a website, which may include texts, photos and clips. This makes the 
self look like a ragged network and leads to a decline in private interiority. 
The subject or the self is no longer regarded as the driving force of history, 
or as the source of signif ication and the exercise of power that it was taken 
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to be for so long. We are exposed to all kinds of media influences beyond 
our control. There is no innate original self anymore; no one rules his or 
her own production of self.
Seen in this light, one might wonder where the cult of the self comes 
from and why it is so persistent. It is almost inconceivable that my form of 
self-awareness represents just one possible historical form, that I am not just 
‘I’ but an internalized cluster of rules for the use of media. We have diligently 
practiced to make our feelings and thoughts conform to the regulations 
of the media culture. Yet, all of our hard-won psychological interiors will 
probably be a thing of the past in a century from now. People will no longer 
experience themselves as we do now. Under the influence of new media, 
they will create different kinds of selves.
Once we realize that the self is not innate, but rather a culturally mal-
leable construct, the demand arises for research on the preconditions of 
such constructions. The form that the self assumes in some place and time 
or other depends, at least in part, on the media from which it emerges. In 
today’s digital media culture, a new and unprotected form of being oneself 
is manifested: a malleable self that can be transformed to suit the context. 
This self no longer expresses its pre-existing interior, but balances on the 
boundaries and interfaces of the media and a plurality of (sub)cultures. It 
slips through the cultural chinks and breaks down the historically erected 
partitions between them. The so called private interior is turned inside out 
to take part in the media flow. Today’s material conditions no longer call 
for singular self-expression, but pluralistically mediated productions of self.
Helmuth Plessner wrote about the scenario for the future mediated 
production of self with his philosophical anthropology. In this contribution, 
I would like to argue for the merits of this vantage point. After making 
the diagnosis sharper by deriving the evil of the so called loss of self from 
linguistic deception, I shall introduce Plessner’s material a priori as a frame-
work in which supposed evils and their solutions can be seen more clearly. 
I shall then proceed to show how the modern notion of self emerged from 
material conditions and how a constantly changing production of self can be 
continued under new conditions, thereby demonstrating the applicability 
of Plessner’s anthropology to technological culture in the digital era.
The linguistic deception
The skin seems to form the barrier between inner and outer world. At f irst 
sight, that boundary coincides with the difference between the private and 
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the public domain. The inner self is located in the private quarters behind 
the wall, whereas the public self is our showcase to the outside world. This 
way of thinking, which sees the self as an entity enveloped by the body, 
is widespread. We talk about self-expression as if there is a self inside us 
that passes its feelings and thoughts through a hatch to the outside world, 
which then receives and interprets the linguistic signals as expressions of 
an inner life. The strict association of private with interior and public with 
exterior, however, is only a relatively recent phenomenon. It dates back to 
the Renaissance, on the eve of the modern era. We are still saddled with it, 
but by now this form of awareness of self has already shown some signs of 
considerable wear and tear.
Friedrich Nietzsche created a major rift in the modern notion of self. He 
attributed the awareness of self – the idea that there is an I inside me that 
is the source of my actions and also the point of reference of my experi-
ences – to what he called the ‘phantom pain of language.’1 Phantom pain 
occurs when you have lost an arm or leg but your brain makes it appear as 
if you still feel an itch or pain in the absent limb. According to Nietzsche, 
the awareness of self is anchored in language. Every time you speak you 
say ‘I.’ You adapt the verb to the personal pronoun: ‘I’ do this, ‘I’ experience 
that. That is why you think there must be a real referent, that there must be 
an ‘I-core’ persisting within that remains intact even when you are silent. 
But this perception is an illusion. When being silent, you experience the 
phantom pain of language, as the presumed referent pronounced previously 
still itches afterwards. You might as well search for the ‘it’ of ‘it’s raining,’ as 
if it were to exist independently of language. Awareness of self, according 
to Nietzsche, exists only in language. It is a by-product of speech. So how 
can it be the source of linguistic utterances?
The inner self is the exclusive product of language. The self may be the 
product of speaking about it, but it is not its source. Let us go back to the 
metaphor of the hatch, but this time place it between a shop and the shop 
window. Suppose that the shop window is the showcase of the interior, 
represented by the dark shop behind it. You are standing on the pavement 
in front of the shop and attract the attention of by-passers to the wares 
on display. These are the books you have read, your favourite CDs and 
f ilms, your brand-name clothes, and all kinds of electronic gadgets that 
function as status symbols. You claim that the items on display are only 
a poor sample of all the things in the shop, but unfortunately the door is 
1 Rüdiger Safranski, Nietzsche (2002), 209, with reference to Friedrich Nietzsche, Sämtliche 
Werke (1980), vol. 3, 591ff. 
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locked and the by-passers cannot go in. To give them an idea of the contents 
of the shop, you place a ground plan of it in the window. In your stories 
you relate the trophies in the window to what you claim are the laden 
shelves inside the shop that you have indicated on the ground plan. This 
double display of the interior (as self-expression in the public domain and 
as representation of what is on sale inside) works excellently as a strategy 
to arrange all your narratives about yourself. However, there is no need at 
all for the shop behind the showcase to really exist for this strategy to be 
successful. The representation as a ground plan plus your story is enough 
for the mutual understanding of inner and outer sides. The interior is an 
internalized by-product of the language of the street. The so called inner 
self is reproduced time and again in conversations, but there is no need to 
attribute an existence to it outside those conversations.
This example is not completely of my own invention. It too is the retelling 
of a story, based on one of the famous parables from Philosophical Inves-
tigations of the linguistic philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889-1951). In 
section 293, Wittgenstein supposes that everyone has a box with something 
inside it, but no one can look into anyone else’s box. It is only through discus-
sion that they can f ind out what the similarities and differences are in the 
contents of other peoples’ boxes and ones own box. After a lot of discussion 
it is decided that what is in all the boxes is a beetle. Well, Wittgenstein 
says, there is no need for such a thing as a pre-existing beetle to be in every 
box in order to arrive at that conclusion. After all, it is the discussion that 
creates the referent of what we call a ‘beetle.’ The illusion of an inner self 
is created in the same way. It requires other people, and simply cannot be 
done with a private language. Wittgenstein wants you to suppose that you 
experience a certain feeling today and write that in your diary. Tomorrow 
you have the same feeling and you write that you had the feeling ‘E’ again. 
But how do you know that it is the same feeling? If you have changed since 
yesterday, you cannot know it. You might hold a different feeling to be the 
same one. If you want to catch yourself at it, you are like a man who says 
‘this is how tall I am,’ while he places his own hand on his head. There is 
no possibility of comparison. It is akin to wanting to verify the veracity of 
a certain newspaper by buying another copy of the same edition. A private 
language is ruled out.
Wittgenstein’s aim in philosophy is ‘to show the fly the way out of the 
fly-bottle.’ A trap to catch flies or wasps has the form of a bottle into which 
the insect can fly, but from which it cannot escape once it is trapped. The 
awareness of self is trapped in a similar way in the cocoon of language that 
has been spun around it. Can the self be freed from there? No, it cannot, 
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because it would vanish outside the bottle or outside the f igments of the 
imagination in which it occurs. Wittgenstein tried to achieve that, but 
had to pay the price of silence. Silence prevails where there is no self being 
produced.
The inner nature of the so-called inner life may be a linguistic illusion, 
but we can still talk about it and refer to it as though it really does exist, and 
that is why it is still kept for all practical purposes. When Sigmund Freud 
described the inner life in terms of a basement where the unconscious id 
(Es) takes shelter, a ground-floor level for the ego (Ich), and an attic room 
for the superego (Über-Ich), was he describing an existing psychological 
structure, or was this an interior design proposal? He claimed to have bor-
rowed his metaphor for the inner life from his archaeological interest in 
stratif ied excavations and the technology of pumping minerals from deep 
below the earth’s surface. The fact that he is using metaphors makes his 
proposal of arranging all impulses and instincts along those lines no less 
useful as a social strategy for understanding, as history has proven it to be. 
His post-Victorian model of personality couched in industrial metaphors 
prevailed all way until late into the twentieth century and did not lose its 
validity until the emergence of digital technology.
There is in itself nothing wrong with the fact that a determinate self – 
whose form is necessarily bound to its era – is produced. But philosophical 
objections can be raised above all to the reif ication of the notion of self, 
which produces the impression that an independent agent hidden inside 
oneself must correspond to that notion of self. Does it really matter though? 
I argue that it does: this seemingly trivial mistake – that can be tremen-
dously useful in our communication with one another – inevitably leads 
to misplaced motives driven by self-delusion. The notion of self that is 
produced solely by language gets in the way once we want to account for 
miscommunication and the physical unease that inevitably arises from the 
friction between language and body.
Compare, for instance, the way humans relate to their surroundings with 
the bodily way animals relate to them. If a fox hears rustling in the under-
growth, his body puts him in a state of extreme alertness. The hormones that 
are released in his body make him ready to f ight, mate, or run away. The fox 
may be err and react to false alarms, but there is no doubt that his reactions 
are an adequate response to real stimuli whose promises can be redeemed. 
It is astonishing to see how differently we humans react in comparison. As 
long as our linguistic relation to the world around us remains pragmatically 
embedded in our actions, we stay close to an appropriate physical response 
or satisfaction, but as soon as language is reif ied, a dramatic separation 
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occurs. Our mouth waters as we leaf through a cookbook; erotic images 
excite us; ideological and sectarian icons enrage us. The body dangles like 
a puppet from the strings of language, the hopeless victim of the production 
of an internal secretion that no longer corresponds to a real environment 
but exclusively to the symbolic order. Instead of being the master of our 
own fate, we often feel at the mercy of the caprices of our own body as it 
revolts against linguistic disciplining. According to Freud, this is inevitable 
and cultural discontent forms a part of the human condition. According to 
others though, including Nietzsche and Wittgenstein, it is at least necessary 
to f irst undo the reif ication of notions in order to free the body from the 
cocoon of language. Plessner’s philosophical anthropology points in this 
direction as well.
The material a priori of the production of self
In Plessner’s anthropology, the self is not superimposed onto the body. 
To the contrary, the self is an emergent phenomenon. The notion of self 
is an indication of a certain stage in the increasing complexity of how life 
organizes itself. Plessner describes that process and its stages in Die Stufen 
des Organischen und der Mensch (1928).
Plessner studied and obtained his doctoral degree in biology. His main 
interest was in how life organizes itself. This means that the starting point 
of his philosophical biology was the living body. He began his analysis 
from the ground up and not from the observatory tower of linguistic 
reflection. In discussion with some of his colleagues, he found himself in 
the phenomenological-hermeneutic camp because it offered him the best 
concepts to account for the pre-reflexive relation between organism and 
environment. Plessner thereby anticipated the work of Merleau-Ponty. He 
borrowed Husserl’s idea of the intentionality of consciousness, but he also 
recognized that intentionality at the pre-reflexive level, in every relation 
between an organism and its environment. The organism constitutes itself 
in and through its intentional relation with its environment. Equipped with 
only this modest toolbox at the time, he – like Husserl – engaged with the 
philosophy of Immanuel Kant.
In his critiques, Kant had shown that human knowledge consists of the 
imposition of categorical patterns on sense impressions. Sense impressions 
are indeed pre-sorted, since our mind supplies the conditions of space and 
time to every experience, but in other respects they remain undifferentiated 
until reason steps in. Reason, for example, imposes the category of causality 
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on perception. In Plessner’s f irst major work, Die Einheit der Sinne (1923), he 
criticized this Kantian dichotomy of categories of reason and amorphous 
sense impressions. Plessner declares the intentionality of Husserl to apply 
to the senses as well. The senses already arrange the world synthetically 
before reason intervenes.
Plessner’s interjection is not a frontal attack on Kant, but a proposal to 
extend Kant’s work to the level of the senses. In doing so, he falls in line 
with Kant’s Critique of Judgment [Kritik der Urteilskraft], in which Kant 
argued that the unity of experience is not simply given a priori, but has to be 
actively created. Reflection on the unity of experience belongs to the f ield 
of aesthetics, the subject of this third Critique. Aesthetics targets, f irst and 
foremost, the level of the senses. Plessner is in agreement with this. There 
is no overarching guarantee (in the idea of God or Being) for the unity of 
experience, nor is there a pledge for it (nature). Unity is, at most, an aesthetic 
regulatory idea that, according to Plessner, is already aimed at the lowest 
levels of organic complexity, but can never be fully attained.
In Die Stufen from 1928, Plessner resumes the idea that all life opposes 
chaos and inf inity by creating unity. An organism already creates unity at 
an elementary level by an intentional act of boundary realization. Every 
form of life – albeit at different levels of complexity – actively maintains 
the boundary with its environment. Boundary maintenance proves to be 
a task of all life which is constantly under threat. In the last pages of this 
book, which deal with human beings, Plessner crowns his philosophical 
work with his ideas about the ultimate unattainability of unity. People long 
to return to an overarching or supporting unity, but they will never f ind 
it. They long to return to God or Nature, but can only build such a ‘home’ 
themselves as a temporary platform above an abyss. We have to wrest our 
home base from the underlying mediations that link us with the outside 
world and our fellow human beings and we better be satisf ied with that 
precarious achievement.
Plessner sees self-awareness as an outcome of the growing complexity 
in how life is organized. He reconstructs the requisite steps leading up to 
it. Die Stufen deals with the continuity and discontinuity between plants, 
animals and human beings. The intentional relation with the environ-
ment is f irst formed in the plant. Plessner called the intentional basic act 
‘boundary realization.’ The plant interacts with its environment across the 
boundary, or to put it more precisely, the plant distinguishes itself from its 
environment by means of boundary maintenance, while the environment 
is itself constituted by this very act. A dynamic equilibrium is sought in the 
interaction between the two. For example, petals open when the sun rises 
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and close when it sets. Plessner calls this active maintenance of interac-
tion – at different levels of complexity, depending on whether it is a plant, 
animal, or human being – the positionality of any life form.
The positionality of animals differs from that of plants in terms of in-
tentional mediation (mediation in the phenomenological sense, not to be 
understood as ‘deliberate or intended’ retroaction). This primal mediation 
gives the animal a centre from which to operate in relation to its environ-
ment. However, the animal is incapable of distancing itself from its own 
centre, i.e. observe or direct itself from a distance. That requires a further 
act of mediation, which leads to the emergence of the human from the 
animal as well as to the rise of the specif ic human world. Unlike animals, 
people do not coincide with themselves, but are in a position next to or 
above themselves. This is because of their constitutional relation to self 
or ‘eccentricity.’ This is also why they have no direct access to the world, 
which is very specif ically and contextually ‘their’ world, but at most only 
a thoroughly mediated one that always remains incomplete. The requisite 
mediations take place through language, image and technology.
Plessner worked recursively. Observing a great diversity of life forms and 
using a limited number of categories – intentional boundary maintenance, 
mediation and positionality – he derived the supporting categorical frame-
work of nature. The framework of categories makes it possible to reconstruct 
the world of flesh and blood in all its diversity. Plessner calls his framework 
of categories the ‘material a priori’ of the different life forms. He differs 
from Kant in that Kant traced categories that enable the ‘knowledge’ or 
‘understanding’ of nature, while Plessner tracks down the conditions of 
possibility of a cognizant existence. What are the categorical conditions 
that must be met if a self-ref lexive life form is to emerge from nature? 
Plessner was proud of having supplemented Kant’s cognitive a priori with 
the material a priori of the human cognizant life form.
In Plessner’s system, human self-awareness is an a posteriori effect of how 
life organizes itself, but not its transcendental origin. Plessner does not fall into 
the trap of the reification of the self vis-à-vis the mediations of which it is the 
product. The relation to self can be culturally elaborated in many different 
ways. The so-called autonomous self is a historical phase of the self that 
depends on modern techniques of representation. First there are technical and 
visual relations to the world, from which a specific sense of self emerges that is 
narratively constituted in the modern period. That ‘self’ takes over and claims 
to be able to deliberately handle the underlying mediations – on which that 
‘self’ depends for its own survival. In opposition to this modern self-delusion, 
Plessner gives priority to the mediation in its specific, material form.
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He explains at the end of Die Stufen that human eccentricity inevitably 
leads to a division into an inner world, outer world, and a shared world. 
This is followed by the famous three primary laws of the eccentric life form: 
mediated immediacy, artif iciality by nature, and the utopian standpoint. 
Taken as a whole, this means that the boundaries between inside and 
outside are not f ixed, but they rather have to be redrawn anew in each 
historical period, depending on the negotiations between people and their 
mediatory instances. Plessner hereby anticipates philosophies of mediation 
that were developed much later, such as those of Bruno Latour and Don Ihde. 
Right from the start he defends a plurality of cultural possibilities. People 
should not allow themselves to be deceived by religious or philosophical 
promises. There is no happy end around the corner, no f inal oneness to be 
expected. Self-articulation remains a tricky enterprise. Whether we like 
it or not, we have to interact with the material conditions of our day and 
confine ourselves to that.
The persistence of the modern subject
‘More is thought than people think,’ Plessner wittily remarked. There is no 
one in your head who does the thinking. Plessner’s material a priori formally 
clarif ies the emergence of self-awareness from how life organizes itself and 
goes on to demonstrate that material mediation is a necessary condition of 
human self-articulation. On the basis of those premises, it then becomes 
possible to explain – with an appeal to specif ic historical mediations – 
how the modern ‘autonomous’ subject (the ‘somebody’ who thinks in the 
head) could arise and maintain its currency for a while. After all, every 
philosophy – and in the last resort the philosophy of human eccentricity 
as well – derives most of its validity from the artefacts and media that are 
popular in its cultural context. The modern autonomous subject received 
philosophical expression from René Descartes, who fell back on the camera 
obscura that was making such a furore at the time. The elaboration of this 
example will serve to show the usefulness of Plessner’s material a priori 
and demonstrate where the representational model of knowledge that is 
under review comes from.
The modern era began when Descartes pronounced the autonomous 
status of the subject: cogito ergo sum. But this pronouncement was preceded 
by discoveries in the f ield of instruments. The rules of drawing by using 
linear perspective were developed by Filippo Brunelleschi in 1425, after 
which Leon Battista Alberti recorded them ten years later in De Pictura, 
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his treatise on painting. Linear or centralized perspective is based on a 
one-eyed vision focused on a f ield of intersection – usually a pane of glass 
– placed at right angles to the line of vision. If you then f ix your gaze, or 
keep your head still with one eye shut, and transfer the lines that you see 
to the glass, this procedure automatically results in a reconstruction of 
three dimensions on the plane surface. In Perspective as Symbolic Form 
(1927), the art historian and neo-Kantian Erwin Panofsky demonstrated 
that centralized perspective is not a faithful reproduction of what we see, 
but forms a specif ic regime of vision that is imposed on the impressions of 
the senses. That regime not only encapsulates the world within a specif ic 
representational form, but it also manoeuvres people into the position 
of becoming remote viewers. The world as a scene that can be externally 
calculated and the concomitant spectator have been created by this new 
way of viewing since 1435. It then took only a small step for Descartes in 
1637, when he decked this spectator out philosophically as an autonomous 
subject.
The pane of glass plus the addition of a visor to keep the head still became 
the standard equipment of Renaissance artists. In the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries, the production of the objective world and of the 
corresponding spectator/observer was taken over by the camera obscura, 
the new mediatory instrument for viewing. This enabled the material 
automation of the production of the modern subject. This material view 
of the genesis of the subject goes further than Panofsky as a neo-Kantian 
could go, but it is defensible in Plessner’s terms. After all, for its articulation, 
the subject depends on mediations that cause that subject to interact with 
the material world.
The camera obscura consists of a black box with a small aperture in one 
of the walls that functions as a single eye or lens. An image of the outside 
world from a centralized perspective is projected onto the opposite wall. 
If the image that appears in the box, darkroom or tent is traced, the result 
is a representation from a centralized perspective. The camera obscura 
replaced the pane of glass and visor as an instrument for artists. They 
took it outdoors to represent landscapes in perspective. In the nineteenth 
century, it became possible to record the images in a small-format camera 
obscura on photosensitive f ilm. This camera became the popular successor 
to the camera obscura. Each of the remediations in this outlined history 
reproduced the spectator subject.
The camera and television still reproduce the autonomous subject of the 
Renaissance every day, but by now of course, a number of rival technologies 
have emerged, each of which produces a different type of subject. In their 
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book Remediation: Understanding New Media, Bolter and Grusin distinguish 
the remediated self, the virtual self and the networked self in relation to 
contemporary digital technologies (Bolter and Grusin 1999). This brings us 
to the end of the exclusive appeals to the Cartesian notion of self.
Regardless of all that, the roots of modernity still lie in the process of the 
production of self by viewing instruments such as the camera obscura, the 
camera and television, as I outlined above. Even though they have become 
outdated, their influence seems to be fairly ineradicable. In that respect we, 
are still faithful heirs to Descartes. He not only proclaimed the modern ob-
serving subject – as the hub in his new scientif ic method – but also engaged 
in science himself. Among his writings is a treatise on optics, in which he 
compares the eye with a camera obscura. The modern ideal of knowledge 
is based on that comparison. There lies the origin of the predominance of 
the representational model under scrutiny, as can be seen once we rewrite 
history from the perspective of underlying material mediation.
For Descartes, the camera obscura is a model for the acquisition of knowl-
edge (Bailey 1989). The eye works like a camera obscura. The lens of the eye 
is the aperture in the black box. An image of the outside world is projected 
onto the retina, leading to the production of a representation of the outside 
world within the head. But who reads that image on the screen of the retina? 
Perhaps a homunculus, a miniature counterpart of ourselves located in the 
middle of our head? Descartes drew a methodological distinction between 
the body – that he conceives in mechanistic terms – and the soul. Still, the 
two domains have to be brought together and in contact with one another. 
Descartes claims that this takes place in the pineal gland in the middle of 
the head. That is the small chamber where the homunculus resides and 
from where it observes the world and gives names to everything. That is the 
cockpit where the homunculus pulls the levers to set the body in motion. 
Each of us has his or her own representation of the outside world in the 
head, depending on perspective. If we move our bodies through space an 
take up each other’s spatial positions, we can assume one another’s perspec-
tives. Knowledge is thus based on reciprocally compared and corroborated 
representations of the world that we perceive somewhere outside ourselves, 
but that is duplicated inside us via words and images.
Until the late twentieth century, certain knowledge consisted in the 
correspondence between the object and its representation ascertained by 
the spectator. By now however, that ideal of knowledge has been replaced 
by a pragmatic approach that f irmly embeds language in transactional 
practices and in the cultural contexts in which they take place. The rep-
resentational model of the remote observer has been replaced by that of 
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knowledge acquisition through involvement in which language use can 
also develop dynamically. Plessner certainly contributed to the correction 
of the Cartesian anthropology, but over and against that he also developed 
a philosophical anthropology in its own right in which the mediated exist-
ence of human beings occupies a central position. Moreover, Plessner also 
shows how philosophy serves to create an equilibrium in human existence 
amid the constant changes of the mediatory substratum of artefacts and 
media. The validity of a philosophy depends partly on the media from 
which it borrows its problems and metaphors. This gives his philosophy an 
intercultural importance too. Technology is not a universal influence for 
Plessner, as it was for his contemporaries Jaspers and Heidegger. Plessner 
can culturally differentiate; he was the f irst to formulate a philosophical 
anthropology that offers insight into cultural variation on the basis of 
material mediation.
Material mediation in cultural plurality
The philosophical anthropology of Helmuth Plessner proves to be ex-
tremely topical in the philosophy of technology and in the discussion of 
cyborgs. This theme is raised for discussion by several participants of this 
volume. In contrast to the dualistic view, they argue that the human body 
is thoroughly ambivalent (laid out for mediation). Our natural alienation 
in our bodily relation is discussed by Maarten Coolen in this volume. Dierk 
Spreen argues in his chapter on the cyborg that alienation of the body is 
constitutive of human identity and that “attributions of agency have to 
be negotiated over and against the implanted brain chip.” Security policy 
gains new f ield as criminals may hack into the body. Hans Peter Krüger 
uses these examples to show that the boundary between the private and 
the public domain has to be redrawn time and again; for Plessner, the 
limits of the community are at stake each time we engage in this process. 
Although the cyborg hardly marks a radical break in the Plessnerian view, 
since people are artif icial by nature anyway, Jos de Mul and Peter-Paul 
Verbeek wanted to widen that framework by adding an extra, trans-human 
stage to the Stufen.2
Plessner is rightly being rediscovered today and deployed as a phi-
losopher of mediation because he emphasizes the reciprocity of body 
and community even more than Merleau-Ponty does with technology 
2 See the chapters of Coolen, Spreen, Krüger, De Mul, and Verbeek in this volume.
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as the mediatory third party. I am therefore all the more surprised that 
Joachim Fischer saw so many obstacles on this path. He praised Plessner’s 
anthropology as the navigable middle course between the biologism 
of Darwin and the culturalism of Foucault. He immediately placed my 
contribution in the rejected Foucault camp. That is probably only possible 
if Foucault’s work is reduced to the initial stage of Les Mots et les Choses 
(1966), in which Foucault exposes the anonymous power mechanisms that 
are at work in (self)disciplining through language. But later – particularly 
in Surveiller et Punir (1975) – Foucault points to the disciplinary power of 
material mediations with the famous Panopticon of Jeremy Bentham as the 
paradigm. Moreover, he focuses his attention on all kinds of insidious forms 
of bodily disciplining that are inherent in the appropriation of military 
and medical technologies. This focus on materially mediated biopolitics 
led him to raise the question of ‘care for oneself ’ (Le Souci de soi) once 
again in the f inal stage of his work, starting with the second volume of his 
trilogy on sexuality (1984). How can autonomy be acquired in negotiation 
with embodied technologies? We also came across the same question 
in applications of Plessner’s philosophy of mediation to the example of 
the implanted brain chip. Autonomy is not innate, but has to be wrested 
from the mediatory media that drive and support the production of the 
subject. That is why I seek to form an alliance with Plessner and the late 
Foucault. In my book Technology Art, Fairs and Theatre (2003), I propose 
a reconciliation between Plessner’s anthropology and Foucault’s recom-
mendation of practices of care for oneself vis-à-vis material mediations. 
But would that lead to the culturalism that Joachim Fischer fears?3 Which 
form of culturalism is he afraid of? There is something important at stake 
in the anthropological discussion. In the modern tradition, the notion of 
culture is mainly identif ied with the symbolic order: the superstructure 
of texts and art. That did not change when postmodernism came into 
fashion at the end of the twentieth century, because that philosophical 
current was nourished mainly on linguistics and semiotics. The same 
holds true for poststructuralism, to which Foucault is often ascribed, 
which was integrated in postmodernism as one of its tributaries. In that 
vision, cultures are taken to consist of interlocking networks of signs and 
texts. Those texts have abandoned the modern media of books and other 
printed matter and are now found dispersed in the street, in advertising, 
status symbols, designer clothing, and so on. Moreover, it is impossible 
to distinguish pure styles any more, eclecticism rules, with a complete 
3 See the Fischer’s chapter in this volume.
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cultural relativism as the result. This form of culturalism – Fischer seems 
to regard Foucault as an apologist for it, if not its founder – falls under my 
criticism of the exclusively linguistic view of culture, cultural identity 
and cultural self-awareness. My initial diagnosis of linguistic aberrations 
mainly targets postmodern lifestyle identities, whose production is entirely 
semiotic. In this respect, I share Fischer’s preoccupations, but my solution 
lies in a different direction.
The major philosophers of technology of the last century – the French-
men Jacques Ellul, the German Martin Heidegger, and the American Lewis 
Mumford – all propagated a monolithic and universalist view of technology. 
Although technology today is considerably more differentiated and avail-
able in a large variety of subcultural forms of manifestation, there is still 
a fear of the global levelling of cultural differences. Everywhere where 
Philips, Sony, McDonalds and Nike enter with their goods and services, 
local traditions and rituals die out and are replaced by a universal TV 
language. People watch Dallas everywhere; the world is becoming the same 
everywhere. I would like to deploy Plessner’s anthropology of material 
mediation against this incorrect view. The world is only becoming the 
same everywhere with regard to the semiotic f ield. If artefacts and media 
are taken to be nothing but signif iers and sign transmission stations, then 
everything does become the same indeed, but that is exactly what I am 
arguing against by using Plessner. Artefacts are embedded in the body and 
the senses, and in that social process, they interlock with local practices, 
context-bound idiom and signif ication. That means that the cultural 
production of self is also characterized by a contextual differentiation. 
It is not even ruled out that the embedded artefacts may in turn become 
involved in a culturally innovative refashioning process and undergo cul-
tural differentiation (for example, video art in China is different from that 
found in Europe or the United States). Hence, the world is not becoming 
the same everywhere. You can only think that if you remain bogged down 
in semiotic culturalism.
There are few philosophical anthropologists whose work has man-
aged to stand up to the rightly anti-essentialist critique mounted by the 
postmodernists. The work of Helmuth Plessner displays less existential 
pathos than Heidegger, for example, (which is why it eclipsed earlier), but 
as the ripple of semiotic postmodernism recedes, it becomes all the more 
topical for its sober emphasis on the cultural diversity of our mediated 
existence.
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19 The Brain in the Vat as the Epistemic 
Object of Neurobiology
Gesa Lindemann
Neurobiology, science studies and philosophical anthropology
Neuroscientists have developed a fascinating imaging technique. They 
produce pictures that, they claim, show which regions of the brain are 
active when we feel, when we perceive other persons, or when we make 
decisions. It is the aim of many neuroscientists to explain such mental 
phenomena by reducing them to neuronal events. The crucial step for fulfill-
ing this objective would be to build an explanatory theory of the brain. 
Constructing such a theory is therefore a long-term aim of neuroscience, the 
achievement of which requires specif ic research strategies. Contemporary 
approaches in neuroscience deem it necessary to examine the activity of 
individual cells, of small cell groups, and of the dynamic organization of 
large neuronal networks. This activity is identif ied with the brain’s internal 
processing of signals (and information). According to the self-interpretation 
of the researchers, “invasive electrophysiology” is the branch of research 
concerned with how the brain processes signals in detail, and it is this kind 
of research which will lay the groundwork for an explanatory mechanistic 
theory of the brain. Other types of signals like fMRI do not have the same 
reputation of being relevant for an explanatory theory of the brain. Changes 
in blood oxygen level, for example, are evaluated as an indication that 
energy-demanding neuronal activities have occurred in corresponding 
areas, which is why more energy has been used and therefore more oxygen 
consumed. Assuming that this is the case, such a measurement would offer 
indications as to where to presume increased neuronal activity, but it could 
tell us nothing about what has actually occurred in these areas.
During invasive electrophysiology, electrodes are placed into an organ-
ism’s brain. These electrodes detect and transmit the electrical signals of 
individual cells and smaller cell groups. For ethical reasons, such research 
is not conducted on human subjects for purely scientif ic purposes, but only 
on animals.1 The most frequently used animal subjects include mice, rats, 
1 This technique is used on human subjects only when electrodes are introduced into the 
brain for therapeutic reasons, for example, in treating people with epilepsy. The electrodes are 
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cats, and macaque monkeys. Macaques are used almost exclusively for 
the analysis of higher regulatory functions, including complex learning 
processes. This was also the case at the institutes where I carried out my 
observations.
According to the scientists’ understanding of their own findings, electro-
physiological research provides a mechanistic account of the brain and its 
functions by using a third-person perspective.2 An explanatory theory of 
mental phenomena like attention, memory or decision-making will thereby 
be achieved.
In this article, I argue that it is impossible to give a valid account of 
the experimental process, as long as only a third-person perspective is 
adopted. A close examination of the research process instead reveals that, 
in practice, neuroscientists adopt a “second-person perspective.” They treat 
their counterparts as expressive beings that must be understood thoroughly 
before they can be handled properly.
Understanding the expressivity of others is usually used as a framework 
for the analysis of social persons. We expect that our counterpart is not only 
a physically perceived entity, but also a meaningful one. By this we mean 
that there is a self that expresses itself, its intentions and expectations, 
through gestures and speech. This can be described as a “second-person 
perspective,” which is usually restricted to an analysis of interactions among 
symbol-using beings – like humans (Bohman 2000). Using the approach of 
Helmuth Plessner (1928), it becomes possible to adopt the second-person 
perspective also for the analysis of the interactions with beings and among 
beings, who do not use symbols. It enables us to show that in order to per-
form their experiments, neuroscientists have to understand their research 
subjects, but do not need to treat them as self-conscious social actors. In 
particular, Plessner’s theory allows an understanding of a crucial feature 
of neurobiological brain research: the epistemic object of such research is 
the isolated brain as a system. During the experiment’s initial phases, the 
interaction between the experimenter and the organism is crucial, but in 
the phase of preparing and analyzing data, it is the brain which becomes 
then used to stimulate certain areas of the brain electrically. However, these same electrodes can 
also be used “in reverse,” that is, to record the electrophysiological signals of neurons. The areas 
of the brain involved here are not determined according to the criteria of scientif ic research but 
rather by those of therapeutic treatment. Research and recording based on scientif ic criteria in 
the narrower sense of the term can be conducted only on nonhuman organisms.
2 Wolf Singer, one of the leading neuroscientists, who is also engaged in discussions with 
philosophers, states this in several publications. See, for example, his essays in Singer 2002.
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the system of interest. The epistemic object of neurobiology is treated as if 
it were a brain in the vat.
I will develop my argument in three steps. After a short description of 
Plessner’s theory of positionality, I present a description of research prac-
tices in monkey labs and f inally I offer an interpretation of these practices.
Expressivity and expressive realization as an attribute of 
positionality
In terms of methodology, Plessner generalizes the use of a second-person 
perspective. Usually, a second-person perspective is adopted in order to 
understand social phenomena, like symbolic interaction. Plessner extends 
the use of the second-person perspective by applying it to beings that do not 
use symbols but are simply alive or are simply conscious. Understanding 
symbols or understanding interactions mediated by symbols is only one 
form of understanding. According to Plessner, the most basic event for 
understanding is the event of being alive.
Plessner uses the term positionality to denote the capacity of living 
things to realize their own borders, a quality which distinguishes them 
from inanimate things. A living being delimits itself from its environment 
and mediates all of its contact with that environment through these self-
drawn borders. Living beings regulate contact with their environment and 
maintain themselves vis-à-vis that environment as self-organizing enti-
ties. Plessner thus asserts that biologically observable and experimentally 
determinable phenomena must also be comprehensible in terms of his 
theory of positionality. If this is the case, we can, conversely, also regard 
such biological phenomena as the realization of being alive. Plessner views 
expressivity coming into play even at this level. Living organisms produce 
their own borders – a fact that is evident on or in the organism itself and can 
therefore be observed. The production of one’s own borders is an expressive 
phenomenon insofar as being alive is not strictly identical to the produced 
phenomena, which can be observed directly. According to the theory of 
positionality, the observed phenomena must be treated as indications of 
the fact that the organism is alive. In other words, the reason to interpret 
phenomena in such a way is that they are an indication of the activity of 
life, which appears only indirectly. Being alive is an attribute that has to 
be concluded from the observed phenomena.
A further complication arises for living things that possess conscious-
ness, or in Plessner’s words, that exist on the level of “centric positionality.” 
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According to Plessner, conscious living beings are able to relate to the fact 
of their border realization and can therefore regulate their external appear-
ance independently. We can distinguish here between two dimensions of 
this relationship of the living being to its environment: 1) perceiving the 
external f ield and 2) affecting the external f ield. Both of these dimensions 
are realized expressively. The organism appears as a being that perceives 
and affects. We should not equate expressivity solely with affecting, as 
perceiving is also realized expressively. Thus, through observation we are 
able to determine that an organism, f irst perceives its environment, then 
affects its environment; and subsequently mediates between the two. How 
an organism coordinates this perceiving and affecting is left to the organism 
itself. As part of this process, an organism develops expectations about 
the future course of events and acts in accordance with these expecta-
tions. To the extent that an organism regulates itself in this way, it alters 
its own appearance according to its inner state and thereby regulates its 
own expressivity. For Plessner, understanding a conscious organism makes 
reference to its inner states and to how it regulates itself based on its relation 
to the environment.
“Eccentric positionality” designates a situation arising from the perfor-
mance of self-regulation, in which an organism is able to distance itself 
from this performance and is thus capable of relating to it. On the level of 
eccentric positionality, an organism is able not only to develop expectations 
and regulate its behavior accordingly, but also to relate itself to its own 
performance of self-regulation. In other words, it can comprehend itself as 
an organism that other organisms develop expectations about. Eccentric 
organisms adjust their own behavior according to the expectations others 
have of them. For eccentric organisms, the environment is also populated by 
other expecting organisms, whose expectations must then be anticipated. 
When referring to the circumstance of organisms existing in this kind of mu-
tual relationship, I use the term “personale Vergesellschaftung” (Lindemann 
2009, chap. 2). It may be translated as “sociation3 to social persons.” Thereby 
I mean that a being becomes a social person within and by the process of 
sociation. This circumstance must also be realized expressively. There is, 
however, a further and decisive feature we must consider here. If sociation to 
social persons is realized expressively, it can only be observed in the relation 
3 The German word “Vergesellschaftung,” translated from German into English, means 
“sociation.” See, for example: Wolfgang J. Koschnick, Standard Dictionary of the Social Sciences 
(München: Saur, 1993), vol. 2, part 2, 2021.
the brAin in the vAt As the ePisteMic obJec t of neurobiology 339
of organisms to one another. Eccentric positionality and sociation to social 
persons cannot be realized by an individual organism alone.
Eccentric positionality and sociation to social persons refer to highly 
complex relationships which show a structure that is different from the 
agency of (conscious) living beings. By using Plessner, we can also dif-
ferentiate these forms of agency from the agency of inanimate artifacts; 
that is, from entities which cannot die and which are not considered to 
have expectations. Artifacts are assumed to break down, but they are not 
assumed to display an autonomous activity which ceases such that it would 
be meaningful to describe the process as dying. As a result, reference to 
Plessner allows us to develop a highly differentiated concept of agency, 
which is neither flat (like Latour’s 2005) nor dichotomous.
Plessner’s theory provides a fresh perspective in another respect as well. 
Hans-Joerg Rheinberger (1992a, 80f.) has offered an intricate analysis of rep-
resentation in science. He shows that far from representation being a means 
of portraying a pre-existing reality, the experimental process produces the 
represented reality. In these terms, brain activity as it occurs in neurosci-
ence would be conceived of as an epistemic object which is not external 
to representation. To the contrary, the experimental system would be the 
condition of existence of brain activity as an epistemic object. The brain as 
an epistemic object is represented by traces produced by recording devices, 
but these traces do not represent nature. Instead, it is the experimental 
system which produces brain activity as an epistemic object by representing 
it as traces.4 Applying Rheinberger’s framework, the process of representa-
tion refers above all to the activities of neuroscientists and artifacts. But 
there is another actor in the f ield: the monkey organism. Plessner’s theory 
demands that we always ask ourselves the following questions: What is the 
role of the living organism in the experiment? What is the signif icance of 
its expressivity? Is there anything indicating that its expressivity has to 
be understood?
My data suggests that in many f ields of neurobiology, the living organism 
cannot be transformed completely into a technical and/or epistemic object. 
The experiment is persistently concerned with the present activities of 
the living organism. It is only during the f inal stage of data analysis that 
neurobiological experimenters can create an epistemic object.
4 For an analysis of visualization techniques, see also Don Ihde (2006) and his concept of 
revolutionary visualizing techniques.
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Experimental practices
In neurobiology, the whole experimental process, from designing the experi-
ment to data analysis and publication, can typically take up to 5 years. An 
experiment is conducted in four stages:
1. Designing the experiment
2. Integration of the subject into the experimental setup; in the case of 
monkey subjects, this includes teaching them the desired task
3. Recording neuronal activities while a subject performs the task
4. Collecting and analyzing the data
In the next paragraphs, I will give a brief overview of the specif ic tasks and 
challenges a researcher must face in each of the four stages.
Stage 1: Designing the experiment and preliminary procedures
Based on existing knowledge, a research question is somewhat precisely 
def ined and a target area is identif ied, e.g.: Which brain region’s neu-
ronal activity is relevant for short-term memory, motor control or visual 
perception (or even more specif ically: for perception of color or shape)? 
Often the target area is called the “region of interest.” With reference to 
Rheinberger’s distinction between technical and epistemic objects, a 
region of interest shows properties of both. Based on certain postulates 
about how neuronal signals are processed, electrodes of a certain shape 
and sensitivity must be used. A technically stable connection must be 
established between the cells of the region of interest and the measuring 
and storing devices. This connection has to function in the same way 
reliably and repeatedly. In this sense, the region of interest has the char-
acteristics of a technical object (see Rheinberger 1992b). At the same time, 
it is unknown which events will occur, and which pattern of neuronal 
activities will be detected in the region of interest. The brain, particularly 
the region of interest, will be transformed into an epistemic object when 
the recorded data is analyzed.
Stage 2: Integration of the subject into the experimental setup
Integrating a monkey subject into the experimental arrangement is a com-
plicated interactive process. In particular, two aspects are important here: 
First, during this phase, the monkey is recognized as a conscious organism 
which has to be motivated to participate actively in an experiment. Second, 
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the monkey exists not only as an organism, but also as a technical object 
which can be connected to several technical devices in order to perform 
the experiment. Both aspects are of crucial relevance for an understanding 
of the integration process.
The monkey in the chair
The f irst step in a subject’s integration into the experimental setup is to 
get him/her into a so-called “restraint chair.” According to the necessities 
of the experimental design, a monkey chair restricts the subject’s move-
ments. To limit mobility, a very common device is a metal collar around the 
neck of the monkey, which can be connected to the chair. However, some 
experimenters do not use a collar and prefer instead for their subject’s body 
to be enclosed in a Plexiglas box with only its head protruding from the top. 
The initial steps of familiarizing the monkey subject with the experimental 
setting are done either by a lab technician or by an experimenter – usually 
a PhD student.
It is a long, step-by-step process in which a subject learns to leave the 
cage, being moved into a chair, being brought from the monkey room to the 
lab where the experiment will take place, and f inally learn and perform the 
task for hours at a time. It should always be the same person who handles 
the monkey, and there should never be more than three persons involved. 
In every step of this learning process he will be rewarded, by being given 
fruits, nuts, raisins, water, juice, etc. The f irst lesson the subject must learn 
is that it is the experimenter (or the lab technician) who provides these 
fluids and delicacies.
A lab technician describes how he gets a monkey into a restraint chair:
The f irst step is to go into the room, so the monkey gets used to the pres-
ence of someone new. I feed him fruits, candies and treats. The animal 
becomes accustomed to the presence of the new person. Once the monkey 
has grown familiar with the new situation, he is anesthetized and f itted 
with a collar. The next step is to hold a pole into the cage and latch the 
pole to the collar. When the monkey becomes anxious, he again receives 
fruits, candies and treats. When he comes to tolerate it, he5 is taken out 
of the cage. […] When a monkey is taken out of the cage, all the other 
monkeys will look at him. The monkey becomes anxious. To calm the 
monkey and make him ‘confident in the process,’ I offer fruits, candies 
5 At most of the institutes I observed, the Macaque monkeys were referred to as a “he” or a 
“she” and not as an “it.”
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and treats to all the monkeys in the room. […] Then the fruits are placed 
in the chair. One has to pull the monkey into the chair ‘gently but f irmly.’ 
Usually we are stronger than a monkey. […] It takes 5-10 minutes. Once the 
animal is in the chair, it gets something special, again fruits or something 
(Field notes, G.L.).
The lab technician understands the monkey explicitly as a being who per-
ceives his environment, experiences his own states (e.g. he may be anxious), 
and acts in response to his perceptions. Furthermore, the monkey is treated 
as a being with expectations. The subject is used to a routine, i.e. he or she 
has developed concrete expectations concerning the course of events. Even 
the occurrence of a new person in his environment is considered a breach 
of his expectation pattern. In such cases, the subject has to learn that the 
new situation is not harmful, and then gradually develop new patterns of 
expectations.
I interpret this account as an indication of the lab tech recognizing the 
monkey as a conscious being. It is not an ascription which can be withdrawn 
voluntarily. For all practical purposes, the monkey must be recognized as 
a conscious subject by the lab technician and/or by the experimenter. The 
methods adopted by other lab technicians or by experimenters differ in 
detail. I found no evidence, however, to suggest that for practical purposes 
a lab technician or experimenter does not recognize a macaque subject as 
a conscious being – expecting a certain course of events and regulating his/
her own relationship to the environment.
The second aspect of the monkey being treated as a technical object 
becomes obvious by looking at the surgical preparations of the monkey’s 
head. Determining the region of interest in an individual monkey brain 
means determining where a so-called “recording chamber” will be im-
planted on the skull. A piece of the cranium must be removed under sterile 
conditions equivalent to those in neurosurgical operations on human 
beings, leaving an opening approximately 1.5-2.0 cm in diameter. The 
recording chamber is then placed through this opening. An electrode 
matrix can be attached to the chamber and rendered immovable. Usually 
the matrix is only placed on the chamber during recording sessions and 
removed after recording.6 The recording chamber is implanted in such a 
way that the regions of interest are easily accessible by perpendicular entry 
of the electrodes into the brain.
6 Only sometimes electrodes are implanted chronically.
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In order to ensure that the activities of the same cells or cell groups are 
recorded consistently, the electrodes must f irmly stay precisely in the same 
position all throughout the procedure. Presumably, an organism would not 
sit as still as is required. The recording chamber must be placed on the skull 
such that a head post can additionally be attached to the monkey’s head. 
The post serves to mechanically f ix the head during the experiment. The 
head post is the f irst indication of the necessity of persistently transforming 
the organism into a techno-epistemic object.
The monkey in the chair facing a task
The next steps are concerned with familiarizing the monkey with the lab 
itself and to get him/her to learn the task. The latter consists of two parts: 
First, the chair is placed in a box, which serves as a faraday cage, in front of 
a monitor. Now the subject must learn to treat the events displayed on the 
screen as a problem, the solution to which requires him/her to take action. 
Second, the subject has to learn to work for an extended period (3 to 4 hours). 
This learning process is called “training.” A monkey who is being trained is 
“working.” A monkey who performs many consecutive trials without a break is 
“a good worker.” To illustrate these terms, I will describe a task in more detail.
The “delayed match-to-sample” task is a variable experimental design 
frequently employed in monkey labs worldwide. This experiment involves 
presenting a subject with two visual stimuli in short succession. The f irst 
of these is the “sample stimulus,” for instance the image of a banana. The 
second, the “test stimulus,” presents either the same image – a banana 
again – or another image, for example, a cherry or an umbrella. If the 
same image appears, there is a match, or correspondence, between the 
test and sample stimulus. If a different test stimulus is presented, there 
is a non-match, or non-correspondence. The monkey’s task is to indicate 
through his/her behavior whether s/he has comprehended the difference 
between a match and a non-match. The macaque is presented with various 
options, depending on the experimental design. The subject can press two 
different buttons (for example, the left one for a match and the right one 
for a non-match). Each of the individual sequences lasts only a few seconds 
and is repeated hundreds of times in every session. Well-trained laboratory 
monkeys are even capable of engaging in up to two thousand individual 
trials per session. For each correct answer, the subject receives a reward in 
the form of a drop of water or juice. The sequence within each individual 
trial as well as the succession of individual trials in a session is timed in 
milliseconds. The reason for this is that signal processing in the brain is 
assumed to occur at a comparable or even faster velocity.
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The monkey in the chair working for a reward
Learning a particular task can often be a complicated interactive process 
in which the reward serves two separate functions. 1) It is through the 
reward that the subject is induced to participate in the experiment at all. 
2) However, the reward also has a cognitive-interactive function.
Regarding 1: By and large, macaque subjects are not motivated to take 
part in the experiment on their own accord. Their interest in participation 
must be induced indirectly. During the work period, they are given no fluids 
as part of their daily diet. In the researchers’ jargon, the macaques have 
to “earn” their f luids through participation in the experiment. In the eyes 
of the experimenters, deprivation of f luids does not constitute a negative 
sanction, but instead increases their receptivity for positive reinforcement. 
The experimenters strictly reject negative reinforcement in the form of 
punishment. Although deprivation of fluids may be seen as a drastic meas-
ure, it does not have a conditioning effect that could unambiguously alter 
behavior. It is left up to the monkey subjects whether and to what degree 
they are motivated by this measure to participate in the experiment.
Occasionally, a subject sits in a chair in front of a stimulus and does not 
work. When discussing possible solutions, scientists and lab technicians 
take into account the fact that a subject does not react only to the stimulus in 
the lab. In order to understand why a subject is not motivated to participate 
in the experiment, scientists and lab technicians always refer to the situ-
ation of the subject as a whole. As a starting point, they take the behavior 
exhibited by the monkey. Lack of motivation could be caused by restraining 
devices. If that is suspected, the experimenter will examine them and check 
whether they could make the subject feel too uncomfortable, and whether 
adjusting them helps to increase the monkey’s motivation. If the subject 
does not display any signs of distress, s/he will be suspected to have fallen 
back on other sources of liquid. This opportunity may be offered by the 
housing conditions. Some monkeys live in groups in spatial cages which are 
cleaned with water. Finally, a subject can try to drink as little as possible.
Although the monkey is made thirsty by rather rigorous methods, no 
one believes that his/her behavior is simply externally determined. To the 
contrary, the monkey is supposed to have a choice in how to react to the 
situation. This becomes more obvious when other reasons are discussed. If 
a subject not only works poorly but is anxious or somehow agitated, it is an 
indication that the monkey is having trouble with cage-mates. Researchers 
discuss, in accordance with their interpretation of the monkey’s situation, 
how s/he can be eff iciently motivated to resume participation in the train-
ing or the experiment. If the social situation is believed to be the problem, 
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it is exhaustively discussed: Which individuals are compatible with which 
others? Which individuals would f ight with each other, etc.? Especially in 
the case of group housing, falsely estimating relationships among macaques 
can have severe consequences, since their f ights can lead to serious injuries.
If an organism is treated in this way, s/he is recognized as a conscious 
being. As such, the macaque subject cannot be controlled directly, but her/
himself steers how s/he is controlled by external means. It therefore seems 
appropriate to assume that the macaque subject is expected to follow a 
motive. It is up to the macaque to decide whether s/he allows him/herself 
to be motivated.
Regarding 2: Beyond this function, the controlled administration of fluids 
also works to permit a clear interactive understanding on the behavioral 
level between subject and scientist. Scientists expect that, within an ex-
tremely controlled situation, the macaque subject will regard a sequence 
of images on a monitor as a task to be accomplished. It is impossible to 
explain this to the subject verbally, but must be demonstrated by giving 
or withholding a reward. Since the macaque subject is almost certainly 
thirsty, s/he is supposed to be interested in fluids and in anything that will 
result in him/her receiving them. Whether the subject is able to perform the 
cognitive task can then be inferred by his/her behavior. Pressing a button or 
releasing a lever indicates the subject’s response to the image sequences. If 
subjects react randomly, their behavior is evaluated as non-comprehensive. 
For example, one experimenter assessed the situation as follows: “He doesn’t 
understand yet.” If, in contrast, the subject does not press the buttons 
randomly but in the desired manner, the monkey has demonstrated that 
s/he understands what is happening. Conversely, administering the reward 
demonstrates to the monkey that s/he has performed correctly. “I ask Ms. 
Miller (laboratory technician), ‘Why don’t you wait until the monkey has 
answered correctly four or f ive times? Then he could receive more water at 
once instead of a small drop for each correct answer.’ Ms. Miller, ‘That’s not 
possible. How would the monkey know that he has answered correctly?” 
(Field notes, G.L.).
For a macaque subject to be admitted for an actual experiment, three 
conditions must be satisf ied: 1. The subject must demonstrate that s/he 
has understood that the sequence of images or other stimuli is a task that 
needs to be accomplished. 2. The subject must demonstrate through his/
her answers that s/he understands what is happening and what is expected 
of him/her. 3. The subject must demonstrate a continuous readiness to 
participate in the experiment. If any of these three criteria is not met, the 
subject is not admitted to the experiment.
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Stage 3: The experiment
The actual experiment begins – like the training before – with the subject 
being f ixed in the chair. Then, the electrode matrix has to be placed on 
the recording chamber. The subject is presented with the stimuli and 
performs as it has been trained to do. During an experimental session, a 
subject performs up to 2000 single trials. While the monkey is performing, 
the experimenter lowers electrodes into the subject’s brain; s/he does not 
notice this, as the brain tissue is not sensitive to pain. Neuronal activ-
ity is represented through both visual and auditory means. Visually, the 
neuronal activity of several cells – the local f ield potentials – appears as 
an irregular curve that flickers on a monitor – a so called oscillator. The 
activity of individual cells is represented as a succession of discontinuously 
illuminated dots, which can also be depicted through sounds. The auditory 
representation of neuronal expressivity is similar to the static on old shellac 
records. In this way, the organism acquires a new technically mediated 
expressive surface: It exhibits behavior (eye movements, pressing buttons, 
moving levers) and neuronal activity (spikes, local f ield potentials).
In order to prepare this data for further analysis, measuring devices spe-
cif ically designed produce traces which are electronically stored. Certain 
curves indicate eye movements of the subject. Other curves indicate the 
local f ield potentials and discrete dots indicate the rates of spikes. In the 
neuronal data, the onset of stimulus and the time of the subject’s response 
(pressing a button, releasing a lever, etc.) are recorded.
Stage 4: Data analysis
The process of data analysis consists of four steps: f irst, sorting out the 
remaining artifacts and evaluating the data’s quality; second, organizing the 
data in sets7; third, transferring the data into an artif icial multidimensional 
space and analyzing it; fourth, writing, discussing and publishing a paper.
Well-organized datasets are malleable, so that they can be readily tailored 
towards the specificities of the analysis. As such, they are a prerequisite for 
the next step. The acquired data is then transferred into an artif icial multi-
dimensional space in which the gestalt of the curves is analyzed, as well as 
their relationship to perceptual and behavioral events: Onset of stimulus, eye 
movements, performing a correct or incorrect response – all of these events 
may or may not be correlated with a particular pattern of neuronal activity.
7 For a more detailed description, see Lindemann 2009b.
the brAin in the vAt As the ePisteMic obJec t of neurobiology 347
During the training and the experimental session, researchers are 
dependent on monkeys as organisms developing and regulating their own 
relationship to their environment. In contrast to this, every operation in the 
artif icial space is under strict control of the scientist. Of course, technical 
problems might come up at times. Sometimes an analysis requires more 
computer power than is available, and the analysis has to be split up, which 
in turn can cause further technical problems. Perhaps a computational 
cluster does not function or an analysis is not properly constructed. But 
there is no need to establish a trustful relationship with computers and 
analytical tools. They are not wilful beings with their own interpretation 
of their environment. To the contrary, the elements of the artif icial space 
can be constructed and reconstructed only by paying close attention to 
mathematical logic and technical restrictions. There are no needs of living 
beings to be paid attention to.
With reference to the distinction between technical and epistemic 
objects and their relationship to the organism, it makes sense to describe 
the brain as it is malleably represented in the artif icial multidimensional 
space as the epistemic object of neuroscience. It is no longer the brain as 
an organ of the organism that is of interest here. Instead, it is the brain 
as a mechanical system, which perceives the stimulus and responds to it 
appropriately. Not the organism as a whole, but the brain itself is attentive 
and memorizes a stimulus.
Interpretation
For all practical purposes, the experimenter recognizes the monkey as an 
actor who treats the experiment as an element of his/her daily routine in 
a multi-interaction setting and not as an isolated episode. The scientist 
assumes that the subject (made thirsty through deprivation of liquids) will 
participate in the experiment only because s/he expects to be rewarded 
with water or juice. Since the direct reaction to a series of images or stimuli 
results in the macaque subject receiving this reward, the scientist further 
assumes that the subject will respond directly many hundreds of times to 
the sequences of stimuli as a problem presented to him/her.
This description of the experimenter’s interpretation of the monkey is 
based on an understanding of the monkey subject as an organism having 
expectations and acting accordingly. These are the features of centric posi-
tionality. The organism reacts directly to the stimulus, regardless of whether 
this occurs through cognitive learning or merely out of habit, i.e. without 
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any cognitive exertion. In assuming this, the experiment also systematically 
excludes a level of self-regulation that would make it impossible for us to 
classify the organism’s behavior. Scientists assume that when an organism 
acts within the experimental setting, it regulates its behavior according 
to the stimuli presented to it. In this way, an organism’s behavior can be 
understood as a response to a specif ic stimulus.
Figure 19.1
this figure illustrates the reactions of the epistemic object to stimuli, which are presented in the first 
line. the second and third lines show “spikes” and the fourth line a computed version of the trace of 
a smaller group of cells, known as “local field Potential” (taken from Kreiman et al. 2006, 438).
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If the organism, in contrast, were to relate to itself as part of the ex-
perimental setting, it would regulate its behavior according to its own 
incorporation in the experiment. In other words, it would no longer react 
spontaneously as an organism, but instead as an organism that understands 
itself as part of an experimental setup, within which expectations have 
been placed on it. If this were correct, an experimenter could no longer 
unambiguously attribute the subject’s behavior to the organism; rather, s/he 
would always also have to understand this behavior as that of an organism 
relating to itself as a being that has expectations placed on it. Such an 
organism would no longer be characterized merely as a consciousness aware 
of its surroundings and acting accordingly; rather, it would also have to 
be understood as a self-consciousness, that is, as a self-conscious being in 
relation to another self-conscious being.
Understanding an organism solely as a conscious self renders that 
organism unambiguously. For if a subject reacts not only to the stimulus 
in the experiment, but always also relates to itself as part of the overall 
experimental setting, it would give rise to a specif ic kind of doubling. When 
the subject responds correctly, this can mean that it has understood what 
is going on and has answered accordingly. However, it can also mean that 
it has correctly responded because it wishes to present itself as a good or 
virtuous subject that does not want to disappoint the experimenter. And if 
the subject answers incorrectly, this may mean that it has not understood 
the task (stimulus-related), that it is no longer motivated to take part in the 
experiment, or it has lost its concentration (stimulus-related, spontaneous 
reaction to the situation). However, it may also mean that it has understood 
the task correctly, but has answered incorrectly because it wants to show 
annoyance with the experiment or wants to annoy the experimenter, that 
is, to disappoint the latter’s expectations. Such behavior can no longer be 
understood in the sense of a spontaneous self-regulation, but rather as 
the behavior of a social person, an eccentric being, relating to itself as the 
performance of self-regulation.
The consequences of this are the following: If we assume that spontane-
ous behavior does not appear in pure form here, but rather that, in the sense 
of eccentric positionality, a spontaneous consciousness is accompanied by a 
distance to itself, we are unable to unambiguously correlate the organism’s 
behavior to its regulating function (which cannot be directly observed), 
or to correlate these to neuronal activity. It is then impossible for us to 
identify unambiguous neuronal patterns. While we could indeed identify 
neuronal patterns, we would no longer be able to clearly determine what 
circumstances we should correlate these neuronal patterns to. It might be 
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a correlate for a direct reaction to the stimulus or a direct reaction to the 
situation. However, it might also be a correlate for how the subject related to 
itself as a component of the situation in which it was presented with a task.
I use the phrase “the necessity of the organism’s centric positionality in 
the experiment” to describe the circumstance in which the experimental 
interaction is constructed such that a subject reacts in an experimental situ-
ation, but does not relate to this situation as such. A centric organism can 
develop expectations with regard to the course of the experiment. This can 
certainly include a subject habitually reacting to particular stimuli only in 
a particular situation, but outside of the habitual setting, it no longer reacts 
to the stimuli in this way. What is essential here is that the subject in no way 
relates to the expectations of the researcher implicit in the experimental 
setup. The centric positionality of the organism incorporates the organism 
into the experimental order and allows the researcher to control it. The 
centric organism is a rational actor who displays his/her order of prefer-
ences and acts accordingly in a calculable way. The intricate relationship 
between monkey subject and experimenter is always managed in terms of 
the monkey being a centric organism. It is essential for an experimenter 
that s/he not be compelled to pose such questions as: Will the subject annoy 
me? Does the subject alter its behavior arbitrarily when dealing with other 
experimenters? Does the subject give incorrect responses at times, even 
though it is attentive and has understood what is going on?
The necessity of the organism’s centric positionality exists also in experi-
ments performed with human subjects, although incorporation of human 
subjects in parallel experimental arrangements occurs in a different manner. 
The actual experiment is framed by a communicative process in which the 
subject is thoroughly informed in advance what is about to happen to him 
during the experiment, and the subject has to communicate that s/he has 
understood the message about what is to take place in the experiment.8 Only 
after informed consent has been obtained does the human subject actually 
participate in the experiment. The subject expects that the experimenter 
does not make some nice sounds but that the experimenter expects the sub-
ject to understand the given information. Such a chain of communications 
includes mutual expectations and can thus be identif ied as the relationship 
of eccentric beings. Rather than using thirst and reward, the experimenter 
has to trust that the subject, in answering the “questions,” responds solely to 
the stimuli of the experiment. Therewith, the experimenter assumes that for 
all practical purposes of analysis, the experimental subject exists as a centric 
8 For a more detailed description of performing such agreement, see Roepstorff 2001, 761f.
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organism, which responds directly to stimuli. Paradoxically, this holds true, 
although experimenters have to rely on a particular form of how subjects 
understand themselves as a part of the experimental situation as a whole: 
The experimenter trusts the subject as a subject, who always understands 
him/herself as a cooperative subject. Experimenter and human subject 
constitute communicatively, i.e. as eccentric beings, the experimental frame-
work. Once they move into that framework, the experimental subject has 
to be treated as a centric being for the same reasons as the monkey subject.
Now we can describe more concretely what is meant by adopting a 
second-person perspective in understanding biological phenomena. The 
starting point is sociation to social persons: At least two or three actors 
(Lindemann 2005) relate to each other such that they anticipate the expecta-
tions of the other and behave accordingly. These organisms must not only 
have minds, but also be mind-reading organisms. By keeping the subject in 
the state of centric positionality, the research interaction is dissocialized. 
The researcher recognizes the subject as someone who expects something 
concerning the course of events in a certain situation. But the experimenter 
does not recognize the subject as expecting that the experimenter expects 
the (monkey) subject to do something. Since I have extended, following 
Plessner, the second-person perspective, it becomes obvious: The monkey 
subject is nonetheless understood and recognized as a conscious being 
(centric positionality), but not as a self-conscious social person (eccentric 
positionality). So far, such differentiations have been overlooked in the 
analysis of laboratory life. Adopting a new conceptual framework has made 
the analysis sensitive enough to see them.
Nevertheless, formulating an unambiguous regulatory phenomenon will 
not suff ice on its own. The brain itself must be conceived in a particular 
way. It must not be understood as an organ of the organism, but instead it 
has to be transformed into an epistemic object beyond the organism. What 
is the difference between the brain as the epistemic object and the brain 
as an organ of the organism? If one were to assume that the brain itself did 
not react to its environment, but the organism reacted using its brain as a 
means of steering its response, the analysis would be confronted with a new 
degree of freedom. The brain as an epistemic object of neuroscience is not 
easy to analyze, because “plasticity” is one of its crucial features. A brain 
adapts to an environment; and as such it does not always react in exactly 
the same way. The brain, as the organ of an organism, would be even more 
diff icult to analyze. It would be the plastic organ as used by the organism 
that formed the reaction. As such an organ, the brain could even be used 
differently in solving the same experimental task.
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I think that understanding the brain as the organ of self-regulation would 
result in two problems. The first of these is experimental in nature and easy 
to solve. There might not be only one pattern signifying a certain state – like 
being attentive or memorizing something or reacting – but instead a variety 
of patterns or a certain type of pattern. The second problem is of conceptual 
nature. In order to identify a pattern or a type of pattern, it is necessary to 
construct an unambiguous relationship between, f irst, neuronal patterns 
and how these patterns are related to the functioning principles of the brain, 
and, second, the state the pattern is considered to signify (working memory, 
for example). If it is assumed that the brain is the organ of self-regulation, 
the neuronal pattern can signify the state in two ways. First, the brain can 
be considered as the (mechanical) system in question, in which case only its 
internal functional principles are relevant. Second, the brain is seen as a system 
which serves as an organ of the organism, therefore its functional principles 
are of relevance only with reference to its relation to the organism as a whole.
My conclusion is that in order to make unambiguous sense of a detected 
pattern, it seems necessary to make a decision about the assumed position-
ality of the research subject. Experimentally detected patterns are only 
related to the brain as the system in question, and not to the brain as a 
means by which an organism steers itself. This seems to be an implicit 
precondition for identifying patterns of correct/incorrect answers. If the 
decision were not made, the way in which the actual documented traces 
of brain activity should be read would become an open question: as an 
indication of the brain as a system or of the brain as an organ in the service 
of the organism? The discussion on the brain in the vat, inspired by Hilary 
Putnam (Gere and Gere 2002), echoes philosophically the research perspec-
tive adopted by neurobiological research, which isolates the brain from the 
living organism and treats the brain itself as the system in question. In fact, 
it seems that the epistemic object of neurobiology is the brain in the vat 
and not the brain functioning as an organ of the organism.
Figure 19.2 Monitor Monkey Brain
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Figure 19.2 is part of a PowerPoint presentation of a neurobiologist. It 
illustrates perfectly the steps from the behaving organism in front of the 
stimulus (upper left side) and the target area (upper right side) to the signal 
traces of the brain (lower left side) and, after the transformation of the 
signal into frequency space, the traces of the brain as an epistemic object 
(lower right side). The story starts with the organism and ends with the 
brain in the vat.
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20 Switching “On,” Switching “Off”




Parkinson’s disease is a neurodegenerative disease only occurring among 
the human species. On a pathophysiological level, a selective process of 
cell destruction is observable (Braak et al. 2004). It progresses from the 
enteric nervous system (neurons in the stomach and intestine) to the 
central nervous system in a stereotypical manner (ibid.). Once it reaches 
the symptomatic stage, the clinical phenotype of a complex, yet incurable 
movement disorder along with a variety of psychosocial consequences 
emerges. The chief symptoms are tremor (involuntary movement of the 
hand), rigidity, akinesia (inability to initiate or slowness of movement) and 
postural instability (inability to keep one’s body in a stable or balanced 
position). As a consequence, the human body begins to take on a life of its 
own: “The f irst and most natural instrument of man” (Mauss 1989) def ies 
control by its owner. There is a general decrease in the ability to catch 
artefacts, walk, speak, and perform gestures. Habitualized motoric skills 
in private and professional settings decline.
Medication, most notably levodopa, provides signif icant relief from 
symptoms in the early stages. However, long-term use is complicated by 
fluctuations that result in periods of severe symptoms during periods when 
the drug level is too low (off periods) and periods of improved symptoms 
when the drug level is suff icient (on periods). Moreover, involuntary move-
ments (dyskinesia) can be induced during on periods. These fluctuations 
and dyskinesia become more and more irregular and uncontrollable by 
medication adjustments. In this stage of Parkinson’s disease, an increasing 
number of patients decide for a new Parkinson’s disease therapy: deep brain 
1 I would like to express my gratitude and thanks to the following persons and institutions 
who helped and supported me during the work on this chapter: Tilman Allert, Mrs. C., Maarten 
Coolen, Ian Copestake, Eilika Freund, Sarah Küper, Kristina Lepold, Jos de Mul, Sassan Sangsari, 
Dirk Spreen, and the anonymous doctors and patients involved in the project and the Frankfurt 
Graduate School.
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stimulation. An electrode is implanted into a specif ic region of the brain, 
the subthalamic nucleus. It is electrically driven by an impulse generator 
with a battery implanted in the patient’s chest. After successful insertion, 
f luctuations, dyskinesia and tremor can be signif icantly reduced, often 
allowing patients dramatic improvements in overall mobility. Following 
evidence-based medicine, the therapy is considered a potent treatment in 
advanced Parkinson’s disease (Deuschl et al. 2006).
However, the renaissance of functional stereotaxy in the therapy 
of movement disorders comes along with clinical reports of adaptation 
problems in the peri- and postoperative situation (Ceballos-Baumann, 
Gündel 2006). Amongst the transient neuropsychiatric and psychiatric 
side-effects reported are mania, hypomania, apathy, anxiety, depression 
and hypersexuality, pathological gambling and impulsivity. Suicides also 
occur occasionally. The “burden of normality” (Wilson et al. 2001), identity 
crises and diff iculties in integrating the implanted artefact into schemes 
of the self and the body, or the spouse’s perception of the patient, rank 
high among the psychosocial adaptation problems (Schüpbach et al. 2006). 
Continuous quarrelling or even break-ups are interpreted as a maladaptive 
postoperative transformation of the partnership or family network.
Anthropological thinking in the field of neurosurgery
I started to investigate these problems from the perspective of social psy-
chology and the sociology of family (Hätscher 2009). The study is conducted 
in collaboration with two clinical centres, specif ically a department for 
neurology and a centre for neurorehabilitation. While neuropsychiatric 
adaptation problems need to be explained in terms of pathophysiology, 
identity problems and changes in the familiar coping setting require a 
broader theoretical framework to be explained with suff icient depth. A 
sociological perspective within a biopsychosocial framework (Mullins et 
al. 1996) is needed. But what is evident at f irst sight proves to be a very 
diff icult problem in research. In the f ield of adaptation processes after deep 
brain stimulation, clinicians and scientists have to deal with a nature vs 
culture problem in an increased manner: culturalistic as well as biologistic 
reductionisms fail to explain the phenomena of postsurgical adaptation 
problems. A frontal lobe disorder might be diagnosed, an unintended ir-
ritation of the limbic area by the electrode may occur, but yet this does not 
suff iciently explain a patient’s psychosocial problems. Practice theory and 
case reconstructive research on the other side fail to elucidate impulsiveness 
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or the phenomenon of the so called “awakening” (Sacks 1982) after surgery. 
Still, we are talking about a coherent event affecting cells, brain processes, 
bodies, biographies, partnerships and family structures. Theoretical con-
cepts such as autopoiesis, self-referentialty or multifactoriality describe the 
process, but do not really help explaining and understanding it. In contrast, 
within the available theoretical and especially anthropological accounts 
Plessner’s philosophical anthropology promises to be a fruitful and attrac-
tive candidate for an appropriate conceptualization. The Plessnerian scholar 
gains insight into a conceptualization of human practices that surmounts 
the old dichotomies of the natural sciences (Naturwissenschaften) vs. the 
humanities (Geisteswissenschaften), of body and mind, as well as artificiality 
and naturality.
Still, Plessner has worked on an individual anthropology (Hauke 2000). 
He is also renowned as a theoretician who points to the limits of community. 
This is what makes it diff icult to focus on a patient’s family problems using 
his writings – although Plessner of course has a concept of sociality called 
“Mitwelt.” Instead, these are problems in the patterns of communication 
occurring in the more intimate sphere of the couple or familial community, 
which are usually reconstructed using the paradigm of symbolic interac-
tionism or “social anthropology” (Delitz 2008).
But scholars doing research in the f ield of family-coping and medical 
sociology tend to underestimate the reality of biological processes, as well 
as the influence of the medical system – instead discounting clinicians 
who neglect the importance of the patients and their relatives work in the 
process of coping with a chronic illness and the reality of cultural processes. 
Here, Plessner’s approach stands out from the rest. His writings, stem-
ming from a trained zoologist as well as a philosopher and sociologist, are 
capable of reminding the mainstream (medical) sociology community of 
its obliviousness to the signif icance of the body, while on the other side 
is capable of reminding neurologists of their obliviousness of the social 
facts. But it still remains a problem of multidisciplinarity, not to mention 
interdisciplinarity, that sociologists know so little about pathophysiologi-
cal processes and clinicians on the other hand know so little about social 
processes: Bridging the disciplinary gap is a far too diff icult task and one 
has to remain humble in one’s aims as a scientist. Nevertheless, in the 
following I will try to investigate to what extent Plessner’s thinking in the 
f ield of philosophical anthropology can help shed light on some major 
problems in the project. To this end, I will focus on different oppositions 
such as object and subject, naturality and artif iciality, inside and outside, 
de- and recentration, and f inally, laughing and crying. I will thereby follow 
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two paths: 1) Investigating Cartesian and transhumanistic elements in the 
current neurosurgical praxis, and 2) Reflecting on the concept of the cyborg 
using the example of deep brain stimulated Parkinson patients.
Radical Cartesianism and the renaissance of stereotactic and 
functional neurosurgery
Clinical practice rests on scientif ic theories, proven knowledge of how to 
apply them, and last but not least, to the ideas of men. I will try to make 
such an account explicit by using the example of stereotactic and functional 
neurosurgery. Following a pragmatist and neo-Vygotskian thought collec-
tive, artefacts and tools used in sophisticated f ields such as the laboratory 
or operation room can be considered as clotted solutions to a former action 
problem. Neurologists and psychiatrists working in the field of neurosurgery 
treat diseases, which are conceptualized as brain pathologies: Tourette 
syndrome, Parkinson’s disease, obsessive-compulsive disorder, depression, 
anxiety and even schizophrenia. Focussing on the last group of mental-
health problems, a striking difference appears between psychotherapeutic 
and psychosurgical approaches, which nowadays reappear: No conceptual 
difference is made between the animal model – where experiments are 
performed and treatments are tested – and man. Illocutionary acts, dreams, 
deontic scorekeeping, narrative identity, the faculty of speech, a symbolic 
sphere, constitutive for humans – if we follow other anthropological ac-
counts – are peripheral for therapeutic purposes. Instead, a direct contact 
between the surgical knife, electrodes or lesion tools and the structures of 
the central nervous system is established. Access is made using the so-called 
stereotactic frame. In the following section, some issues concerning the 
stereotactic approach and its epistemological and practical implications 
will be considered. For this purpose I want to examine a photographic 
portrait. It depicts the physician and inventor Lars Leksell (1907-1986), 
famous for the invention and ref inement of new neurosurgical techniques, 
such as the Leksell stereotactic system, which is displayed in the picture 
(see f igure 20.1).
In the picture an operating table can be seen. A cranium is placed on 
its upper border. The cranium is f ixed in a stereotactic frame. Leksell is 
standing behind his setup. His stature is that of a respected and renowned 
expert. Already aged, his appearance is that of an elegant man. He is wearing 
a white coat and a tie. His gaze is concentrated. One hand is placed in his 
pocket, while the other one is placed under his chin. The similarity to the 
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f igure of Hamlet, holding a skull, is an overt one (and in case the allusion was 
intended, one may wonder if the clinic can actually provide an appropriate 
ground for allegory and staging). Instead of his hands holding the cranium, 
it is f ixed by the apparatus around it. In other words, the apparatus works 
as a ref ined extremity, in fact, it is conceptualized as a prosthesis. How can 
the constellation consisting of physician, cranium and stereotactic system 
be interpreted? For this, I would like to introduce a reading that goes back 
Figure 20.1 Professor Lars Leksell (1907-1986) with his first stereotactic instrument
image: courtesy of elekta Ab
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to Plessner and Descartes. The apparatus f ixes a cranium: “To be or not to 
be, that is the question.” This skull, although constitutive to vertebrates, is 
featured as an object: unanimated, immobile. In this way it does not differ 
from the kind of entity Plessner begins with in his phenomenological inves-
tigations in The Levels of the Organic and Man [Die Stufen des Organischen 
und der Mensch, 1928] with objects (Dinge). Using the stereotactic frame, 
the cranium is conceptualized as res extensa – if we follow Descartes’s 
world-fundamentalization resulting in a dualism consisting of nonmaterial 
entities, i.e. qualitative properties (res cogitans) that lack extension and mo-
tion, and material entities (res extensa), to which the human body belongs, 
having the material properties of both extensin and motion. Bodies belong-
ing to the res extensa follow the laws of physics and can be measured in an 
quantitative way. In the picture, this result of scientific revolution is exposed 
in a clear way: stereotactic frames are triaxial Cartesian coordinate systems 
(with the exception of the Leksell system, in which polar coordinates are 
used) transformed into practical tools. A device can easily be moved on 
these axes and precisely f ixed on a previously determined point. A drill 
and some other tools, such as electrodes or cutters, can be inserted into the 
central nervous system to alter the structure of a specif ic area. Up until this 
point, stereotactical and functional neurosurgery follows a deep Cartesian 
approach. It is important to note here that “Cartesian approach” is not 
meant in a strict historical, exegetical sense of the word, but more broadly, 
is meant to denote the Cartesian aftermath of the emergence of empirical 
science such as physiology and psychology. It is Plessner, who points to 
this historical relation in his Stufen (Plessner 1975, 46). By these means, 
parts of the human body appear only in their quantitative properties, the 
unanimated body following the laws of a Newtonian universe. Psychology 
and Physiology, as they emerged as disciplines of empirical science in the 
nineteenth century, were no longer concerned with or, as Plessner notes, 
even “blind” to the nonmeasurable properties of animated beings. This is 
also due to an ongoing secularization and a rejection of the so-called Natur-
philosophie and metaphysics in general. As Plessner later notes in his Stufen, 
it would be regressive not to rely upon exact measurability (Plessner 1975, 
42). But scientif ic problems still emerged even following the acceptance of 
Descartes’s fundament principles. Plessner diagnoses a “Problemstellung,” a 
post-Cartesian problem position. The problem itself is also inherent in the 
aforementioned picture. Here, it has an ethical as well as an epistemological 
dimension. From an ethical point of view it must be noted that the cranium 
formerly belonged to a living human being whose recognition is not granted 
much room. From an epistemological standpoint it must be obvious that 
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in the context of stereotactic surgical practice the central nervous system 
is treated and thereby reduced to an object as well. As a result, the solution 
of materialistic monism appears, reducing qualitative properties of the 
mind (and as Plessner notes, of the pure object as well) into quantitative 
properties. But there still exists at least one subject apparent in the picture: 
Leksell himself. This seems paradoxical. Does Leksell’s mind consist of mere 
quantitative properties as well? Or – to follow Plessner’s interpretation 
of Descartes’s philosophy – is it a mere coincidence that Leksell chose to 
be the only subject in the picture, so to speak: The Cartesian cogito in 
its egologic universe, conceptualizing all objects as precisely measurable 
(cf. Hauke 2000)? From here one may raise the question, how is the brain 
able to function as a vessel for qualitative properties? And last but not 
least, an irreducible subjectivity exists in exactly the moment in which 
someone separates the cranium as an object from Leksell, the human: this 
gives rise to a lot of epistemological problems that materialistic monism 
as well as Cartesianism are unable to solve. At this point one could go back 
to Plessner’s Stufen and study his solutions. But I want to follow another 
path. What interests me, is the fact that regardless of all the epistemologic 
problems implied, it can hardly be denied that stereotactic approaches have 
had a renaissance in recent years. Neurologists in this f ield would not follow 
the Plessnerian battle cry: “Get away from Descartes!” (Plessner 1975, 42), 
because they are not very interested in raising epistemological questions, 
especially if they lack any foreseeable application for them. Their habitus is 
pragmatic in nature, and so was Descartes (Perler 1998; Schnädelbach 2004):
I have never made much account of what has proceeded from my own 
mind; and so long as I gathered no other advantage from the method 
I employ beyond satisfying myself on some diff iculties belonging to 
the speculative sciences, […] I never thought myself bound to publish 
anything respecting it. But as soon as I had acquired some general no-
tions respecting physics, and beginning to make trial of them in various 
particular diff iculties, had observed how far they can carry us, and how 
much they differ from the principles that have been employed up to the 
present time, I believed that I could not keep them concealed without 
sinning grievously against the law by which we are bound to promote, as 
far as in us lies, the general good of mankind (Descartes 2008).
First and foremost, a treatment of essential tremors or dystonia using deep 
brain stimulation techniques appears to be effective. Localizing centres in 
deep regions of the brain via the stereotactic frame and stimulating specific 
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cores makes treatments possible that were unthinkable a hundred years ago, 
not to mention in the age of Descartes. Neurosurgeons treating Parkinson’s 
disease, dementia, cancer or Tourette syndrome are at the forefront of a 
clinical project to overcome diseases, decay and ageing. It is performed 
by using technology grounded in mathematics and empirical science. The 
project itself is not a very new one. Let me cite Descartes once more, the 
technician and natural scientist, as George Canguilhem outlined him in 
his 1937 lecture “Descartes et la technique” (Canguilhem 2006, 8):
It is true that the science of medicine, as it now exists, contains few things 
whose utility is very remarkable: but without any wish to depreciate it, I 
am confident that there is no one, even among those whose profession it is, 
who does not admit that all at present known in it is almost nothing in com-
parison of what remains to be discovered; and that we could free ourselves 
from an infinity of maladies of body as well as of mind, and perhaps also 
even from the debility of age, if we had sufficiently ample knowledge of their 
causes, and of all the remedies provided for us by nature (Descartes 2008).
As Canguilhem notes, Descartes’s main concern was not to formulate 
another utopian goal (Canguilhem 2004, 6), but instead, his main concern 
was to solve practical problems. After having accepted the fact that he was 
bound to his own body as a living body (Leib), a body he could not substitute, 
he had to f ind other strategies. Outer organs should complement or alter 
inner organs. Their artif iciality should help to overcome the burdens of 
naturality (Canguilhem 2006, 19). A promising therapy in late stage Par-
kinson’s disease has emerged in deep brain stimulation, a treatment that 
helps to reduce the cardinal symptoms of a severe chronical illness, a typical 
old-age disease. The main strategy being used here is the transformation 
of the patient into a so called “man-machine,” in which human practice 
has not only altered the environment of the natural body, but technology 
surpassed the border of the skin to create a “phenomenological cyborg” 
(Spreen 1998). Here, the epistemic approach, the instruments being used, 
as well as the aim, are all Cartesian in nature.
Deep brain stimulation in the treatment of Parkinson’s disease: 
A case of cyborgism?
Let us have a closer look at the deep brain stimulation procedure for 
the treatment of Parkinson’s disease. Here we f ind that an electrode is 
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implanted into a specif ic core of the central nervous system, the nucleus 
subthalamicus. It is electrically driven by a battery implanted under the 
patient’s chest. These electrical impulses block the electrical signals that 
cause Parkinson’s symptoms. In this way, the cardinal symptoms e.g. a 
tremor – an involuntary, rhythmic muscle movement of the hand – either 
vanish entirely or are reduced signif icantly. What is important to note is 
the fact that a cure is nonetheless impossible, as this treatment is only able 
to suppress symptoms. Although sophisticated technology is used in the 
surgical procedure, the implant itself is a “low tech” device when compared 
to technologies as they are discussed in transhumanistic discourse, for 
example, nano-, bio-, info- and cognotechnologies (More 1996). But it is 
hard to deny that deep brain stimulation features all the characteristics 
commonly referred to as constitutive for cyborgs: artefacts fusing with 
phylogenetic old structures of the brain, wedding of f lesh and chrome, the 
control of biological functions with the use of electronic devices. What 
distinguishes Cyborgs from man? Or to be more precise, what distinguishes 
cyborgs artif iciality from the natural artif iciality of man? One could argue 
that it is the very fact that synthetic parts enhance the body’s mechanisms; 
implants like the cochlea implant or implanted harddisks transform man 
into a restorative or even enhanced cyborg. If we take this perspective, we 
have to agree with the distinction between “natural” versus “artif icial” in a 
sense of “nature” vs. “culture.” In this respect, we also differentiate between 
“inside” and “outside,” thereby referring to glasses – which are worn outside 
– in comparison to, for example, the cochlea implant. But from an analytical 
point of view, I hesitate to follow the differentiations made. To focus on 
the treatment of Parkinson’s disease, we might ask: Does a fundamental 
difference between a medicamentous treatment and deep brain stimulation 
really exist? Personally, I cannot see it. The levodopa drug most often used 
in medical treatment is an industrially manufactured artefact, like the 
neurostimulator. One takes it out of the package and swallows it. Up to 
this point it is still an entity existing in the environment of the organism. It 
then passes the intestinal mucosa as the critical border. Having later passed 
the blood-brain barrier, the central nervous system is reached. Here the 
precursor is f inally converted into the neurotransmitter dopamine. If we 
take a closer look at the deep brain stimulation apparatus on the other hand, 
it is noteworthy that it stays a foreign object all throughout, despite it lying 
under the skin. Intermediation between organism and artefact happens 
only beyond the tip of the electrode. From this point of view, medication 
is a less intrusive technology compared to deep brain stimulation: If any 
complications occur between the drugs substances and the organism, no 
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explanation seems necessary. The therapeutic effect is the same, although 
deep brain stimulation is certainly a more effective treatment in late stage 
Parkinson’s disease (Oertel and Reichmann 2008, 24), and is in fact the only 
option left at this point of development. If we follow these considerations, 
we should not apply an inside/outside differentiation that follows man’s 
outward contours. A patient swallowing the levodopa drug or a “brute 
fact” like a potato being altered by cultural practices like cooking is, in 
this respect, an even more cyborg-like being compared to a deep brain 
stimulated Parkinson patient. Yet, it does not make sense to talk of these 
patients as being cyborgs. In contrast, one can argue that man has been a 
natural born cyborg since the very beginning of cultural evolution (Clark 
2003). So if we are on the wrong track, in what way is it fruitful to perceive 
a deep brain stimulated patient as a “man-machine”?
Eccentric positionality is the organic stage constitutive of human be-
ings (Plessner 1975). Any other stage would be systematically impossible 
(Haucke 2000). To conceive of cyborgs as the next stage of man would 
imply introducing teleology or “progress” into philosophical anthropol-
ogy. Plessner undoubtedly refused this notion (Plessner 1961, 33). What is 
more, it would also follow vulgar attempts to present human history as a 
history of technological progress in which men have begun to alter their 
biological determinacy by means of a new stage of technology (More 1996). 
Furthermore, I do not want to deconstruct the difference between the 
concepts of man and machine. Rather, I think it is fruitful to maintain the 
boundary for analytical purposes. The crucial question is: How is it that in 
cases like deep brain stimulation, handling of the patients’ naturality, and 
the world of artif icial artefacts and prostheses, levelled in order to maintain 
a balance? How do patients recentre themselves? To analyse these questions, 
it is important to take the perspective of surgically treated patients. In my 
empirical project, in which patients with deep brain stimulation and their 
spouses are interviewed, I observed cases, in which the intervention was 
perceived as a marvellous cure (Hätscher 2009). Patients who suffered from 
severe Parkinson’s disease for years, all of a sudden regained control over 
their entire body again. As I observed in two cases, the stimulator itself was 
not an entity that had to be integrated into the self-concept of the patient. 
Although one might want to conceptualize these patients as some kind 
of cyborg or man-machine, they actually did not feel like it. But this was 
not always the case. Some patients and their relatives reported problems 
while attempting to integrate the machine into their daily practice, more 
specif ically, psychosocial adaptation problems occurred (Schüpbach et al. 
2006). In our project I encountered cases in which the stimulator had to be 
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f ine-tuned or even repeatedly switched on and off for several reasons after 
surgery. I will give empirical examples for both cases.
I would like to start with the complicated procedure of f ine-tuning, where 
the goal is to f ind the proper adjustment among a dozen of parameters and 
nearly endless combinatory possibilities. The (re)programming has to be 
done by a specialist. But as always, time is precious and patients cannot 
be examined over long periods. Yet, a correct f ine tuning is essential for 
an optimal outcome. In a way, the patient’s quality of life depends on it, 
because mood, temper, speech, gesture and, last but not least, motor skills, 
are heavily influenced by the stimulation. Most important in this respect is 
the administering of medication and the f ine tuning of the apparatus, as it 
can also be performed by the patients themselves, thanks to the develop-
ment of a therapy controller. This device is virtually identical to television 
remote controls that can be bought in electrical stores. The procedure is 
very diff icult, as a lot of trial and error may be needed. The interaction of 
stimulation and effect has to be carefully observed. In some cases, long 
intervals appear between cause and the effect appearing, as in the case of 
this 68-year-old man:
Case-Report I
A: Ja ich glaub ich muss meine rechte Körperseite, also die linke Hälfte, 
die hat er jetzt f ixiert auf einen bestimmten Kanal (1,4s) ob man da (-) 
noch etwas machen kann. Wenn ich nämlich – (1,5s) ich nehm ja praktisch 
– (1,3s) zwanzig Prozent nur noch der Medikation die ich vorher hatte 
(1,3s) und äh (---) da (--) hat er JETZT, da hab ich ooch so ne Durchhän-
ger gehabt, in der letzten Zeit, wo ich also – große oder lange Zeiten, 
schlechtere Beweglichkeit. Äh weil ja ne größere Agonisten, ne höhere 
Agonistendosis das Hebepan etwas erhöht, nicht, und das ergänzt dann 
etwas. Darf ich natürlich auch nicht weiter äh machen. Ich würd sagen 
ich muss mir SELBST, ich spür das ja SELBER wie das wirkt? (---) und dann 
müsst ich eventuell, neige ich etwas zur ÜBERbewegungen ne? Und das 
wieder fein hehe auszutarieren, möglicherweise nochmal (-) wir ham ja 
jetzt wieder n Termin und möglicherweise muss ich das nochmal mitner 
(-) Schrittmacherrückstufung parallel äh erledigen.
Translation
A: I guess I have to (-) my right side of the body (-) I mean he (the physician, 
JH) f ixed the left side (electrode in left hemisphere of the patient’s brain, 
JH) on a specif ic channel (-) if something can be optimized here. Because 
if I, well, right now I take practically twenty percent of the medication. 
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And he just recently (-) I felt such a fatigue in the recent weeks when my 
overall mobility worsened more or less, because of taking more agonists, 
took more of this one preparation, it complements it a little. Of course I 
am not allowed to do it (administering of medication, JH) by myself. But 
I would say, I can feel it by myself you know? How it sinks in and then I 
would have to, I probably tend to hypokinesia, you know? (-) To balance 
it out. Probably again, we will arrange another time and date with the 
doctor, probably it will be necessary to downgrade the stimulator a little 
bit.
What we see here is an obvious struggle to regain autonomy over ones 
own body. High levels of neurological expertise as well as tacit knowledge 
and experience are required while the patient seeks to cope with this dif-
f icult situation. The linguistic structure of the text with its disrupted and 
discontinued phrases impressively depicts the patient’s fluctuation between 
moments of initiative and self-reflection (“I can feel it by myself”) on the 
one hand, and a disturbing sense of being subjected to an obscure disease 
and a complicated therapy, on the other, that makes him depend on the 
professional specialist. This man is striving for “self-governance,” he “wants 
to master his body” but in order to reach this objective, his own effort as 
well as further collaboration with the neurologist is necessary.
Postsurgical adaptation problems and Plessner’s philosophical 
anthropology as a theoretical framework
The other situation is even more irritating and leads back to our reflection 
on Plessner’s concepts in the f ield of neurosurgery and brain implants. In 
the following it will be demonstrated in how far philosophical anthropology 
is capable to elucidate the phenomenon: The mentioned situation appears 
whenever the neurostimulator is temporarily deactivated for a number of 
reasons. In this situation what I would like to call “front-stage-android” – 
borrowing the term “front stage” from Goffman’s sociology – can be seen. 
Using the remote control, the stimulator can be shut off, either by a physi-
cian, the patient himself, or even his relatives. Now the cardinal symptoms 
are no longer suppressed and reappear either spontaneously – especially in 
the case of tremor-treatment – or gradually. I will demonstrate two cases 
of suffering from severe rigidity and akinesia in a so called “OFF-state.” In 
both situations, either the partner or his relatives make use of the remote 
control. After pushing the button, the patients fall back into a situation of 
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total immobility. What looks like a man-machine being shut off is actually 
just a relapse into the former illness, the symptoms of which are now no 
longer repressed. Pushing the correct button-sequence again, the patients 
are “reactivated,” it is like switching a person “On” and “Off.” In what fol-
lows, two transcribed sequences will be presented in which the situation 
is conveyed through the conversations of the patients and their relatives.
Case-Report II:
Note: The couple makes regular use of the ON/OFF function. The patient 
himself is paralyzed, still he prof its from deep brain stimulation. The 
patient’s wife shuts down the stimulator every time she puts him to 
bed. Once in a week she is visiting her friends in the evening. During 
the meetings she regularly disappears for a few minutes to follow the 
procedure at home. I interviewed both the patient and her.
One year follow-up interview, B: wife, E: couple, nurse and interviewer
B: Wir sind gerade beim (--) wir trinke da was oder weil jemand Geburts-
tag hatte; sach ich muss HEIM, ich muss meinen MANN ausschalten!
E: hehehehehehe
B: Ich muss meinen Mann abstelle hehehehe.
E: Hehehehehe
B: Also ich konnt halt n dreiviertel Jahr überHAUPT net lache – aber jetzt 
kann ich wenigstens wieder LACHE.
Translation:
B: We’re drinking something, or we are at someone’s birthday and I say: I 
gotta go home, I have to turn my husband off! (everyone laughing) I have 
to turn my husband off (everyone laughing)! Well, I wasn’t able to laugh 
for nearly nine months but now I’m at least able to laugh.
Case-Report III:
Note: In this second scenario, a severe episode of hyperkinesia occurred 
under stress. To be able to manage such a situation in the future, the 
physician introduced the couple to the use of the remote control.
Three month follow-up interview, A: patient, B: wife, I: interviewer
A: Und dann merkt man das alles SCHWERER wurde. Nach zehn zwölf 
Minuten und nach fünfzehn Minuten konnte ich mich GAR nicht mehr 
370 JohAnnes hätscher 
bewegen. Dann schaltet man wieder AN? Nach ner viertel Stunde nach 
zehn Minuten – is alles wieder in ORDnung. (3 s) Hab ich schon gesagt 




A: Und stellt mich in die ECKE.
Translation:
A: I couldn’t feel the weight in my legs. It increased slowly. After 15 
minutes I couldn’t move myself anymore. And then, you turn it “On.” 
After 15 minutes everything is perfectly alright again! (pause of 3 sec.) I 
already said to myself: If my wife is fed up with me, then she nicks the 
remote control and turns me off! (I and B laugh heavily.) And puts me 
into the corner!
In both cases, laughter occurs. Next, I will argue that a) this laughter com-
prises a structural, anthropological problem and hence has a universal 
character, insofar as it cannot be reduced to the situation; and b) the Pless-
nerian anthropology can provide an intriguing solution to this problem.
According to Plessner’s anthropology (Plessner 1970), laughing as well 
as crying can be understood as a human response to crises. In such situ-
ations, no routines or patterns of interpretations exist that assure a clear 
def inition. Thus, a proper alignment cannot happen. If we focus on the 
linguistic transcripts as I have just presented them, it can be studied, how 
a meaningful sequence, a pragmatic rule-following in conversation, is 
adjourned. What is not apparent is the fact that laughing is primarily a 
reaction of the body (and one can build the argument that video protocols 
would provide a better basis for data). If we follow Plessner, laughing is 
comprised of a special relationship between man and his body (as living 
being) in its eccentric positionality. This is an even more important point 
in the case of Parkinson patients, whose primary problem is the loss of body 
control. Pathophysiological processes make it impossible for the person to 
move their extremities, form a gesture, move themselves, or perform other 
basic social practices. Chronical progrediency forces patients to withdraw 
from the public appearance. Thus, Parkinson’s becomes an issue that brings 
about shame in the persons affected by it (Nijhof 1995). With the sociological 
thought of Plessner, it is possible to interpret this circumstantial loss of the 
body as the primary tool for performing impression management: the ability 
to work in a flexible way in role-taking or in Plessner’s words: the ability to 
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wear different “masks” in the public sphere. Instead, the pathophysiological 
mechanisms force the individual into a single social role, the role of the 
“drunk” or the “madman.” By withdrawing from the public sphere, the 
familial community as the only hideaway left is often experienced as a 
psychosocial jail. In the decision to opt for deep brain stimulation and 
after surgery, patients are able to explore the sphere of public life again, a 
possibility that within Plessner’s anthropological framework, is constitutive 
for the status of being a person. It can happen in a rapid manner, even after 
years of chronic progrediency and decay.
Going back to laughing and crying as limits of human behaviour: To 
become a person, a threefold entity of mind, psyche and body (as living 
being) (Geist, Seele und Leib) is necessary. This entity, this state of personal 
integrity is not of an enduring nature: Abnormal situations, actual limits, 
force this entity to fall apart (Plessner 1961, 161). This is also the case in laugh-
ing or crying. The body, as a living body, slips away from control and takes 
over: It no longer serves as an instrument, with which one can act, speak, 
gesture or express something but the body reacts in direct counterblast 
(ibid.). It is a physiological automatism causing laughter. But as Plessner 
points out, humanity is effectively demonstrated through an abdication of 
body control, body possession, demonstrated by the disintegration of the 
threefold entity constituting the person. In this f igure, the false dichotomy 
of hermeneutics and biology is overthrown: It comprises a reaction of the 
body to a crisis in the f ield of sense-structured world. Only an anthro-
pology synthesizing both layers is capable of explaining this reaction in 
non-reductionistic terms. But what is the matter? What exactly is the limit 
in this case that causes laughter in the examples above?
The symptoms of Parkinson’s disease lead to a loss of a person’s ability to 
master his bodily control. By now, this potential is regained with the aid of 
deep brain stimulation. In the process of recentring oneself, a psychosocial 
adaptation problem appears: The human being, in its eccentric positionality 
appears – at least in the patterns of interpretation operative in the patients 
and his or her spouses – in one of its endless aspects as an artefact itself: 
as a machine, as an android. But the person, who lost the possession of his 
body, is not an android. The technology used to suppress the symptoms 
only behaves much more machine-like in comparison to, for example, 
the levodopa medication. What fails to be an analytical difference – the 
difference between an ordinary human and a so called cyborg – is in fact 
a difference in the processual behaviour of the body as a living body. The 
alteration of the pathophysiological mechanisms can be controlled by but-
tons. This confuses us, since buttons belong to machines in our ordinary 
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perception. But if the human is capable of differentiating humans from 
things, plants and animals (Plessner 1975; Haucke 2000) than an irritation 
appears in exactly the moment at which the body as a living body reacts 
like a machine in the perception of either the patient or his spouse. This 
situation causes laughter in the cases presented above. But by laughing in 
an abnormal situation, deep brain stimulated patients remain human in 
their natural artif iciality.
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21 On Humor and “Laughing” Rats
The Importance of Plessner for Affective Neuroscience
Heleen J. Pott
Introduction
The philosophical study of laughing has a long history, including contribu-
tions from Plato, Aristotle, Descartes, Kant, Schopenhauer, and Bergson. 
In trying to understand the meaning of human laughter, philosophers 
traditionally investigated the occasions that make us laugh: jokes, comedy, 
and humour, asking questions of when and why it is that we burst out into 
laughter. Everyone considered laughter to be a uniquely human capacity. 
“No other living things laugh,” as Aristotle puts it in Parts of Animals (673a9).
In recent times, scientists began to question philosophy’s assumption of 
laughter as a phenomenon exclusively found in human beings. Laughter is 
not unique to humans, as other primates do it as well. Contrary to popular 
opinion, most laughter is not about humour, but about social relationships, 
says psychologist Robert Provine in his bestselling book Laughter: A Sci-
entific Investigation (2000). Laughter’s emergence within the evolution of 
the mammalian brain took place much earlier than is generally believed, 
predating the development of language by perhaps millions of years.
According to neuroscientist Jaak Panksepp, even non-primate mam-
malian brains are capable of producing laughter. In Affective Neuroscience 
(1998) he famously defends the claim that rats laugh when you tickle them, 
although we just can’t hear the ultrasonic play vocalizations because of the 
high frequency (50 kHz). Panksepp’s proposal is that circuits for laughter 
and play exist in very ancient regions of the brain that we share not only 
with chimpanzees and apes, but also with rats and other rodents.
Does this mean that philosophy has lost its relevance to the study of 
laughter today? Should we disqualify philosophical studies because of their 
anthropocentrism and turn to empirical research on the laughter of chimps, 
dogs and rats instead? Or is there still reason to see the “laughing” of rats 
and other mammals as behavior that is qualitatively different from most 
types of human laughter – is animal laughter not genuine laughter after 
all, as philosophers traditionally made us believe?
In this paper I will defend the thesis that we don’t necessarily have to 
choose between these two options. Instead, I will argue that traditional 
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philosophical approaches are perfectly compatible with the results of 
today’s scientif ic research on animal laughter. To clarify this point, I will 
revisit Helmuth Plessner’s hermeneutics of laughter presented in Laughing 
and Crying (1970) and show that a rethinking of Plessner’s conceptual frame-
work has much to teach us today about how there is a shared evolutionary 
basis for human and animal laughter, while at the same time highlighting 
important ways in which laughing can be seen as an exclusively human 
trait.
Why do we laugh?
Why do we laugh? What conditions and mechanisms are involved that 
trigger the explosion of gasping, grunting noises ensuing from such diverse 
stimuli as hearing funny jokes, watching Mr. Bean on TV, attending a 
birthday party, or smoking weed with friends?
The question may seem simple, but it is incredibly diff icult to formulate 
an adequate answer. At f irst sight, nothing could be more common than 
laughing. We all do it, it is part of a vocabulary that is shared by the members 
of all different cultures. You don’t have to learn it, the language of laughter 
is understood ubiquitously. Even children who are born blind and deaf still 
retain the capacity to laugh.
However, as soon as you actually try to answer why we make these weird 
noises, laughing stops seeming familiar. One of the puzzling things about 
it is that we do not freely, consciously and purposefully choose to break 
out into laughter, it simply happens to us in certain situations. There has 
been no preliminary decision to laugh, and we cannot start it on command. 
Only very good actors can convincingly fake that they are laughing. And 
neither can we stop it on command. As everyone knows from experience, 
inappropriate laughter is often diff icult to disguise and it can easily get 
out of control.
Consequently, laughter cannot be seen as a voluntary activity, but neither 
can we think of it as an automatic physiological event triggered by some 
external stimulus. It is true that during exuberant laughing, our facial 
muscles stretch, we make a sequence of rhythmic expiratory sounds, tears 
stream and the body collapses, our physical existence seems completely 
disorganized. The interesting thing however is that it is not my body, but 
it is me who laughs – laughter is a meaningful activity. People laugh about 
something and they do it for a reason. One may ask why somebody is 
laughing, but it would be unorthodox to ask why somebody is sneezing, 
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or yawning, or coughing. An outburst of laughter can be deeply revealing 
about that individual’s personality.
In addition, the reasons for laughing can be pretty sophisticated, as is 
illustrated in one of our earliest cultural narratives about laughter. In the 
Book of Genesis, God promises Abraham, who is one hundred years old at 
the time, that his wife Sarah will soon give birth to a son. Upon hearing the 
news Abraham falls on his face, laughing. Later on three angels approach 
Abraham in his tent and promise that Sarah will have a baby in the next 
year. Now it is Sarah who laughs, asking how she, old as she is, can still 
become a mother. The Lord then asks whether Sarah believes that there 
are things impossible for God. And Sarah becomes afraid, the Bible says, 
and denies having laughed at all.
Sarah’s reasons for laughing are highly complex. According to philoso-
pher Agnes Heller, who mentions Sarah’s laughter in her study on comic 
phenomena (Heller 2005), Sarah does seem to laugh at God f irst of all, but 
by doing so she is also personally implicated, she also laughs at herself. Her 
laughter expresses not just a simple lack of faith in God’s promise, but it 
is perhaps even more a laughter of self-irony, embarrassment, impossibil-
ity. The story indicates that there may exist a close relationship between 
laughter and a sense of incomprehensibility, even absurdity. Whatever 
it might have been exactly that made Sarah laugh – disbelief, doubt, or 
despair – there def initely was a lot of lucidity in her laughter (ibid., 29)
So at least we may say that some instances of human laughter can be 
complicated phenomena, involving mind, body and soul. For many philoso-
phers, this complexity is eff icient proof that laughing is a uniquely human 
capability, and that pondering on laughter is likely to give us some insight 
into what kind of persons we actually are.
Panksepp’s laughing rats
Recently however, a number of scientists have argued that the capacity 
to produce laughter is not exclusive to human beings, but exhibited as 
well by other mammals. In his book Laughter: A Scientific Investigation 
(2000), the American psychologist Robert Provine defends the claim 
that contrary to popular belief, laughing is not about humour, it is about 
instinctive social bonding. The sound of laughter is a social play vocaliza-
tion, and as such, a laughter’s stimulus is not a joke, but the presence 
of an animate other, Provine says. Chimpanzees, orangutans and other 
mammals laugh in social conditions like rough-and-tumble play, chasing 
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games or tickling. The fast and breathy vocalizations that they produce 
during play or when being tickled, have more than a passing resemblance 
to the laughter humans produce. The difference is merely that apes and 
other mammals vocalize as they inhale and exhale, whereas humans 
laugh during exhalation only, in the same way we do it during speech. In 
Provine’s view, the evolution of bipedality in human ancestors freed the 
thorax and uncoupled breathing from running, providing humans with the 
typical f lexible breath control required for both laughter and speech. His 
thesis is that human laughter is unusual in solitary settings – you cannot 
tickle yourself – and that it evolved from the ritualized panting sounds of 
our ancient primate ancestors during playing. It is literary the sound of 
play, a signal that reveals us as social animals, with the primal ‘pant-pant’ 
becoming the human ‘ha-ha-ha.’
According to Jaak Panksepp, a psychologist and neuroscientist at Wash-
ington State University, laughter is a capacity that can be found not only in 
primates but in non-primates too. Panksepp discovered that even rats can 
laugh (Panksepp 1998). In a groundbreaking article, he and his colleague 
Burgdorf describe how, in a systematic study of non-human tickling, rats 
respond to f inger strokes of their belly with ultrasonic play vocalizations 
that may be the rat’s equivalence to human laughter. The play – and tickle-
induced ultrasonic vocalization patterns (50 kHz chirps) in rats cannot be 
heard with the unaided human ear, but they seem to signal a readiness for 
social encounter. The rats that chirped the most were also the most playful, 
according to the authors. During the experiment, Panksepp’s hand was 
accepted as a playmate and the rats were returning to it time and again for 
more tickling (Panksepp and Burgdorf 2003).
Panksepp and Burgdorf point out a number of reasons for the hypothesis 
that such rat vocalizations reflect a type of positive affect that may have 
evolutionary relationships to the joyfulness of early human laughter ac-
companying social play. According to their theory, rats, apes and humans 
share homologous brain circuits that generate basic emotional feelings, e.g. 
rage, distress, care, lust and playfulness. The sources of play and laughter 
in the mammalian brain are instinctual. Play is about physical touch, both 
touching others and being touched, which is the essence of being a mammal. 
Laughter by tickling evolved as a way of cementing the affective bond 
between parents and children, thereby laying the foundation for a behavior 
that then be passed on as a useful social trait for adult mammals. The 
sensory capacity of detecting other animals and the associated defence of 
the body boundaries that are exercised in early play, must be widespread 
in animal life. Therefore it is to be expected that the tickling response will 
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also be found in non-primates such as rats, squirrels, cats, dogs and many 
other animals.
Their proposal is that tickle may be at the root of all play, in animals as 
well as in humans, triggering feelings of joy and playfulness in the young and 
of sexual arousal in adults. The human taste for humour is based in some 
fundamental way on the existence of this kind of infantile laughter. As we 
learn to tickle each other with words, we may be developing new synaptic 
connections to neural zones residing deep inside our brain, according to 
Panksepp. He believes that rat laughter and infantile human laughter do 
share enough evolutionary relations for the former to be useful in decoding 
one of the great mysteries of human life – the genesis of pleasure and joy.
So it seems as if we ran into a dilemma here. From a philosophical point 
of view, human laughing about jokes, comedy, irony, or absurdity (as in the 
case of Sarah in the Old Testament), seems to have nothing in common with 
the chirping noises that rats make in Panksepp’s laboratory in response to 
tickling. It looks as if the difference could not be any larger. Sarah’s laughing 
was characterized by disbelief, embarrassment and possibly a number of 
other self-reflective states that rats obviously do not dispose of. So why take 
Panksepp’s claim seriously at all?
On the other hand, Panksepp and other neuroscientists have compel-
ling evidence to suggest that playfulness, and also rage, fear, lust, care, 
panic, are biologically basic affects that derive from architecturally and 
chemically distinct circuits, hard coded into the subcortex of the mam-
malian brain at birth. They function in a similar way in humans as they 
do in non-human mammals. Laughter, as an expression of the social play 
system, seems to derive from the same causal mechanisms in animals 
and humans. Rats may not have a sense of humour or comedy, but just 
like human beings, they do appear to have an enormous sense of fun and 
play, as Panksepp puts it.
In the next sections, I will make an attempt to reconcile Panksepp’s 
claim that rats can laugh with the idea that laughter is uniquely human, as 
many philosophers have argued. I will show how Plessner’s philosophical 
explanation of human laughter as a boundary phenomenon provides us with 
arguments to develop a strong case in this regard. It is true that Plessner 
stresses that laughing (and crying) “in the full sense of the words” are 
uniquely human phenomena. However, as I will argue, a thorough reading 
of his hermeneutics also provides us with the instruments to distinguish 
different sorts of laughter and to build bridges between self-conscious hu-
man laughing and the vocalizations of rats, chimps and little children in 
tickle and play.
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Plessner’s hermeneutics of human laughter
Plessner starts his analysis of Laughing and Crying (1970) with an intrigu-
ing claim: “Laughing and crying […] are forms of expression which, in the 
full sense of the words, only man has at his disposal” (1970, 24). He then 
continues: “The statement that evidently only man has laughing and crying 
at his disposal, but not the lower animals, states no hypothesis which can 
one day be disproved by observation, but a certainty.”
Right from the beginning, Plessner criticizes the idea that humans are 
uniquely characterized by “rational” activities such as speaking, thinking, 
and long-term goal-directed acting. In his view, “bodily” experiences, such as 
laughing and crying, should be counted amongst the human monopolies as 
well. A creature without the possibility of laughing and crying is not human 
at all, according to Plessner. Therefore, any attempt to explain laughter (and 
crying) in terms of archaic reactions and to reduce them to elementary 
drives for shelter or communication misses the point completely, in his view.
With “laughter in the full sense of the word,” Plessner obviously does not 
refer to tickle and play situations. He is instead referring to laughter as it is 
related to the comic, to wit and humour, and also to embarrassment and 
despair (Plessner 1970, 194). What characterizes these specif ic occasions 
is that they generate a laughter that is simultaneously experienced as a 
loss of rational self-control, and as a meaningful response to the situation. 
When we burst out into laughter after hearing a really good joke, normal 
functioning is temporarily interrupted and an objective manipulation of 
the situation is over, Plessner says. The laughter breaks out eruptively, runs 
its course compulsively, and lacks definite symbolic form (Plessner 1970, 25). 
It is closer to an inarticulate cry or to a bodily reflex, than to disciplined 
speech. Yet, laughing remains the one and only true answer we can give to 
the funny situation.
For Plessner, the underlying question runs as follows: how should we 
understand that an articulate human being who in normal conditions can 
control his bodily expressions, falls into an automatic bodily reaction as 
soon as he “gets” the punch-line of a funny joke? How can we explain an 
automatism that shakes us so thoroughly, and yet is so much more than 
merely a bodily reaction? Neither the dualistic vocabulary of materialistic 
science, nor that of idealistic phenomenology can give a satisfying answer 
to this question, Plessner emphasizes. What this type of laughter points out 
is “the secret composition of human nature” itself. To explain the puzzle 
of laughter, we need a hermeneutic analysis that takes into account the 
human being as a whole.
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Plessner’s naturalized hermeneutics is based on the notion of eccentric 
positionality, as a constitutive principle of human behaviour. Man is his 
body and he has his body as a physical thing. He is living in two different 
orders, as he famously claims. Human life is constituted by having to f ind 
an arrangement with respect to this relation between being a body and 
having it. It is precisely this ambiguous structure of human existence that 
can explain how it is possible that man, as an intellectual being, can lose 
his relation to his own body in something as characteristic as laughing.
In Plessner’s view, only beings that have self-control can lose it and sur-
render to the body in this way. Laughter happens when a situation confronts 
us with a multiplicity of meanings so that we feel immobilized among 
the abundance and don’t know what to do. When the direction is missing 
in which we must organize ourselves as eccentrically positioned human 
beings, we give up the directed relationship to our environment, the body 
slips away and we laugh. But while the body takes over the answer, the 
person remains intact as a person, Plessner writes (1970, 33). Laughing is 
a meaningful reply. The unique experience of the brokenness of man’s 
relation to his body during laughter exemplifies how fundamentally human 
corporeality differs from animal embodiment.
We tend to laugh in situations that are ambiguous or incongruous, yet 
not in such a way that it harms us, according to Plessner. If the ambiguous 
situation is also serious, posing a real threat to our well-being, we do not 
typically laugh. Instead, we are liable to panic or even lose consciousness. 
In non-dangerous situations however, especially if we cannot respond to 
the situation by means of words or actions, gestures or emotional expres-
sions, we let ourselves go, automatism comes into play, and we laugh. Thus, 
laughter is the inarticulate, disorganized, yet intelligent expression of a 
boundary situation.
Tickling babies
An interesting implication of his hermeneutic approach is that Plessner has 
to make a sharp distinction between the eruptive, compulsory laughter at 
wit, comedy and humour, which he analyzes as a breakdown of the control 
a person has over the body, and other forms of laughter-like behavior such 
as giggling, smiling, laughing out of joy, laughing in play and after being 
tickled, polite conversational laughing, and social laughing. In all these sorts 
of laughter, there is no breakdown in the sense that the active directedness 
to the environment is maintained.
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Plessner is obviously interested f irst and foremost in the more dramatic 
forms of human laughing. This may explain why he has many interesting 
things to say about humour and comedy, but relatively little about the 
laughter of babies and little children.
Of course, developmental psychologists would be inclined to see the 
different forms of laughing as different only in degree and not in kind, 
with eruptive laughter at comedy and jokes on the more sophisticated side 
of the spectrum, while the polar opposite is in uncomplicated laughter of 
babies in tickling or little children playing. Scientists who specialize in 
the ontogenesis of laughter tell us that babies start to smile in their second 
month and that they f irst laugh at about four months of age, their laughing 
being a way to interact with the mother and other caregivers. The incidence 
of laughter becomes more frequent later on, as do the varieties of occasions 
that elicit it. According to psychologist L. Alan Sroufe, the laughter develops 
from being a response to direct physical stimulation, toward smiling and 
laughing in response to a remote stimulus. One-year-olds laugh most at 
items that provide an obvious element of cognitive incongruity – mother 
sticking out her tongue, or playing peekaboo. Older babies seem to love the 
unpredictability of a situation like this so much that they begin to take an 
active role in the production of it. According to Sroufe, the development 
of laughter goes hand-in-hand with the development of the capacity to 
coordinate different tactile, auditory and visual schemata. Humans laugh 
most often during early childhood, and the most abundant laughter occurs 
during rough-and-tumble play and as a result of being tickled gently (Scroufe 
1996, in Prusak 2006, 45).
The interesting thing is that the occasions that elicit laughter from 
babies and small children in tickling and play all seem to have certain 
characteristics in common. First, they all present an incongruity – a char-
acteristic that certainly holds for tickling, which is an ambivalent form of 
contact that is at once repulsive and attractive, potentially threatening 
and comfortable. Secondly, when a child is confronted with an incongru-
ity, she stops whatever else she was doing and a bodily tension builds up, 
which is necessary in order to release subsequent laughter. Thirdly, the 
need for tension relief alone can never provide a suff icient explanation for 
laughter, where the tension leads to depends on a further characteristic, 
namely the child’s evaluation of the one who tickles. How the person that 
tickles her is perceived and valued can make the whole difference between 
a ticklish delight and an ordeal (Provine 1999, 100). Consequently, whether 
the stimulus of laughter is effective depends on the relationship with the 
tickler as much as it depends on any of the movements that he makes with 
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his hand. Laughing due to tickling and play is always an expression of the 
one who laughs, and not merely a bodily event.
In this respect, the laughter of little children has a lot in common with 
the laughter of rats, as Panksepp and Burgdorf point out. The chirping 
reaction of rats is a meaningful response as well. A video on YouTube with 
Panksepp’ s laughing rats shows that these laboratory rats really enjoy being 
tickled because they socialize with the hand that tickles them. What the 
video makes clear is that tickle involves more than the sensory physiology 
of touch and the physical properties of the stimulus – not just anybody, in 
any circumstance, can make rats laugh by tickling them.
A fourth characteristic therefore is that from a psychological point of 
view, laughter is always social. This is in sharp contrast to crying, which is 
a solitary activity most of the time. From childhood, we learn to laugh at 
incongruities in a social context. We laugh at others and in the company of 
others, signalling friendly intentions and the feeling that we are part of a 
group. Laughter is contagious – even in the case of tickling, when children 
laugh together with the person who tickles them. As Panksepp and Burgdorf 
suggest, we may assume that the whole puzzle why one cannot tickle oneself 
may be due to the fact that the underlying neural systems in the tickling 
response are controlled by social cues and social interactions – the percep-
tion of being wanted/chased as well as the predictability/unpredictability 
of the resulting social interactions (Panksepp and Burgdorf 2003, 542).
The social function of laughter in play and in situations of tickling is likely 
to be positive, but can also be negative at times. Children laugh not only 
with others, but also at others, trying to force them to conform or to cast 
them out of the group. In adulthood we make jokes on those who obviously 
fail to meet the requirements of the social rules. Laughing can be used as 
a tool to reinforce a group’s solidarity by devaluating outsiders – humans 
often laugh together from a position of moral power and superiority, which 
is probably one of the reasons why laughing has never been very popular in 
philosophy. Plato, Aristotle and Hobbes noticed correctly that we have a bad 
habit of laughing at those who don’t f it in the group, or at the misfortunes 
of others.
A f irst conclusion we can draw might be that certain “family resem-
blances” (Wittgenstein) hold between the behavior of rats producing ul-
trasonic vocalizations while being tickled, the expressive sounds produced 
by babies and little children in tickling and play, and the eruptive laughter 
adult human beings produce at hearing a joke or watching “the world’s 
funniest home videos.” Together they represent a heterogeneous collection 
of states that have various degrees of similarity to each other. The similari-
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ties explain why both ordinary and scientif ic language users easily refer to 
these analogous behaviors with the general and unspecif ic term “laughter.”
A second conclusion might be that the common features of different 
sorts of “laughter” – the perception of incongruity, the built up of bodily 
tension and its relief, the process of evaluation, the mechanism of social 
inclusion – provide compelling evidence for the claim that the human taste 
for humour is indeed based on the existence of childhood joy and laughter 
in humans and other mammals. The f irst joke, the f irst action to produce 
a laugh without physical contact, probably was the feigned tickle, the same 
kind of movement parents make when they play with their babies.
Eccentric animals that can laugh
The reasons why Plessner focussed in Laughing and Crying (1970) on what 
we might call the more dramatic instances of laughter – laughter as a crisis, 
an uncontrolled eruption – may have become clear by now. His purpose 
was to understand laughter in its typically human aspects, as a meaningful 
answer that is at the same time a loss of orientation, a fall into the body. 
From the point of view of philosophical anthropology this is the real mystery 
of laughter, because this would never occur to non-human animals. It is 
precisely here that human corporeality appears to differ fundamentally 
from animal embodiment.
In spite of many remarks that seem to prove the contrary, I don’t think 
that Plessner’s point was that laughing – in a more general sense of the 
word – should be denied to creatures such as little children, babies, or 
even chimps and rats. In Laughing and Crying he explicitly acknowledges 
that there are different sorts of laughter, being on a curve which “stretches 
from the mediate occasions of boundless joy and titillation to the boundary 
situations of embarrassment and despair. The top of the curve, which is 
correlated with the occasions of the comic and of wit and humour, indicates 
laughter in its full development” (Plessner 1970, 113).
Therefore I assume that Plessner, if he were still alive, would readily admit 
that the behavior of chimps and rats while being tickled, shows interesting 
similarities with the behavior of babies or little children and that tickling is 
probably the closest we get to the laugh-inducing snatching and grabbing of 
our ancestors. He would easily join Panksepp in his conclusion that although 
laboratory rats lack a sense of humour, they do appear to have a sense of 
joy and fun. He would probably even agree with V.S. Ramachandran that 
a possible evolutionary explanation for the emergence of fully developed 
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human laughing might be that the individual is alerting others in the social 
group that the incongruity he detected is of trivial consequence, that there 
has been a false alarm (Ramachandran 1998, 352).
Neither would Plessner, in my view, object to the claim that most laughter 
in the human world is not about humour or wit, but about the relationships 
between people. Most of the time, laughter takes place in ordinary daily 
conversations, it is about things that are far from what one might call funny. 
Most laughter does not follow jokes or slapstick. It is a sort of social glue that 
bonds relationships, a kind of polite, artif icial laughing, e.g. when your boss 
is making a speech. No doubt, Plessner would agree with Provine that most 
laughter happens during the pauses between the words, and that it seldomly 
interrupts breath or the sentence structure of speech in all entirety.
Yet, there are instances where it does exactly that. Sometimes we burst 
out into laughter when we hear a funny joke, in the process of which our 
body becomes alien to us. “We understand we are arriving at a boundary 
[…] our laughter is an embodiment of the estrangement from our body” 
(Plessner 1970, 138). To clarify how this peculiar event is possible, we need 
to understand that man is living in two different orders: he is eccentrically 
positioned in his world, an embodied creature and a creature in the body at 
the same time. It is precisely man’s ambiguous position that constitutes the 
basis of laughing. In Plessner’s interpretation, we are capable of breaking 
out into laughter because of our brokenness.
Therefore, the bottom line of Plessner’s investigations reads loud and 
clear that the eruption of the alien body in laughter cannot be reduced to 
some primitive animal forerunner. To the contrary, it should be seen as a 
triumph of man, a victory of the self, even in catastrophe. Eruptive laughter 
exemplif ies what is unique to the human being. It is in the breakdown of 
organized behaviour that we actually experience how our reflective relation 
to ourselves has indeed an origin in human corporeality, as the Dutch 
philosopher Maarten Coolen says (Coolen 2008, 165). In losing control over 
his body, man still attests to his sovereign understanding of what cannot be 
understood, to his power in weakness, to his freedom and greatness under 
constraint (Plessner 1970, 67).
Consequently, Plessner’s hermeneutics testif ies to a strikingly original 
understanding of man and his place in nature. It presents man not as a 
rational animal, actively controlling the machine of his body, but as an 
ambiguous creature, living in a condition of instability. Precisely when the 
body takes over, he asserts himself as a person and proves his humanity. Or 
to summarize it concisely: Plessner presents man as the eccentric animal 
that can laugh.
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22 A Moral Bubble




One of the greatest challenges in our information society is to acquire 
knowledge out of all the information that is piling up around us. Especially 
in the online world, where the bits of data are constantly multiplying, it 
has become impossible to eff iciently search and f ind information without 
some – technological – assistance.
Many consider online personalization – the possibility to tailor online 
services to the individual needs and preferences of users – as one of the 
“Holy Grails” in the world of ICT (Van der Hof and Prins 2008; Nabeth 2008). 
The search engine Google, which provides users with search results relevant 
to their individual context, is a prime example of online-personalization 
practices. But also Facebook personalizes its services by ranking the mes-
sages on a user’s page in order of importance, and online advertisement 
companies make it possible for their clients to display tailored adds to 
potential costumers all over the internet. Obviously, online personalization 
has many advantages. It provides an easy retrieval of relevant information 
and enables a more eff icient and adequate way of doing business. In short, 
it makes online interactions run smoothly.
However, as online personalization becomes more and more sophisticated, 
it might also affect users negatively. Online personalization may lead to, what 
I will refer to as, a moral bubble. Contradicting information often triggers 
moral repositioning. However, by presenting users with information that 
only affirms their initial beliefs, online personalization might hamper this 
moral evaluation. Although in everyday life, we usually act without giving it 
a second thought, by following routines more than by engaging in conscious 
decision-making, the possibility to reflect upon our actions, nevertheless, 
is an important human attribute. Or, as Hildebrandt (2008, 27) claims: “the 
very small amount of actions we actually consciously intend, are distinctive 
for our moral competence.” Information works as a key to open the room of 
moral reflection. Although the room is not frequently visited, it nevertheless 
is an important place to reside once in a while to affirm who we are or per-
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haps change who we want to be. Without being confronted with alternative 
beliefs of others or contradicting information, it becomes more difficult to 
comprehend the motives of other persons or feel empathy for their considera-
tions (Nussbaum 1997). Moreover, even when the moral bubble turns out to 
be a positive one, a bubble that guides our actions in ways we consciously 
endorse, it still deprives us of the possibility to practice our reflective attribute. 
Reaffirming the choices once made is also a valuable pursuit. All in all, by 
presenting users with information that dominantly confirms their initial 
beliefs, online personalization aims at the heart of moral agency.
Although it becomes quite evident that profiling is a technology that may 
leave a mark on moral practices, it is only quite recently a material turn has 
occurred in the f ield of applied ethics, resulting in more attention to the 
moral agency of artifacts (Verbeek 2011a; Swierstra et al. 2009; Swierstra 
and Waelbers 2012). While there is still debate on how to def ine this moral 
agency of artifacts, some consensus has been reached on the fact that 
“the artefacts we deal with in our daily life help to determine our actions 
and decisions” (Verbeek 2009, 226). In other words, online personaliza-
tion practices are based on technologies that “mediate what we believe 
to be the case, what we believe to be possible and what we believe to be 
desirable” (Swierstra and Waelbers 2012, 160, italics in original). Because 
of this technological involvement, it is important to look deeper into the 
way a technological practice such as online personalization influences 
moral decision-making. Although a lot of attention has been paid to the 
phenomenon of online personalization and more particular to its legal, 
democratic, and economical consequences (Hildebrandt 2009; Hildebrandt 
and Gutwirth 2008; Hildebrandt and Rouvroy 2011; Van der Hof and Prins 
2008; Solove 2004), very little research has been done on the implications 
for moral agency of this widely used online technology (an exception is the 
edited book of Hildebrandt and Rouvroy 2011).
In this book chapter, I will make use of some key insights of the philoso-
phy of technology – more specif ically deriving from postphenomenology 
as formulated by Ihde and Verbeek – to clarify and analyse the way online 
personalization can result in a moral bubble. I will turn to the work of the 
German philosopher Helmuth Plessner to analyze the profiling technologies 
that enable online personalization.
Based on this body of literature, I will discuss two ways in which online 
personalization influences moral repositioning. First, I will focus on the 
way in which prof iling technologies build a closed Umwelt instead of an 
open world, resulting in an online environment that is characterized by 
cold ethics rather than by hot morality.
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Second, I will focus on the opaqueness of the personalized interface. Up 
until now, there has not been much public debate about online person-
alization. As a consequence, a clear set of rules or agreements on how to 
implement profiling technologies is lacking. Therefore, most of the time it 
is not transparent based on which – automatic – decisions an interface has 
been designed. Moreover, because users have no direct access to the settings 
of the interface, they cannot judge for themselves whether the f iltering of 
information is taken place accurately (Hildebrandt 2011a). Consequently, 
there is little room for moral repositioning.
Online personalization might hamper normative reflection. The moral 
change activated by online personalization can be characterized as es-
tablishing moral stagnation. By way of conclusion, I will explore means to 
avoid this stagnation. Based on a multi-actor approach, I focus on possible 




Personalization can be perceived as an organizational strategy of companies, 
governments and other organizations to provide services by means of ICTs 
to a large number of individual customers worldwide on an individualized 
basis (Van der Hof and Prins 2008, 113). Delivering personalized services 
based on detailed information about the preferences and behavior of users is 
one of the key ambitions of almost all online retailers (Van der Hof and Prins 
2008; Prins 2011). Online companies see personalization as an excellent 
tool for presenting users with a selection of information based on personal 
preferences instead of letting their potential customers swim (and probably 
drown) in an endless sea of data. The overall goal they want to achieve 
by tracking users is to increase their sales (Etzioni 2012). Nevertheless, 
personalization might also benefit users. It can ensure a flow of information 
a user on its own would not be able to generate. Personalization can make 
interactions online easier because they are already deprived of useless 
data. Personalized information might also empower an individual and 
strengthen personal development (Kelly 2010). Moreover, Sunstein (2013) 
speaks of personalized default rules, which could be installed to provide 
people with personalized nudges to ensure they act in a way that might 
make them “healthier, wealthier, and happier” (ibid., 9). Moreover, by sup-
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porting personal aspirations, personalization, ideally, could contribute to 
a better world (cf. Nabeth 2008).
The conditio sine qua non for online personalization is automated 
profiling. By means of algorithms, databases f illed with huge sets of data 
are mined to create, discover, or construct knowledge (Hildebrandt 2008, 
17). Prof iling is used to create profiles of individual users based on which 
personalization can take place. These profiles can be seen as “hypotheses” 
(ibid., 18); predictions about future preferences and behavior. Interestingly, 
these hypotheses are not necessarily based on a common sense expectation 
or on earlier-established knowledge. The hypotheses often just “emerge” in 
the process of gathering and analyzing data (ibid.).
To gain a better understanding of how profiling works, we will focus on 
retargeting, a form of prof iling, which has skyrocketed over the last couple 
of years and is an important feature of the personalized web (Beales 2010; 
Helft and Vega 2010; Lambrecht and Tucker 2012). Online retailers do not 
merely want to display a website tailored to the specif ic interests of their 
visitors. Better still, since visitors often leave the website without purchase, 
corporations want to follow visitors all over the web with personalized adds 
in the hope to persuade them to buy the item –or a related one – they have 
shown interest for in the past.
E-Advertising companies make this real-time targeting possible for 
online retailers. By dropping a cookie – a small, non-intrusive text f ile – in 
the potential buyer’s browser, retargeting systems are able to identify this 
specific user when visiting the web shop (Watts 2012). If this potential buyer 
is for example, looking at a pair of shoes, a cookie is placed into her browser 
connecting it to that pair of shoes (Steel 2007; Helft and Vega 2010). When 
she leaves the online shoe retailer, surf ing to another website, the company 
is alarmed and automatically starts bidding on advertisement space on that 
other website, ensuring a personalized shoe-advertisement shows up when 
that web page has been loaded. All this happens fully-automated in a mere 
6 milliseconds (Criteo 2013). Retargeting makes it possible for companies 
to ‘follow’ a user online, showing her advertisements and other informa-
tion tailored to her previous online actions and interests, consequently, 
contributing to the arrival of a personalized online environment.
Online parties that want to make use of retargeting can also turn to 
Google that started testing this specif ic form of profiling – they refer to it as 
remarketing – in 2009 (Helft and Vega 2010). For Google, retargeting is just a 
more specif ic form of behavioral targeting (cf. Beales 2010), which is one of 
their core occupations (Helft and Vega 2010). Google’s business plan is built 
on two pillars. One the one hand, the company wants to sell advertisements 
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that ensure their clients a good return on investment; on the other hand they 
want to provide users with accurate search results. Mager (2012) speaks of 
the “service-for-profile model.” A user can use the search engine free of cost 
because the profile Google creates is sold to profit-making corporations.
In order to build these prof iles and provide users with personalized 
search results, Google has to have access to a large body of behavioral data. 
Taking into account their status as an “obligatory passing point” (Mager 
2012, 776) for almost everyone who wants to f ind information online, this 
does not seem to impose problems. Google can relate a query to the user’s 
search history and has the ability to cross-reference this information with 
data coming from their other services such as Gmail and Google Docs (Tene 
2008, 1448). In addition, Google always makes use of contextualization 
(Enge 2011). The search engine takes into account context elements such as 
geography, language, and seasonality to make the interaction between its 
interface and the user run smoothly. In addition, even when a user is not 
logged in to Google, the search engine personalizes its results by making 
use of cookies. For a period of 180 days, a cookie linked to the user’s browser 
keeps track of the search history.
All these sorting techniques enable Google to tailor its list of results 
to the specif ic needs of the user. For what is relevant to one person does 
not have to be relevant to someone else. Similarly to the way in which the 
targeted ads of online retailers add to the personalization of the internet, 
the personalized search results of Google shape the online environment. 
The information Google presents to the user is based on automated profiling 
rather than on transparent or objective standards.
Although users have the feeling they are anonymous online and nobody 
is interested in their online activities, the opposite is the case (Benoist 2008, 
168). Almost 80% of the most often-visited websites use tracking technology 
to gather information of their visitors (Angwin 2010) and a majority of them 
use this information to tailor their interface – the website environment – to 
the personal prof ile of their users (Pariser 2011; Solove 2004; Zittrain 2008; 
Morozov 2011; Goldsmith and Wu 2008). Even people who are aware of 
these profiling practices cannot always escape. Etzioni (2012, 929) reports 
the use of “supercookies” which are not only diff icult to detect but can 
even reinstall themselves after they are removed. Also Facebook, with its 
Like button implemented on many websites, is able to track the visitors 
of those websites even when they are not a Facebook-member themselves 
(Roosendaal 2011). All in all, there is a whole range of online actors, from 
retailers such as Zalando and Amazon to the search engine Google, working 
hard to turn the internet into a f iltered and personalized environment.
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Filter bubble
Nowadays, the vision of an open and free internet as it was proclaimed in 
the early 90s of the last century can be judged as utopian and perhaps a 
little naïve (Morozov 2011; Wu 2011; Ess 2011). It is now generally recognized 
that internet service providers (ISPs), search engines, online businesses, 
and social network sites have a big say in what kind of information a user 
has access to (Zittrain 2008; Goldsmith and Wu 2008). Consequently, we 
see a filtered internet, tailored to the specif ic needs and habits of its users.
Pariser (2011, 9) coins the term “Filter Bubble” to refer to this “unique 
universe of information for each of us” that has come to dominate the online 
world. Although Pariser acknowledges the advantages of online personaliza-
tion, in his book he primarily stresses its dark sides. An online world with 
information that only confirms previous actions and beliefs, Pariser claims, 
might negatively impact the creativity, empathy, and personal development 
of people. Moreover, because more and more online parties are using these 
personalization technologies, Pariser (ibid., 111) states “we’ll increasingly 
be forced to trust the companies at the center of this process to properly 
express and synthesize who we really are.”
Pariser (2011) and others – such as Zittrain (2008), Sunstein (2007), and 
Solove (2004) – claim that the internet is transforming from an open to a 
closed environment. I will elaborate on the analysis of Pariser by underpin-
ning it with a theoretical framework and investigate the workings of this 
personalized internet, or filter bubble, in a normative setting.
Analysis
Technological mediation
Authors like Latour (1992), Ihde (1990) and Verbeek (2000) have convincingly 
shown that technologies are not just neutral instruments performing a pre-
defined task, but that artefacts also influence the actions and experiences 
of their users in often unforeseen ways. This co-shaping of experiences 
and actions of users has been called “technological mediation” and it is a 
useful starting point to analyze human-world interactions, or in our case 
to analyze human-personalized interface interactions.
It is important to understand that this technological mediation is two-
folded. Technology and users have a permanent stake in shaping each other. 
More than the “building bricks,” they are the “products” of their interaction 
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(Verbeek 2000, 183). Therefore, online personalization is not just about a 
personalized interface but also about a personalized user. In the interaction, 
the user is constantly shaping and re-shaping the interface based on her 
online behavior. Conversely, the interface, presenting the online world in 
a personalized manner, is affecting the user by pre-sorting her choices and 
actions (Pariser 2011).
In analyzing technological mediation, one can take on different ap-
proaches. Verbeek (2000; 2009) makes a useful distinction between a media-
tion of experience and a mediation of praxis. In the former, the emphasis lays 
on how artefacts mediate people’s perception or rather on how “reality can 
be interpreted and be present for people” (Verbeek 2011a, 8). In the latter, 
the focus is on how artefacts mediate people’s actions. Consequently, online 
interaction can be analyzed from a perspective of experience as well as 
from a perspective of praxis. One can either choose to focus on the way 
the online world is present to the user or focus on the way a user can (inter)
act making use of these online technologies. Because, in this chapter, our 
aim is to analyze how normative reflections might be influenced by the 
information and choices that are presented to users online, we will take 
the mediation of experience as our point of reference.
The online world is presented to the user through the interface on her 
computer screen. Without a computer or other mobile device the online 
world would remain inaccessible. With Ihde (1990), we could classify this 
mediation of the online world, therefore, as a hermeneutic relation. In a 
hermeneutic relation, an artifact represents reality in such a way that its us-
ers have access to it through the concerning artifact. Behind the computer, 
a user is looking at the personalized interface, which is the object of her 
perception, while simultaneously this interface is referring beyond itself 
to what is not immediately seen, namely the online world. Through this 
hermeneutic relation of user and personalized interface, the user can, so 
to speak, read herself into any possible, online situation without actually 
being there (cf. Ihde 1990, 92).
In mediation also a translation takes place (Ihde 1990). Some aspects of 
the online world are amplified, while others are reduced. Looking at the per-
sonalized interface, it even is its principal goal to amplify the information 
that f its the profile of the user and to reduce information that is irrelevant 
to it. The personalized interface pre-sorts a specif ic kind of interpretation 
and shapes what counts as “real” (Verbeek 2011b).
However, this postphenomenological conceptualization also has its 
limits. As Søraker (2012) convincingly shows, in analyzing the internet it 
becomes diff icult to clearly distinguish between fundamental concepts 
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such as technology and world, since the interface that mediates the online 
experience simultaneously is the online world itself. “Virtual worlds are 
both worlds and technologies; the computer simulation is both the under-
pinning of the virtual world and the means of mediation” (ibid., 504). As a 
result, when analyzing the interface we have to be aware of its mediating 
function on the one hand and its ontological function on the other. To 
put it differently, in the hermeneutic relation of user and online world, a 
personalized interface does not only mediate and represent the online world; 
it also forms its ontological foundation.
A closed interface
To gain a better understanding of the workings of profiling technology and 
how it influences our normative reasoning, we f irst and foremost have to 
understand that the core activity of this technology, namely to automati-
cally categorize and generalize information, is not merely confined to ma-
chines. Perhaps contra-intuitively, the non-reflective profiling of algorithms 
resembles the way living nature, including human beings, interact with their 
world on a daily basis. In order to hold their ground, plants, animals, and 
human beings all make use of –what we might call – biological profiling to 
f ilter their overly complex environment. In a routine-like manner, they are 
“extracting relevant information from the environment” in order to adapt 
themselves to this environment and survive (Hildebrandt 2008, 26). In line 
with Hildebrandt (ibid., 24), we might say that “prof iling is not only a part 
of professional and everyday life but also a constitutive competence of life 
itself in the biological sense of the word.”
To understand how profiling is in fact an important element in the every-
day life of all living nature, I turn to Plessner’s The Levels of the Organic and 
Man [Die Stufen des Organischen und der Mensch]. Central to his analysis is 
the interaction between life forms –plants, animals or human beings – and 
their environment.1
According to Plessner, animals are ‘captured’ in a “Funktionkreis.” They 
are aware of their environment as far as their building scheme permits 
1 It has to be stressed that Plessner – not only a philosopher but also a zoologist by training – is 
well aware of the fact that distinctions made between plants, animals, and human beings can 
only be of an ‘ideal-typical’ nature. Throughout his work he emphasizes the continuation of 
life forms, as they are linked as stages of positionality” (see the contribution of De Mul to this 
volume). Nonetheless, when we compare the interaction between animals and their environment 
on the one hand and the interaction between human beings and their environment on the other, 
some central aspects of prof iling become apparent.
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them. Consequently, the information they receive while prof iling their 
environment can only be of use in a specif ic situation, for example, when 
they perceive an enemy close by and have to choose between fleeing and 
f ighting. Although especially higher mammals have a certain awareness 
of their environment, they cannot reflect upon their choices. They cannot 
break out of the actual situation, sit down, and wonder how to bring their 
strategies to perfection based on the gathered information over time. All 
information that is acquired by profiling their environment must f it into 
their pre-existing knowledge frame. Not aware of a past or future, non-
human animals live “here and now” in an “Umwelt,” a closed environment 
limited by their building scheme (Plessner 1928, 1978).
Just like other animals, prof iling by human beings often takes place in 
a routine-like manner. People take the presence of the world, their fellow 
human beings, and the objects they encounter for granted. In everyday 
life, people do not doubt their existence. Moreover, they expect to see and 
experience the world in a similar way as their fellow human beings do. 
The human world is an inter-subjective world. Meaning is, often implicitly, 
constituted in and through interaction with others. Human beings certainly 
not think through all the choices they make. To reduce the complexity 
inherent in human life, they are in an often-unconscious way generalizing 
and categorizing the information around them (Luhmann 1979).
Notwithstanding the fact that human beings mostly act without giv-
ing it a second thought, this does not mean their ref lexive attribute is 
unimportant or even superfluous. On the contrary, according to Plessner, 
human beings differ from other animals because they are “conscious of 
their consciousness.” Human beings are aware of the fact that they are the 
ones who are profiling the world. Human beings can take on an “eccentric 
positionality,” as Plessner calls it, and reflect upon their relation with the 
world, with their fellow human beings, and with themselves. They can 
break out of an actual situation and become aware of its contingency. This 
second order awareness makes that, so to say, from a distance human beings 
can look back and reflect upon the course of action, being able to consider 
possible alternatives. Often, this awareness is triggered by new information 
contradicting their knowledge frame and, eventually, this confrontation 
might lead to the adjustment of their initial set of beliefs. De Mul and Van 
Den Berg (2011, 52) refer to this process of evaluating internal and external 
motives as “the reflexive loop.”
All in all, this ontological distance def ines the way human beings are in 
the world. They do not live in a pre-existing, f ixed environment, tuned to 
their building scheme as other animals do. Human beings have to mould 
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their own world through culture, language, and technology. Their world is 
never f inished and, therefore, their interaction with it can be characterized 
as “open.” Although human beings lack a f ixed Umwelt, by making use of 
artif icial means the whole world can become their home. Consequently, 
Plessner describes human beings as “artif icial by nature.” On biological 
grounds, they need technologies such as automated, online prof iling to 
mediate their interaction with the world. Plessner speaks of mediated 
immediacy to point out that all human interaction is in fact mediated 
interaction.
Nevertheless, in daily life people may often ‘forget’ that the routines in-
scribed in their bodies are human-made and therefore changeable (Plessner 
1978). And although all interaction is mediated, human beings experience it 
as direct, dismissing possible side effects of the mediating artefacts at hand. 
Human beings tend to uphold a utopian belief in a stable and unchangeable 
world, steered by universal rules. Morals exist as daily routines and are 
considered self-evident. As a result, people often experience the world they 
live in as a closed world instead of as an open, cultural world. This cultural 
world puts its stamp on human life, but it is only by reflection or when a 
situation of conflict occurs that people become aware of its contingency. 
Or as Swierstra and Rip (2009, 210) claim:
We become aware of moral routines when people disobey them, when 
conflicts between routines emerge and a moral dilemma arises, or when 
they are no longer able to provide satisfactory responses to new problems. 
To put it strongly: whereas morality is characterized by unproblematic 
acceptance, ethics is marked by explicitness and controversy. Ethics is 
‘hot’ morality; morality is ‘cold ethics.’ We perform ethics when we put 
up moral routines for discussion.
The f irst indication that a f ilter bubble may lead to a moral bubble is the fact 
that it invites users to live in a closed Umwelt instead of in an open world. 
Prof iling technologies build an online world, which resembles the closed 
world of animals, determined by their Funktionkreis. In a f ilter bubble, it is 
not likely to encounter conflicting opinions or disturbing information that 
spur moral reflection. Hence, it becomes increasingly diff icult to be aware 
of the contingency of the presented information. Online, people reside in a 
personalized Umwelt, and contrary to the cultural and open world, this is not 
a shared world [Mitwelt] in which meaning is inter-subjectively constituted. 
By feeding users a string of information that only aff irms their pre-existing, 
individual beliefs, a personalized interface is more about cold ethics than 
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about hot morality. Taking into account that “conscious reflection is the 
incentive to create new habits” (Hildebrandt 2008, 27), a f ilter bubble gives 
rise to moral stagnation rather than to moral repositioning.
The “technological intentionality” (Ihde 1990) of the personalized inter-
face, therefore, is one of confirming the status-quo. This is not only a threat 
to the personal development of users, but it also endangers the development 
of a viable democracy. For a democracy to thrive, it is necessary that citizens 
have a shared body of knowledge and at the same time become aware of 
the diversity of opinions (Hildebrandt 2011b; Van der Hof and Prins 2008; 
Nussbaum 1997). The workings of a personalized interface support neither.
An opaque interface
The second indication that a f ilter bubble may turn into a moral bubble can 
be found in the opaqueness of its functioning. Whereas, even if a user has the 
intention to reflect upon the way information is presented to her online, she 
has no access to the information that has led to her personalize interface. 
Without this information she cannot come to a well-informed judgment 
and, as a result, she remains in her moral bubble. Moreover, even on a 
societal level this knowledge about the workings of the profiling practices 
is lacking. There has not yet been a thorough, public debate about the values 
and norms prof iling technologies have to apply to. Or, in other words, a 
moral bubble immediately becomes cold ethics without any preceding hot 
morality.
Ihde (1990) already pinpointed a possible problem that might occur in 
hermeneutic human-technology relations when the artifact (the interface) 
is presenting something (the online world) in a faulty manner. Without 
the interface, there is no online world. It is impossible to have a “naked 
perception” or a non-mediated perception of the online world based on 
which a user can judge if its representation is suff icient. The average user 
might be able to read the interface, but not to explore the inner workings 
of the underlying prof iling technologies. “Personalization […] may force 
individuals into restrictive two-dimensional models based on the criteria 
set by technology and of those who own and apply the technology” (Van 
der Hof and Prins 2008, 121).
Instead of delegating functionality to profiling technologies in a deliber-
ate way, these technologies can become to dominate our experience of the 
online world (cf. Verbeek 2011b). Van den Hoven (1998) speaks of “artif icial 
authorities” to emphasize the reliance of users on their devices to function 
properly.
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The impossibility to see through the functioning of the underlying 
prof iling technologies also shows that, although we speak of a personal-
ized interface, this user herself does not own the interface. The mediation 
of perception taking place through the interface is a mediation enabled 
by a third party, namely an online company. This company has its own 
interests, which do not necessarily align with the interests of the user 
(Mager 2012). Consequently, the only way of gaining access to the settings 
of the interface is through the company who owns it. And as Hildebrandt 
states: “If the interests of the data controller (the company behind the 
interface, EK) and subject (user, EK) differ it may well be that the in-
terests of the data controller, who pays for the whole process, will take 
precedence” (2008, 19).
A possible answer
Because of the personalized Umwelt instigated by profiling technologies 
and their opaque workings, users are invited to live in a moral bubble. 
The arrival of this moral bubble can be categorized as an unintended 
and unwanted consequence of personalization online. We can assume 
neither the developers nor the users of personalized services are aiming at 
diminishing moral repositioning. It is also not the ‘fault’ of the personalized 
interface that it has the tendency to turn in to a moral bubble. Both user 
and interface constitute each other in the interaction and become as it 
were a hybrid entity with human as well as non-human features. When 
a user is online, she comes to embody, so to speak, the interface. And the 
interface cannot exist without a user shaping it. In other words, while it is 
true that the personalized interface influences users’ behavior by creating 
a moral bubble, it is equally true that the way in which users interact with 
the interface is shaping the working of that same interface. Provoking moral 
stagnation therefore is not an inescapable characteristic of the personalized 
interface but of a certain interaction between user and interface.
By way of conclusion, I will sketch a preliminary direction for countering 
the negative effects that might be caused by the moral bubble. Considering 
the scope of this book chapter and the complexity of the problem at hand, 
it is not possible to come up with a full-fetched answer. Nonetheless, our 
analysis of the moral bubble shows that for a solution to be successful, it 
should at least take a multi-actor approach. The moral bubble arises from 
the interplay of user, company, technology, and the legislation that imbeds 
these actors. Consequently, all these actors should be included in our search 
for a possible answer to the arrival of a moral bubble.
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User
Users are able by changing their interaction with the personalized interface 
to adjust its workings. This “domestication” (Silverstone and Hirsch 1992; 
Frissen 2004) of artefacts often occurs when the artifact is embedded in 
daily practice. Pariser (2011) recommends several personal strategies to 
replenish the f ilter bubble with new and diverse information.
By altering her daily routines online, a user can open up the personalized 
interface and indirectly persuade it to build in new elements of information. 
Or as Pariser (ibid., 223) states: “varying your path online dramatically 
increases your likelihood of encountering new ideas and people.” Another 
strategy is to prefer websites that are transparent about the profiling tech-
nologies they use to websites that are not. By being conscious about the kind 
of interfaces one uses, the influence of a moral bubble can be minimized.
However, a necessary condition for successfully getting around the moral 
bubble is some basic knowledge on how profiling technologies work. If users 
are sleepwalking into a moral bubble, they cannot change their routines. 
Unfortunately, knowledge about online personalization is often absent. 
Pan et al. (2007) for example, show how college students aren’t aware of the 
ranking strategy of Google and blindly trust the search engine by clicking 
on the f irst search results that pops up, even when the abstract seems less 
relevant.
In his pamphlet Program or Be Programmed, Rushkoff (2010) makes a 
stand against digital illiteracy and encourages the development of basic 
programming skills for all internet users. Having insight in the basic work-
ings of programming must strengthen users to use personalized interfaces 
in a safer way. Developing digital literacy or e-skills is also on Europe’s digital 
agenda. It is assumed that children can benefit more from the internet when 
they are better able to recognize and deal with online risks such as a biased 
online environment (De Haan 2010; Sonck et al. 2011).
Technology
By adapting the design of the personalized interface, the development of 
a moral bubble might also be tempered. Although in general, the influ-
ence of the engineer on the design of an artifact is by far the largest in the 
early stage of development, this does not have to apply to the personalized 
interface. Different than analog artefacts which, when bought, in general 
are out of reach for the engineers, digital artefacts such as the personalized 
interface, never really leave the realm of design. Because of its virtuality, 
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the personalized interface can interact with users while staying within 
reach of the engineers. Consequently, the influence of the engineer on the 
workings of the personalized interface remains signif icant, even after the 
interface has been employed.
To counterbalance the workings of the moral bubble, I would like 
to introduce the concept of programmed serendipity: the intentional 
replenishing of the personalized interface with random information. 
By including a portion of information that not directly derives from the 
personal prof ile of the user in the interface, the f ilter bubble and there-
fore also the moral bubble becomes less absolute. Consequently, there is 
room for conflicting opinions and information that could instigate moral 
repositioning.
The question remains however, based on which parameters this ‘un-
personalized’ stream of information should be built. Sheer randomness – as 
the opposite of personalization – could easily result in information that is of 
no interest to the user at all. Hence, sheer randomness is not an instigator for 
moral repositioning since it is more likely to repel a user than to stimulate 
her in reflecting upon the presented information. With Gadamer (1972), 
we could say that to get the conversation started, we should f ind ourselves 
between the limits of ‘strangeness and familiarity.’ If the random informa-
tion is completely strange to the user, she probably will not be interested 
nor make an effort to evaluate it. If the information is completely familiar, 
no repositioning will take place either. Programmed serendipity therefore 
is, to a certain extent, depending on the same personalization techniques it 
is supposed to counterbalance. To replenish the interface with information 
that will catch the attention of the user, some basic interests of the user 
simply have to be known f irst. Eventually, taking Gadamer’s limits a step 
further, it might come down to f inding the right balance between random 
and personalized information.
Computer scientists and programmers have taken on the task of f ind-
ing this balance and safeguarding serendipity in the online world. For 
example, Campos and De Figueiredo (2002) have investigated the pos-
sibility of ‘programming for serendipity.’ They developed a software agent 
called Max “that browses the web in order to f ind information that might 
stimulate the user, especially information that the user is not focused 
upon” (ibid., 52). Making use of, amongst others, the user’s prof ile and 
a lexical database, Max formulates suggestions based on the generation 
of alternatives, the selection of also less signif icant concepts, replacing 
selected concepts by other, related concepts, and random stimulation 
(ibid., 57).
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Also Helberger (2011), who addresses the problem of the moral bubble up 
and foremost from a policy perspective, sees concrete design principles as 
a manner of ensuring diverse information exposure online. She speaks of 
“diversity by design” and analyzes four different conceptions of exposure 
diversity which could inform the design of internet technologies such as 
Electronic Programme Guides and search engines, namely: “Discovering 
the Difference, Exposure to Diverse Media Outlets, Promoting Personal 
Autonomy, and Encouraging Serendipitous Discoveries” (Helberger 2011, 
464).
All in all, it becomes clear that programmed serendipity could help to 
safeguard the open character of the online world, but only if the engineers/
companies that own the interface are willing to cooperate. To a certain 
extent, their willingness depends on –legal – regulation.
Regulation
Finally, to enable moral repositioning, users should be allowed access to 
the information behind the interface. As we have seen, even if a user wants 
to reflect upon the way information is represented to her, she is unable 
to do so because of the lack of transparency of the profiling practices. As 
Koops (2011) argues, it is not very effective for users to control the process of 
collecting and managing data as such. It would be more useful to make the 
process of decision-making transparent. Users should be able to control how 
companies, but also governments make use of personal data. Eventually, 
users should have a say in how the interface looks like. This “decision-
transparency” is a necessary condition to empower users. It enables them 
to take a stand against unfair decisions.
The successful establishment of such measures largely depends on the 
action undertaken by governments and other international institutes. Key 
actors such as the European Union, the World Wide Web Consortium (W3C), 
and the American Federal Trade Commission (FTC) recently have been 
putting the negative consequences of personalization on the digital agenda. 
In its report “Protecting Consumer Privacy in an Era of Rapid Change,” the 
FTC (2012) pleads –amongst others – for legislation that enables consumers 
to access the information that is being collected about them by online 
companies (more specif ically the FTC focuses on “data brokers”). FTC also 
urges these companies to develop a central website to inform users about 
the way their data is being collected and used and to explain how users 
can control this data use.
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Within the W3C (2013), the Tracking Protection Working group is prepar-
ing recommendations to “improve user privacy and user control by defining 
mechanisms for expressing user preferences around Web tracking and 
for blocking or allowing Web tracking elements.” In their effort to deliver 
“global consensus def initions and codes of conduct” they try to involve as 
much as possible other relevant actors such as governments, academia, 
industry, and advocacy groups (ibid.).
In January 2012, The European Commission (2012) announced a com-
prehensive reform of data protection rules not only to “strengthen online 
privacy rights,” but also to “boost Europe’s digital economy.” If these changes 
are instituted, they could help to temper the moral bubble. For example, 
the European Commission claims that people will be having easier access 
to their own data. Moreover, wherever consent is required for data to be 
processed, it should become clear that this consent has to be given explicitly, 
rather than assumed (which often is the case now). In addition, people will 
be able to refer to the data protection authority in their own country, even 
when the company that has been collecting their data resides outside the 
EU.
Conclusion
All in all, it becomes clear that there is no clear-cut answer to the arrival of 
a moral bubble online. Nonetheless, since this moral bubble is not a trait of 
the personalized interface as such, but emerges in the interaction between 
the user and the interface, a multi-actor approach is needed. Engaging 
users, companies as well as governments and other international partners, 
therefore, seems to be the most fruitful approach.
In this book chapter, I have analyzed the way in which a moral bubble 
arises online. Two main reasons for such a moral bubble to emerge have been 
examined. First, because the personalized interface shows only familiar and 
validating information, it gains the character of a closed Umwelt. Users do 
not encounter countervailing information and therefore are not stimulated 
to reflect upon their own routine-like behavior. A personalized interface is 
therefore more about cold ethics than about hot morality. Second, a personal-
ized interface may turn into a moral bubble because of its opaque character. 
Users have no clear insight into the way the profiling technologies work 
and shape the interface. Consequently, users are blindly depending on the 
companies behind the interface to deliver them a good-working and fair 
interface.
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Precondition for the Criminal Liability 
Of Artificial Life Forms
Mireille Hildebrandt
ALFs: Automatic and autonomous agents
Building on Maturana and Varela (1998), Bourgine and Varela (1992, xi) 
have def ined artif icial life (AL) as “a research program concerned with 
autonomous systems, their characterization and specific modes of viability.” 
Their working definition differs substantially from mainstream attempts to 
def ine AL in terms of the extraction of necessary and suff icient conditions 
of biological life forms, which are then applied to non-biological entities, 
hoping to thus synthesize life. Rather than opting for an imitation of biologi-
cal life, they focus on the autonomy of living systems, whether natural or 
artificial. They emphasize autonomy as the most salient feature of life, which 
they further define by the constitutive capacities of viability, abduction and 
adaptability. Viability regards the capacity to respond to unpredictable 
changes in the environment in a manner that allows the system to maintain 
its organizational identity (implying operational closure), for instance by 
changing its internal structure (often entailing structural coupling with 
other living systems within the environment). To anticipate changes and 
to respond to unanticipated change, living systems need to function as 
abduction machines, producing sets of responses that sustain the unity of 
the system. Adaptability implies that the internal restructuring adequately 
f its with the challenges produced by the external environment, without 
annihilating the organizational identity of the system. Clearly, Bourgine and 
Varela did not consider Plessner’s notion of centricity, let alone eccentric-
ity, as a necessary condition in this regard. For them, neither natural nor 
artif icial life forms presume eccentricity or centricity to qualify as living 
systems. They do require a measure of autonomy, even if this may not be a 
suff icient condition.1 One could associate the way Bourgine and Varela as 
1 Maturana & Varela (1992, 48) emphasize that living systems are not the only autonomous 
entities. For instance, societies are autonomous systems, but they differ from organisms in the 
degree of autonomy of their components (ibid., at 198-199). In a similar vein one could suggest 
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well as Maturana and Varela def ine living systems with Plessner’s notion 
of the border or boundary and with his concept of positionality. For both 
Varela and Plessner, the difference between the border between a non-living 
thing and its environment on the one hand, and the border between a living 
system and its environment on the other hand, is that in the former the 
border is neither part of the environment nor of the thing, whereas in the 
latter, the border is actively created and maintained by the living system of 
which it is also a part. Interestingly, both Plessner and Varela consider living 
entities to be systems, meaning that the identity of the entity derives from 
the productive interrelations between its components. Last but not least, 
both speak of the capacity for self-regulation (Selbstregulierbarheit, Plessner 
1975, 160-165; autopoiesis, Maturana and Varela 1998, 47-48) as crucial for 
living forms, even if Plessner may understand this as a transcendental 
category rather than an observable.
To further investigate the notion of autonomy, we can use Steels’s 
distinction between automatic and autonomous agents. Steels def ines 
agents as systems, meaning “a set of elements which have a particular 
relation amongst themselves and with the environment” (Steels 1995, 1). 
He then def ines agents as performing a particular function for another 
agent or system, and f inally, he stipulates that agents are systems capable 
of maintaining themselves. Agents thus come close to living systems, which 
operate on the basis of two mechanisms:
– They continuously replace their components and that way secure exist-
ence in the face of unreliable or short-lived components. the individual 
components of the system therefore do not matter, only the roles they 
play.2
– The system as a whole adapts/evolves to remain viable even if the envi-
ronment changes, which is bound to happen (Steels 1995, 2).
Steels then goes on to explain the meaning of autonomy in terms of its 
etymology, which stems from the self-government of the Greek city states: 
autos (self) and nomos (rule or law). Those who live in accordance with their 
own law are autonomous, whereas those obedient to an external law are not. 
that autonomic computing systems could be autonomous in the sense outlined by Maturana & 
Varela, without necessarily being alive.
2 This observation is similar to Maturana and Varela’s distinction between organisation and 
structure: whereas the organisation of a system refers to “those relations that must exist among 
the components of a system for it to be a member of a specif ic class,” its structure refers to “the 
components and relations that actually constitute a particular unity and make its organization 
real” (Maturna and Varela 1992, 47).
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He contrasts this with the term automatic, which he claims to be derived 
from cybernetic or self-steering. This implies that “automatic systems are 
self-regulating, but they do not make the laws that their regulatory activities 
seek to satisfy” (Steels 1995, 4).3 Autonomous systems are self-governing 
as well as self-regulating, whereas automatic systems are merely self-
regulating. Old style artif icially intelligent entities (AIs) are automatic to 
the extent that they cannot step outside the boundaries of their original 
design, whereas living systems are autonomous because they have not 
been built and programmed by others and are capable of self-organization, 
development, adaptation and learning in order to sustain their viability in 
a changing environment. The difference between AI and AL, therefore, 
seems to be that between automatic systems and autonomous systems. In 
speaking of artif icial life forms (ALFs) instead of artif icial lives (ALs) I wish 
to prevent equating AL with humanoid robots or other imitations of human 
beings, since I expect artif icial life to develop as life forms that are entirely 
different from our own. ALFs might, for instance, emerge from distributed 
polymorphous multi-agent systems that would present us with novel life 
forms that are not necessarily contained within the “skin” of a robot, and it 
may be diff icult at this point to even imagine “them” as identif iable entities.
Autonomic computing
Having thus differentiated between automatic and autonomous systems I 
will now introduce a further distinction, namely that of autonomic systems. 
The reason for this is that the autonomy of living systems, as def ined by 
Varela and by Steels, does not match the notion of human autonomy that 
is assumed by our Western legal framework. Criminal liability requires 
a measure of autonomy, and it assumes that such autonomy is not to be 
found in animals or machines. To differentiate human autonomy from the 
autonomy of current artif icial autonomous systems we will need a more 
precise def inition of human autonomy, and a clear understanding of the 
kind of autonomy that adheres in current artificial autonomous systems. For 
the latter I will refer to the notion of autonomic computing, for the former 
I will refer to Plessner’s eccentric positionality.
The tech industry giant IBM has introduced the notion of autonomic 
computing (Kephart and Chess 2003), using the autonomic nervous system 
as a metaphor, to describe computing systems capable of self-management 
3 Steels (1995, 5) refers to a personal communication from Tim Smithers in September 1992.
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(self-repair, self-maintenance, self-configuration). It does not strike me as 
altogether improbable that by designing a system capable of managing itself, 
a self may actually emerge in the process of def ining itself and of actively 
maintaining its borders. This would imply that even if these systems are 
programmed to achieve goals that we have set for them to accomplish, the 
goal of self-management may at some point claim priority. This relates to the 
third criterion that Steels introduced in his definition of autonomous agents; 
to be an agent rather than merely an instrument, a system must have its 
own interest in maintaining itself. To the extent that autonomic computing 
systems achieve such a level of autonomy, they could thus qualify as ALFs.4
In 1995, Steels concluded that no robots were as yet autonomous in the 
sense he described. To decide whether autonomic computing systems are 
autonomous in Steels’s sense would require empirical investigation. Since 
at this point in time, autonomic computing is still in its infancy and thus 
more of a vision than a reality, empirical evidence cannot provide very 
precise answers yet. However, it makes sense to anticipate the consequences 
of developing autonomic systems in case they do become autonomous in 
ways that qualify as similar to human autonomy, because this would have 
far reaching legal and ethical consequences. For all practical purposes I 
will understand “truly” autonomic computing systems as a novel type of 
ALF, judging them to be fundamentally different from “stand-alone” old 
school AI robots.5
One of the consequences of computing systems that function as an agent 
for their human users by sustaining their own identity will be a fundamental 
unpredictability. This unpredictability is “caused” by the complexity of the 
interactions of their components (autonomic systems will def initively be 
multi-agent systems), as well as by their polymorphous character (to achieve 
their goals they may change their structure). The uncertainty brought 
about by the emergent properties of multi-agent interactions relates to the 
behaviour of the emergent system, while the uncertainty brought about by 
4 Note that in The Tree of Knowledge (1992, 48) Maturana & Varela admit that not all autono-
mous entities are living beings. Though in Autopoiesis and Cognition (1980, 82) they still held 
that autopoiesis is both a necessary and a suff icient condition for life, their claim in The tree of 
knowledge is more modest. This would mean that autonomic computing systems could qualify 
as ALFs, depending on what f inally determines whether a system is or is not alive. Note also 
that consciousness, let alone self-consciousness is not a requirement for an entity to be alive.
5 New style robotics develops robots capable of perceiving and enacting their environment, 
based on machine learning techniques. This may entail autonomic computing. “Stand alone” 
old school robotics refers to the fact that these robots had no connection with databases, little 
or no capacity to perceive the world and no ability to improve their performance based on real 
time feed-back. 
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structural changes of the components of the system relates to the identity 
of the system that is behaving. In both cases, serious problems may occur 
if the behaviour of the system results in harm or damage: f irst, it may be 
diff icult to attribute causality to either individual nodes of the system 
or to its user or designer (thus requesting us to focus on the behaviour 
of the ALF) and second, it may be diff icult to identify the system as the 
object of attribution of causation (how can we identify a particular ALF?). 
A third, even more challenging issue, concerns blameworthiness: can we 
censure the system, hold the ALF accountable in its own right? Within the 
framework of criminal law, liability depends on wrongfulness and culpabil-
ity and this seems farfetched, even if causality could be attributed to an 
identif iable autonomous computing system. This raises many questions 
regarding causality, wrongfulness and culpability. In this contribution, I will 
focus on what it would take to actually blame an ALF for its behaviour. At 
which point does an ALF qualify as an autonomous system that can be held 
accountable in a court of law? I believe that Plessner’s distinction between 
a centric and an eccentric positionality provides a salient conceptual tool to 
make the difference between autonomy as a characteristic of all autonomic 
systems and the autonomy that is – so far – specif ic for human agency. But 
before attempting to highlight this crucial difference between centric and 
eccentric positionality, it is important to pay attention to the noncentric 
positionality of plants, to remind us of the fact that life forms are not neces-
sarily centric.
Within the realm of living organisms, Plessner distinguishes among 
three life forms: plants, animals and humans. Life forms are characterized 
by their positionality, which constitutes the manner in which they relate to 
their spatial and temporal environment and to their self. By categorizing 
these life forms, Plessner does not deny their empirical overlaps, but instead 
emphasizes the need for analytical distinctions that allow one to better 
understand what kind of transitions are at stake among different life forms. 
The extent to which he adheres to a transcendental perspective is not what 
I wish to dwell on here, though it may be interesting to investigate the 
implications of his interpretation of Kant at this point.
According to Plessner, plants have an open form of organization, respond-
ing to their environment in a way that is less mediated by the internal 
complexities of the organism than in the case of animals. Their inner 
workings are not centralized as they are in animals with a spinal cord or 
central nervous system. He therefore coins plants as “dividuals” instead 
of individuals. There is a kind of equivalence between the nodes of the 
plant that is transformed to a more hierarchical system of components in 
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animals that allows for a greater differentiation between different parts 
of the animal, but consequently gives rise to a somewhat less f lexible or 
open structure. The most salient feature of plants as compared to animals 
is the lack of a centre of organization. In plants, perception is not enacted 
via a set of specif ic organs (eyes, ears, skin, nose) that produce a unif ied 
experience thanks to the way the central nervous system responds to the 
imprint of events in the environment. In fact, the whole idea of enaction – 
coined as such by Varela, but present in Plessner’s work – does not apply to 
plants (Plessner 1975, 225).6 “Experience and action (i.e. centrally mediated 
movements, which can be modif ied by associations) go against the grain 
of the open form.”
Animal life forms entail a centralized organization of action/percep-
tion, afforded by the central nervous system that creates an awareness of 
an embodied self that is both the material body (Körper) and its central 
representation as an organized unity (Leib).7 The transition from plant to 
animal seems to afford the birth of a “unif ied” self that confronts the envi-
ronment in a frontal manner instead of confronting all of its components 
at once (on all sides). The difference is not that a plant does not sustain an 
identif iable organization with a specif ic repertoire of strategies to deal 
with environmental change. Rather, the difference is that the organization 
of plants is non-hierarchical in the sense that their perceptions and their 
decisions to act are not mediated through a central point, making it hard 
to even speak of a plant’s actions when referring to its movements (e.g. 
during growth). To read a centralized plan into the development of a plant 
would be a mistake for the following reason: “It would be a betrayal of the 
essence of plants (as it would be a betrayal of nature), to understand them 
as symbolic, as the embodiment of a principle that expresses itself in them, 
as the articulation of a force, a soul, a reality, that is no longer themselves” 
(Plessner 1975, 226).8
6 My translation of: “Empfindung und Handlung (d.h. durch Assoziationen modif izierbare, 
zentral vermittelte Bewegungen) widersprechen dem Wesen offener Form.”
7 Stufen, 230-231: “Er [animal organism, mh] ist die uber die einheitliche Repräsentation der 
Glieder vermittelte Einheit des Körpers, welcher eben dadurch von der zentralen Repräsentation 
abhangt. Sein Körper ist sein Leib geworden, jene konkrete Mitte, dadurch dat Lebenssubjekt 
mit dem Umfeld zusammenhangt.”
8 My translation of: “Es ist nun einmal ein Verrat am Wesen der Pflanze (wie es ein Verrat 
am Wesen der Natur ist), sie symbolisch zu nehmen, als Verkorperung eines in ihr sich aus-
sprechenden Prinzips, als Ausdruck einer Kraft, einer Seele, einer Wirklichkeit, die nicht mehr 
sie selbst ist.” 
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In exploring the idea of artif icial life forms, we must take this warning 
to heart. Apart from the fact that smart technologies may not qualify as 
life forms at all, for instance because they are heteronomous in their design 
and mechanistic in their operation (self-regulating but not self-governing), 
smart technologies could theoretically display a non-centric positionality 
akin to that of plants, rather than providing a virtual core that springs from 
a centralized organization of perception and action.9
According to Plessner, animal positionality is def ined by centricity 
and frontality. Crucially, the animal has a body and is a body, but he 
does not understand this dualism in a Cartesian manner (discriminating 
two substances). Plessner speaks of a double aspectivity that creates a 
distance between the Körper (the body an animal experiences as having) 
and the Leib (the body an animal experiences as being), suggesting that 
this distance is productive in allowing for a dynamic representation of 
the self (Leib) in relation to its body (Körper) in its environment. The 
productive split between these two bodies is brought about by the centric 
positionality of animals and pertains equally to human beings, who share 
the dynamics of becoming an individual in front of an environment that 
is constituted as such in the con-frontation with a unif ied self. The rep-
resentation that is enabled by the centric organization of animals is also 
what allows them to learn from past experience, aligning their knowledge 
about the past with anticipation of future occurrences (Plessner 1975, 
277-287). One can explain this by highlighting that representation does not 
necessarily refer to symbolic representation, as it can merely denote the 
imprint that is made on the perceptive/enactive structure of the animal. 
As Steels observes:
Representations are physical structures (for example, electro-chemical 
states) which have correlations with aspects of the environment and thus 
have a predictive power for the system. These correlations are maintained 
by processes which are themselves quite complex and indirect, for example, 
sensors and actuators which act as transducers of energy of one form into 
energy of another form. Representations support processes that in turn 
influence behavior. What makes representations unique is that processes 
9 I expect that smart technologies that qualify as autonomous according to Steels’ def inition 
will exhibit the kind of distributed intelligence that is explained by connectionist models of 
the brain. This raises the question which entity we are talking about when referring to an ALF: 
the autonomic computing system itself (the brains) or the system that it embodies, nourishes 
and produces (the entire body).
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operating over representations can have their own dynamics independently 
of the dynamics of the world that they represent (Steels 1995, 7; my italics).
In Plessner’s analysis, the difference between animals and humans resides 
in the fact that humans have developed an awareness of the distance be-
tween Leib and Körper. In using language, which allows a person to address 
what is not here and what is not now, human beings have developed the 
capacity to decentralize their position in space and time, thereby “liberat-
ing” themselves from the here and now that holds together the animal 
self: “To the animal his here-and-now character is not given, not present, it 
emerges in him and in that way carries the hidden barrier against his own 
individual Existence. Indeed it (the Leib) is present to itself (the whole), 
but the whole is not present to it. Present to it is the outer world and the 
Körperleib” (Plessner 1975, 239).10
Unlike animals, the human life form is not enclosed in the Umwelt-
channel of the here and now. The animal may be conscious of its environ-
ment and of its own body as its own body, but it is not conscious of being 
conscious because it cannot escape what is present – it cannot leave its 
specif ic Umwelt-tunnel (Cheung 2006, 321). In phenomenological terms 
there is intentionality (consciousness of something), but this intentionality 
regards the outside world as it appears in the act of perception.11 The animal 
is a self, but not an “I” (Plessner 1975, 238), because the “I” depends on an 
eccentric positionality, which is made possible only in the use of human 
language.12 This can be illustrated with the constitution of the self in the 
language of an infant. If I address an infant by pointing at her and saying 
“you are Charlotte” and pointing back at myself, saying “I am Mireille,” 
the child will initially imitate me and – pointing to herself – repeat: “you 
Charlotte,” and – pointing to me – repeat: “I Mireille.” My response (“no, you 
Charlotte, I Mireille”) will not catch on until the day that Charlotte suddenly 
realizes that she is “you” for me, whereas she is “I” to herself. This capacity to 
turn back on herself from the position of the other is afforded by language 
and constitutes the birth of eccentric positionality in humans. Language 
also allows us to present what is absent (in time or space), thus opening the 
10 My translation of: “Dem Tier is sein Hier-Jezt-Charakter nicht gegeben, nicht gegenwärtig, 
es geht noch in him auf und trägt darin die ihm selbst verborgene Schranke gegen seine eigene 
individuele Existenz. Wohl ist es (als Leib) ihm (dem Ganzen), nicht aber das Ganze sich 
gegenwärtig. Ihm gegenwärtig ist Außenfeld und Körperleib.”
11 On intentionality as consciousness of something as something (“nothing is given which is 
not given as such”), cf. Waldenfels 2004, 237-239.
12 On Plessner’s language concept in relation to the human life form, see Cheung 2006.
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door for our imagination, and providing an entirely new “infrastructure” 
for the representation of our selves and our environment, creating the 
possibility to reinvent our selves as well as each other. The absence, lack 
or emptiness that animals cannot conceive of,13 is the precondition for 
humans to move from the Umwelt of ostensive reference to the Welt brought 
about by the use of language (Ricoeur 1976, chapter 4).
Eccentricity thus refers to a centric self that is consciously aware of itself. 
Looking back at it-self from the position of others (Selbstdistanz), it causes 
a decentralization of the self by introducing the position of the observer. 
This doubling of the double aspectivity is what enables the constitution of 
an outside world, an inner world and a middle world (Mitwelt).14 The Umfeld 
is replaced by an outside world that is f illed with things that are not merely 
perceived from the centric and frontal position of a self, but can be observed 
from the position of other selves or from that of the same self in another 
time and place. The body – one’s own body – can now appear as one of 
these things that crowd an outside world. At the same time, the self looks 
back at itself via the gaze of the other (Mead 1959, 134), thus instantiating 
the “I” that is performing this act of constitution, creating a view of the self 
as another (Ricoeur 1992; Waldenfels 2004) and thus instauring an inner 
world: In the distance to himself the living being is given as its inner world 
(Plessner 1975, 295).15
Finally, taking the position of the other (Mead 1959; Merleau-Ponty 
1945; Ricoeur 1992; Butler 2005) enables a double anticipation (Hildebrandt, 
Koops, and De Vries 2008); it enables us to anticipate what others expect 
from us; it enables us to anticipate how others will interpret our behaviours. 
In a way it precedes the birth of the outside world and the inner world; to 
be consciously aware of oneself as a self one has to be addressed as such by 
another and to construct one’s identity as a particular person one must be 
drawn into a web of meaning that can be moulded into one that signif ies 
13 Plessner speaks of “ihm verschlossene Anschauungsmöglichkeiten” (Plessner 1975, 271). I 
prefer the term conceive, because dogs and cats seem very capable of missing a close companion, 
whether another pet or a human person. They cannot, however, thematize, objectify, modify 
or otherwise conceptualize the sense of loss they experience. They are caught up in it, just like 
they are caught up in their Umwelt-tunnel.
14 Plessner situates the Seele at the level of the Innenwelt, the Bewustsein at the level of the 
Aussenwelt and the Geist at the level of the Mitwelt. The term Mitwelt would translate as ‘with-
world,’ which is not the same as ‘middle world’ or ‘shared world.’ For this reason I mostly prefer 
to use the German term.
15 My translation of: “In der Distanz zu ihm selber ist sich das Lebewesen als Innenwelt 
gegeben.”
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such identif ication: “The Mitwelt carries the person, while at the same time 
it is carried and built by him” (Plessner 1975, 303).16
The position of the observer and human autonomy
Plessner extends his analysis regarding the difference between centric 
and eccentric positionality with the articulation of three constitutive 
anthropological laws: the law of natural artif iciality; the law of mediated 
immediacy and the law of the utopian position. The double aspectivity 
that is typical for humans involves an inescapable need to reconstruct the 
self, the world and the others, thus entailing an unavoidable artif iciality 
of the Körperleib that grounds us. This natural artif iciality need not be 
thought of as lamentable. Quite to the contrary, it should be celebrated 
because it is the result of a freedom that is productive of and produced by 
the human life form. But it also stands for a rootlessness, an uncertainty 
and an awareness that we have no immediate access to the self, the world, 
or our peers. This is how we come to envy the animal that is caught up in 
the immediacy of its Umfeld: an animal may be sad, but it lacks the capacity 
to reflect upon its own sadness. Such reflection creates a distance between 
us and our feelings that seems alien to a centric position. The upside is that 
such reflection allows us to think in terms of possibilities, to imagine an 
outside world that is not (yet) reality, to initiate a measure of novelty in 
the web of meaning that constitutes the Mitwelt and to experiment with 
different selves (roles), thus enlarging the repertoire of coping strategies for 
expected and unexpected challenges (Lévy 1998). Possibility, however, does 
not equate with unbounded freedom, it refers to a disposition that springs 
from a reiterated decenteralization, a capacity to look at things, people 
and the self from a variety of positions and to thereby bring forth a world 
that is tested from a plurality of points of view, instead of taking the f irst 
(own) point of view for granted. At the same time, the re-creative nature of 
language, which allows one to speak of what is not, enables a genuine form 
of novelty – negotiating the constraints of language.
Language thus affords the human life form to take the position of the 
observer (the third person singular, or what Mead called “the generalized 
other”), which – it seems to me – lies at the root of Plessner’s anthropo-
logical laws. Being thrown into a language that generates the position of 
16 My translation of: “Die Mitwelt trägt die Person, indem sie zugleich von ihr getragen und 
gebildet wird.”
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the third person singular humans are forced to be artif icial, mediated 
and utopian; there is no way back to a natural, unmediated access to the 
here and now. The constitution of the human self thus coincides with its 
fundamental splitting image: that of the observer who observes herself 
while observing herself etc. Looking at how Maturana and Varela introduce 
the position of the observer, one can detect important differences between 
various perspectives on observation. First, they connect the position of the 
observer with the predictability of the behaviour of systems under observa-
tion (Maturana and Varela 1998, 122-125). This – in and of itself – does not 
necessarily depend on an eccentric position, since all living systems need 
to anticipate the behaviour of their environment. Second, they explain that 
such prediction depends on the interpretation by the observer of past and 
present behaviours of other systems and their respective environments 
or niches (Maturana and Varela 1980, 8-9). The observer’s predictions, 
based on her descriptions of an entity as a unity of interactions with its 
environment, must not be confused with the way that the system under 
observation – itself – anticipates changes in its environment.17 This will 
depend on its own organization, whereas the observation depends on the 
observer’s organization. The interactions lie in the cognitive domain of 
the observed entity, while the causal or other relations between an entity 
and its niche as observed by the observer lie in the cognitive domain of the 
observer. In fact, Maturana and Varela’s observer is a human person, whose 
description is addressed to another observer, which she may be herself. 
It seems that language not only enables observation, but in fact equals 
observation: “Anything said is said by an observer” (Maturana and Varela 
1980, 8). The most direct reference to what Plessner coins as eccentricity can 
be found in their statement (Maturana and Varela 1980, 8): “The observer can 
define himself as an entity by specifying his own domain of interactions; 
he can always remain an observer of these interactions, which he can treat 
as independent entities.”
What is important here is the claim that an observer – thanks to the 
use of language – can distance herself from her self and treat her own 
interactions as if they are disentangled from her self18: she can take an 
eccentric position with regard to herself. Some observers would describe 
17 Making the distinction between the operational closure of the observed system and that 
of the observer is itself an observation that belongs to the domain of the observer. Hayles (1999, 
145) rightly points some epistemological paradoxes in Maturana’s position here.
18 On the role of semantic description, language and human consciousness, see Maturana & 
Varela 1998, chapter 9: Linguistic Domains and Human Consciousness.
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this as second order statements about f irst order interactions. This can be 
an accurate description if we acknowledge that the second order statement 
does not contain a view from nowhere; it does not represent a given reality 
“out there” and cannot make sense if it does not connect to the regularities 
we encounter. Maturana and Varela explain:
Again we must walk on the razor’s edge, eschewing the extremes of 
representationalism (objectivism) and solipsism (idealism). Our purpose 
in this book has been to f ind a via media: to understand the regularity of 
the world we are experiencing at every moment, but without any point 
of reference independent of ourselves that would give certainty to our 
descriptions and cognitive assertions. Indeed, the whole mechanism of 
generating ourselves as describers and observers tells us that our world, 
as the world which we bring forth in our coexistence with others, will 
always have precisely that mixture of regularity and mutability, that 
combination of solidity and shifting sand, so typical for human experi-
ence when we look at it up close (Maturana & Varela 1998, 241).
It seems apparent that the position of the observer defines human autonomy 
as distinct from the autonomy that def ines all living systems in general. 
The observer entails the difference that makes a difference. In the words 
of Katherine Hayles: “Although the observer’s perceptions construct reality 
rather than passively perceive it, for Maturana this construction depends 
on positionality rather than personality. In autopoietic theory, the opposite 
of objectivism is not subjectivism but relativism” (Hayles 1999, 43).
Though Hayles is not referring to Plessner’s usage of the term positional-
ity, her observation is interesting because one could say that in a similar way, 
Plessner’s eccentric positionality does not refer to a psychological analysis, 
but to the fact that the human life form is capable of taking a second and 
third person perspective. Connecting Plessner with the work of Maturana 
and Varela, one could say that this position accounts for the fact that hu-
mans can bring forth a world that 1) reflects the constraints they encounter 
in their domain of interactions and 2) opens up a plurality of alternative 
interactions. The connection between being an observer and being capable 
of prediction implies that the individual observer has a measure of choice in 
how to act, working out the potential consequences of different courses of 
action as well as anticipating how her fellow-observers will “read” alterna-
tive actions. This foresight can be based on Plessner’s utopian position that 
allows an observer to look back from the future, consciously anticipating 
how her actions will be understood by other observers. The domain of the 
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observer assumes and generates Plessner’s Mitwelt that carries and supports 
(trägt) the individual person, who is born in this process. There is another 
interesting analogy between Plessner’s work and that of Maturana and 
Varela. In both cases, the human organism is capable of creating a shared 
world, called Mitwelt by Plessner, and society by Maturana and Varela. In 
contrast, systems theory, especially that of Luhmann, tends to reify this 
Mitwelt or society as a third order unity that effects operational closure in 
a manner similar to f irst – and second order organisms (cells and metacel-
lulars), neither Plessner nor Maturana and Varela fall in this trap. In the case 
of Plessner, the Mitwelt is underdetermined by the anthropological laws, 
and saturated in the ambiguities of the double anticipations that nourish 
it. Maturana and Varela devoted an entire chapter to Social Phenomena 
in order to explain that: “an organism restricts the individual creativity of 
its component unities, as these unities exist for that organism. The human 
social system amplif ies the individual creativity of its components, as that 
system exists for these components” (Maturana and Varela 1998, 199).
This is why the domain of the observer cannot affect the kind of op-
erational closure that biological organisms must perform to sustain their 
identity, and that is also why the human life form entails a rootlessness, 
ambiguity and uncertainty that is at the same time its freedom to perform 
as an outlier. In this sense, human autonomy differs fundamentally from 
the autonomic nervous system that enables its emergence, as well as from 
autonomic computing systems that cannot reflect on the meaning of their 
interactions.
One last point must be made. Maturana and Varela’s self-observing ob-
server can be understood as a mechanism that produces second order beliefs 
about its own f irst order beliefs. To the extent that autonomic computing 
entails self-management, one could argue that the system generates second 
order beliefs about its f irst order beliefs. This, one could argue, implies that 
autonomic computing systems indeed qualify as eccentric and autonomous 
systems. The double anticipation that is implied in the eccentric position 
can be interpreted as an observer’s attribution of certain intentions, 
allowing the observer to adequately infer and predict the behaviour of 
others. Siding with Dennett (2009), for example, one could claim that the 
question of whether people or autonomic computing systems “really” have 
second order beliefs and intentions is a misguided question, since there is 
no way to anchor the difference, in which case there is no point in trying 
to determine whether autonomic computing systems develop an eccentric 
position. Instead, we must ask ourselves whether we can better anticipate 
their behaviour if we understand them as rational agents that are capable of 
420 Mireille hildebrAndt 
having f irst and second order beliefs and desires. This constellation is what 
Dennett has coined the intentional stance: assuming that another acts on 
the basis of intentionality because that better explains her behaviours. For 
many reasons, however, Dennett does not f it well with Plessner. Though I 
do not think that Plessner would reject the possibility of non-biological life 
forms developing an eccentric positionality, I do think that he would not 
be satisf ied with ALFs merely “displaying” an intentional stance.19 From his 
semi-transcendental perspective, it makes no sense to attribute intentions 
– and thus eccentricity – to a system that has no conscious self-awareness. 
Dennett’s behaviourism and physicalism don’t seem to be in alignment 
with Plessner’s philosophical anthropology.
However, if we “(mis)read” Dennett’s position as if it were in line with 
that of behaviourists like Ryle and G.H. Mead, I think that we could end 
up close to Plessner’s stance: what counts is not some metaphysical theory 
about the essential nature of human beings, but the paradoxical f irst hand 
experience of an eccentricity that allows us a permanent distantiation and 
concurrent reconfiguration of inner, outer and middle world (Mitwelt). This 
is what forces us to develop second order intentions and this allows us to 
address those we “read” as taking a similar stance in life as responsible for 
their actions. Creatively misreading Dennett as a proponent of Plessnerian 
thought, I suggest that endorsing the intentional stance versus an ALF 
would be a worthwhile experiment, a way of f inding out whether they 
indeed live up to the expectations that spring from interactions with a 
person who is capable of developing a mind of her own.
To what extent and why can ALFs be held criminal liable, if at all?
The difference between centricity and eccentricity is important from the 
perspective of legal philosophy, because it relates to the type of human 
agency that is presumed in legal notions of accountability, especially in 
the case of criminal liability. To hold a person accountable in a court of 
law for having committed a crime, she must be capable of wrongful action 
19 This could bring us to a discussion of Searle’s Chinese room argument against the Turing-
test. See on this point Hayles 1999, xi-xiv and 289-290. Maybe the point is that Searle’s fear 
that machines could in fact act as if they know Chinese, meaning that once they convince a 
Chinese of such knowledge over an extended period of time they will in fact have developed 
the capacity to attribute meaning to the signif iers of the Chinese language. This is not to deny 
that their meaning will not differ substantially from ours, due to difference in embodiment 
and historicity. See also Floridi and Taddeo 2009.
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and culpability. However, before embarking on these requirements, we 
must f irst establish whether or not ALFs, such as autonomic computing 
systems, could cause criminal harm or endanger values and interests that 
are protected by the criminal law. One could argue that it is never an ALF 
that commits such crimes but rather its designers or users, rendering the 
ALF itself as being merely an instrument. However, if we assume that ALFs 
are autonomous in the sense that they are being capable of taking decisions 
that neither the designer (programmer) nor the user could have foreseen, 
we have to acknowledge that they can in fact cause harm or damage that 
would fall within the scope of the criminal law if committed by a legal 
person (a human agent, or, for example, an association, company or trust 
fund, to the extent that positive law allows this). It seems to make no sense 
to attribute the liability to those who could not have foreseen (and thus not 
have prevented) this action. Note that ALFs will be created precisely because 
of their capacity to f ind novel solutions without human intervention.20 
ALFs will mostly be created as agents that perform specif ic tasks for an 
organization or person who is keen on delegating tasks to such agents; they 
can be automatic in the case of simple straightforward tasks, but when 
we speak of ALFs, we refer to more complex autonomous systems that are 
capable of coming up with unexpected solutions. The relevant comparison 
here is not the liability of the producer or the user of a product, but the 
liability of the owner of an animal for the harm or damage it causes due to 
its own initiative. This demonstrates that the mere fact that autonomous 
agents entail a measure of unpredictability does not imply that we can hold 
them responsible under the criminal law.21 Another salient comparison is 
the notion of “acts of god,” like earthquakes, f loods or volcanic outbursts. 
Though they cannot be attributed to a particular human person or organiza-
tion, we cannot call the earth, sea or mountain to account in a court of law.
This is related, as in the case of animals, to the fact that holding a person 
accountable for a criminal offence assumes that she should have been 
aware of the wrongfulness of her action, and moreover, can be blamed for 
having violated the law. In this sense, we do not assign full personhood to 
animals.22 My use of the word person is somewhat provocative, because we 
20 Cf. e.g. Karnow (1996), who points out the precarious legal implications of this planned 
unpredictability.
21 For this reason Teubner’s (2007) example of animal liability in medieval times seems mis-
taken to the extent that it aims to demonstrate that it makes sense to attribute legal personhood 
to nonhumans. 
22 Nevertheless, animals can be said to have a specif ic personality: fearful, trusting, secretive, 
unscrupulous, loyal. This probably means that personhood entails more than just moral and 
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tend to assume that only human animals qualify for personhood. Following 
Plessner, however, we can understand personhood as the individuality 
typical for the eccentric position, emerging at the nexus of the inner, outer 
and middle world (Mitwelt), though without any essentialist foundation or 
f inal determination: “His existence is truly built on nothing” (Plessner 1975, 
293).23 To be a person means being capable of knowing and willing (ibid. also 
Frankfurt 1971), that is, capable of differentiating between one’s urges and 
one’s second order desires about these urges, thus forming an intention and 
acting upon it. For an ALF to be liable under the criminal law, this would 
imply that four conditions must be fulf illed: f irst, it must be identif iable 
as a unity of perception and action (centricity); second, the harm or danger 
must be attributable to its action; third, it must be foreseeable by the ALF 
when performing the incriminated action; and fourth, the ALF must be 
capable of the double anticipation that allows anticipation of how others 
will “read” its behaviours (eccentricity). The f irst condition relates to what 
is called actus reus in criminal law, the second (overlapping with the third) 
relates to the requirement of causality, whereas the third and fourth can be 
associated with the concepts of wrongfulness and culpability.
If we want to punish an ALF for actions that fall within the scope of the 
criminal law, it must also be in a position to exercise its rights of defence; 
under the rule of law, punishment takes place after a fair trial (due process) 
has taken its course. This is the crucial difference between punishment 
and discipline, as Hegel saliently suggested when differentiating between 
punishing a person and training a dog. In a liberal democracy, punishment 
implies more than the expression of strong disapproval, requiring instead 
the communication of censure (Duff 2001), which is a bidirectional process. 
Punishment – unlike discipline or manipulation – assumes an appeal to 
the double anticipation of whoever has been singled out for its address. 
This means that a defendant can contest the accusation and reject the 
charge, not only by denying that she committed the incriminating action, 
but also by opening a dialogue about the meaning of the legal norm she 
allegedly violated and the meaning of her action in the light of this norm. 
Due process and a fair trial thus again assume an eccentric positionality. 
Punishment is not merely about imposing suffering, but also about defining 
which behaviour counts as criminal. For this reason, a democracy entitles 
a person who is subject to criminal sanction to being part of the constitu-
legal responsibility; it would be interesting to investigate to what extent having a personality 
is a necessary but not a suff icient condition for moral or legal personhood.
23 My translation of “Seine Existenz ist wahrhaft auf Nichts gestellt.”
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ency that def ines which actions fall within the scope of the criminal law 
(self-government). This implies that criminal liability for ALFs would entitle 
them to vote and partake in democratic government.
Conclusions
Plessner’s notion of human eccentricity has turned out to make an impactful 
difference when it comes to the attribution of criminal liability. This notion 
indeed allows us to discriminate between automatic devices, autonomous 
machines, and the type of human autonomy that is preconditional for 
accountability under the criminal law. Moreover, it enables us to investigate 
whether artif icial life forms might eventually qualify for being censured 
under the criminal law, as well as the exercise of due process rights and 
– eventually – participation in def ining the contents of the criminal law.
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24 Not Terminated
Cyborgized Men Still Remain Human Beings
Dierk Spreen
Between bios and techne
Usually “cyborg” (cybernetic organism) means a “self-regulating organism 
that combines the natural and artif icial together in one system” (Gray 
2001, 2). Cyborgs are mixed beings of animal and technology, man and 
technology or technological and organic or biologic parts. However, this 
mixture does not imply that these differences are “neutralized” by the 
cyborg. Rather, anthropological questions operating at differences, those 
between man, animal, plant and automat, become a topic of discussion 
already in a double sense: on the one hand, the cyborg appears as a f igure 
where the boundaries between body and technology are blurred. Of course, 
technology can be incorporated not only into the human body, but also 
into animals or even plants. Vice versa, technological systems can be 
linked to biologic parts, for example, by combining micro-organisms and 
micro-processors. From f ilms and TV we know about plenty of examples of 
androids covered under human skin. Such cases are either human, animal 
or android cyborgs.
On the other hand, cyborgization again brings in the classical differences 
of philosophical anthropology. Both the differentiation between man/
animal/plant and the difference between man/machine are involved in this 
matter. However, whereas in most cases the f irst series is continued without 
any problem at all – everybody believes to know the difference between a 
cyborg-mouse and a human cyborg – the second one is often understood 
as a socioevolutionary trend, and the age of post-humanism is predicted. 
According to post – or transhumanistic theories, cultural evolution leads 
to the human body being replaced by a machine body. This body appears as 
a sheer artefact, which may be changed just as clothes bought ready made 
(Moravec and Weizenbaum 1993; Moravec 1996, 112-117; see also Becker 
2000). Such visions have the paradox effect that “human cyborgs” become 
the symbol of a “post-human age” (Gray 2001).
In this chapter, a concept of human cyborg will be supported, which 
still understands technologically “enhanced” people as “human” and which 
understands talking about cyborgs as a discourse and topical f igure of the 
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“reflexive modernization” (Beck et al. 1994),1 i.e. a kind of modernization 
where the repercussions of the societal organization of reality are discussed 
and thus exert an influence on this very same organization. At the same 
time, this means that cyborgs neither undermine the linguistic or the 
conceptual differentiation between the organic and the technological, nor 
that between man and animal. However, what can become problematic are 
the ways of human self-understanding and ideas of social relations which 
exclude the technological and the artif icial from the description of the 
self, from physicality and the social or understand them only as additional 
factors. Rather, technology and the boundary between the living and the 
technological become a problem which cannot be rejected and exiled to the 
culture pages, but which for many people increasingly becomes an everyday 
aspect of experiencing their own bodies as well as interpersonal relations.
To make this plausible, I will proceed as follows: at f irst there will be 
an attempt at def ining the idea of man as a “cyborg” in more detail. In 
this context I will introduce the “regulator model,” which makes the body 
obvious as something that is technologically operated in general, without 
losing any of the specif ics of cyborgization. Following this, I will explain 
why humans who become cyborgs nevertheless stay to be human and are 
neither harbingers of a (renewed) “fall of the Occident” nor of a post-human 
society. To do so, I will reach back to Helmuth Plessner’s philosophical an-
thropology. In this context, Plessner’s anthropology is of particular interest, 
as it thinks the relation between the organic and the technologic without 
referring to anti-technological value orientations. Rather, Plessner assumes 
the “humane nature” of technological utopia (GS X, 37) and develops a theory 
of society which considers the artif icial, the produced and the technologic 
to be constitutive for social structures and life worlds. At the same time, 
however, his way of discussing the artif icial social world remains tied to the 
concept of “man.” Thus, we are presented a social-theoretical concept that 
1 Quotations from books and texts published in German were translated into the English 
language.
Figure 24.1 Sketch of the “Regulator Model”
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is particularly suitable for evaluating if the technicization of the human 
body will stay within “man’s” (practical and ethical) space of possibilities.
Finally, I will expose some f ields of the debate on cyborgs. This is meant 
to, f irst, illustrate to what extent the cyborg is a discursive f igure of the 
“reflexivity of modernity” (Giddens 1990), and, secondly, to clarify that he/
she does not at all go beyond the scope of that what is possible for man. 
For, if we agree with Plessner, we must precisely expect that the relation 
between technology and body will prove to be problematic because it is 
not set by nature, but is civilization-historically variable and determined 
by society and must thus continuously be discursively negotiated. Being a 
collective term for invasive body technologies, “the cyborg” thus proves to 
be not a symbol of trans- or post-humanist leaps of evolution, but a f ield 
where one can discuss possible shifts of the boundary between technology 
and body in modern society.
The regulator model
For a long time, technology has been much more than just tool, kitchen aid 
or industrial machine. It is rather that it tackles man and nestles against 
the body. Man is surrounded by a technological aura which is tied to his 
bodily here and now and moves along with him: mobile phone, laptop, PDA, 
MP3 player, portable navigation systems, interactive clothing equipped 
with nanotechnology, etc. These technologies are connected to the bodily-I 
and become a part of our self-perception. The mobile phone, for example, 
almost permanently locates the body in the public within a network of 
familiar relations. At any given time, it is possible to contact friends or 
family members and to cover the unfamiliar with familiarity. Walkman 
or MP3 player provide the perception of city and landscape with a suitable 
sound, which way the perception of body and self is changed (Winkler 
and Tischleder 2001). Nonetheless, these technologies stay at the physical 
surface. While they inf luence self-perception or become aspects of the 
bodily-I, they may be misplaced, lost or forgotten. It’s quite likely that we 
notice that it’s missing and may suffer from certain inconveniences as a 
result, but at least it is possible to leave the mobile phone without dying.
The situation is different for technologies that connect to the body and 
cannot be detached without causing serious harm or more. Here, at f irst 
all kinds of medical technologies attract our attention: prostheses, heart 
and brain pacemakers, cochlear implants or neuro-chips. But also radi-
ofrequency identif ication (RFID) chips, which are implanted into the hand 
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and at the f irst draught automatically pay the drink or – in a Star Trek-like 
fashion – make it possible to open the car door with a tiny gesture, to name 
a few. In these cases, technological apparatus or systems become a part 
of the body, they are “installed” into the human body and thus become 
aspects of one’s own physicality. Donna Haraway calls them “intimate 
components” of our bodies (Haraway 1991, 178). Technology gets under 
the skin and intrudes the body. Human cyborgs are technology, precisely 
“because they are physical” (Spreen 2004, 341).
But in this way the status of technology is changed, too. Generally, 
technological artefacts are means and tools of purposeful use. They serve 
for manipulating the world (including one’s own or another body). They are 
thus characterized by availability or “being at hand” (Heidegger 1993, 69f.). 
And the body is that what we “feel” (Böhme 1985, 120). One’s own body is 
not only a ‘thing’ which is handled in some way. Rather, it is characterized 
by a certain degree of non-availability, for it ties man to a here and now, to a 
certain position in the world. Helmuth Plessner expresses a similar view by 
distinguishing “having a body” (Körper-Haben) from “being a body” (Körper-
Sein): one has a body, one is physical. With the aid of the body, one is capable 
of reaching out to the world. By way of being a body one is grasped. Now 
if technology becomes a part of our body, it changes in some way from the 
register of having to the register of being. At the same time, it also remains 
artif icial, something which can be switched on and off, must be maintained 
and repaired, and can be upgraded or needs electricity. To make it possible 
to ask about the specif ic signif icance of body invasive technology in the 
context of the general technologic-media culture of modernity, a model is 
needed which depicts the step beyond the boundary of our skin without 
losing sight of the context of the technologic saturation of the close area of 
our physicality and of society.
For this, one may imagine that by help of a sliding regulator, the tech-
nologization of the body can be shifted on a scale between lowtech body 
and hightech body (f ig. 1). If the boundary of the skin has been crossed, 
man becomes a human cyborg. This is what I call the subcutaneity criterion 
(Spreen 2000, 27f.). If the regulator is pushed back – which is not always 
possible, but sometimes (e.g. if an RFID chip is removed from the body) – the 
human cyborg will be an “ordinary” man once again. We must assume that 
the degree of technologization and cyborgization will rise with increasing 
age and increasing progress of the development of nano-technology.2 This is 
2 Estimations at the degree of cyborgization in the Western world are between 10 and 50 
percent.
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due to today’s medical nature of most cyborg technologies. But subculture 
examples such as implanted RFIDs, the boom of surgical cosmetics or the 
attractiveness of anti-aging practices make it all too probable that soon 
crossing the boundary of the skin will no longer be restricted to medical 
applications.3 At f irst, the regulator model meets def inition needs. When 
is it possible to speak of a “cyborg”? – The thesis that we have always been 
cyborgs4 is little convincing, for doubtlessly the systematic development of 
body invasive cybernetic technologies is a cultural innovation which is due 
to impressive progress in the fields of life sciences and computer technology. 
But above all, the model is meant to clarify that modern individual and 
social relationships must principally be understood by their constitutive 
relation to material technologies and technological media. The regulator 
scheme emphasizes the “political centrality of technology” (Gray 2001, 20), 
i.e. the fact that body-, bio – and social policies cannot be imagined beyond 
the technological. In this context, technology is understood to be somewhat 
of a “medium, where dead and alive, spiritual and material, problems and 
programmes, action-related and automat-like are related to each other 
and are made permeable for each other” (Gamm 2000, 291f.). The regulator 
model makes obvious that physicality, self-constitution and society cannot 
be imagined without conceptually taking technology into consideration.
On the anthropology of cyborgs
If we choose to regard the social, the living body, and both individual and 
collective self-understanding technology to be of constitutive signif icance, 
wouldn’t it make more sense to speak of a “trans-human society,” the “end 
of man” and “post humanism”? – This conclusion was indeed drawn by 
some theories on technologization (Angerer 2002; Becker 2000; De Mul 
2003). Vice versa, paradoxically this way they confirm that man and society 
might be imagined in a “pre-technologic way.” However, the philosophical 
anthropology developed in the f irst half of the twentieth century, already 
rejected naive ideas of a natural originality of man. That even cyborgization 
3 This also assumed for many science f iction novels such as William Gibson’s Neuromancer 
trilogy.
4 This is also stated by Manfred Clynes, who invented the term “cyborg”: “Homo sapiens, 
when he puts on a pair of glasses, has already changed. When he rides a bicycle he virtually has 
become a cyborg” (Gray 1995, 49).
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does not at all go beyond the concept of man is something I like to show by 
using the works of Helmuth Plessner.
In principle, the following cyborg technologies may be imagined at f irst:
– New senses: an appropriately upgraded cyborg might perceive changes 
in its environment which man’s natural senses cannot perceive (e.g. 
radiation or magnetic f ields).
– New organs, which either maintain, modify, or secure the body’s inner 
regulation: not only the activity of the heart can be additionally regu-
lated. It may also be imagined that for example, breathing, metabolism 
and temperature are altered, enabling humans to exist in completely 
new environments. Also, we may imagine artif icial backup organs.
– Controlling psychic functions by way of purposeful steering: with the aid 
of an apparatus which release drugs, hormones or stimulations within 
the body, it would become possible to manipulate physical reactions, 
emotions or cognitions. For this, different models of steering may be 
adequate: cybernetic self-regulation, purposeful control by others or 
control by the consciousness itself (e.g. deep brain stimulation in case 
of Parkinson’s disease).
– New organs to have effect on the world: prostheses may not only replace 
lost organs, but also integrate new functions into the body. An abundance 
of specif ic examples where new organs are used as tools or organs can 
be found in science f iction literature.
This raises, most of all, two kinds of questions. Firstly, why should such an 
enhanced being still be “human,” given its substantially altered shape and 
behavior? Secondly, is it still possible to speak of a “human” if a software 
calculates data taken from the body to determine the appropriate “action 
plan”? To whom can the performance of cyborgs be attributed, after all?
Plessner determines man topologically, i.e. by concepts describing its 
position within the world. “Being a body,” man is unavoidably obliged to 
the spatial-chronological position he occupies. By “having a body,” however, 
he decides about his environment and makes history. Plessner calls this 
double aspect of being a body and having a body an “eccentric positional-
ity.” This way he describes a relation to the world which on the one hand 
always already goes beyond the body, has its centre outside the body, but 
on the other hand, is fundamentally linked to the body and physical exist-
ence. In so far, man does not only exist within the actual “here-now,” but 
“behind himself” (Plessner 1975, 292). The essence of this anthropology is in 
describing man both as being tied to body and space and as an artif icial and 
space-claiming being. Thus, Plessner speaks of man’s “natural artif iciality”: 
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“Being existentially in need, a half by nature, naked, for man artif iciality 
is an essential expression of his nature. […] Artif iciality of acting, thinking 
and dreaming is the inner means by help of which man as a living natural 
being is in accordance with himself” (Plessner 1975, 316).
This version of man is not only compatible with the technological open-
ing up of new spaces – particularly by way of space travel, which implies 
nothing less than the construction of artif icial spheres of life (Fischer 
2007; Spreen 2004) – but also to the technological opening up of the inner 
space of the body and thus also the brain (Fischer 2002, 236-239). Being a 
natural-artif icial being, man is a biological body being, which has always 
been leaving the space of the biological and moves within a world of culture, 
of history, of art, of technology and of language. Why should the human 
potential to open towards the world and to open up the world stop at his 
own body? Rather, the anthropology of openness towards the world can 
move with man changing shape and thus also with the technologization 
and changing of the body: “Being man is not tied to a certain shape and 
might thus also happen by various shapes which are not congruent with 
those we know. Man is tied to the centralist way of organization which is 
the basis of his eccentricity” (Plessner 1975, 293).
Thus, the technological change of the human body alone is an insuf-
f icient reason for why we should speak of post-humanism – but what about 
the problem of attributing actions? For example, a BrainGateTM Neural 
Interface System of the American Cyberkinetics Neurotechnology System 
company is able to read the f iring of neurons within the brain, interpret it 
with the aid of a specif ic software, and translate it into actions. The chip 
is about 4mm x 4mm big. But what if the software produces interpretive 
mistakes, resulting in unwanted actions?
Not only do translation mistakes at the interface between brain and 
prosthesis constitute a problem, but there are also issues associated with 
programmed, automatic reactions carried out by an inner-body machine. 
Who or what has been acting then (Zoglauer 2003)?
How could we use Plessner as an argument with respect to such problems? 
– It must be emphasized that Plessner speaking of an eccentric positionality 
does not aim at an absolute autonomy of acting subjectivity. In a perspective 
which understands human beings as life forms of eccentric positionality, 
it seems rather normal that humans are necessarily confronted with the 
possibility of losing control over their bodies. Man is able to weep and laugh. 
According to Plessner, these are answers to “disasters,” in the context of 
which the subject loses control, but which does not suddenly make man 
non-human. Rather, man has lost “his relation to his physical existence, 
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it evades him and so to speak does with him as it wants. Nevertheless, 
one perceives this loss as an expression of and answer to an appropriate 
situation” (GS VII, 274).
This means: Plessner understands the loss of control by the body to 
be a condition for the constitution of the self and therefore attributes an 
important function to the “I” losing control:
By losing power over himself, by giving up on understanding himself, 
man neither gives testimony to his superior understanding of that what 
cannot be understood nor to his power in the face of powerlessness nor 
to his freedom and greatness in the face of constraint. He knows how to 
f ind answers even there where is nothing to answer. If not having the 
last word, he plays the last card in the game, loss meaning a gain for him 
(GS VII, 276).
Such experiences are thus of great signif icance for the development of the 
self. As a result, it is not total subjectivity and responsibility, but rather the 
specif ically eccentric positionality between body and physicality, between 
acting and suffering, between having and being that is characteristic of 
being human. Experiences of surprising oneself are thus genuinely human 
and constitutive for the self. Other theories on man draw quite similar 
conclusions. Sigmund Freud showed that the I is not the sole master in its 
own house. George Herbert Mead assumes the intransparency of the I, i.e. 
the subject-I: “Only after having acted we know what we have done; only 
after having spoken we know what we have said” (Mead 1973, 240).
Thus, after all Plessner formulates a theory which is the foundation of 
constituting new meanings during an identity crisis.5 The “uninfluenc-
edness,” “unarticulatedness” and “senselessness” of physical expressions 
demand interpretation, attribution of meaning, and disciplining, while at 
the same time going beyond them (GS VII, 276).
Thus, if human cyborgs are confused by the reactions of their “smart” 
prostheses, is it that then something is happening which is beyond man’s 
horizon of experience? Physical confusion is more or less common. Fur-
thermore, the human way of understanding the world and himself includes 
the possibility of disturbing border experiences. Instead of implicitly 
postulating a specif ic “post-human” quality of experience, with Plessner 
we may assume that the modes of problematizing and answering such 
expressions of physicality take a new shape. Does one steer towards a kind 
5 On this in detail, see Spreen 2008, 30-53, 60-62.
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of “technological unconsciousness” or does one ask oneself which body-
technological constellation/interaction has created this reaction? If so, what 
might this show? It will be very interesting to analyze such discussions on 
the self and on identity constructions: how will human cyborgs integrate 
their physical expressions into their idea of themselves? When will such 
processes fail? What will be the exact role of discourses discussing the shift 
of the boundaries between body and technology (= cyborg discourses)?
Problem fields of cyborg discourses
It seems to follow that cyborgization does not at all force us to assume the 
“disappearance of man.” Nevertheless, the technologization and network-
ing of bodies creates a number of chances and risks which are negotiated 
by way of reflective discourses. They are about interpreting experiences, 
about determining both individual and collective self-images, about the 
image of man, and about social and ethical questions. At least four topics 
of discussion arise from here:
Interface: artif icial organs are repetitions. This way, shifts between the or-
ganic and the technologic are created within the body, places of “différance” 
(Jacques Derrida). Independent of their degree of perfection, new organs 
will always remain replacements, additions or (re)constructions, which 
mark inner-physical interfaces (Spreen 2004). This way, certain interface 
problems may come up within the body, which might gain our attention. 
Some examples are: rejection reactions, infections, interpretation problems 
in the context of the inner-body exchange of information, side-effects or 
permanent social caution and self-watching (Manzei 2003, 185-207). It is 
often impossible to speak of harmony within the bodies of cyborgs, as it is 
suggested by many texts on this topic, more or less unquestioned. To the 
contrary, by factual technology immigrating into the body and provoking 
interface problems, body-technology becomes systematically topical.6
Networking: frictions at the interfaces can hardly be avoided if grown 
organism and produced mechanism are put together to form a body. Thus, 
the cyborgicized self is confronted with perpetually possible inner effects 
of technology, due to which it is typical of these technologies that they 
are connected to outer-body knowledge and control institutions. Human 
cyborgs are permanently controlled by medical institutions – that is health 
6 E.g. with incorporated “cultural techniques” (habit, rites, traditions) this def initely not the 
case; rather they usually appear as habits as a matter of courses (Mauss 1989, 205).
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care professionals, hospitals or research institutions. There they are sup-
ported, and from there they receive their upgradings. The vision that in 
the future “we cyborgs” will connect to the internet by way of USB 4 to 
download the new f irmware for our brain implant from our doctor’s server 
is thus not too far-fetched.
There is a number of questions and problems we need to address: to 
what extent will such a body become a public place and a societal entity? 
How could privacy be def ined under such conditions? Also, the actions of 
cyborgs may be manipulated from the outside by way of their networked 
implants, so that personal autonomy will be threatened, posing ambiguities 
and uncertainties in the attribution of moral blame. And what if prostheses 
can be permanently connected to health servers via Bluetooth and mobile 
phones? Criminals might hack themselves into the bodies, as they already 
do today with the hard discs of unsuspecting users. State security institu-
tions, on the other hand, might be tempted to use similar means to control 
risk groups. Will the body of the cyborg also become a new f ield of security 
policy beyond medical immunology?
Upgrading: another set of problems results from the improvement 
promises and optimization utopias of discourses on cyborgs. Cyborg 
technology is getting less and less restricted to medical applications. 
Rather, research strives for “upgrading” and “improvement” to relieve the 
body from his natural restrictions (Keller 2004). In a totalized power and 
risk society, where there is demand for the stress-resisting, young and 
optimized high performance individual, he/she will be provided with an 
enormous competitive advantage by re-arming and extending his/her body 
at regular intervals. The boom of anti-aging, f itness or cognitive enhance-
ment (Ritalin, for example) shows that there is great demand for all offers 
that can improve performance and physical attractiveness. Could social 
inequalities be increased this way? The basic health system will not cover 
needs of body upgrades which are not medically induced but have only 
been created by market dynamics. This will have the effect that the health 
of individuals with high buying power will be amplif ied, whereas highly 
resource-constrained individuals will have to be satisfied with involuntarily 
giving up on rearmament.
Spatial revolution: The word “cyborg” originates from space research. The 
idea of the cyborg is simply based on reversing the principle of clothing: 
how could one survive in space without a spacesuit, “qua natura,” or in 
alien atmospheres (Clynes and Kline 1995, 30)? In this context, questions 
concerning life within highly artif icial environments become radicalized. 
How do you build self-suff icient biospheres to settle on Moon or Mars 
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exploiting noble earths or other raw materials? How do you construct cabins 
and life systems for deep space travel? Can man live in space colonies? What 
about space agriculture and so on?7
Such “science f iction” discourses highlight that man is not only not tied 
to Planet Earth and “soil,” but also not tied to a certain physical shape. 
They refer to the civilization-historic contingency of his living conditions – 
including his physical appearance – and thus emphasize the “start towards 
Artif icial Society” (Heinrich Popitz) and its possibilities. Discourses on 
cyborgs and space do not only discuss the reorganization of nature for 
human purposes and man’s distancing from nature, but they also point out 
to the consequences of such tendencies of modernity, which are triggered 
if both aspects are combined: The technological shaping of man’s inner 
nature (Popitz 1995, 132).
The anthropology of eccentric positionality opens up purely technologic 
spheres of life to man, as it understands him to be an artif icial being by 
nature. And as man is able to transform his environment, why should this 
creative power stop at the limit of the skin? Why not change man, by add-
ing technologic organs to his body, by technologically extending physical 
capabilities, by medially networking and physically adapting him to foreign 
environments? – Plessner also clearly saw the possibility to technologically 
change the body. However, he also stresses that just how man depends on 
artif iciality, he also depends on his organic nature and bodily existence. 
This tension cannot be abandoned as long as humans live or they themselves 
let the human race live. Thus, from Plessner’s point of view, it is hardly 
surprising that discursive f ields develop where the relationship between 
artif icial and natural aspects is intensively debated and where problems 
of this relation become obvious. Instead, precisely this must be expected, 
because man does not “exist out of the midst of himself,” but must cope 
with “constitutive homelessness” (Plessner 1975, 309).
Cyborgs as a figure of “reflexive modernization”
Living with cyborgs means recognizing that indeed society does not only 
consist of humans, but is in many respects also technologically-medially 
constituted. The social sciences and the humanities tend to give up on epis-
temically focussing the social on man. For “reflexive” or “second” modernity, 
a similar thought is typical, in so far as it lines out the risks and chances 
7 For an earlier discussions about this topic, see Heppenheimer 1977.
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of the technological domination of nature (Beck 1986, 254-374; Beck et al. 
1994; Giddens 1990, 36-45). In a general sense, the theory of “reflexive mod-
ernization” aims at explaining the social not only by the social or by human 
action contexts. Rather, it is about creating a systematic place for, f irstly, 
objects, things, material technologies and media and, secondly, for bodily 
existence and nature in the context of social-theoretical conceptuality.8 
This modernity is reflective in so far as the repercussions of the societal 
organization of reality are discussed. While doing so, effective factors and 
constitutive elements which prove to be impeding and stubborn towards 
social references of meaning are systematically included. This implies an 
extension or reformulation of the “social-constructivist attitude,” which 
reconstructs societal reality only from everyday references of meaning or 
from discursive-symbolic meaning (see Eßbach 2001; Mersch 2002; Spreen 
2008, 43-50). In this context, the cyborg proves to be one of the discursive 
f igures by way of which such repercussions become obvious: In the context 
of the cyborg f igure, shifts of the border between technology and body are 
made a topic of discussion without giving up on the conceptual distinction 
between the organic and the technologic. In precisely this way does the 
technologic-medial as well as natural or physical constitutional conditions 
of social contexts and relations become visible. Particularly in the f ields of 
interface, networking, upgrading and spatial revolution the technologic and 
physical constitution of modern self – and social conditions is made a topic 
of discussion. These are reflective discourses on cyborgization. “Cyborg” in 
this context is a metaphor of our time, that is “a matter of f iction and lived 
experience” (Haraway 1991, 149). This image helps to make the structural 
shifts in the globalized information and knowledge society visible.
However, here it also becomes obvious that it continues to be reasonable 
to maintain conceptual differences between organic and technologic, hu-
man and non-human (man/animal, man/machine), in order to make the 
bodies’ permeability for technology visible, as well as the problems arising 
from this. From a Plessnerian perspective, “man” will not disappear when 
the regulator is shifted beyond the boundary of the skin, as he has already 
been a natural-artif icial being prior to such shift. The aforementioned 
f ields of the discourse on cyborgs prove to be ambivalent. They refer both 
to problems and to possibilities: interface problems, but on the other hand 
8 And thirdly – for the sake of completeness I must point out to this – the fact that we cannot 
go back to a state before historic events and the thus connected traces of remembrance must 
be given a systematic place in social theory. This becomes particularly important if it is about 
questions dealing with collective violations, violence and war (Spreen 2008, 30-75).
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new life chances; sociation of the body, but at the same time increased 
security; increased social differentiation, but on the other hand individual 
improvement, change of shape, but on the other hand the opening up of 
new environments etc.
On the other hand, particularly in the context of post-humanist and 
post-feminist discourses, the cyborg is considered a border f igure, by which 
not only the dichotomy of being natural and being artif icial, but also that 
of man and woman becomes blurred and disappears. This opens up op-
portunities to rewrite identity and role models, which are organized along 
the borders of the sexes.9 According to this radical-constructivist reading, 
after all the technicized body appears to be arbitrarily socially recodable. 
Cyborgs, it is stated, are “beyond traditional binary structures” (Lenzhofer 
2006, 194), and the cyber future is said to be “a clean slate, or a blank screen, 
onto which we can project our fascination” (Springer 1999, 53). With the 
Plessnarian approach in contrast, the observation is emphasized that the 
technologic crossing of the border of the skin does not at all trivialize the 
conceptual differentiation between the technologic and the organic (which 
is as true for the concept of “border” itself). Rather, “cyborgs” prove to be a 
discursive f ield of reflection within which the societal change of identities, 
roles and power structures may be made a topic of discussion precisely 
because the “material” conditions for the constitution of social situations – 
for example, technologic, medial, natural or physical – attract attention by 
their difference to each other and their resistance to discursive attributions 
of meaning. Technological inventions, new media, spatial revolutions, or 
indeed shifts of the border between technology and body result in new 
experiences which resist common patterns of interpretation and thus 
stimulate a novel reflection of our societal situation.
Discourses on cyborgs discuss journeys between body and technology, 
nature and culture, man and artefact in societal contexts. Being a f igure of 
discourse, “the cyborg” makes these journeys a topic of discussion and at 
the same time emphasizes the signif icance of differences. Moreover, this 
approach highlights the technological-media constitution both of modern 
societies and modern self-constitutions. Although in this context, particu-
larly the technological and medial constitutions of society are discussed, 
it does in no way imply the dawning of an age of post-humanism. Rather, 
technologic and artif icial constitutional conditions are relevant for the 
entire history of society (see Popitz 1995, 39-43). From such a point of view, 
9 See e.g. Haraway 1991; for a summary, see Lenzhofer 2006, 194-196; for a critical view of this, 
see Balsamo 1996.
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reflective modernity does not reflect a “post-humane” change of societal 
relations, but only a reasonable self-reflection by modernity, i.e. a cultural 
learning process which processes historic experiences. It is an essential 
content of this reflection that it shows and recognizes the (always effective) 
varied material constitution of societal conditions.
this way, it becomes obvious how necessary it is to take constitutive 
(“non-societal”) dimensions into consideration when it comes to the social-
scientif ic reconstruction of self – and societal conditions. For this, Plessner’s 
anthropology proves to be a helpful approach. His way of reflecting on the 
constitutional conditions of artif icial society does not only succeed in mak-
ing current phenomena, such as the cyborgization of man, understandable, 
but in this context it also resists any fashionable, intellectual impulses 
towards an implosion of categories and conceptual de-differentiation. For, 
by the concept of eccentric positionality, man’s specific border situation is 
marked, which combines freedom and necessity, social norm and natural 
causality, the intelligible and the sensual, culture and nature, without 
“sublating” this antinomic structure towards one side or the other, however.
Although Plessner developed his anthropology as early as in the f irst 
half of the twentieth century, it still proves to be an approach which is able 
to grasp current technologically induced problems. But maybe this is not 
that surprising, as for the time being, no kind of reality has appeared on 
this side or that side of the orbit which was not at least basically imagined 
and projected by the technologic-natural-scientif ic drafts and the science 
f iction of the early and mid-twentieth century (Fischer 2002; Spreen 2004).10
However, as man lives in a state of “alienation” in accordance with his 
nature, even his artif icial life worlds will not be able to satisfy the illusion of 
a “home” which is a matter of course and without problems. Indeed, Plessner 
speaks of artif iciality as “the detour towards a second fatherland where 
[man] will f ind a home and will be absolutely rooted” (Plessner 1975, 316), but 
there are two reasons why this position may not be interpreted as a “coming 
home” with the aid of technology and artif iciality. Firstly, this becomes 
obvious by a historic perspective: The development of his technology has 
10 What has also not appeared yet are the “aliens” who are omnipresent with science f iction. 
Making contact to them may be supposed to definitely make way for that “decentralized concept 
of the world” of which Martin Schwonke speaks, while following Plessner (Schwonke 1957, 140): 
To a cosmos which includes contact to that what is “maximum alien” (Schetsche 2003), a concept 
of the world is appropriate for which no longer Man is the measure of all things: “Just as Earth 
will become an insignif icant, neglectable piece of dust whose destruction is of no interest for 
the universe, ‘homo sapiens’ will become one intelligent being among many, which will, indeed 
must wear off, without intelligence and life as such being extincted” (Schwonke 1957, 141).
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provided the species Homo sapiens with the possibility of causing its own 
extinction. In this respect, Günther Anders – also in the theoretical context 
of philosophical anthropology (Reimann 1990, 30-35) – doubted that man’s 
imagination would be able to catch up with this possibility. That is why he 
speaks of “man’s outmoded nature” (Anders 1956). Regardless of whether 
or not we like to agree with Anders that much, his concept neatly points 
out the destructive possibilities of modernity and thus precisely demands 
an ethical-humanist answer. Although at a f irst glance, speaking of “world 
without man” (Anders 1984) may remind us of post-humanist apologies, it 
must be understood as a contrafactual, humanistic-ethical appeal. Thus, 
what we may learn from Anders is that this destructivity (not at last in the 
form of war) is a problem which will inevitably accompany the future of 
man (Spreen 1998, 152-164). Consequently, artif icial society will not become 
a second home where man might believe to have no problems and to be “in 
good keeping.” Rather, such kind of “being in good keeping” is replaced by 
man’s “task” “to take care of himself for the continuous existence of human 
life within cosmos” (Fischer 2007, 59). From these destructive possibilities 
emerges humanity’s moral and security-political obligation to reduce global 
risks of violence (such as nuclear terrorism).
The destructivity that an artif icial society is provided with may also 
be found in human cyborgs, not only because they too will not be able 
to get rid of the knowledge of the nuclear bomb, but also because in a 
cultural-psychological sense, we may understand the invasion of the body 
by technology to be an “identif ication with the aggressor” (Gendolla 1982; 
Spreen 1998, 91-96). Thus, connecting the body to technology is also the 
result of being threatened by total violence. That is why even neo-romantic 
visions of a technology-free, pure bodily existence will do next to nothing 
about the fact that man is unable to go back to a stage before knowledge and 
the given constructive and destructive possibilities – the idea of incapability 
is antiquated. “The idea survives. Plato victorious” (Anders 1980, 395). Even 
the “lowtech body” – just as the name says – depends on the technological: 
“It is impossible to run away from the machines and go back to the f ield. 
They will not release us, and we will not release them. By an enigmatic 
power, they are within us, and we are within them” (GS X, 38).
Secondly, the idea that by way of “forced interruption” and “artif icial 
elements,” a closed circle of life (Plessner 1975, 316) would be able to generate 
a home which is by itself a matter of course, is already rejected by Plessner 
himself. What might be achieved at best, is a “second” fatherland; however 
the latter will continue to be artif icial, changeable and thus doubtful. 
Accordingly, such unnaturality and “constitutive imbalance” (Plessner 
440 dierK sPreen 
1975, 316) are due to the structure of human life. They result in man being 
fundamentally obliged to self-reflectivity – particularly man “in the age of 
mechanical reproduction” (Benjamin 2008), i.e. in modern, artif icial society: 
Nothing is a matter of course, everything is potentially a problem. Thus, in a 
modernity which is permeated by reflective discourses, man lives inevitably 
in a state of constitutive foreignness: “Who is on the side of intellect will 
not return” (Plessner 1976, 342).
In contrast to the background of this obligation of self-reflectivity and the 
ethical-humanist (as well as security-political) “task,” Plessner’s anthropol-
ogy can neither consider the natural nor the artif icial body as a lastingly 
unproblematic “home” of the human self. In this way, Plessner makes a 
theoretical offer to sociology, which bears contemporary signif icance. At 
the same time, it forces us to bring up alterity, artif iciality and alienality 
as constitutive factors and grasp modernity without giving up on “man” or 
on important conceptual differentiations, such that between nature and 
culture, or between the organic and the technologic. Being dependent on a 
technology-permeated body and a completely artif icial habitat, man stays 
“man.” In this way, his societal and historic possibilities become obvious, 
but by none of these possibilities does his “real nature” becomes obvious, 
for his eccentricity does not allow man “any clear f ixation of his own status” 
(Plessner 1975, 342). Precisely because of this, he is able to be a cyborg at all.11
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25 Plessner and Technology
Philosophical Anthropology Meets the Posthuman
Peter-Paul Verbeek1
Introduction
Until recently, Helmuth Plessner’s work has hardly played any substantial 
role in the philosophy of technology. The only two exceptions are the work 
of two Dutch philosophers of technology, Petran Kockelkoren (2003) and 
Jos de Mul (2003), who investigated Plessner’s concept of mediation and 
eccentricity, respectively, with regards to technology. While Kockelkoren 
founded the contemporary approach of technological mediation in Pless-
ner’s anthropology, De Mul expanded Plessner’s concept of eccentricity into 
‘poly-eccentricity,’ in order to do justice to the new ways of being-in-the-
world made possible by information technologies.
In this chapter, I will take this discussion a step further. First, I will sketch 
the account of human-technology relations in the history of philosophical 
anthropology. This will provide a context for taking up some of Plessner’s 
ideas in philosophy of technology. Second, I will discuss how Plessner’s 
framework sheds a new light on technology and the mediating role of 
technologies in human existence. Finally, I will investigate if and how 
Plessner’s theory can help to analyse contemporary technological develop-
ments that are often understood in terms of ‘human enhancement’ or even 
‘posthumanism.’ Do we need to expand his theory in order to make sense 
of the newest technologies, or does his original work still apply on its own? 
Can Plessner’s anthropology help us conceptualize how technology takes us 
beyond the human? Or does his work rather urge us to see ‘posthumanism’ 
as a necessary ingredient of being human?
1 This chapter is a revised and expanded version of a chapter in my Dutch book De grens van 
de mens: over techniek, ethiek en de menselijke natuur (Rotterdam: Lemniscaat, 2011), translated 
from the Dutch by Hermien Lankhorst.
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Philosophical anthropology and technology
Philosophical anthropology – the discipline of philosophy that is concerned 
with understanding the human being – can be seen as the philosophical 
answer to the new ways in which humans were being approached by biology 
and the behavioral sciences at the start of the past century. New develop-
ments, such as the theory of evolution, psychoanalysis and behaviorism, 
all questioned the manner in which ‘man’ was understood traditionally. 
All of a sudden, these emerging new approaches labelled humans as part of 
the animal kingdom, as a thin f ilm of ‘I’ on a swirling mash of unconscious 
wishes and desires, or as a stimulus-response machine. As a result, the 
philosophical question of what it means to be human resurfaced. In light 
of all these new attitudes, how should the human be understood?
We are currently facing similar circumstances, albeit not through develop-
ments in science but in technology. Many new possibilities have emerged to 
intervene in human nature: psychopharmaceuticals, tissue regeneration, in-
telligent prostheses, brain implants, and many more. All these developments 
raise the question anew about what human nature is and where the limits 
of humanity lie. In the f irst wave of philosophical-anthropological theories, 
the focus lied on defining distinctive boundaries between human beings and 
animals. The animal, which shows instinctual behavior, stands in opposition 
to man, who acts freely, gives meaning to the world and shapes his or her own 
existence. Oddly enough however, the technique has always played a large 
role in philosophical anthropology as well. Philosophical anthropologists 
like Ernst Kapp, Hermann Schmidt and Arnold Gehlen were all fascinated by 
the relationship between technological artefacts and the human organism. 
The idea that humans come to this world as imperfect beings that have to 
survive on their own by using technology has always been a dominating view.
We humans are Mängelwesen (‘imperfect creatures’), as Gehlen expressed it 
so poignantly in Der Mensch: Seine Natur und seine Stellung in der Welt (1940), 
invoking Herder. Since we have no specialized organs and instincts, we could 
never survive in a natural environment. We do not have fur to keep ourselves 
warm and physically we are neither equipped to protect ourselves nor to obtain 
food. We have to add something to ourselves to be able to exist – and it is for 
this reason that the relationship between the human organism and technology 
has always played an important part in philosophical anthropology.
At the end of the nineteenth century, Ernst Kapp was among the first to take 
a closer look at the relationship between the human organism and technology. 
His central thesis in Grundlinien einer Philosophie der Technik (1877) was that 
of organ projection: technologies are conscious or unconscious projections 
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of human organs. A hammer is a projection in matter of what the fist is in 
the organic domain. A saw is a projection of human teeth. The telegraph 
network – which was being constructed in Kapps’s time – is a projection of 
the central nervous system. Because we, human beings, ‘objectify’ ourselves 
in matter, we develop knowledge about ourselves as well. We discover who 
we are by projecting elements of ourselves in matter, and by subsequently 
f inding out that we are more than just the sum those projections.
Kapps’s position comes down to an inversion of the theory that, since 
the Enlightenment, nature has increasingly been understood in mechanical 
terms. Kapp does the exact opposite: he thinks the mechanical from the 
organic, technique from nature. We create a material world of technical 
objects by externalizing elements of our own organism – and in this way 
we discover more and more of ourselves in the use of technology.
In the twentieth century, Hermann Schmidt further elaborated the 
relationship between the organic and the technical. In ‘Die Entwicklung der 
Technik als Phase der Wandlung des Menschen’ (1954), Schmidt discerned 
three stages in the development of technique. The earlier analysis by Kapp 
relates to the f irst stage: that of the tool. Here, the necessary power comes 
from human labour, as well as the intelligence to use the instrument for a 
specific purpose. The second stage is that of the machine. This derives power 
from itself, but it still has to be operated by a human being for a certain 
purpose. Finally, the third stage is that of the automaton, which derives both 
its physical operation and the purposeful deployment of its machinery from 
technology. In a way, the human subject has become redundant here, as both 
physically and intellectually, the automaton has become self-suff icient.
In Beyond the Machine [De machine voorbij, 1992], the Dutch philosopher 
Maarten Coolen showed that Herman Schmidt also approached technology 
as an externalization of man, which can serve as a source of self-knowledge. 
We recognise aspects of ourselves in technology and at the same time we 
discover that we are more than that alone. The machine embodies the physi-
cal use of the tool. The automaton then embodies the purposeful operation 
of the machine. Subsequently, we human beings, who can relate to machines 
and automatons, are always more than just the externalized elements of 
ourselves. We are more than machines, even when parts of ourselves can be 
understood as a mechanism, and more than automatons, even though we can 
certainly consider aspects of ourselves as such. Human self-understanding 
develops itself in the mirror of technology, according to Coolen:
It is my intention to develop a philosophical appreciation of technique 
in which technological artefacts can be considered to be expressions 
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of the human mind. Therefore, I am interested in precisely those an-
thropological ideas that one can associate with the act of technological 
transformation itself. What can man learn about himself from his own 
fabrications? (Coolen 1992, 165-166; translation mine)
In the twentieth century, Arnold Gehlen built on the ideas of Schmidt, by 
raising once more the question of how all these technologies relate to man 
as an organic being. In his text “A Philosophical-Anthropological Perspec-
tive on Technology” (2003, 213), Gehlen distinguishes three relationships 
between man and technique:
– Organ replacement – for example, the hammer that replaces the f ist.
– Organ improvement – for example, the microscope that enhances the 
already existing capabilities of the eye.
– Organ relief – for example, the wheel that makes it possible to move 
heavy objects without burdening the body too much.
Here, Gehlen perceives the tendency that the organic is increasingly being 
replaced by the inorganic. More and more, technology is taking over the 
place that once belonged to man – and this is a development that could also 
turn against humans, Gehlen thinks.
The approaches of Kapp, Schmidt and Gehlen all show in their own way 
the relationship between organic people and non-organic technologies. In 
the end, however, these positions aren’t adequate. Contemporary techno-
logical developments that go beyond the configuration of usage-situations 
do not f it the frameworks above.
A good example is the technology of deep brain stimulation (DBS). This 
technology stimulates specific parts of the brain with low-voltage electricity 
in order to achieve an effect on the motor capacities of Parkinson patients, 
or on the moods and sensations of psychiatric patients. Such brain implants 
cannot be understood as organ projections – after all, which organ would 
be projected here? They also go beyond the dialectic of tool-machine-au-
tomaton – rather, the hybrid of human and technique that emerges through 
the implantation of a DBS-device forms a next phase in this development.
This is where the cyborg appears: a creature that is part human, part 
technology (cf. Haraway 1991). A substitution of the organic by the inorganic, 
Gehlen’s biggest fear, is not the issue here. On the contrary, the organic is 
absolutely central and merges with the inorganic in order to operate better. 
While the body functioned as a completely natural boundary between 
humans and technology in classic philosophical anthropology, that line 
becomes more fuzzy when it comes to the latest anthropo-technology. 
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These technologies do not project the body, nor do they complement it; 
rather they merge with it to become a new hybrid body.
To truly understand this new phase in the relationship between humans 
and technology, we have to overcome a large conceptual hurdle. The di-
chotomy of man versus technology, that seems so self-evident to many, just 
does not f it with the matter at hand. Anthropo-technologies require that 
we blur the boundary between man and technology, which is an incredibly 
fundamental boundary. After all, we see ourselves as natural, while technol-
ogy is artif icial – and as a result, we experience the blurring of boundaries as 
a degradation of our authenticity. However, it appears necessary to consider 
this distortion of boundaries as part of the human condition.
The distinction between the natural and the technical is very old indeed. 
The ancient Greeks distinguished technè (technique, craftsmanship) from 
fysis (nature), both forms of poièsis (creation): while fysis creates itself, 
technè is interference by humans. A flower blooms by itself, but a building 
or a painting is made by people. While technique is the work of man, man 
is not a product of technique.
French philosopher of technology Bernard Stiegler argued in Technics and 
Time (1998) that it is precisely this distinction between techne and fysis that 
needs to be reconsidered. Stiegler argues that man has to be seen as a creature 
that is originally technological, an idea that Pieter Lemmens beautifully 
developed in Driven by Technology [Gedreven door techniek, 2008]. After all, 
humans have always technologically interfered in nature, precisely as “defec-
tive beings” (Mängelwesen), and thus an ‘artif icial’ surrounding emerged 
in which human development – or evolution, if you like – has taken place.
From the outset, man has been interwoven with technology on an 
organic level as well. Because of the slow pace of development, this had 
not been noticed for a long period of time. However, since the emergence 
of modern technique, the developments have gained momentum and it 
has become clear how the environment of human existence changes as a 
result of technology.
What constitutes the humanity of man and lies at the root of the break of 
the human-animal from the continuity of animal life, Stiegler states […], is 
nothing less than a process of technological exteriorisation of life. […] Man 
is a creature that, rather than entering the struggle for his existence with 
his own organs, comes into it with artif icial ‘organs’: tools and techniques 
that are located outside his own biology but on which he nevertheless has 
become completely dependent for his survival, and so they have become 
of vital importance for him (Lemmens 2008, 397; translation mine).
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This notion of ‘originary technicity’ – by which Stiegler indicates the 
originally technological character of man – sheds a completely new light 
on the question of ‘the boundary of man.’ It shows that there has never really 
been a clear boundary between humans and technique to begin with. As 
Donna Haraway puts it: “the cyborg is our ontology” (Haraway 1991). The 
cyborg – the merging of the mechanical and the organic –embodies not 
the alienation of being human, but in fact shows its fundamental structure. 
We have never been specimens of ‘man,’ at least not in the sense that we 
could indicate a primordial condition of humanity from which we could be 
alienated. What makes us humans is precisely the fact that we continually 
mould ourselves. In that sense, we have always been cyborgs.
Plessner and technology
This self-designing character of man has been an important theme in twen-
tieth-century philosophy. Heidegger argued in Sein und Zeit (1927) that man, 
from his ‘thrownness’ (Geworfenheit) into this world, continually ‘designs’ (Ent-
werft) himself: the fact that we exist comes over us, but the way in which we 
fill in this existence is an assignment to ourselves, a productive interplay with 
our thrownness. The existential tradition, too, is based on the idea that man 
himself is responsible for who he is: humans do not coincide with themselves, 
but they have freedom, and from this freedom their existence is not simply a 
given, but a task. Nietzsche’s statement, that man is a being that needs to be 
surpassed, not a goal in itself but a transitional being, may be understood in 
this way as well. It is man’s purpose to always transcend himself.
It appears that, with the latest technologies, we encounter a new meaning 
of the words of the German philosophical anthropologist Helmuth Plessner, 
man is ‘artif icial by nature.’ In his influential work The Levels of the Organic 
and Man [Die Stufen des Organischen und der Mensch, 1928], Plessner made 
an analysis of modes of existence of different types of organic beings, 
including humans. He looks at these beings in terms of their ‘boundary 
realizations’: the way in which they may or may not demarcate the line 
between themselves and their surroundings. This turns out to be a valuable 
criterion for distinction.
Stones, for example, are defined completely externally. They do not have 
an ‘inside’ from which they could experience a boundary with a world 
‘outside.’ Meanwhile, plants do have an inside and an outside: there is 
a boundary between an ‘inside world’ and an ‘outside world’ and their 
metabolism regulates any traff ic across the boundary.
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Because of this boundary between the inside and outside, plants, just like 
all living creatures, have positionality: they have a relationship with their 
border. However, a plant does not know about this boundary, it has no centre 
from which it can experience its own limits. This is what distinguishes 
plants from animals. Animals do operate from a centre: an animal is not 
just an organic body, but it is also in that body and experiences the world 
from that body.
The human way of existence, then, is characterized by the fact that 
humans have a relation to their centre as well. They do not only act from a 
centre, they are also aware of it. This adds a third dimension to the human 
physicality. Not only are humans their body and in their body, they also have 
a body. They have a relationship to their corporeality. In addition to their 
centricity – operating from their centre – they are also eccentric, i.e. they 
can step outside their centre and develop a relationship with it. People are 
always an audience of themselves: they do not coincide with themselves, but 
in addition to their experience of the world, they always have an experience 
of their experience.
This eccentricity makes humans, in the words of Plessner, “artif icial 
by nature.” It is part of our nature that we are unnatural. The reason for 
this is the tension that our eccentricity creates. Because people do not 
just ‘exist,’ their existence is an assignment for them, a challenge, a task. 
It belongs to our nature that we continually have to make something of 
ourselves. Plessner explains eccentricity as the experience of a permanent 
imperfection. The distance to ourselves and to the world, which arises 
through our self-consciousness, begs to be bridged. It is precisely here that 
technique plays an important role: man creates for himself an artif icial 
environment to compensate for the imperfection and the nakedness that he 
experiences. We do not take ourselves and the world as given, but as a task: 
we literally have to make something of it. Technology bridges the distances 
and compensates the imperfections that we experience.
In this way, Plessner radicalizes the philosophical anthropological theme 
of man as a deficient being. For him, the human def icit is not the lack of 
an adequate organic set of instruments for survival, but a consequence of 
human eccentricity. Because people have a relationship to their centre, 
there is a distance to themselves and to the world that they then try to 
bridge. It is this eccentricity that makes us human, and it is this distance 
from our own centre that ensures that people technologically interfere 
in reality.
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Mediation and technology
The eccentric character of human existence also gives the human relation 
to the world a specif ic character. Plessner characterizes it as an ‘indirect 
directness,’ or ‘mediated immediacy.’ Our relations to the world always 
involve a detour. They can never be experienced as direct, because we 
always have a relation to these relations. Because of our eccentric nature, 
we are never entirely ‘in’ these relations; we are always aware that there 
is this relation. Any experience of the world inevitably also involves an 
experience of the relation that makes this experience possible. The world is 
never merely ‘given’ to us, because we are always aware of the way in which 
it is given. We only have mediated access to the world.
Dutch philosopher Petran Kockelkoren introduced Plessners concept of 
mediated immediacy into philosophy of technology. The mediated charac-
ter of our relation to the world also involves technologies, as Kockelkoren 
explains (Kockekoren, this volume). Connecting to Martin Heidegger’s 
ideas about the ‘ready-to-hand’ character of tools (1927), and to Don Ihde’s 
analysis of human-technology relations (1990), Kockelkoren argues that 
technologies deserve a well developed place in our understanding of the 
relations between humans and the world (Kockelkoren 2003).
In Being and Time, one of the subjects Heidegger investigated is the relation 
between human beings and ‘equipment,’ or ‘tools’: things that are used to fulfill 
a particular purpose. Heidegger shows that when we deal with such objects, 
they withdraw, as it were, from our experience. We do not focus on our ham-
mer when we are hammering, but on the nail we want to hit. Things-in-use are 
‘ready-to-hand,’ as Heidegger calls it, as opposed to ‘present-at-hand’ objects 
that are examined from a detached and external standpoint. Our experience 
of the world takes place through the things that we use. We do not experience 
these things themselves, but they give us a specific form of access to the world.
Don Ihde elaborated this idea of ‘readiness-to-hand’ into an analysis 
of various types of human-technology relations. Ihde has researched the 
many ways in which the relationship between humans and the world is 
actually mediated by technologies (Ihde 1990). People can embody technolo-
gies, as when wearing a pair of glasses, which one does not look at but look 
through. Other technologies require that we have to read, in the way that a 
thermometer gives information on temperature, or an ultrasound scanner 
gives a representation of an unborn child. People can also interact with 
technology, as when operating a DVD player or setting a central heating 
thermostat. Finally, within the framework sketched by Ihde, technologies 
can also play a role in the background of our experience. The fan noise 
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made by a computer and the illumination provided by room lights are not 
experienced directly, but form a context within which people experience 
reality. All these human-technology-world relations can be seen as specif ic 
instances of ‘technological mediation.’ In our technological culture, these are 
the shapes that our ‘mediated immediacy’ or ‘indirect directness’ can take.
Ihde’s framework has been of considerable value to philosophy of technol-
ogy. Yet, current technological developments seem to urge us to expand 
this framework. The implicit focus of Ihde’s schema is technology that gets 
used: glasses, telescopes, hammers, and hearing aids. However, the newest 
technologies increasingly evoke human-technology relationships that can 
no longer be characterized in such ‘use’ configuration.
The development of intelligent environments, for instance, with the 
Ambient Intelligence programme initiated by Philips as a prime example, 
leads to a configuration that might rather be called immersion. Here, people 
are immersed in an environment that reacts intelligently to their presence 
and activities. Such technologies go beyond what Ihde calls a ‘background 
relationship’; because they engage in an active interaction with humans, 
they are more than just a ‘context.’
At the other end of the spectrum there are technologies that do not merge 
with our environment, but with ourselves. Technologies like brain implants, 
psychotropic drugs, and intelligent prostheses, blur the boundaries between 
technologies and the human body. Relations with these devices go beyond 
that of incorporation; it might be said to represent a merge, as it becomes 
diff icult to draw a distinction between the human and the technological. 
When a deaf person is given a degree of hearing capability thanks to a coch-
lear implant connected directly to their auditory nerve, then this ‘hearing’ 
is a joint activity of the human and the technology; it is the configuration 
as a whole that ‘hears,’ and not a human being whose ‘hearing’ is restored 
thanks to technology (cf. Verbeek 2008).
Sometimes, these technologies are sees as steps towards ‘human enhance-
ment.’ Rather than restoring an original state, and ‘curing’ people with ‘de-
fects,’ these technologies interfere directly with what it means to be human. 
Deep brain stimulation is a good example here, as this technology consists of a 
device with several electrodes that are implanted deep into the brain in order 
to reduce, for instance, the motor effects of Parkinson’s disease, or the impact 
of psychiatric disorders such as severe depression or obsessive-compulsive 
disorder. These implants can have a serious impact on people’s personality.
A famous case was described in the Dutch medical journal Tijdschrift voor 
Geneeskunde. This article recounts how the condition of a patient suffering 
from Parkinson’s disease improved markedly after having been implanted 
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(Leentjens et al., 2004). Yet, while the symptoms of Parkinson’s disease 
reduced notably, his behavior also changed and developed to become 
increasingly more uninhibited. He got involved in extramarital relation-
ships, spent all his money carelessly, and was unaware of his behavioral 
change until the DBS was discontinued for medical reasons. As soon as 
his Parkinson’s symptoms returned – he became entirely bed-ridden and 
dependent. There appeared to be no middle way; he would have to choose 
between a life with Parkinson’s disease, bed-ridden – or a life without the 
symptoms, but so uninhibited that he would predictably get himself into 
trouble. In the end, he chose to be admitted to a psychiatric hospital, where 
he could continue DBS and suffer fewer symptoms of his disease, but at the 
same time be protected against his undesired behavioral changes.
This case raises all sorts of questions about how technology affects what 
it means to be human. What does this imply for our understanding of our 
‘mediated directness’? And how can Plessner’s anthropology help in analyz-
ing human-technology relations like this? Can human beings who surround 
or even change themselves with the latest technology still be understood 
by using Plessner’s terms?
Expanding Plessner
Jos de Mul has argued (De Mul 2003, 2010) that contemporary information 
technology really puts Plessner’s notion of eccentricity to the test. This technol-
ogy adds a new dimension to the ‘positionality,’ which for Plessner counts as the 
defining aspect for distinguishing between stones, plants, animals, and human 
beings. Information technology enables different forms of being-there, such 
as telepresence and presence in a virtual reality. In the case of telepresence, 
humans are present in the world through a robot: they experience and act at a 
distance, because they are in contact with a part of reality, through cameras, 
microphones and the ‘body’ of a robot, where their own body is not present at 
that moment in time. And in the case of virtual realities, people experience 
and act in an artificial reality through an avatar who represents them in that 
reality: they see their own avatar on screen, walking through a virtual world.
Both forms of being-there imply a new positionality, according to De 
Mul. They change human eccentricity, not by moving the centre of a human 
being to a different place – to the robot or the avatar – but by doubling the 
centre. The centre of our experience is no longer exclusively in our own 
body, but neither is it moved to a robot or an avatar. The centre of our 
experience is in both our own body and outside of it. We experience the 
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world by experiencing what the robot experiences; we act in a virtual world 
by letting an avatar act on behalf of ourselves.
De Mul calls this form of eccentricity poly-(ec)centricity: in contemporary 
information technology, a multiplication of centricity and eccentricity occurs 
(De Mul, 2010, 201-205). Instead of extending our body with technology and 
being in the world ‘through technology,’ we are present in a twofold manner: 
we interact with technology and technology acts on our behalf; we experience 
the technology and we experience how technology experiences the world.
However, this extension of Plessner’s notion of human eccentricity is 
not suff icient to do justice to all new technologies. De Mul’s expansion 
allows us to bring prosthetics and virtual environments into Plessner’s 
framework in order to analyse the relationships between man and the world. 
But technologies such as psychotropic drugs, deep brain stimulation and 
genetic intervention play a completely different role in human eccentricity.
These technologies all interfere – at least potentially – in human con-
sciousness. Rather than influencing the centre from which humans act and 
experience, they influence the nature of human eccentricity: the way in 
which people relate to themselves. By influencing our moods, by altering our 
ability to concentrate or even by interfering with our character traits, these 
technologies change eccentricity itself. They do not result in multiple centres 
of experience, but in a new position outside of ourselves. A position from which 
humans not only relate to their centres, like in the case of the eccentric posi-
tion, but also to eccentricity itself, in which they now can actively interfere.
Here, we seem to encounter a new positionality. Just like human eccentric-
ity moved beyond the centricity of the animal, these new technologies seems 
to take us beyond the eccentricity of the ‘old’ human. This new positionality 
could be called meta-eccentricity. Rather than involving a multiplication of 
bodies from which people are present in the world, as in De Mul’s concept 
of poly-eccentricity, this form of eccentricity involves a change of the body 
itself, which forms the basis of human eccentricity. The body is no longer a 
given that may or may not be extended with other entities: it has become 
possible to interfere in the bodily basis of eccentricity. The eccentric idea 
that we not just are a body, but also have a body, needs to be extended with 
the meta-eccentric idea that we can also interfere in our body.
As a result, rather than just having a relationship to our centric position, 
we also have a relationship to our eccentricity, which makes this position 
visible. We are eccentric with regard to our eccentricity – hence ‘meta-
eccentricity.’ Our very eccentricity has entered the realm of human action 
and design, as the case of the Parkinson patient with deep brain stimulation 
showed. This man did not simply have freedom in the sense we ordinarily 
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conceive it, but he had to decide about the freedom of his own freedom. Not 
only did he look over his own shoulder, as eccentric positionality could be 
explained; he also had to decide how to look over his own shoulder.
What does this all mean for our notion of man? To what extent can we call 
a meta-eccentric being still a human being? Plessner classif ies the organic 
into a few ‘steps’: from stone via plant and animal to man. Do we have to 
place the cyborg, constructed from human and technological components 
and characterised by poly – and meta-eccentricity, on a new step? Or do these 
forms of eccentricity belong to the natural artificiality of man as well? Does a 
post-human relationship to the world become visible with these new ways of 
being-in-the-world, or are these simply extensions of the repertoire of man?
Interestingly, the meta-eccentric form of positionality that becomes 
visible when analyzing recent technological developments can in fact be 
seen as a fully-fledged aspect of human existence. The technological ways 
of interfering in ourselves show what we implicitly have always already 
been, only with greater intensity: we are artif icial creatures that f ind their 
origin in technology. It is our ‘natural artif iciality,’ in Plessner’s terms, that 
makes our eccentric positionality artif icial as well. In retrospect, we have 
in fact always organized how we are eccentric, by developing frameworks of 
interpretation about ourselves, and organizing the decisions we make about 
ourselves and our own lives in cultural practices and material arrangements.
We do not stop being human when we interfere with our bodies; on the 
contrary, this is precisely what characterizes us as human. In Donna Haraway’s 
terms: “we have always been cyborgs.” Bernard Stiegler even uses a vocabulary 
that resembles Plessner’s thoughts when he speaks about our ‘originary pros-
theticity’ or even ‘originary technicity.’ Just like how a human being does not 
stop being an animal by adding an eccentric position to the centric, we do not 
become less human by adding a meta-eccentric position to our eccentricity.
In short, in human existence, the seemingly obvious dichotomy of physis 
versus techne is distorted right from the onset. Technology is part of human 
nature – it is an element of our ‘natural artif iciality.’ Recent technological 
developments do not go beyond Plessner’s framework, but rather provide 
a new, more radical interpretation of his theme. Furthermore, they allow 
us to ref ine Plessner’s analysis of human positionality, by showing that 
eccentricity always involves meta-eccentricity as well.
In this age of human enhancement, we no longer just design our existence 
existentially, but also biologically – according to Stiegler we have in fact 
always already done that without explicitly realizing it, but it becomes more 
explicit in these times of fast paced technological development. The fact 
that the latest ‘anthropo-technologies’ appear to be radical variations of 
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the old theme of the natural artif iciality of man does not make it any less 
relevant in terms of its implications. Through the intertwining of fysis and 
technè, new technologies shape the human condition in new ways over and 
over again. The meta-eccentricity that has always implicitly accompanied 
human eccentricity is now moving explicitly to the foreground, given that 
emerging technologies allow us to interfere in new ways in the character 
of our own freedom and the shapes our eccentricity can take.
Conclusion
Helmuth Plessner’s philosophical anthropology offers highly relevant 
insights into philosophy of technology, especially when it is expanded in 
confrontation with the contemporary approach of technological mediation. 
Mediation theory can be grounded in Plessner’s analysis of the ‘indirect 
directness’ of the human way of being in the world. Furthermore, contem-
porary technological developments that involve a physical ‘blending’ of 
humans and technologies give the impetus to expand Plessner’s theory of 
eccentricity. Technologies that explicitly interfere in our minds and moods 
– drugs, brain implants – give us the possibility to modify our eccentricity. 
In a way, we have become eccentric with respect to our eccentricity.
Upon closer inspection however, this meta-eccentricity appears to be a 
phenomenon that has always accompanied human eccentricity. We have 
always – albeit usually only implicitly – organized our ways of being ec-
centric. It is eccentricity itself that makes it possible to develop a relation, 
not only to our centricity but to our eccentricity itself as well. This brings us 
back to that other, dialectical tradition in the anthropology of technology: 
in the mirror of technology, we keep discovering and overcoming ourselves.
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26 Philosophical Anthropology 2.0
Reading Plessner in the Age of Converging Technologies
Jos de Mul
Introduction
The aim of this chapter is to demonstrate the relevance of Helmuth Plessner’s 
philosophical anthropology in the twenty-f irst century. In the f irst part of 
this chapter, I will argue that the heydays of philosophical anthropology 
in the f irst half of the twentieth is closely connected with the (Darwinian) 
naturalization of the worldview. Whereas the debate on naturalization 
resulted in an unfruitful opposition between ‘greedy reductionism’ and a 
no less ‘greedy transcendentism,’ Plessner’s philosophical anthropology, 
presented in his magnum opus Die Stufen des Organischen und der Mensch 
(1928), offered a promising ‘third way.’
In the second part of this chapter, I will discuss some of the objections 
that have been raised in the course of the twentieth century against the 
alleged essentialism and anthropocentrism of the project of philosophical 
anthropology, and which, at least according to the critics, suggest that 
philosophical anthropology has to face the same fate as its subject ‘man,’ 
which – to use the often quoted metaphor of Foucault – is about to be “erased 
like a face drawn in the sand at the edge of the sea” (Foucault 1970, 387). I 
will argue that, although Plessner is far from being a hardboiled essentialist 
or a defender of anthropocentrism, the critiques invite a revision of at least 
some elements of Plessner’s philosophical anthropology in order to make 
room for a necessary reflection upon the challenges we face at the beginning 
of the twenty-f irst century.
In the third and last part of my chapter, I will argue that such a revi-
sion is especially needed in light of neo-Darwinism and the converging 
technologies that are intertwined with it. These technologies promise – or 
threaten, depending on one’s perspective – to give Foucault’s ‘End of Man’ 
a material turn. While classical Darwinism challenged the human place in 
cosmos mainly in theoretical terms, converging technologies like genetic 
modif ication, neuro-enhancement and electronic implants, have the po-
tential to ‘overcome’ Homo sapiens sapiens as we know it in a more radical, 
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practical sense.1 This creates within us a certain urge towards fundamental 
post-essentialist and post-anthropocentric human self-reflection. The claim 
I will underpin is that Plessner’s anthropology still offers a fruitful starting 
point for the development of this ‘philosophical anthropology 2.0.’ I will 
demonstrate this by a critical re-interpretation of Plessner’s three ‘anthro-
pological laws’ in light of the aforementioned converging technologies.
Beyond ‘greedy reductionism’ vs. ‘greedy transcendentism’
One way to interpret the rapid development and immense popularity of 
philosophical anthropology in the f irst half of the twentieth century is to 
conceive of it as a reaction to the revolutionary developments in the natural 
and social sciences that took place since the second half of the nineteenth 
century. Especially Darwin’s theory of evolution necessitated a fundamental 
reconsideration of – to quote the title of Scheler’s famous essay – ‘the human 
place in the cosmos’ (Scheler 1928). Darwin’s ‘dangerous idea’ (Dennett 1995), 
the presupposition that a simple algorithm of reproduction, variation and 
selection is responsible for the entire evolution of life on earth, did not only 
question the alleged gulf between human beings and (other) animals, but 
even questioned the gulf between animate and inanimate nature. After all, 
Darwin’s theory of evolution seduced many followers to a ‘greedy reduction’ 
of life to a series of biochemical processes.
The main reactions of those who opposed this mechanistic interpretation 
of Darwin’s theory of evolution were twofold. Negatively, the opponents 
tried to underpin Kant’s claim – in Kritik der Urteilskraft – that there will 
never be a biological Newton who could explain teleological phenomena 
such as the emergence of even a single blade of grass (Kant 1968, B337). 
Positively, the opponents tried to show that there are phenomena or princi-
ples that necessarily escape a naturalistic and mechanistic approach. They 
either postulated the existence of a vital, teleological principle, a life-force 
distinct from biochemical reactions, as did, for example, the neovitalist 
Hans Driesch by implementing an Aristotelean notion of entelegy, or of 
a spiritual, metaphysical dimension, as did Max Scheler by opposing a 
divine Spirit (Geist) to the ‘drive driven’ life force (Drang). As different as the 
approaches of these two supervisors of Plessner were, they both deepened 
1 Varying Marx’s eleventh thesis on Feuerbach, the motto of the converging technologies seems 
to be: “The biologists have only interpreted the world differently; the point is to change it.”
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the emerging gap between the natural sciences (Naturwissenschaften) and 
the humanities (Geisteswissenschaften).
Plessner, coming both from biology and philosophy, took another, 
more fruitful approach, which – critically – endorses the naturalization 
of the worldview. In “Ein Newton des Grashalms” – written in 1964, one 
decade after the f irst adequate description of the double helix structure 
of DNA molecules, which marked the beginning of the turbulent history 
of molecular biology – Plessner states that by now even the phenomenon 
of (inner) teleology has become subject to a biochemical analysis. Several 
decades before the emergence of synthetic biology, Plessner already admit-
ted – approvingly quoting Wendell M. Stanley – that “eventually chemists 
should be able to synthesize a small polynucleotide specif ically arranged, 
hence one now dares to think of synthesizing in the laboratory a structure 
possessing genetic continuity and of all the tremendous implications of 
such an accomplishment” (Plessner 1980ff.; GS VIII, 262).2
However, this did not convince Plessner to accept a mechanistic inter-
pretation. Biochemical analysis may eventually clarify how the vital and 
psychic functions of living organisms are being materialized, but not what 
life in its subsequent stages and various expressions is. In his own words: 
“It is here that we f ind the limits of the Newton of the grass blade, not in 
the phenomenon of teleology, as Kant thought” (GS VIII, 262).
However, as much as Plessner rejects the ‘greedy reductionism’ of the 
mechanistic worldview, which attempts to explain “too much with too 
little” (Dennett 1995, 82) he also rejects the ‘greedy transcendentism’ of 
the vitalistic and metaphysical alternatives of Scheler and Driesch, which 
explain ‘too little with too much’ and for this reason inevitably are driven 
back to “cryptological formulas’ (GS VIII, 261), various intuitions of a 
transcendent God (GS IV, 18), stop-gap solutions (Verlegenheitslösungen) 
and contradictions (GS IV, 32). To clarify his own position, Plessner uses 
the term ‘hylozoist,’ which Driesch used to debunk Plessner’s approach 
in Die Stufen, as an honorary nickname. After all, the idea that life is 
inseparable from matter (GS IV, 177), and that human life is a psycho-
physical unity (GS IV, 75), is not only defended by ancient hylozoists 
like Thales, Anaximenes, and Heraclitus, but it is indeed also the very 
presupposition upon which Plessner’s bio-philosophy and philosophical 
anthropology rest.
2 The English translation of this and the following quotes from German texts in this chapter 
are made by the author, with the exception of the quotes from Die Stufen, which are taken 
(sometimes with small modif ications) from the not-yet-published translation of Scott Davis. 
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Philosophy, as Plessner understands it, should take the scientif ic under-
standing of life forms as its starting point in order to elucidate the “immate-
rial dimensionalization of lived matter” (GS VIII, 261). Or, as he expresses 
it in Die Stufen, it is an “a prioristic theory of the essential characteristics 
(Wesensmerkmale) of the organic” (GS IV, 158). In the foreword to the second 
edition (1975), Plessner further elaborates: “This theory is not a prioristic 
because of its starting point, as if it would develop out of pure concepts, 
with the help of axioms, a deductive system, but because of its regressive 
method which aims at elucidating the conditions of possibility of a given 
fact” (GS IV, 29-30).
Plessner further elucidates these conditions of possibility as “material [or 
concrete] a prioristic” characteristics of life (GS IV, 172; cf. GS VIII, 392ff.). 
They are
preconscious a priori forms, categories of existence, vital categories, which 
belong to deeper strata of existence of the carrier of life, the organisms 
(not understood as existing objects, but rather as living subjects), upon 
which the mutual address and mutual belongingness of the organism 
and its surrounding world [Umwelt] are based (GS IV, 110).
Because only “life understands life,” as Plessner quotes Dilthey’s life-
philosophical credo in Die Stufen (GS VIII, 59), one needs a hermeneutical 
phenomenology to explicate and interpret these vital categories, inher-
ent in all organic expressions of life. The vital categories that result from 
this hermeneutics of organic life – ‘double aspectivity,’ ‘boundary’ and 
‘positionality’ – enable Plessner to develop a profound and illuminating 
analysis of the subsequent stages of life, which not only holds the promise 
of bridging the gulf between life sciences and philosophy, but also, with 
the additional category of eccentric positionality, provides the building 
bricks for a (material) philosophical anthropology (cf. Fischer 2000, 279-283), 
which, moreover, provides the social sciences and humanities within a 
profound psycho-physiological foundation.3
3 “The aim of Plessner’s anthropology was to f ind a mind/body neutral language that could, 
in terms simultaneously empirically and phenomenologically meaningful, locate human be-
ings amongst the continuum of living organisms and yet also pick out the differentia of their 
organismic being” (Moss 2007, 147).
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Philosophical Anthropology 1.0 under attack
In retrospect, as promising as philosophical anthropology appeared to be in 
its formative years, its heyday was short-lived (cf. Fischer 2008). After World 
War II – prepared by the vitriolic attacks Heidegger directed at philosophical 
anthropology in the 1930s and 40s – the discipline became the subject of 
a series of fundamental critiques. Though for different normative reasons, 
these critiques were especially directed against the alleged essentialism 
and anthropocentrism of philosophical anthropology.
This critique was, at least in part, politically motivated. In the case of 
the Frankfurt School, for example, it was directed at the essentialist notion 
of a f ixed human nature, which, according to the critics, characterizes 
philosophical anthropology. Referring to Scheler, Max Horkheimer states in 
his early “Remarks on Philosophical Anthropology,” that “there is no formula 
that defines the relationships among individuals, society and nature for all 
time” (Horkheimer 1993). The critique of the Frankfurters was especially 
directed against the conservative politics that would emerge from this 
essentialist notion of human nature, and which contradicts the neo-Marxist 
hope to create a ‘New Man’ along the way of a more or less revolutionary 
transformation of society. As Lukács claims in Geschichte und Klassenbe-
wußtsein, “[t]he transformation of philosophy into an anthropology has 
lead to a fossilization of man transforming him into a f ixed objectivity 
[Gegenständlichkeit], and as a consequence a setting aside of dialectics and 
history” (quoted in Marquard 1982, 134).
One could question whether this neo-Marxist critique also applies to Pless-
ner. After all, eccentric positionality, the key notion of Plessner’s philosophical 
anthropology, does not so much set aside the notion of history, but rather 
designates the fundamental openness of the human life form that is the 
very condition of the possibility of human history. As we read in Die Stufen: 
“As eccentrically organized being, man must still make himself into what he 
already is” (GS IV, 383). This is not an accidental characteristic, but constitutive 
for the human life form. After all, as Plessner expressed it in the first of his 
three anthropological laws: man is artificial by nature (GS IV, 382ff.): “Because 
man is compelled by his type of existence to lead the life that he lives, i.e. 
to make what he is – just because he only is when he realizes himself – he 
needs a complement of an unnatural, non-grown kind. That is why they are 
artificial by nature, on the grounds of their form of existence” (GS IV, 384-5).4
4 “Man tries to escape the unbearable eccentricity of his being, he wants to compensate for 
the lack that constitutes his life form. Eccentricity and the need for complements are one and 
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It is because of man’s natural artif iciality and his “ontic necessity” (GS 
IV, 396) to express himself, that man has a history:
Thanks to his expressivity, man is a being that, even when he continually 
intends to conserve himself, presses on towards ever different realization 
[nach immer anderer Verwirklichung], and so leaves a history behind 
himself. In this expressivity alone lies the inner ground for the historical 
character of his existence (GS IV, 416).5
Be that as it may, in a certain respect the critique that Plessner’s philosophi-
cal anthropology presupposes an unchanging human nature, hits target. 
Although the notion of ‘eccentric positionality’ constitutes the inner ground 
of historicity, Plessner seems to understand the material a priori of eccentric 
positionality as a kind of essence of humanity, which itself is not subject to 
historical development. In this sense, we paradoxically might call Plessner 
an anti-essentialist essentialist. After all, in his f inal analysis, Plessner 
explicitly claims that eccentric positionality is the highest possible stage 
of animal nature:
One comprehends why animal nature must remain preserved at this 
highest positional stage. The closed form of organization is only carried 
out to its most extreme degree. The living thing in its positional mo-
ments just does not has a point from which a rise [Steigerung] could be 
attained, other than through realization of the possibility of organizing 
the reflexive general system of the animal body according to the principle 
of reflexivity, and through positing that which constitutes the animal 
the same. We should not understand ‘need’ in this context psychologically or as something 
subjective. It is something that is logically prior to every need, drive, tendency or will. In this 
fundamental need or nakedness we f ind the motive for everything that is specif ically human, 
the focus on the irrealis and the use of artif icial means, the ultimate foundation of the technical 
artefact and that which it serves: culture” (GS IV, 385).
5 As Lenny Moss argues in ‘Contra Habermas and towards a Critical Theory of Human Nature 
and the Question of Genetic Enhancement,’ referring to the philosophical tradition to which 
Herder and Plessner belong: “The progressive removal of an organism from a f ixed niche for 
which it is specialized and to which it is f inally attuned results in an interiority that is increas-
ingly capable of undertaking its own self-formation. Detachment results in vulnerability, but also 
in a potential space of subjective openness to both the nature within and the nature without. The 
space of subjective openness can and must become formed, and it does so in a social context” 
(Moss 2007, 142). Concerning the persistant tension between anthropology and philosophy of 
history in the German philosophy of the last centuries, see Odo Marquard’s ‘Zur Geschichte 
des philosophische Begriffs “Anthropologie” seit dem Ende des achtzehnten Jahrhunderts’ 
(Marquard 1982, 122-144)
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stage of life, once again in relation to the living creature. A further rise 
beyond this is impossible, since the living thing now really comes behind 
itself (GS IV, 363).
In this crucial passage, Plessner seems to revert to a kind of Kantian tran-
scendentalism in which the a priori is formal and timeless (not unlike is 
the case with Heidegger’s Daseinanaytik in Sein und Zeit – bien étonnés 
de se trouver ensemble!).6 Although it might be true that Plessner – as he 
emphasizes in the foreword to the second edition – offers no deductive 
system out of pure concept, the developmental logic of the subsequent 
stages of positionality gives his argumentation a ‘conceptual closure’ that 
resembles the conceptual necessity of Hegelian dialectical synthesis. Any-
way, this developmental logic seems to convince Plessner to repudiate, at 
least in passages like the one just quoted, the open character of the historical 
development of the material a priori, as analyzed by Dilthey in his Kritik 
der Historischen Vernunft (see De Mul 2004, 140ff.). Our eccentricity should 
not be understood in an essentialistic, a prioristic sense, it is the result of 
a long evolutionary, historical, cultural and technological development 
(Nauta 1991; De Mul 2003).
In light of the historical character of the material a priori and the ongoing 
techno-cultural developments, it seems to be rather inconsistent to exclude 
the possibility of further stages of positionality on ‘formal-transcendental’ 
grounds, whereas only empirical experience of future life forms – be it 
organic or artif icial – could determine the outcome of this possibility. 
Considering the past four billion years of the evolution of life on earth it 
seems to be somewhat naïve, certainly for a biologist, to claim that the ec-
centric type of positionality that characterizes Homo sapiens is the highest 
positional stage that can ever be attained.
It all comes down to one question: could we imagine a type of positional-
ity beyond the eccentric type? As the development of life does not follow a 
necessary logic, but is rather the product of a series of contingencies (Gould 
1989), predictions about the future are dicey. However, the prospect of 
Homo sapiens 2.0 and trans – and posthuman life forms is not sheer science 
f iction. A number of technological developments already seem to have 
started to modify the positionality of the human life form. Specif ic types of 
information and communication technologies, such as telepresence, create 
a phenomenal experience which could be called poly(ec)centric. When a 
6 Perhaps this a priorism also displays the impact that Weber’s typology had on Plessner 
(Schüßler 2000, 12f.). 
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person is connected to a robotic body and experiences the world through 
the artif icial senses and limbs of the robot, the result of this doubling of 
the body is an experience of simultaneously having multiple centres of 
experience, and occupying multiple eccentric positions (see for a detailed 
exposition: De Mul 2003; cf. Verbeek’s contribution to this volume).
This phenomenon of poly(ec)centricity can be situated within the ‘contin-
gent logic’ of Plessner’s stage-model. In order to be able to do so, we should 
f irst realize that the stages Plessner distinguishes show a certain dialectical 
order. Whereas the positionality of plants is open, the positionality of the 
animal is closed. In the sixth chapter of Die Stufen Plessner characterizes 
the closed form of positionality of animals as centric, whereas in the seventh 
chapter the human sphere is opposed to this sphere as (also) being eccentric. 
If we wish to characterize eccentric positionality in Die Stufen, we could call 
it virtual. Why virtual? Well, it’s because the eccentric position a human 
being can occupy is not a physical place or body, but rather a ref lexive 
relationship, the relation the living body has to itself. However, in the case 
of telepresence, when we perceive the world through the artif icial senses 
of the robot and interact with the world with the help of its artif icial limbs, 
our eccentric position gets a material (boundary) realization. Virtual ec-
centricity becomes real eccentricity: our centricity doubles. Whereas the 
center of the somatosensory apparatus remains located in our organic body, 
vision and hearing are phenomenally experienced from the center of the 
robotic body. However, our eccentricity also gets distributed: though we 
are centred in two bodies at once, at the same time we are outside both of 
our bodies. The result may be dissociation, at least from an anthropocentric 
perspective.7
This last remark evokes the second fundamental objection that has 
been raised against philosophical anthropology, which is directed at its 
inherent anthropocentrism. Although anthropocentrism is no invention 
of philosophical anthropology – it characterizes the modern, Western 
worldview and before that Christianity, if not already in its Jewish and 
Greek roots – philosophical anthropology has been accused of being one of 
its last and most radical expressions.8 Just as in the case of the critique of its 
7 New technologies – be they new means of transport, protheses or deep brain stimulation – 
often have a disruptive effect on the human body scheme and evoke phenomena of de-centring, 
which calls for collective strategies of domestication and incorporation of those technologies 
(cf. Kockelkoren 2003).
8 As Heidegger’s expresses it vehementically: “Turned into anthropology, philosophy gets 
ruined by metaphysics” (Heidegger 1967, I, 79).
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alleged essentialism, the ontological critique often has a normative tenor.9 
For example, deep ecologists such as Arne Naess regard anthropocentrism 
as a crucial element in the reduction of all inanimate and animate nature to 
raw materials for the inexhaustible human needs and desires. Theoretically, 
by devaluing animals to sheer machines, as did Descartes, or practically, 
as we can witness it in the bio-industries. According to deep ecologists, 
philosophical anthropology sets man apart from nature, whereas we should 
instead consider humankind as an integral part of the ecosystem.
“Our history is not a single-species narrative, but intimately connected 
with the histories of various other species, ranging from domesticated 
animals and cultivated plants to ecosystem dynamics and climate change. 
Seeing humans as ‘authors’ or ‘directors’ of processes of domestication, 
philosophical anthropology failed to appreciate how we are targets as well” 
(De Mul, Verbeek, and Zwart 2009).
It is true that the branches of philosophical anthropology which are mo-
tivated by a ‘greedy transcendentism’ – we could think of Max Scheler here 
again – indeed have a strong tendency to oppose man, gifted by Geist, to na-
ture. However, in the case of Plessner, there is a rather strong emphasis on the 
continuation of life forms, as they are linked as stages or levels of positionality. 
At the same time Plessner’s philosophical anthropology makes clear why it 
is so diff icult, if not impossible, for humans to act in a non-anthropocentric 
way. Both aspects can be explained from the fact that human beings are 
both centric and eccentric. As centric beings, anthropocentrism – and the 
individual form of it: egocentricity – is unavoidable. However, thanks to our 
eccentricity we not only have the possibility to take the perspective of our 
fellow men and women, but that of other centric species as well. As such, we 
are even able – though not always and seldomly in its full range – to criticize 
egocentricity and anthropocentrism and to embrace a non-anthropocentric, 
ecological point of view instead of a single species narrative.
Today, philosophers of technology argue that we should not only apply 
this non-anthropocentric, ecological approach to animate nature, but to 
inanimate nature as well. Bruno Latour convincingly argued that technical 
artefacts are less instrumental than it is often presupposed and should be 
regarded as “actants” themselves (Latour 2002). Technology co-evolves with 
human beings. While technological innovations can be seen as products 
of human tool-making, we ourselves are the products of technology as 
well. Eccentricity is as much the outcome of, as it is the precondition for 
9 As every ontology implies a certain deontology, every ontology-critique is motivated by a 
different (de)ontology.
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techno-cultural development. It cannot be seen as simply given, but it is 
interwoven with technologies, ranging from the introduction of mirrors 
and writing, up to intrusive information and communication technologies.
When we think Plessner’s second anthropological law, the law of medi-
ated immediacy, we realize, however, that the idea of a co-evolution of 
man’s positionality and techno-cultural artefacts isn’t foreign at all to 
his philosophical anthropology, even though Plessner – because of his 
aforementioned closed developmental logic, isn’t able to develop its full 
implications:
Equally essential for the technical artifact is its inner weight, its objectivity 
that discloses the aspect of technology that only can be found or discovered, 
but never made. Everything that enters the sphere of culture shows its 
dependence on human creation. But at the same time (and to the same 
extent) it is independent of man (GS IV, 397).
When we take note of the aforementioned critiques of the alleged essential-
ism and anthropocentrism of philosophical anthropology, the tentative 
conclusion is that Plessner’s philosophical anthropology is still a good 
starting point for the development of a philosophical anthropology, which 
is prepared for an adequate reflection on the challenges humankind faces 
at the beginning of the twenty-f irst century. However, in order to develop 
such a ‘philosophical anthropology 2.0,’ we should purify Plessner’s account 
from its essentialist tendencies, opening the space to reflect on emerging 
trans – and posthuman types of positionality. Moreover, it should comple-
ment its unavoidable anthropocentrism by eco-centric, socio-centric and 
techno-centric views, calling for even more intense interactions between 
the various f ields involved, and bridge the alleged gap between humanities, 
social and natural sciences (De Mul, Verbeek, and Zwart 2009).
Philosophical Anthropology 2.0
The development of an upgraded version of philosophical anthropology is 
needed, because at the beginning of the twenty-first century the proclaimed 
‘End of Man’ seems to get yet another, more material turn as a result of 
the development of neo-Darwinism and the converging technologies 
(biotechnology, information technology, nanotechnology, neurosciences, 
cognitive science, robotics, and artif icial intelligence) that are intertwined 
with it. Whereas classical Darwinism challenged the human place in the 
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cosmos mainly in a theoretical sense, technologies like genetic modif ica-
tion, neuro-enhancement and electronic implants have the potential to 
‘overcome’ Homo sapiens as we know it in a practical sense.
Genetic modif ication, neuro-enhancement, electronic implants and 
distributed explants offer unprecedented possibilities to modify the human 
life form, whereas synthetic biology, robotics, artif icial intelligence and 
artif icial life might even create new artif icial life forms. Given the ontic 
necessity of the human expressivity and artif iciality, the question is not 
whether we will use the technological possibilities to (continue to) modify 
ourselves, but rather for what purposes, in which direction, and in what 
manner. At f irst, these questions seem to belong to the normative branches 
of disciplines such as ethics, and social and political philosophy (concerning 
the goals) and technical disciplines (concerning the means). Besides the 
question if goals and means simply can be distributed that way, which I 
personally do not believe to be the case (see De Mul 2010b) – herein lies a 
fundamental task for philosophical anthropology 2.0. After all, in order to be 
able to answer the ethical questions for what purposes and in what manner 
we should apply these technologies, we should not only answer the question 
what exactly the living thing is that we want to modify or transform10, we 
should also try to f igure out what kinds of life forms are possible given the 
constraints of the ‘raw material’ we are working with.
In a number of respects, the theoretical challenge ‘philosophical an-
thropology 2.0’ faces at the beginning of the twenty-f irst century strongly 
resembles the challenge of ‘philosophical anthropology 1.0’ at the begin-
ning of the twentieth century. Plessner’s main opponent in Die Stufen is 
Descartes; that’s why the second chapter of the book is entirely devoted to a 
fundamental and subtle refutation of Cartesian dualism and a preparation 
of Plessner’s alternative thesis, which departs from the notion of double 
aspectivity of ‘the living thing.’ Although Plessner is far from being the only 
twentieth century critic of Cartesian dualism, in many ways this dualism is 
still prominent in the theories that surround the converging technologies, 
even when these theories often are presented as anti-Cartesian.
This, at least, is the critique that Max Bennett and Peter Hacker direct 
against the dominant movement of contemporary neurosciences. In their 
much discussed book Philosophical foundations of neuroscience (Bennett 
10 “The constitution of hermeneutic as anthropology needs a foundation in a science of life, 
a philosophy of life in the sober-minded, concrete sense of the words. First, it is necessary to 
gain clarity about what may be referred to as alive, before further steps be taken to a theory of 
the experience of life in its highest human strata” (GS IV, 76).
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and Hacker 2003) they argue that the whole history of neuroscience is char-
acterized by a profound dualism, although during its course it transformed 
from a substance-dualism into a structural dualism. In their discussion with 
Daniel Dennett and John Searle – published under the title Neuroscience & 
Philosophy. Brain, Mind, & Language (2007) – they summarize their critique 
as follows:
The greatest f igures of the f irst two generations of twentieth-century 
neuroscientists, e.g. Sherrington, Eccles, and Penf ield, were avowed 
Cartesian dualists. The third generation retained the basic Cartesian 
structure but transferred it into brain-body dualism: substance-dualism 
was abandoned, structural dualism retained. For neuroscientists to-
day ascribe much the same array of mental predicates to the brain as 
Descartes ascribed to the mind and conceive of the relationship between 
thought and action, and experience and its objects, in much the same 
way as Descartes – essentially merely replacing the mind by the brain 
(Bennett et al. 2007, 131).
According to Bennett and Hacker, expressions like ‘The brain sees…,’ ‘The 
brain interprets…,’ ‘The brain decides…,’ etc., which we f ind in almost 
all mainstream neuroscientif ic literature, are victim to what they call a 
mereological fallacy, which “involves ascribing to parts attributes that can 
intelligibly be ascribed only to the wholes of which they are parts” (ibid., 
131). After all, it is not the brain that sees, interprets or decides, but the 
whole person.
The critique of Bennet and Hacker is clearly inspired by the later 
Wittgenstein and Ryle: in their view a mereological fallacy – or ‘pars pro 
totology’ – is an evident example of a category mistake. However, as sound 
as their critique, which is entirely in alignment with Plessner’s anti-dualist 
hermeneutics of organic life may be, as Wittgensteinian ‘therapists’ they 
mainly criticize and do not offer an alternative to mereological neurosci-
ence. As Bennet and Hacker argue, the progress of neuroscientif ic research, 
as fascinating many of its f indings may be, is suffering severely due to the 
fact that these f indings are often misinterpreted from a dualistic perspec-
tive. Far from being able to actually explain the phenomena, these theories 
mask the absence of any substantial explanation by redescribing them 
in misleading terms (ibid., 161). For this reason there is a strong need for 
a more adequate interpretation of neuroscientif ic research, which could 
“facilitate it – by excluding nonsensical questions, preventing misconceived 
experiments, and reducing misunderstood experimental results” (ibid., 162). 
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Such a hermeneutics of organic life might also be helpful to develop a more 
adequate understanding of the research and experiments in the domains of 
robotics, artif icial intelligence and artif icial life, which are also still strongly 
misunderstood from a structural dualism. We could think here of thought 
experiments about downloading the mind in a machine, as described by, 
for example, Hans Moravec and other so-called transhumanists (Moravec 
1988, 1999; for a critical discussion see De Mul 2010a, 243ff.).
Moreover, the theoretical debates that currently surround the converging 
technologies also show – in a new shape – the same unfruitful opposition 
which characterized the debate around 1900. In the case of molecular biology 
and the debates about genetic engineering, for example, we again witness 
the opposition of a ‘greedy reductionism,’ defended by popular biologists like 
Richard Dawkins (Dawkins 1976) vs. a ‘greedy transcendentism,’ nowadays 
mostly defended by creationists with a Christian background. The unfruit-
ful discussions – if we may call the mutual debunking that way – between 
the representatives of both groups push for a new, ‘third way.’ Herein lies 
an important task for a Plessner-inspired philosophical anthropology 2.0.
With regard to the determinism in molecular biology, the prospects 
of a hermeneutics of organic life, are clearly more promising than they 
were in the two decades immediately following the publication of Dawkins 
epochal book in 1976. The ‘one gene, one function’ approach that initially 
characterized DNA research, which – for theoretical and/or funding reasons 
– was still dominant at the beginning of the human genome project, lost 
its popularity with the growth of our knowledge about the complexity of 
the expression of genes. As we realize nowadays, genes cannot only play 
different encoding roles depending on the specif ic ‘genetic network’ in 
which they are operating, their expression is equally dependent on their 
interaction with all kinds of intra – and extracellular influences. Moreover, 
as system biologists like Denis Noble have shown, the reductionist approach 
and metaphors such as ‘self ish genes’ become even more misleading in the 
context of multilevel systems biology:
Higher levels of organization, such as tissues, organs and system, con-
strain and order the lower levels through what we may call downward 
causation. […] Viewed from the perspective of the organism, or even from 
that of its environment, DNA is a database from which the organism 
extracts the information required to make the proteins it needs in the 
right quantities in the right places. This form of downward causation is ef-
fected through epigenetics: chemical marking of the genome to determine 
which genes are used or silenced at a given time. Genes therefore don’t 
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have much chance to be self ish; they are more like the ‘prisoners’ of the 
organism. […] Like the pipes of a huge organ (there are organs with as 
many pipes as there are genes in the human genome!), they are ‘played’ 
in different ways by the different cells, tissues and organs of the body to 
produce the ‘music of life.’ And when we succeed in identifying ‘genetic 
programs’ in the body, they turn out to be the functionality itself (Noble 
2008; cf. Noble 2006).
While causation on the molecular level is susceptible to a mechanistic 
explanation, an additional layer of functionalist explanation is needed as 
soon as we enter the domain of multilevel systems such as tissues and 
organs, where mechanical processes become a function of this higher level 
of organization. On this level, we can no longer separate these physical 
processes from the functionality itself. Seen from a Plessnerian perspec-
tive, we could say that on this level we witness the emergence of double 
aspectivity that characterizes the ‘living thing.’ Moreover, the metaphor of 
the music of life, which Noble uses, opens the space of yet another, third 
layer, that of a hermeneutics of organic life, in which tissues, organs, organ-
isms, and groups of organisms interpret both their ‘genetic scores’ and their 
environment. We could image a ‘poetics of genetics’ that would study the 
different modes of interpretation we f ind in the different levels of organic 
life (cf. Borgstein 1998).
Moreover, in the age of converging technologies, such a hermeneutics 
of organic life, that also includes the ‘prehuman,’ should be complemented 
by a hermeneutics of artif icial life, that studies the art of interpretation as 
it is and will be found in ‘posthuman’ forms of life. Starting from a sheer 
syntactic interpretation of the mechanical computers as we know them 
today (comparable to the basic levels of interpretation on the molecular 
level), via the pragmatic interpretation as we f ind in the more complex 
robotics systems that are currently being developed (and which may be 
compared to the way multi-level systems in ‘living things’ interpret the 
DNA database and their environment), such a hermeneutics of artif icial 
life might lead us to the semantic types of interpretation, which we already 
f ind on the level of human life. And perhaps this development may even 
lead further to modes of interpretation that are far beyond the grasp of the 
embodied intelligence of human beings.
Although the understanding of such posthuman life forms may f inally 
remain out of reach for human intelligence, we should realize that the stages 
of organic and artif icial life are continuous entities: together they form a 
continuous chain of countless life forms. As the example of telepresence 
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has showed us, we are already involved in the creation of next-level life 
forms. This at least opens the prospect that we might be able to understand 
the emerging new forms of life up to a certain level. In the concluding 
part of this chapter, I would like to try, looking at the development of the 
converging technologies and using Plessner’s three anthropological laws, 
to formulate some general intuitions about post-anthropological life and 
the three aff iliated post-anthropological laws.
From ‘artificial by nature’ to ‘natural by artifice’
The law of natural artificiality does not provide any reasons for repudiating 
the converting technologies driven cyborgization of man as unnatural, 
as this process has characterized the co-evolution of the human species, 
culture and technology from the very beginning. Although Plessner only 
witnessed the very f irst steps of this process when he was already relatively 
old, he certainly did not turn down this development. In the 1975 foreword to 
the second edition of Levels of the Organic and Man, he writes: “Phenomena 
such as regulation, control and memory, which for long have been regarded 
as the Arcana of the living substance, have lost their uniqueness in the light 
of cybernetics. Perhaps too fast, but these electronic models entices us into 
analogies. And these are fruitful too” (GS IV, 15).
However, the converging technologies promise – or threaten, depending 
on one’s perspective – to reverse the relationship between the natural and 
the artif icial. When we think of synthetic biology, for example, we witness 
the development of a whole array of techniques that modify existing live 
forms with the help of genetic modif ication, metabolic pathway engineer-
ing, genome transplantation, the creation of entirely new life forms with 
the help of BioBricks, extended DNA (xDNA), and the creation and use of 
additional nucleotides, which expands the four-letter language of DNA to 
a six-letter language (ETC Group 2007). This so-called ‘alien genetics’ is 
only one way the cyborgization of life is taking place (De Mul, 2013). We 
could add numerous other strategies that are being developed, such as the 
neurotechnological and nanotechnological engineering of organic life, the 
addition of electronic implants and distributed explants, up to the creation 
of artif icial intelligence and artif icial life. Natural selection, which has 
been the motor of the evolution of life on earth for several billion years, 
and which in the short human culture already has been complemented 
with breeding, is increasingly becoming an unnatural selection of artif icial 
elements. As a consequence, trans – and posthuman life will increasingly 
be ‘natural by artifice.’
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From ‘mediated immediacy’ to ‘immediate mediality’
The second anthropological law formulated by Plessner, the law of mediated 
immediacy, seems to undergo a dialectical radicalization and reversal as 
well. In the age of intentional bionic artifacts, the realization of the bound-
ary (Grenzrealisierung) of the human body will be increasingly modif ied 
by implanted intentional bionic artefacts, prof iling technologies, remote 
control etc. In at least two important ways, the situation we have today 
differs from the past. First, in comparison with previous forms of technical 
mediation, these artefacts are increasingly made and invented instead of 
being found or discovered (cf. GS IV, 397). Second, due to their invisibility, 
we will also become less and less aware of the mediated character of their 
mediation, leading to an ‘invisible visibility’. Plessner def ines mediated 
immediacy as “that form of binding [between two terms] […] in which the 
mediating intervening term is necessary in order to accomplish or secure 
the immediacy of the connection” (ibid.). In the case of living beings, this 
intervening term is the human body (cf. the contribution of Maarten Coolen 
in this volume). ‘Immediate mediality,’ on the other hand, refers to the 
fact that in cases of poly(ec)centricity or meta-eccentricity, immediacy 
is the result of a technological mediation that is constitutive for human 
experience and without which the experience wouldn’t be possible at all.
Mediated immediacy also refers to the fact that cultural and techno-
logical artefacts, though dependent on human creation, gain a certain 
independency and start to determine human life. In the case of intrusive 
technologies, this has profound consequences for the control we have over 
our body. They are characterized by  immediate mediality, as the independ-
ence of our technological creations increasingly loses its metaphorical 
character. When Bruno Latour calls laboratory instruments agents and 
writes about the “tragic dilemma’s of the safety belt,” he admits that he in 
a way is overstating his case (Latour 2002). However, synthetic biology and 
artif icial life are creating agents in the full sense of the word, real agents, 
whose behavior is diff icult to predict and even more diff icult to control. 
And when we merge these agents and human bodies, for example, in a 
conceivable case of engineered permanent deep brain stimulation, this 
would affect the human lifeform in a fundamental way.
In the past decades, sociologists like Ulrich Beck and Anthony Giddens 
have introduced the notion of a risk society, which is closely connected 
with the fact that modern society increasingly manufactures new types 
of risk because of the unforeseen side effects of our technological actions 
(Beck 1986; Giddens 1990). By producing intentional bionic artefacts, the 
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converging technologies not only manufacture risks, but also fundamental 
uncertainty with regard to their effects. Whereas classical risk governance 
tried to control simple and complex risks by precaution measures, it is 
increasingly confronted with uncertain and ambiguous risks that urge us 
to redefine the very notion of precaution.
From a ‘utopian standpoint’ to a ‘tragic standpoint’
Plessner’s third anthropological law, the law of the utopian standpoint 
warns us, today in an even more radical sense than Plessner could have 
ever imagined, not only for being too optimistic about the controllability of 
this project of cyborgization of man, but also for being too optimistic about 
its contribution to (trans – and post)human well-being or happiness. The 
technological modif ication of our positionality and the distribution and 
transformation of our eccentricity might intensify the alienation that is 
inherent in the eccentric life form and that constantly evokes our attempts 
to overcome this alienation. If something will be overcome, it will not be 
our alienation, but rather our specif ic form of life.
Living things die. As Marjorie Grene expresses it in her analysis of 
Plessner’s philosophical anthropology:
The inevitability of death, the approach of death, taken together with 
the whole spiral-like process of development that has preceded it, show 
us further, that living things, unlike inanimate objects, have a destiny. 
[…] Living individuals and only living individuals, with their Janus-like 
direction to and from the world around them, to and from the bodies 
that they both are and have, are destined to live as they do – and to die 
(Grene 1966, 259).
It is our eccentric positionality that gives to our existence the ambiguity 
– of necessity and freedom, brute contingency and signif icance – which 
it characteristically displays (Grene 1966, 274).
Another, ancient word for this ambiguity of coinciding necessity and free-
dom, brute contingency and signif icance is ‘tragic’ (De Mul 2009; De Mul 
2014). It is not only individuals who can die. In the evolution of life on earth, 
it is the destiny of all species that suffer extinction sooner or later. Perhaps it 
will be the destiny of man to be the f irst species that will create – both out 
of freedom and out of ontic necessity – its own evolutionary successors. This 
project will display both the grandness and the dreadfulness of the human 
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life form. In this sense, philosophical anthropology 2.0 is coloured by a 
‘tragic humanism.’ Perhaps this tragic standpoint is the price we have to pay 
for developing a level beyond eccentric positionality. We might be tempted 
to call it inhuman, but as Plessner concludes his essay on inhumanity: 
“Inhumanity is not bound up with a specif ic historical age […], but is rather 
a possibility that is given in man, to ignore himself” (Plessner 1982, 2005).
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